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"Although the problem of effective communication is an old
one, current trends are bringing to it a new sense of
urgency. More and more it is becoming clear that any
fundamental advance in social self-understanding must rest
upon adequate inter-communication. In areas where effective
and highly integrated social effort is required, the problem
is particularly crucial."
(Bavelas, 1953, p.505).
"Rather than a lexicon I hope to provide photographs."
(Bohlen, 1974, p.4).
"[Our aim is to]...present theory that is 'grounded' - that
is rooted in data, that grows inductively out of systematic
investigation of how organisations behave. I am firmly
convinced that the best route to more effective policy
making is better knowledge in the mind of the practitioner
of the world he or she actually faces. This means that I
take my role as a researcher and writer to be the generation
and dissemination of the best descriptive theory possible.
I believe it is the job of the practitioner - line manager,
staff analyst, consultant (including myself when in that
role) - to prescribe, to find better approaches to policy
making. In other words, I believe that the best description
comes from the application of conceptual knowledge about a
phenomenon in a specific and familiar context. To me, good
descriptive theory in the right hands is a prescriptive
tool, perhaps the most powerful one we have."
(Mintzberg, 1979, p.vi).
"If a group has had enough of a history to develop a
culture, that culture will pervade everything."
(Schein, 1985, p.33).
ABSTRACT
This research is focused on information and communication phenomena
within one industrial organisation. From its intellectual situation
within the interpretive epistemological tradition the thesis seeks to
demonstrate the Ltility of the case study approach combined with the
style of qualitative analysis known as 'grounded theory' for scholars
interested in furthering their understanding of the information
dimension of complex organisations. More specifically, a preliminary
examination of the data set in conjunction with a theoretical position
which posited the socially and cognitive constructed nature of
organisations quite naturally led to the case study material being
interpreted through the prism of the cultural metaphor.
Chapter 1 provides an account of the methodological and research
design principles, issues and assumptions on which this research has
been predicated. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the data collected in
the form of brief summaries of the central themes which have been used
to analyse the case study organisation. The cultural perspective on
organisations is then presented in Chapter 3. Acquaintance with the
content of the cultural approach to Complex organisations is required
in order to facilitate the reader's understanding of Chapters 4-10 in
which the data are examined and analysed.
Chapter 4 gives a short introduction to the case study organisation at
which the research was conducted. Chapters 5-8 are detailed case
study analyses of four of the organisation's principal subsidiaries.
These are followed by a macro-organisational analysis which examines
the cultural and information/communication profiles that have been
developed for the subsidiaries within the total socio-organisational
context. Chapter 9's emphasis on the core categories omits some
important aspects of the organisation's culture (its strengths,
weaknesses, the issue of control and its relative stability) which are
dealt with in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 provides a description and
analysis of a new product launch conducted by the organisation: the
chapter seeks to evaluate the merits of using an approach which
emphasises information/communication and cultural variables for the
understanding and analysis of organisational behaviour.
Finally, Chapter 12 sets out some of the conclusions that can be drawn
from this research project. It takes a critical look at the research
design and methodology employed and introduces Kuhn's (1962) concept
of a paradigm which is used as a descriptive and analytical tool for
evaluating the cultural perspective. Some further conceptualisation
of the cases and the new product launch is attempted and process
models of complex organisations in general and organisational culture
in particular are derived and explained. The inter-relation of
information and communication phenomena and organisational culture is
further elaborated first normatively in the form of typologies and
second prescriptively in terms of the use value of culture for
information and communication studies.
	 The conclusions are then
summarised and recommendations for further research are made.
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CHAPTER ONE 
imiHODUCTION
1.1 Prolegomenon 
This research focuses on information and communication phenomena
within industrial organisations. The analytical perspective employed
was provided by the vast and burgeoning literature on organisational
culture. The thesis examines the complex, dynamic and inter-causal
relationship between an organisation's information/communication
dimension and its cultural proclivities. It attempts to understand
how culture influences, shapes and conditions the social context in
which communication takes place, and thus the nature of communication
within an organisation. It also investigates the possibility that
organisational decisions concerning information, the value attributed
to it, the human and material resources devoted to seeking and
analysing it, and the technology and systems used to facilitate these
processes are culturally conditioned.
In addition, the thesis seeks to demonstrate how the case study
approach combined with the style of qualitative analysis known as
'grounded theory' (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Glaser, 1976; Strauss, 1987)
can be employed as utilitarian tools by scholars interested in
furthering their understanding of the information dimension of complex
organisations. The case study data were collected and the grounded
theory methodology applied following an extensive review of the
organisational theory and organisational behaviour literature-. The
use made of grounded theory was not 'pure' in the sense that concepts
and theories discovered in the literature exerted a strong influence
over the construction placed on the data obtained. In fact, with the
generation of the core categories (i.e. the methodology-evinced
central themes) it soon became clear that one approach to
organisations, namely that emphasising culture, offered the most
appropriate metaphorical framework for the further interpretation of
the study. The decision was therefore taken to conduct a detailed
1
review of the corporate and organisational culture literature, and to
use the cultural metaphor as a guide in writing up the thesis. The
value of grounded theory for the elucidation of organisational
cultures had first been suggested by Turner (1971) and Martin and
Turner (1986).
In this first chapter the fundamental epistemological position on
which this research is grounded and the methodological principles by
which it was conducted are stated, and to some extent explored and
justified. There is a brief consideration of the interpretive
approach to social science, the value of and problems associated with
case study projects, a note on research design, an assertion of
methodological principles, a detailed overview of 'grounded theory'
itself, and finally a few words on triangulation techniques. Given
that, as Weick (1983) has stated, "much organisational research is
open to the charge that it is method-specific' (p.21) these
introductory pages are a necessary prelude to the presentation and
analysis of the data: for by rendering explicit the method to which
the research is specific it is hoped both to facilitate the reader's
understanding of the study and to demonstrate the efficacy of method-
specific research of this kind.
1.2 Interpretive Social Science 
The decision to opt for a research paradigm which emphasises the
significance of subjective, inter-subjective and socially created
meanings was made when grounded theory was chosen as the preferred
research methodology. The choice of grounded 'theory was heavily
influenced by the burgeoning number of authors in a range of
disciplines who have used this style of analysis and commented on its
value (see, for example, Trimble, Cherns, Jupp & Turner, 1972;
Johnson, 1981; and Ellis, 1987). Martin and Turner (1986), for
instance, have suggested that there are a number of advantages of
using grounded theory in organisational research, notably its ability
to produce a multi-faceted and dynamic picture of the whole system
2
which incorporates rather than ignores or simplifies the complexities
of the organisational context.
Other researchers in the field have stressed the importance of
adopting an explicitly interpretivist approach to the study of
organisational (including information/ communication) phenomena. Thus
Johnson (1977) and Putnam (1983) have argued that by treating
organisations as the social construction of reality, organising
becomes a process of communicating. Similarly, Hawes (1974) has
maintained that communication is not just another organisational
activity; it creates and recreates the social structures that form the
crux of organising. The later decision to employ the concept and
theory of culture to further the analysis of information and
communication activities was also congruent with this broad approach.
For example, Deetz (1982) considers- that 'the conceptualisation of
organisations as cultures is central to much of the interest in
interpretive approaches to research' . (p.132). These theoretical
assertions, if accepted, provide a strong epistemological case for an
interpretive approach to a cultural analysis of
information/communication issues in organisations, as it can easily be
used to focus attention on those issues which are of primary interest
to us.
1.3 The Case Study Approach 
The decision to opt for a case study approach was influenced by the
choice of 'grounded theory' as the style of qualitative analysis that
would be employed for the process of data interpretation. As Strauss
(1987) asserts:
"...a case history can be very useful if
brought into very close conjunction with
grounded theory. Through it the
researcher can depict a type, an
average, an extreme, or an exemplary
case.“
(Strauss, 1987, p.221).
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The theoretical vindication for this holistic approach was, however,
provided by Yin (1984) and most especially Diesing (1971), who has
demonstrated the 'pay-off' of case study methods as being the kind of
practices and knowledge they make possible, be it in the form of
greater organisational efficiency or the facilitation cf cooperation
in a complex interdependent situation: it gets at something real which
other methods miss. Case study methods are thus valuable for the
information they reveal about the internal mechanisms and dynamics of
a system. These mechanisms and dynamics are:
•••
	 conceived	 as	 psychological
mechanisms of defence, integration,
cognition, balance, perceptual
structuring, symbolisation, and the
like; or as social mechanisms like
communication, commitment, persuasion,
coercion, and inducement. The
constraints do not take the logical form
of necessary or probable implication but
the normative one of expectations,
obligations, commands, self-concepts and
aspiration. Inputs do not take the form
of initial parameter values, but appear
rather as stresses, strains, problems,
and opportunities, compatibilities and
incompatibilities."
(Diesing, 1971,p.264).
In short, survey methods cannot match the richness of detail that can
be achieved via case study methods, and are less well suited to the
discovery of something completely new than measuring known and well
understood phenomena. The case study approach is not, however,
unproblematic. There are at least three basic difficulties:
1)	 one continuous problem for the holist is that of drawing the best
boundaries around his subject matter: the demands of studying a
full system and of studying that system in detail are quite
obviously antagonistic.	 It is clear that the holist ideal of
studying all the important aspects of a particular human whole is
unattainable and that we must be satisfied with approximations.
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2) the second problem is that of observer bias. As Diesing (1971,
p.279) points out, every social scientist must perceive and
interpret his subject matter from some standpoint, and every
scientist must be active with his subject in some manner and will
therefore change it even as he studies it, for 'even the act of
singling somebody out for attention has an affect on him'.
3) third, there is concern that case studies provide little or no
basis for scientific generalisation.
The first difficulty was a cause for concern for this study in that
many potentially valuable (in the sense of data rich) respondents were
not interviewed. Every effort was, though, made to nullify this
problem by obtaining a good representative sample of the various job
functions evident within the subject organisation. The problem of
observer bias is not so easily neutralised; the experimenter cannot
readily be assumed to have taken a detached view of his own biases.
We may, however, question whether this is a substantive problem. The
positivistic demand for investigator objectivity based on distance
(spatial, social, intellectual or whatever) is a far from inviting
alternative. As Weick (1983,p.21) has argued, 'all that distance
seems to improve is ignorance'. In point of fact the grounded theory
methods employed in this research crucially depended on the 'creative
use of bias' (in the sense of preconceived beliefs, attitudes and
expectations) to discover things that might otherwise remain
undetected. There will of course always remain the possibility that
at least some unjustified interpretation of events will find its way
into the analysis, and to rectify this we can do little more than look
to further investigations in this field to counter-balance our own
failings (see also Section 1.6).
The claim that case studies are unsatisfactory because one cannot
generalise from a single case is valid only in a narrow sense. As Yin
(1984) points out:
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"...case studies, like experiments, are
generalisable to theoretical
propositions and not populations or
universes.	 In this sense, the case
study, like the experiment, does not
represent	 a	 'sample',	 and	 the
investigator's goal is to expand and
generalise theories (analytic
generalisation) and not to enumerate
frequencies..."
(p.21)
The choice of the case study approach, the objective of this research
and the choice of grounded theory as the method of data analysis are
thus all intricately tied.
1.4 Research Design 
Access to the subject company, hence forward referred to as 'the
Group', was gained via a mailshot to the Chairman and Chief Executive
followed up by a telephone conversation and a lengthy interview. In
fact ten companies in the Sheffield and Rotherham region were
initially short-listed from a local directory; of these five expressed
an interest in the project, and of these the company chosen for
research exemplified the most persistent enthusiasm. The case study
was based on visits to six of the sites where the company had
offices/factories. A two tier data collection methodology was
operationalised.
First, 66 semi-structured interviews with a representative sample of
managers and other individuals, including secretaries an line
workers, were conducted at the Holdings Board and each of the
principal subsidiaries (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, it should be
noted at the outset that the orientation of this research is heavily
biased towards the managerial (and especially the senior managerial)
perceptions of the organisation. These interviews were recorded on
tapes of which 56 were transcribed before being subjected to analysis.
The shortest interview lasted approximately 45 minutes and the longest
more than three hours, with the average time duration being in excess
of 90 minutes. The interview schedule used was based on an extensive
review of the relevant literature (see Appendix 2). While interviews
are a useful tool for data collection they are highly intrusive and
contrived events in which it is important to assess the role of the
interviewer in constructing meanings and expectations. The decision
to rely on semi-structured interviews despite their associated
drawbacks and deficiencies was related to the choice of 'grounded
theory' as the style of qualitative analysis chosen for data analysis
which is considered in detail in section (1.5).
Some documentation concerning the Group including a company history,
organisational charts and a few internal reports were also collected.
The option of including as part of the data collection methodology
either or both direct observation or participant observation was
discarded as it was considered to be an 'unsafe' way of gaining an
insightful appreciation into the cultural life of the organisation.
The point is that actions are conditioned not only by beliefs and
values but by the demands of the social and economic contexts within
which individuals function. As Schein (1985) has remarked:
"...overt behaviour is always determined
both by the cultural predisposition (the
assumptions, perceptions, thoughts and
feelings that are patterned) and by
situational contingencies that arise
from the external environment.
Behavioural regularities could thus be
as much a reflection of the environment
as of the culture and should, therefore,
not be a prime basis for defining the
culture. Or to put it another way, when
we observe behaviour regularities, we do
not know whether we are dealing with a
cultural artifact or not."
(Schein, 1985,p.9).
In contrast, semi-structured interviews offered a situational context
In which the exigencies of the organisational and business
environments were (generally) distanced from the respondents.
Observation was thus limited to tours of the four factory sites.
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Second, one major project was studied in detail, with special
reference to Group culture, communication, and the use of information
in the various decision making processes. Data collection was again
accomplished through eighteen semi-structured interviews with the
major participants, though this time several interviews with many of
the respondents was found to be necessary given the wealth of data to
be obtained. The data from these interviews was supplemented by every
written document germane to the enquiry (including memos, reports,
telex and fax messages, letters, a variety of notes, agency contact
reports and so forth) that could be extricated by the researcher from
the Group's and individuals' private information systems. Documents
are messages that have a permanent structure (Johnson, 1977), and
since organisational documents are prepared for the consumption of
organisational members, they can be useful indicators of the internal
rhetoric of the organisation (Bantz,.1983). Indeed, given that the
documents are created by organisational members they grow out of the
communicative process of organising (Cheney, 1983) and proved an
interesting and valuable supplement to oral sources of information in
the quest for organisational 'reality'.
1.5 Mode and Style of Analysis 
An essentially qualitative mode of data explication has been utilised
in this thesis for the interpretation of the research results. The
particular 'style' chosen is 'grounded theory' as expounded by Glaser
and Strauss (1967), Glaser (1978) and Strauss (1987). This approach
to the interpretation of data seemed particularly attractive given the
burgeoning number of authors in a range of disciplines who have used
grounded theory to examine activities as diverse as hospital planning
procedures (Trimble, Cherns, Jupp & Turner, 1972), the information
seeking behaviour of academic social scientists (Ellis, 1987) and
corporate growth (Johnson, 1981), and who have commented on its value.
As the name suggests the grounded theory approach seeks to generate
theoretical statements and, indeed, ultimately complex theories
vindicated by the substratum of empirical evidence from which they
have emerged.
	 However, while the grounded theory perspective is
distinguished by 'an individual character' we should always remember
that the methods it prescribes are by no means to be regarded as hard
and fixed rules for converting data into effective theory. Rather,
they constitute guidelines that help researchers in their enterprises.
According to Strauss (1987) it is important to remember that grounded
theory is not supposed to be a specific method or technique but a
particular style. This style is characterised by a number of distinct
features, such as theoretical sampling, and certain methodological
guidelines, such as the making of constant comparisons and the use of
a coding programme. But whether one chooses to conceptualise these
features and guidelines as a 'style', a 'method' or a 'technique'
seems to be a matter of choice, not epistemological necessity. Glaser
(1978, p.2) for instance, talks of 'the grounded theory method); and,
as we shall demonstrate, we can mould grounded theory into a fully
fledged methodology replete with a method of analysis.
Strauss (1987) identifies eight assumptions which lie behind this
approach to qualitative analysis:
1) a rich diversity of materials, ranging from interviews to census
statistics provide valuable data for research into social issues;
2) that the methods so far deve'-oed for qualitatively analysing
materials are lacking in sophistication, especially compared to
methods for the quantitative analysis of data;
3) that there is a need for effective theory, framed at .various
levels of generality and founded on qualitative	 analysis of
data;
4) theory which is not grounded in data is speculative and hence
ineffective;
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5) that the complexity of social phenomena necessitates complex
grounded theory to describe and explain it, i.e. "conceptually
dense theory that accounts for a great deal of variation in the
phenomenon studied" (Strauss, 1987, p.1);
6) while the diversity of social settings, research projects and
individual styles (etc.) milil -ates against the formulation of a
set of rules which govern qualitative analysis some rules of
thumb and general guidelines which facilitate effective analysis
can be drawn;
7) these guidelines may be of use to the researchers working on a
multiplicity of disciplines across the social scientific spectrum
and can be accommodated by a wide diversity of traditions and
theoretical approaches;
8) finally, research is, fundamentally, work. This means that the
development and use of qualitative analysis "can be enhanced by
thinking specifically of analysis in terms of the organisation
and conduct of that work" (Strauss, 1987, p.1/2).
The grounded theory approach to qualitative analysis is thus a means
of generating scientific (empirically supported) theories. As all
scientific theories require first of all that they be conceived, then
elaborated, then checked out, so the three processes of induction
(hypothesis formation), deduction (the drawing of implications from
the initial hypothesis) and verification (confirmation/refutation of
hypotheses and deductively derived implications) are all equally
important in the formulation of grounded theory. These activities
should not be thought of as a neat series of discrete steps, for all
three processes go on throughout the research project. However,
grounded theory refers not to the application of a simple formula but
to a complex series of interlinking events and procedures, and it is
to these that we now turn.
Nowhere in the writings of Glaser and Strauss is grounded theory
concisely and unambiguously described. The first requirement for this
research was, therefore, to distil the contours of grounded theory
and represent it in a concise and composite diagrammatic form (see
fig. 1). While figure 1 would not be approved of by Glaser and
Strauss who eschew the systems approach, it is a contention of this
thesis that the representation of grounded theory it (and the
following analysis) provide are a useful contribution to the debate on
this 'style' of qualitative analysis. Essentially, what this analysis
does is to reinterpret the grounded theory style, transforming it
into a fully-fledged methodology. It also provides the skeletal
framework around which the data for this research project were
collected and analysed (see Appendix 3 for a more detailed account).
Figure 1 indicates that the starting point for analysis is 'data
collection', that is, the finding and gathering (or generating) of
materials which the researcher will then analyse. Secondary input to
the system which facilitates analysis is 'experiential data'. This
refers to information contained in the memories of researchers which
has been gleaned from past research, textbooks, etc. Analysts are
encouraged to use their own experiential data as this can provide both
added theoretical sensitivity and a wealth of provisional suggestions
for making comparisons, finding variations, and sampling widely on
theoretical grounds.
Qualitative analysis of the data according to the grounded theory
method is based on a concept indicator model, which directs the
conceptual coding of empirical indicators. The operation of the
concept indicator model is relatively straightforward. The indicators
are neutral data and the model concepts are derived from them. The
modus operandi of the model is centred on the logic of comparison.
Two levels of functioning can be detected: first, indicators are
constantly compared with other indicators. Making comparisons forces
the analyst to recognise similarities, differences and degrees of
consistency of meaning between indicators. Where there is uniformity
a coded category is derived.
	
Second, indicators are also compared
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with the emergent concept which is thus more clearly focused and its
content more distinctly explicated. This process of comparison and
analysis is continued until codes have been derived which exhaust all
the data.
'Coding' is the general term which Strauss gives to data
conceptualisation and revolves around the concept indicator model.
Coding is defined as including the raising of generative questions and
giving provisional answers (hypotheses) about categories and about
their relations and a code is described as the term for any product of
the analysis. Coding involves a special 'coding paradigm' which leads
to the discovery and naming of categories and sub-categories. The
coding paradigm also functions as a reminder to code data for
relevance to whatever phenomena are referenced by a given category,
for the following:
- conditions
- interaction among the actors
- strategies and tactics
- consequences
The coding process involves a number of interrelated processes. Aside
from various forms of comparison and discrimination the analyst must
also indulge in theoretical sampling and the asking of generative
questions. Theoretical sampling is a means whereby the analyst
decides on 'analytic grounds' what data to collect next and where to
find them. It is, in effect, a means of ensuring that the emerging
theory controls the collection of data. Generative questions-are an
essential tool for making distinctions and comparisons; thinking about
possible hypotheses, concepts, and relationships; sampling, and the
like. Theoretical sampling and the raising of generative questions
are thus both an integral part of coding.
We can distinguish three modes of coding: open, axial and selective.
Open codes are generated either by scrutinising data word for word or
by first gaining an impressionistic picture of what is in the data and
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then extracting concepts from one's impressions.
	 Either way the
concepts formulated are initially highly tentative, though ultimately
'open coding ,
 both verifies and saturates individual codes. Axial
coding refers to the process of coding around a single category, and
is in essence an essential Dart of the open coding. Finally, there is
selective coding which pertains to coding systematically and
concertedly for the core cetegory. In addition to the three modes of
coding we can recognise two types of code, in vivo and sociological.
In vivo codes are those derived from the language of the field under
investigation (especially from the language of the actors themselves),
while sociological codes are those generated by the analyst.
As we have already seen the concept indicator model serves to
construct categories from the data around which coding takes place.
Some of these categories, called 'core categories', are of special
importance for grounded theory. They have the prime function of
integrating theory and rendering it .dense and saturated as the
relationships are discovered, and are thus instrumental in promoting
theoretical completeness. There are six criteria for gauging whether
a category should be considered as 'core': 1) it must be centrally
related to many other categories; 2) the core category (or rather the
indicators pointing to the phenomenon represented by it) must appear
frequently; 3) the core category must relate easily to other
categories; 4) it must have clear implications for a more general
theory; 5) as the core category is explicated more fully the theory in
which it plays a major role must become increasingly plausible; and 6)
the core category must allow for maximum variation in the analysis.
The impact of coding is felt largely through memoing. Theoretical
memos are writings in which questions, hypotheses and summaries of
codes are elucidated. They are a method of keeping track of coding
results and stimulating further coding, and also a major means for
integrating the theory. Memos are spawned not merely by coding but by
the sorting and examination of existing memos, which occurs at all
stages of the research project. Constant recourse to 'old' data not
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only ensures that theory is firmly grounded but helps direct the
researcher in his future data collection activities.
So far we have seen how data collection, fed by experiential data,
gives rise to codes largely as directed by the concept indicator
model, which are refined and summarised in the theoretical memos. The
result of this activity are provisional linkages between codes as
conceptually dense theory begins to emerge.
	 This stage is termed
'provisional analysis' on fig.1.
	 This activity is accompanied by
verification processes.
	 These are nowhere clearly described by
Strauss. However, we can surmise that what is involved is the
provisional analysis being juxtaposed with the collected data and
discrepancies between the two being neutralised as the provisional
analysis is modified to 'fit' the data.
Verification feeds through to dimensionalising via any new memos which
it may generate. Dimensionalising refers to a form of coding in which
dimensions and sub-dimensions of the categories are generated.
Dimensionalising is defined as a basic operation of making
distinctions whose products are dimensions and sub-dimensions.
Integration of the dimensions, distinctions, categories and linkages
leads to the formulation of the core of the evolving theory.
As is evident from fig.1 data collection, coding and memoing all
interrelate such that developments in one of these can impact on both
the other activities. The result is that the facility (indeed the
necessity) for the various procedures to be gone through more than
once is built into the methodological framework. As Strauss-(1987)
says of the essential procedures for discovering, verifying and
formulating grounded theory:
"These are in operation all through the
research project and.., go on in close
relationship to each other, in quick
sequence and often simultaneously."
(Strauss, 1987, p.23).
This element of reiteration is significant. The specification of a
recursive mode of operation enhances its analytical standing by
facilitating a deeper and more involved analysis, the ultimate
resultant of which is complex (conceptually dense) grounded theory.
While grounded theory seeks to guarantee that theoretical statements
are empirically valid it does not claim to offer a means of
constructing objective theories to explain social phenomena. This is
a vital point. Qualitative analyses of any aspect of social existence
are artificial abstractions from a perceived reality, they are
coloured by the methodological constraints under which the data has
been derived and conditioned by the philosophical perspective under
which the analysis has been formulated. Strauss (1987) is obviously
not unaware of this when he asserts that:
"The researcher's will not be the only
interpretation of the data (only God's
interpretation can make the claim of
'full completeness') but it will be
plausible, useful, and will allow its
own further elaboration and
verification."
(Strauss, 1987, p.11).
1.6 Triangulation 
It has been argued (Weick, 1983) that communication research which
relies on a single observation (such as a transcript) is meaningless.
Weick believes that every datum becomes meaningful only when there is
a relatum. In short, although the use of transcription evidenoe may
seem obvious, sufficient and inevitable what has been said by
respondents becomes data only when readers see what else could have
been said but (because of personal bias, amnesia, lack of awareness
etc.) was not. Triangulation techniques, whether of methods,
theories, investigators or data sources offer solutions to this
problem by providing the corroborative evidence (the relatum) required
to measure and evaluate the quality of the proto-data and facilitate
its use as data susceptible to analysis.
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Given the constraints of time and the practical and theoretical
difficulties (see section 1.4) involved with other methods of data
collection, triangulation of methods (in the guise of participant
observation, direct observation or diaries) were not considered
viable. Nevertheless, a form of triangulation was employed in this
research, namely that derived from the interviews having been
conducted with a variety of respondents at different levels in the
organisational hierarchy, at different times, and within different
subsidiary companies situated in geographically diverse locations.
This follows the description of data source triangulation given by
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983):
"Data source triangulation involves the
comparison of data relating to the same
phenomenon but deriving from different
phases of the fieldwork, different
points in the temporal cycles occurring
in the setting... the accounts of
different participants (including the
ethnographer's) involved in the
setting."
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1983, p.198)
Clearly triangulation of this or any other type cannot serve as a
guarantee to the quality of the transcripts or the theoretical
statements that may be generated from them, though intuitively there
is a good case for suggesting that data triangulation should reduce
the likelihood of serious data distortions. All that can be claimed
is that combined, data source triangulation and a methodology the
essence of which is the logic of comparison may be thought to provide
a sufficient theoretical platform on which to construct the edifice
outlined in chapters 4 to 10.
1.7 A Critical Look at Research Design and Methods 
In this section an attempt will be made to pre-empt some of the more
obvious criticisms that might be levelled against the design and
methods employed by this research. Three broad categories of problem
are identified, elucidated and commented upon. First, the dangers of
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focussing on information and communication are considered. Second,
the extent to which the distinction between 'culture' on the one hand
and 'information/communication' on the other, is an artificial and
therefore possibly unjustified dichotomy. And third, the problems of
conducting a grounded theory study of organisations are discussed in
the light of the weaknesses that have been attributed to this style of
qualitative analysis.
There are a number of specifically identifiable dangers involved with
concentrating on information and communication issues. It could be
argued that to take an information approach:
1) is to attribute undue significance to information phenomena.
Obviously the adoption of an information approach per se does not
necessarily imply the attribution of undue significance to
information phenomena. Whether this research is sufficiently
circumspect in its treatment of organisational and managerial
behavioural processes other than information and communication
phenomena from its adopted cultural perspective is largely
dependent on the sensitivity of the researcher and the
convictions of the reader. All that can be said is that this
research was conducted and the results analysed in full
appreciation of this danger.
2) that it will provide an inadequate account of how important non-
information related processes and structures operate and interact
within the context of managerial and organisational behaviour,
and will fail to examine the inter-linkages between information
and communication and other variables of organisational life.
This objection is in a certain limited sense valid; every
individual study must have its limitations and the parameters of
this research project were carefully crafted and are here
recorded in advance of what is to come. However, the cultural
paradigm used to explicate the data is an eclectic and inclusive
framework for analysis, and every attempt has been made to link
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information and communication activities to the social fabric of
the case study organisation.
3) that it will tend to interpret processes/structures as
information phenomena or information-related when other and
possibly more useful or valid interpretations should be sought.
Any social event or process is open to a multiplicity of
interpretations which, according to our phenomenalist/grounded
theory standpoint are equally legitimate as long as the
interpretations are supported by the empirically derived data.
Thus while one explanation might be considered more utilitarian
than another (one descripto-explanatory theory may highlight
solvable organisational problems more obviously than another, for
instance) all such interpretations are of equal validity in the
ultimate sense that they are all interpretations of a perceived
reality, and not guaranteed veridical accounts of events and
processes occurring in an undisputed objective world. Hence the
most that can be claimed is that while an information
interpretation is valid, its practical and theoretical merit is
yet to be demonstrated.
4) the tendency to use information/communication concepts as the
base denominator for an unjustified reductionism will ultimately
undermine what value the information perspective might have. The
argument is this: models, schema, etc. are used within the social
sciences as simplifying tools which allow us to emphasise one
facet of a complex and variegated reality. But if all aspects of
the phenomenon under study are diagnosed as information relevant,
then we can question the utility of the information framework
itself. In short, its very success could be held to undermine
its operational value. If everything is information, then what
is the point of an information perspective, and what can be meant
by such terms as 'information dimension'?
There are substantive dangers in accepting too broad a
conceptualisation of information.
	 If we were to define planning,
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budgeting, controlling, decision making and so forth as no more than
information actions then not only would this study be open to the
charge of unidimensionality, it would also put in jeopardy the
objective of emphasising the importance of information and
communication for managers and organisations. This potential problem
was, to some extent, obviated by the narrow definition of information
as 'a sign structure capable of altering the understanding of a human
agent' (Boulding, 1956). Had a broader or more nebulous definition of
information been accepted then the open-textured and ambiguous nature
of such a concept might have facilitated its unjustified extension to
embrace actions, processes and structures normally held to be outside
the information/communication remit. Unfortunately, the
sophistication of this information concept precluded its use for the
purpose of data collection, which relied solely on individuals'
intuitive notions of what counted as information and what did not.
Thus to maintain consistency with the concept of information outlined
here, the process of data analysis involved making arbitrary
judgements concerning the respondents' use of the term.
It might be argued that cultural and information/communication
activities cannot be separated out in the 'neat' way this thesis has
suggested. This is the view of Boisot (1987, p.196), who has
attempted to demonstrate 'that a political economy of information and
(his) theory of cultural processes (are) in fact the same thing'.
But while it is indeed true that cultural and informational activities
are aspects of a seamless web of organisational life it does not
necessarily follow that the analysis has been any more artificial than
other organisation-centred research. The point is that cultural and
informational phenomena interrelate in particular ways, and it is
these relationships that this research has sought to explicate.
A further objection that might be raised against the research is that
the principal tool used for data analysis, namely grounded theory, has
been the subject of serious criticisms. The following problems and
difficulties have been attributed to grounded theory:
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1) that there is a dearth of available 'how to ,
 and technical
reference sources providing definitive guidance on the conduct of
grounded theory research (Martin & Turner, 1986).
2) that it is of limited usefulness for dealing with large-scale
structural features of society, such as demographic trends or
systems of social stratification (Martin & Turner, 1986).
3) that it is not concerned with the production of schemes of cosmic
proportions, but the production of theoretical accounts of small
fragments of the world in which we live (Turner, 1983).
4) that Glaser and Strauss are unclear about the nature of the link
between theory and data, and that grounded theories are grounded
not in 'data' but a certain type of data. Thus phenomena which
are widely separated in time, space or the system studied may
yield little useful theory using the grounded theory style of
analysis because close contact with such phenomena will not allow
the deduction of the intuitively plausible inferences on which
the style relies (Brown, 1973).
Interesting though these criticisms are they do not really cut against
this research in any meaningful way. Thus although Martin and Turner
feel that grounded theory requires more detailed elucidation,
sufficient has been written on the technique to apply it in practice
(see for example, Beard & Easingwood, 1989). Doubtless grounded
theory will be continually refined over time, but it is hardly a
'rough and ready' style of analysis even now. Similarly, this-thesis
can agree that grounded theory is not an appropriate technique for all
fields (such as demography), that it is likely to yield better results
when the project it is applied to is narrowly focused, and that it has
problems in coping with certain types of widely separated data,
without qualms. The elicitation of cultural and
information/communication profiles and the analysis of linkages
between the two sets of organisational phenomena was an ideal study to
which grounded theory could readily be applied.
	 In short, the
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research objectives were sufficiently well-defined and the data
sufficiently spatially and temporally contiguous for the project to
experience few substantive methodological problems.
CHAPTER TWO 
PRELUDE TO DATA ANALYSIS: the core categories 
2.1 Derivation of the Core Categories 
Use of the grounded theory style of qualitative analysis revealed two
sets of distinct but related core categories (see Appendix 3). The
first set consisted of ten general characteristics of the case study
organisation, while the second set represented a classification of
information and communication phenomena into six more manageable
categories which were subdivided as appropriate. The ten general
features of the organisation were:
* a personnel orientation,
* loyalty,
* informality,
* professionalism,
* democracy and autocracy
* competition and co-operation,
* conflict and confidence,
* narrowness and introspection,
* marketing-led and production-constrained
* pace of activity
Once these core categories had been discovered it soon became apparent
that they were susceptible to interpretation as cultural traits. The
possibility of using them as a 'cultural profile' for the organisation
which could play an explanatory role vis-a-vis its information
dimension, emerged at approximately the same time.
The categorisation of the information and communication phenomena
discerned in the data was conducted simultaneously with the
recognition of the cultural core categories.	 This second set of
categories were five in number. Of these three refer to forms of
communication and their associated channels (M.I.S., ad hoc
communications and informal communications), one is a meta-level
evaluation of the cultural dimension of the information/communication
profile (information culture type) and the last an evaluation of the
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knowledge	 base	 and	 belief/value
	 set	 associated	 with
information/communication structures and processes.
* the management information system (M.I.S.),
* ad hoc communications,
* the information culture type,
* informal communications and
* information consciousness.
A brief description of the cultural and information/communication
categories, and the relationships between the culture categories, are
given here to focus the reader's attention on what are the most
significant themes of the case study. This will be followed by a
brief consideration of why a cultural rather than any one of a large
number of other competing perspectives on organisation's was chosen as
the guiding metaphor for the interpretation of the research data. The
connections between the two sets of categories is provided as the data
have been presented.
2.2 The Core Cultural Categories 
2.2.1	 Personnel Orientation 
The phrase 'personnel orientation' is used to denote a complex set of
beliefs concerning the Group's attitude toward its employees. These
beliefs can be divided into two basic groups: prescriptive and
dissonant. The prescriptive beliefs were descriptions of actual
group culture which had overwhelming support from respondents in all
parts of the business. On the other hand, dissonant beliefs reflected
disjuncture within the cultural fabric of the organisation, i.e. they
were recognised as Group traits but were not uniformly supported. The
core prescriptive beliefs were that the organisation should provide
jobs, ensure that working conditions and wages were acceptable, have a
high regard for the rights of individual employees and treat
individuals as equals.
The core dissonant beliefs were as follows: that the Group was
tolerant of under-performing employees, had a benevolent (some
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respondents said 'paternalistic') attitude towards its employees and
failed to link rewards to performance. In fact, as will be
demonstrated in chapters 4-10 the dissonant beliefs were strongest in
subsidiary 1 where they were associated with an older generation of
managers. However, even the newer subsidiaries were finding it
difficult to water down the strong egalitarian principles espoused by
the Group, and which made tolerance of poor performance, benevolence
and non-differential remuneration difficult to avoid.
2.2.2	 Loyalty 
A reciprocal loyalty upwards from the employees to the Group formed
the credit side of the personnel orientation. Following Kanter (1972)
and Buchanan (1974) loyalty (or commitment as they refer to the
concept) is defined as the willingneds of participants to give energy
and loyalty to an organisation, to be effectively attached to its
goals and values and thereby to the organisation for its own sake. In
its most basic form loyalty to an organisation implies not only a
belief in its ethical code of conduct, but also an empathetic
identification with at least some of its major objectives and past
achievements.
In this case high levels of loyalty, both to the Group and its
subsidiary companies, was both a result and a determinant of large
numbers of employees spending much of their working lives within the
organisational umbrella. This corporate trait was also associated
with a 'spirit of tradition' which permeated the Group. In addition,
individuals were generally very much aware that the organisatioh had a
lengthy history and this seemed to satisfy their emotional need for
security at a time of high unemployment. Both the traditional
ambiance and perceived stable employment opportunity offered by the
Group fed into and enhanced loyalty to it.
Loyalty to the organisation was manifested in several ways. There was
considerable attachment to the products manufactured and sold by the
Group, especially at Companies 1 and 2. In Company 2 there was also
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a willingness to work long hours at an unusually frenetic pace
relative to the rest of the Group. And of course, most obviously,
there was the fact that so many individuals chose to spend a large
proportion (and in some instances all) their working lives in the
organisation. Only in Company 4, which had special difficulties, were
these high levels of loyalty not evident. These points are examined
in more detail in the following chapters.
2.2.3
	
Informality 
The Group was an extremely informal organisation, and this informality
was evident at all levels in the hierarchy of management and at all
the sites where data collection interviews were conducted. Some of
the most important indicators of this corporate trait included: the
extent to which individuals of differing rank were on first name
terms, a lack of formalised systems (especially communications
systems), and in some instances a perceived lack of clear lines of
authority within what were often very loosely structured departments.
In particular, informality was associated with a preference for team
work and ad hoc, face-to-face communication, both of which were
strongly supported by cultural norms within the Group.
While the Group was indisputably an informal organisation it was not
unequivocally so. There was also a preoccupation with status and
status symbols which had its origins in the Group's history (see
Chapter 8). For example, the Holdings Board offices were far more
spacious and luxuriously decorated than those on any other site,
Company 1 boasted a dining room reserved for senior managers only,
and company cars were looked on with envy by those who did not possess
them and treated as indicators of personal merit by those who did.
What this demonstrates is that organisational life is complex and
heterogeneous, and that the core categories identified here must be
recognised as dominant themes or trends to which others may run
counter. Naturally, where such divergent or opposed trends have been
detected they will be described and exemplified.
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2.2.4
	
Professionalism
The Group was characterised by generally low levels of professional
competence, with terms such as 'casual', 'comfy' and 'slovenly'
commonly applied by respondents in describing the organisation and its
employees. Professional ability was hardly evident in the lowest
managerial ranks and non-existent on the shopfloor. The more senior
management team (below director level) was more able, and levels of
professionalism were improving. The evidence for this came in the
form of more people taking an interest in the longer term strategy of
their subsidiary and the Group, greater efforts now being made to plan
and co-ordinate effectively, and to achieve budget targets - something
which had previously been considered almost inconsequential. The
professionalism of the directors, both at subsidiary and Holdings
Board level, was more difficult to gauge; though the impressive turn-
around in profitability experienced by the Group since 1980 would seem
to indicate that the present team compared favourably with that at the
helm a decade ago.
The overall picture was thus one of isolated pockets of professional
competence, mostly concentrated in senior positions, while the great
majority of employees were low-skilled, relatively uneducated and
narrowly experienced. In a manufacturing industry where the basic
production processes were straightforward, wages no better than
average and many individuals employed as part time workers and/or on
short term contracts, this finding is not surprising. However, the
organisation itself had over the years accentuated the problem by
making little investment in staff training and promoting internally
rather than bringing in experienced individuals from outside the
Group.
The lack of professionalism was manifested in a rich diversity of
ways. The organisation itself was notable for its poorly defined job
responsibilities, few formal control mechanisms, a certain diffuseness
of authority in some areas, a reliance on out-dated information
systems and often slow decision making processes. Complementing these
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organisational traits was the unwillingness of many individuals to
take up the challenges of
responsibility for problems
There were also difficulties
ideas, with employees being
and methods.
the commercial environment or to take
and mistakes as and when they arose.
in introducing (and having accepted) new
largely content to rely on old concepts
2.2.5	 Democracy and Autocracy
The Group was a highly democratic organisation which possessed both
strong consensual and participative norms and an open, flexible style.
The strength of the organisation's commitment to its democratic
principles was reflected in its structure and style of operation,
which tended to decentralise power from the Holdings Board to the
subsidiaries. Furthermore, within the subsidiaries (and the Holdings
Board itself) much decision making tended to be accomplished in groups
or by committees, there was widespread access to information resources
and questioning from subordinates concerning decisions was a feature
of working life.
However, there were obvious and definite limits to Group democracy.
Thus predictably, strategic decision making for the Group was the
preserve of the Holdings Board and the more significant subsidiary
decisions tended to be made by the directors and senior managers. In
Company 2 the dominating personality of the Managing Director
distorted what was an essentially democratic culture, while in Company
4 the Managing Director and senior management team were attempting to
introduce a more democratic ethos into a company where the underlying
beliefs and values were less sympathetic to open and participative
democracy. Moreover, the democratic style could occasionally become
less open and flexible than combative and adversarial, especially in
Company 1 where personal and political antagonisms were most in
evidence. Furthermore, throughout the Group there were a large number
of individuals who complained that the organisation was too democratic
for its own good, and that its decision making processes and speed of
response to external change were impaired by decentralisation of
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responsibility and the perceived need for prior consultation and
discussion with peers and subordinates.
2.2.6	 Competition and Cooperation 
The working environment of the Group was co-operative, and internal
competition between individuals and departments was greatly
discouraged. To some extent the reason for the existence of beliefs
and values which strongly supported co-operative activity can be
linked to functional necessity; that is, in a manufacturing company
where most functions were dependent on others for their smooth
operation and where individual departments could not operate without
their personnel working collectively, it is only to be expected that
co-operation would achieve the status of a cultural norm. There was
evidence of competition between individuals being encouraged at the
lowest levels in production and sales/marketing departments within the
Group, i.e. shopfloor operatives and salesmen in the field. But even
here competitive activity was generally under-stated in accordance
with the cultural heritage of the organisation, which led employees to
associate a competitive ethos with political intrigue - a feature
which had plagued the organisation until comparatively recently.
The 1986 restructuring of the Group which had created a distinct
Holdings Board and five principal subsidiaries had also created an
organisational structure with more scope for competition. For the two
years prior to the conduct of this research the quasi-autonomous
subsidiaries had been set individual profit targets which had led some
of them to compete with each other, and competition was especially
acute between Company 1 and Company 2. The new Group structure was
thus causing a radical change in cultural orientation at the
subsidiary level, though there was as yet no evidence that inter-
subsidiary competition was in turn influencing the internal
functioning of the subsidiaries. Interestingly, the Holdings Board
had introduced a couple of rules which restricted inter-subsidiary
competition, ostensibly for commercial reasons, but arguably (at least
in part), as a result of the
	 cultural proclivity for a non-
- 28 -
competitive internal environment. The fact that nearly all the
respondents interviewed recognised that they worked for a Group, that
many individuals had been employed in more than one of the
subsidiaries and the various inter-dependencies between the
subsidiaries were further restraints on the degree to which
competition had developed.
2.2.7
	
Conflict and Confidence 
This code refers both to the conflictual activity and levels of trust
and confidence discovered within the organisation. The amount of
conflict, the form it took, the scale at which it operated (whether
between individuals or groups, departments, subsidiaries or Holdings
Board and subsidiaries) its causes and time duration were examined.
The ontology and morphology of conflictual activity was found to be
intimately linked to the perceived levels of trust and confidence
individuals had in their work colleagues . and superiors. From the data
it was clear that respondents thought of trust and confidence in terms
of a global feeling of warmth towards their fellow employees. As with
conflict in the organisation levels of trust and confidence were found
to vary from subsidiary to subsidiary and, most strikingly, between
the senior management teams in the Holdings Board and subsidiaries on
the one hand through a continuum of deteriorating confidence to the
shopfloor operatives on the other.
Historically, levels of trust and confidence within the Group had been
low, and the amount of conflictual and quasi-political activity
between individuals and groups correspondingly high. From the early
1980's onwards, following an overhaul of the most senior Group
personnel, trust and confidence within the organisation had developed
together with increasing profitability. However, the 1986
restructuring of the Group had re-opened many old wounds and inter-
subsidiary and subsidiary-Holdings Board conflicts had resulted from
deteriorating levels of trust and confidence. Within the subsidiaries
conflict could be especially acute between the sales and marketing
sections in Company 1 and between the production and technical
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(including quality control) departments of Company 4. These points
are elaborated upon in succeeding chapters.
2.2.8	 Narrowness and Introspection 
The Group was a narrow and introspective concern. Its narrowness of
outlook was best exemplified by its concentration on a few small
sectors of the sugar confectionery market, and an apparent
unwillingness to consider a variety of opportunities even within the
sphere of confectionery. The Group's blinkered perception of the
commercial environment in which it subsisted was symptomatic of its
tendency to introspection. Rather than concern itself with 	 large
amounts of industry and market data the organisation produced
detailed reports on its own plans and performance, and had become
preoccupied with analysing them.
All the manufacturing subsidiaries identified the Group interest
with their own individual achievements and prospects, and concern for
the problems of their sister companies was almost wholly lacking.
The international division (Company 3) was totally dependent on the
Group manufacturing subsidiaries for its products and seemingly
because of this economic motive took a broader view of the Group's
well being. Within the subsidiaries the departments were similarly
often narrow and introspective in their outlook. This was most
evident in Company 1, where size was an important factor insulating
departments from each other, and Company 4 where inter-departmental
communication had been discouraged for some years prior to being
purchased by the Group. In addition, the use of technical
vocabularies reinforced functional divisions, which had the effect of
further isolating departments. The difficulties of moving personnel
between departments (because of the need for specialist knowledge and
skills) and the lack of a coherent training programme to overcome this
problem only exacerbated the cocooning of departments in their own
immediate affairs.
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2.2.9	 Marketing-led and Production-constrained 
The Group had traditionally been a production-led organisation which
valued its manufacturing expertise as the key to its continued growth
and success. Products had therefore tended to be manufactured without
regard for the existing and likely future state of the market. In
addition, the senior production team's preference for manufacturing
what could be made quickly, easily and in bulk had out-weighed the
need to produce the variety of products needed to pursue a marketing-
led strategy. The general cultural association of the company's
future profitability with the skills of the production departments,
together with those department's sheer size, also meant that the
production directors were extremely influential figures within the
organisation.
During the past few years senior personnel within the Group had
Increasingly come to believe that the- manufacturing capabilities of
the organisation should be tailored to better service the demands of
the market.	 In short, that the Group should shift from being
production to marketing-led. However, despite the wishes of the
Holdings Board and many subsidiary executives the organisation was
finding it difficult to adapt to the needs of individual markets, and
production priorities were still often favoured over customer needs.
There was evidence that some production directors had used the power
implicit in their already privileged positions to preserve their
department's 'star' role.
A fuller explanation of the difficulties involved in initiating such a
vast change in corporate outlook must implicate the Group's
traditional deference to production, the problems imposed by the
limited skills and knowledge-base of production employees, and the
constraints imposed by the existing equipment. This is not to say
that marketing was totally impotent. In Company 1 there was a
marketing team with considerable influence over product packaging and
advertising strategies. This was, though, the exception, with Company
2 having only one professional marketeer and Company 4 being forced to
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purchase its marketing support from an outside agency. Attitudes
towards marketing and the concept of a marketing-led organisation were
really only just beginning to crystallise within the Group, and its
metamorphosis into a whole-heartedly marketing-led concern was still
far from complete.
2.2.10	 Pace of Activity
The 'pace of activity' code refers primarily to the internal operation
of the Group, i.e. the pace at which individuals, departments and
whole subsidiaries worked, in order to accomplish their goals and
objectives. Secondarily, the code also refers to the speed which the
subsidiaries (and thus the Group) were able to respond to change in
the external environment. In fact, this second code reference is
intimately tied to the first, with the pace of activity internal to
the organisation largely determining its speed of response to external
stimuli.
The Group as a whole was a slow-moving, cumbersome organisation, in
which work activity was conducted at a relaxed pace, and changes and
opportunities in the environment were neither detected nor responded
to with any degree of immediacy. In brief, it was not a risk-taking,
fast-action, quick-changing company. A traditionally stable
marketplace, familiarity with which had grown up over several
generations, had done nothing to inculcate an ethos of innovation.
This cultural bias towards slow, considered decisions, had helped to
create highly bureaucratic decision making mechanisms. The emergence
of a more youthful, more professional Holdings Board team, aRare of
the Group's inability to push individuals hard or respond quickly to
external change, was having an impact on this facet of the
organisation's psyche. Nevertheless, the Holdings Board itself was
unwilling to push for dramatic alteration in the Group's internal
operation, reflecting the cultural preference for gradual and subtly
induced modification. The executive directors and senior managers of
the subsidiaries were thus almost totally responsible for determining
their own pace of activity.
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Naturally there were variations between subsidiaries. Company 1 and
Company 4 were the slowest moving, with few individuals feeling under
pressure from work commitments or stretching themselves beyond the
minimum required. Senior managers in these companies often sought to
explain this phenomenon by reference to the 'Yorkshire' and
'Devonshire' cultures respectively, which they considered to encourage
a 'lackadaisical' attitude towards work. These companies, and
especially Company 1, were also recognised to be the least responsive
to environmental change, partly (in the case of Company 1) because of
the intricate bureaucracies which supported its decision making
function, but also because of an innate cultural conservatism as
mentioned above. In contrast, Company 2 exhibited attitudes and
beliefs which supported a relatively fast pace of activity internally
and a corresponding ability to move quickly in the marketplace when
required. It too, like Company 1 was situated in the Yorkshire
region, suggesting that the 'local culture thesis' cannot be accepted
without radical modification. A variety of factors account for its
unique position for the Group near the 'fast moving' end of the slow-
pace/quick-pace work activity spectrum, including its size, youth,
history and a number of other cultural traits, as is detailed below.
	
2.2.11	 The Core Information/Communication Categories 
	
2.2.12	 Management Information System 
The Management Information System (M.I.S.) concept is one borrowed
from the literature of organisational behaviour and design. While a
large number of definitions of Management Information System s have
been suggested that given by Stoner (1982) best describes the code
operationalised in this thesis:
"...a formal method of making available
to management the accurate and timely
information necessary to facilitate the
decision making process and enable the
organisation's planning, control, and
operational functions to be carried out
effectively."
(Stoner, 1982, p.645)
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Within the embrace of this code the relevant material is discussed
under four sub-category headings: first, a brief account of the
evolution of the Group and subsidiary M.I.S.'s is provided; second, a
description of the status and attributes of the current M.I.S.'s is
given; third, there is a discussion of the problems and difficulties
associated with the M.I.S.'s; and finally, where appropriate, the role
played by new information technology and any problems experienced in
the use of it are considered.
The management information systems in place within the Group had
evolved over a long period of time without the benefit of an overall
plan. At the subsidiary level information and communication systems
were often out-dated, slow, cumbersome and error-prone. There were
some differences between the subsidiaries, with Company 4 possessing
the least sophisticated set of systems and Company 1 the most
intricate and bureaucratic information mechanisms. Nevertheless, all
the subsidiaries suffered from similar information problems - a lack
of relevant information, information of dubious quality and
reliability, much information stored in the minds of individuals
rather than written down or encoded in computerised databases, and so
forth. The attitude of the Group towards new technology was generally
positive, but investment in computer-based information systems had so
far been small. Arguably this was due to financial constraints as
much as cultural inertia, though there was notably less unease about
acquiring expensive manufacturing equipment than there was powerful
computer systems.
2.2.13	 Ad Hoc Communications 
This code refers to all those work-related communications that did not
take place within the context of the formally specified channels of
the M.I.S.. In fact, the internal dynamics of the Group tended to
generate a far greater amount of extra-M.I.S. information than
information confined to the formal information systems. The reliance
on ad hoc communication reflected organisational norms and beliefs
which valued flexibility, informality and personal contact.
	 A
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cultural distaste for procedure, rationalisation and systematisation
was also evident in some areas of the Group, notably the Holdings
Board, Company 2 and Company 3.
The extont to which ad hoc communication was relied upon by the
organisation was the cause of a variety of information and
communications problems. As much of the internal communications were
accomplished orally there was greater scope for the accidental
introduction of bias and misunderstanding. Furthermore, recipients
were often unaware of precisely what they were supposed to receive or
when, so there was also more scope for the deliberate distortion and
withholding of information. Those individuals who were not natural
communicators could trap information behind closed doors and use it
tactically as a resource for their own personal advantage. A heavy
burden was also placed on those • individuals who were natural
disseminators of information who often had to remember to communicate
with all relevant and interested personnel without the aid of
formalised channels. In addition, inter-departmental and inter-
subsidiary antagonisms and rivalries could more easily interfere with
the flow of information between sections and sister companies. Even
where communication did take place there were frequent problems with
the timeliness, quality and detail of information transmitted, as few
parameters were specified before hand. One special problem was that
because there were few formal mechanisms linking shopfloor operatives
to middle and senior management little information flowed upwards from
the workforce, resulting in the effective isolation and insulation of
both groups from each other.
2.2.14
	
Informal Communication 
The Group possessed an extensive grapevine system. Grapevines, which
bypass the formal authority and information structures, are a feature
of most organisations, and in large concerns are often complex,
diffuse and multi-channelled, and focused on key liaison individuals
(internal gatekeepers) (Caplow, 1946-7; Sutton & Porter, 1968).
Within the Group grapevines could be identified at three inter-linked
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levels, the subsidiary,	 between subsidiaries and between the
subsidiaries and the Holdings Board. Interestingly the industry in
which the Group subsisted
	 itself had a well developed and highly
intricate grapevine:
"Within the whole of the industry there
is a phenomenal grapevine; you have to
be very carefu: indeed what you say to
anybody."
(Development Director, p.22, no.55)
Much of the information transmitted on the Group grapevine was
recognised by the respondents as being of dubious quality and
reliability. Despite this fact, while some individuals were
dismissive of the grapevine others displayed an interested attitude
towards it, and a few people viewed it as a tool of management.
2.2.15	 Information Consciousness 
This code refers to the cultural value placed on information as a
resource and the information and communication systems that have been
implemented to retrieve, manipulate and transmit information. It
represents an evaluation of the organisation's sophistication and
attitudes towards the concept of 'information management'. Turner
(1987) has suggested that organisational information management
strategies can be measured against a four stage evolutionary model.
Phase one of the model, 'procedural efficiency', developed to cope
with expanding amounts of information by means of such tools as
typewriters, telephones, filing cabinets and so forth. Phase 2,
technical efficiency, took off in the 1960's with the original
introduction of computers and duplicating machines. This was followed
by phase three, 'information strategy', which was precipitated by the
technical and functional convergence of data processing, office
automation and telecommunications. In this phase information handling
tools were made available to a much wider range of end users, senior
managers took charge of information management, and more emphasis was
placed on information as a support for the organisation's business and
strategic objectives. Phase 4, knowledge strategy, is the most recent
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development in information management, and describes organisational
exploitation of knowledge resources through expert systems, knowledge
based systems, decision support systems and office intelligence
systems. Measured on this scale the case study organisation was
firmly stuck in phase 2, and seemed unlikely to progress further in
the foreseeable future.
While interesting, Turner's model obscures the important distinction
between internally produced and externally derived information. It
should be observed that this code refers to the Group's cultural
attitude towards both internal and external information. In
particular, it is concerned with the value placed upon information by
the organisation, and its possible implications for the resources
devoted to information/communication activities, and the resources
devoted to information seeking, evaluation and dissemination. In
fact, the level of information consciousness within the Group was
rather low, as indicated by the absence of any generally accessible
central library facilities, the absence of any information
professionals and the small budget devoted to external information
gathering.
2.2.16	 Information-Culture Type 
This thesis distinguishes two major types of communication culture,
'oral' and 'written'. An oral information culture is defined as an
organisational culture, the values and accepted norms of which support
a high degree of word-of-mouth communication. The behavioural side of
the oral information culture is an observable tendency for individuals
to transmit and receive information orally. In contrast to the oral
information culture is the written information culture, the beliefs
and mores of which encourage and foster communication in writing. In
their purest forms the oral and written information cultures represent
two ends of a broad continuum in which many gradations between the two
extremes are observable.
The Group as a whole possessed an oral information culture. However,
while the Holdings Board, Company 1 and Company 2 were characterised
by strong oral information cultures, Companies 3 and 4 were best
described as possessing 'mixed' information cultures, which featured
both strong oral and written tendencies. Although the oral/written
information culture concept is a useful descriptive model, it masks
important differences between departments and individuals. Thus
finance departments were generally found to be less reliant on oral
communication than marketing, sales and production departments.
Similarly, individuals often had complex sets of preferences for how
they preferred to transmit and receive information depending on the
importance of speed, the type of information involved, its complexity
and so forth. Despite these complications, the core category did
describe an important and salient feature of Group life, with most
individuals believing that the benefits of oral information exchange
outweighed its associated costs.
2.3 Linkages between the Core Categories 
It is important to realise that these core categories are not
Isolated, autonomous features, but intimately inter-connected themes
detectable in the organisation's cultural life. A brief account of
the connections between the core categories is provided here in order
to demonstrate the true complexities involved in explicating a
company's culture. The personnel orientation, for instance, was
partially responsible for engendering the high levels of loyalty to
the organisation, and was instrumental in creating an atmosphere of
trust and confidence in which individuals were generally intent
- on co-
operative activity for the benefit of the Group. This same personnel
orientation meant that the company tended (at least until very
recently) to promote long-serving, loyal individuals (despite their
qualifications) to more senior positions, with a concomitant
detrimental impact on the organisation's overall professionalism.
The loyalty and emotional empathy felt by employees towards the
organisation had developed over time and under the influence of the
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personnel orientation. But it in turn had exercised some control over
the evolution of the personnel orientation, making it more difficult
for the company to evaluate employees solely in terms of their
professional abilities and 'hard cash' or use-value. The Group-wide
perception that there was loyalty to the organisation (or more usually
their individual subsidiary) also helped create the conditions in
which trust and confidence were the accepted working norms. The
Informality of the organisation was most clearly linked to relaxed and
casual attitudes to work, and the consequently slow pace of work
activity within much of the Group. It was also symptomatic of a more
deeply rooted spirit of egalitarianism, and both the informality and
the equalitarianism were part of that cluster of values and beliefs
which underpinned the Group's democratic ethos.
The lack of professionalism had largely resulted from the personnel
orientation which de-emphasised professional values and submerged any
professional ethos which might have been latent. This core category
had far-reaching implications for the cultural life of the
organisation, being a causal factor of the Group's narrowness and
introspection (and hence of it still being predominantly production-
constrained), and of its generally slow pace of work activity. The
extent and character of the democracy have primarily to be understood
in connection with the personnel orientation, which had created the
attitudes and beliefs necessary for its development. The high levels
of loyalty, co-operation and trust and confidence were also supportive
of an environment in which democratic values could thrive. On a less
positive note the organisation's attachment to democracy was also a
cause of the relatively slow pace at which the Group could respond to
change and realise opportunities.
The strong belief in the value of co-operative activity and the
consequently co-operative (rather than competitive) nature of the
environment internal to the subsidiaries was founded on high levels of
inter-personal trust and confidence. That co-operation between (at
least some of the) subsidiaries was more fraught, was indicative of
less strong trust relationships between individuals - notably the
- 39 -
managing directors. 	 The inter-personal trust and confidence had
itself developed under the influence of the organisation's personnel
orientation. The high value placed on individuals by the culture
naturally translated into employees having considerable trust and
confidence in the abilities and integrity of their colleagues. The
recognition that most people were loyal to the organisation and the
belief that almost everyone was concerned with the best interests of
their subsidiary also buttressed the trust and confidence facet of the
culture.
The narrow and introspective nature of the organisation had evolved in
part due to the personnel orientation, which dictated that internal
promotions were more desirable than bringing people in from outside.
This cultural trait was also closely associated with the lack of
professionalism, of which it was one manifestation. The introspective
tendencies of the culture and the lack of professionalism were also
reasons why the Group was still largely production-constrained and the
pace of work activity was considered slow. Other factors were also in
play here, with the production-led instincts of many long-serving
employees obviously being linked to the history of the organisation
and the slow pace of work activity understandable in the broader
cultural context of the democratic beliefs and values.
For the purposes of this thesis these core categories have been
interpreted as cultural traits, and conjunctively this set of inter-
related cultural traits is defined as the organisation's cultural
profile. The decision to adopt a cultural approach was taken only
after a detailed review of the literature of organisational theory had
been conducted. The possibility of employing other metaphors -
notably the idea of the political arena - or guiding principles -
such as concentrating on the role of technology - for analytical
purposes were considered. However, the pattern which had by this
early stage emerged from the data, seemed most compatible with the
concept and theory of culture. This is not to suggest that the other
metaphors and theories were not equally valid, or that they could not
have been applied in this particular case. It was, though, considered
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that the cultural metaphor would offer the most complete, rich and
rewarding understanding of the organisation's information/
communication life.
While this may appear to have been a largely arbitrary decision it can
be vindicated on two accounts. First, the grounded theory that had
been built up by this stage was most sympathetic to a cultural
analysis. And second, this is a period of fundamental disagreement,
reflection and introspection in the field of organisational theory in
terms of its perspectives and prospects. This is an important point.
So widespread is the recognition of problems at the theoretical level
that Pfeffer 'is tempted to argue that this growing review and
reflection coupled with ambiguity is indicative of a paradigm crisis
in organisation theory' (1982, p.255). In short, if the case was to
be written up coherently then one metaphor had to be chosen, and for
utilitarian reasons 'culture' was chosen.
This brief overview of the data is now followed by a review of the
corporate and organisational culture literature. Given the vast out-
pouring of culture-related material over the past decade, and which
continues even as this thesis is written, Chapter 3 is necessarily
selective. Nevertheless, the review is deliberately wide-ranging, and
covers all important aspects of the theory of culture relevant to this
study. Armed with a knowledge of the cultural metaphor the case
study itself will be considered in detail in Chapters 4-8.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
"For organisational analysis, we need to
perceive and understand the complex
nature of organisational phenomena, both
micro and macro, organisational and
individual, conservative and dynamic.
We need to understand organisations in
multiple ways, as having 'machine-like'
aspects, 'organism-like' aspects,
'culture-like' aspects, and others yet
to to be identified. We need to
encourage and use the tension engendered
by multiple images of our complex
subject."
(Jelinek, Smircich and Hirsch, 1983,
p .331).
3.1 Prolegomenon 
While there is considerable interest in'information and communication
issues within commercial organisations there are no generally accepted
methods, models or approaches employed in the study and analysis of
them. Rather scholars have used a variety of disparate and
heterogeneous methodological and analytical tools which they have
applied from a multiplicity of perspectives. The immaturity of the
discipline, which has been widely commented upon (Richetto, 1977;
Dennis, Goldhaber & Yates, 1978) can, in a post-Kuhnian era, be
interpreted as a pre-paradigmatic area of inquiry. One possible
interpretation of the problem is that none of the metaphors popularly
used in the theory of organisational behaviour allow for exhaustive
and in-depth information/communication analysis. Given this diagnosis
there is a prima facie case for exploring the merits (and of course
the drawbacks) of the concept of culture as a paradigm for the field.
Some authors have challenged the feasibility (and indeed the utility)
of a paradigm of any sort emerging within the sphere of organisational
communication (Porter & Roberts (1976). Moreover, doubts have already
been expressed by some authors (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982)
concerning the likelihood of an organisational culture perspective
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leading to a comprehensive, unified theory of organisational
communication. While the reservations of respected authors in the
discipline should not be dismissed out of hand, equally their comments
should not be treated as incontrovertible canons of wisdom; in any
event, the reader, having reached the conclusions of this thesis can
judge for himself/herself whether the current undertaking was a
worthwhile project to pursue. While the background to this research
is described in detail in Chapter 2, as a prelude to this it is,
perhaps, worth considering Schein's perceptive comment, that:
"Whether we are taking the point of view
of the total organisation attempting to
operate in a complex environment, or the
point of view of the individual trying
to learn to be productive and satisfied
in an occupation or organisation, or the
point of view of a group engaged in work
and/or face-to-face communication, we
cannot escape having to analyse at some
point the cultural forces involved.
Once we demystify the concept of culture
and learn to analyse its dynamics, it
will aid us enormously in understanding
both organisational and individual-level
phenomena."
(Schein, 1985, p.48).
3.2 Introduction 
The current interest in organisational culture developed as approaches
to organisational behaviour emphasising the importance of structure
were increasingly recognised as failing to disclose significant
differences between companies which nevertheless varied widely in
terms of a variety of performance measurements. The perception that
accepted (largely positivistic) methods and models concentrating on
the rational properties of organisations could not offer satisfactory
explanations for some observed phenomena became increasingly dominant
in the 1970's (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975;
Weick, 1976; Lincoln et al, 1978). Initially scholars focused on
national cultural differences, especially those between the Japanese
and American nations, and attempted to explain various aspects of
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organisational design, behaviour and performance in national cultural
terms. The idea that organisations themselves could be conceptualised
as quasi self-contained cultures emerged in conjunction with this
research. The groundwork for the development of an alternative
approach to organisations had already been prepared by Kuhn (1962)
whose concept of a 'paradigm' as a socio-historically constructed
weltanschuang has since found direct application in an organisational
context (Imerschein, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981).
It is important to note that within the organisational cultural field
there is as yet no single pre-eminent point of view or methodology,
but rather a rich mixture of ideas and approaches. This lack of
consensus on many of the fundamental issues reflects the diverse and
heterogeneous origins of the discipline, which range from anthropology
(Radcliffe-Brown, 1952; Malinowski, 1961; Geertz, 1973 and Goodenough,
1971) to social psychology (Forehand & Gilmer. 1964; Tagiuri, 1968;
Borgida & Nisbett, 1977; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Martin & Powers,
1983). Perhaps the greatest intellectual debt owed by researchers in
organisational culture is to organisational sociology. This view is
suggested most forcibly and plausibly by Ouchi and Wilkins (1983) who
have given a detailed description of the influence of organisational
sociology - the study of myth and ritual, symbolic interaction,
ethnomethodology, and the study of institutions - on the contemporary
study of organisational culture.
The tension between explicit and rational views of organisation on the
one hand and implicit, non-rational views on the other which has long
been a central feature of the sociology of organisations ha-e also
informed the culture literature. Similarly there is scope for a
dichotomy of view concerning whether an organisation's culture should
be treated as a dependent variable with respect to external
macrosocial forces and the individual beliefs and values etc. of its
members, or as an independent, determining variable, especially with
respect to the beliefs and values of employees. A further duality
evident in the organisational culture literature is between those
researchers who have adopted a more global and social approach and
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those who have adopted a psychological point of view. In the first
camp are specialists looking at rites and rituals (Trice & Beyer,
1984), myths and legends (Wilkins, 1983a), and economics (Wilkins &
Ouchi, 1983; Jones, 1983; Barney, 1984). In the second category are
authors such as Pfeffer (1981) who emphasises the lack of coupling
between attitudes and behaviour, Schein (1983a) who argues that
culture is the sum of what individuals have learned from their
organisational world, and a variety of authors following Freudian,
Jungian (Mitroff, 1983) or linguistic (Pondy, 1978, 1983) approaches.
3.3 Empirical Studies of Organisational Culture 
A large and ever burgeoning number of empirical studies in the field
of organisational culture have been conducted. This vast bank of work
is susceptible to classification according to any number of criteria,
but for the purposes of discursive convenience the three categories
devised by Ouchi and Wilkins (1985) will be employed here. They
divide the empirical work up into holistic studies, semiotic or
language studies and quantitative studies.
Exemplars of the holistic approach include Rohlen's (1974) description
of a Japanese bank, Van Maanen's (1973) work on the socialisation of
police recruits, Krieger's ( 1 979) portrait of a San Francisco rock
music station, and Dyer's (1982) description of a computer company.
Semiotic studies, focussing on language and symbolism, have been
conducted by Gregory (1983) on companies in Silicon Valley, Barley
(1983a) on the language of funeral directors and Pondy (1983)
concerning Communist China and an African tribe (the -Nuer).
Quantitative studies of organisational culture include that carried
out by Bowditch et al (1983) on the merger of two banks, a study by
Ouchi & Johnson (1978), and the work of Beck and Moore (1983, 1984) on
the culture of Canadian banks.
3.4 Organisations as Understood in this Research 
Organisations have been variously defined as 'systems of shared
meanings' (Smircich, 1983a), 'symbolic entities' (Morgan, Frost &
Pondy, 1983), and patterns of 'communicative behaviour' (Deetz, 1982).
This research recognises each of these definitions as legitimate and
potentially useful characterisations of organisations, but insists
that each describes only one aspect of what is a highly complex and
indeed contested concept. What all of these definitions enshrine is a
belief that organisations are not concrete, unequivocal and
phenomenologically invariant things. Rather, they must be understood
as social systems which manifest intricate forms of cultural activity.
This is not to say that organisations do not possess the variety of
attributes ascribed to them by more 'conventional' definitions
(Aldrich, 1979; Bedeian, 1980; Daft, 1980; Daft & Lengel, 1984).
However, what it does mean is that these attributes have to be
interpreted not as objectively verifiable elements in a positivist
reality, but as cultural artefacts. Thus if this research seems at
times to arrogate to the concept of organisation characteristics such
as a deliberate structure, an identifiable boundary, goals or
objectives and a collective identity, then these features should be
comprehended as existing as systems of shared meanings among the
respondents which find expression in their communicative behaviour.
The cultural paradigm is hence an ideal tool for the study of the
information and communication dimension of organisations, for as
Pacanowsky and O'Donnell-Trujillo have pointed out:
"...the organisational culture
perspective begins by liberating our
conceptions of what counts as an
organisation	 and	 what	 counts	 as
organisational behaviour. These
conceptual shifts allow us to refocus
our notions of the role of communication
in organisations and thus liberate the
kinds of questions that we as
organisational communication researchers
can legitimately ask."
(Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982,
p.117).
3.5 Selection and Socialisation 
The continued survival and development of an organisation's culture is
contingent on the effectiveness of its selection and socialisation
procedures. A strong and vibrant culture implies a high level of
consensus among employees on important organisational traits and goals
and their continuing identification with and commitment to its ideals,
morality and social groups. The processes of selection and
socialisation serve a variety of roles, including facilitating the
smooth induction of new individuals .
 into the cultural life of the
organisation, creating a psychological barrier prohibiting the
individual's desertion of the culture (Van Maanen, 1976), and
enhancing and protecting the fabric of the culture itself.
Organisational selection is the search mechanism by which candidates
for entry to the culture who already display some degree of
anticipatory socialisation are sought (Salaman, 1979; Merton, 1957).
Socialisation has been defined as 'the acquisition of the requisite
orientations for satisfactory functioning in a role' (Parsons, 1951,
p.205). The term refers to the exposure of new recruits to patterns
of evaluation, ways of thinking, forms of language and myths, which
they must learn if they are to become competent and confident members
of the organisation (Turner, 1971). These socialisation processes
exist in at least five forms: trainees learn from formal instructors,
from peers, from clients, from subordinates and from a multiplicity of
internal groups (Geer et al., 1968). Thus within organisations:
"... the individual's learned deference
towards authority is evoked and
interpersonal relations are ordered i-
ways that honour organisational claims
for loyalty, consistence, and dispatch.
Organisations are composed of congeries
of small groups that have a similar
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influence on behaviour. They inculcate
majority values in their members; they
reward compliance and punish those who
resist their demands.	 In many cases,
group	 values	 contribute	 to	 the
organisation's manifest goals. 	 In
others, they conflict with them."
(Presthus, 1978, p.113)
The extent to which an individual is susceptible to successful
l enculturation l (Hammond, 1960)/ 'acculturation' (Louis, 1983) will
depend not only on his/her sympathies with the prevailing
organisational ethos, but the strength of his/her aspirations to
establish a successful career in that organisation.
	 It is the
Individual's determination to succeed that ties him/her into the
formal and informal systems of rewards and punishments, which provides
the motivation to survive the initial culture shock, and to appear
flexible and cooperative as and when the organisation demands. But
however committed an individual may be • his successful socialisation
also depends on the organisation, and organisations have been found to
vary widely in terms of their efforts to socialise their recruits into
their cultures, a factor which is itself related to the nature and
pervasiveness of an organisation's culture (Salaman, 1974).
Furthermore, it is important to realise that given the complexity of
organisational subcultures that may exist together with the total
organisational culture the process of cultural learning for the
newcomer is not only complicated, but perpetual (Schein, 1985, p.43).
3.6 A Model of Culture Development 
The model of culture development which underpins this research is
closely tied to the interpretive methodological and conceptual
paradigm outlined in Chapter 1. This is not to imply that spatial,
temporal and social context variables are ignored, for it is a tenet
of this thesis that the physical location of organisations, their
historical development and patterns of social interaction within them
are, as Maanen and Barley (1985) have pointed out, important
contributors to the process of cultural formation. But within this
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structuralist context the phenomenon of culture development is
understood fundamentally as an interactive and interpretive process.
Thus the primary notion of culture employed here is founded on the
premise that the 'meaning' of social phenomena is not given a priori.
Instead, meaning is held to be produced through the processes of
individual and socially mediated interpretation (Louis, 1981 & 1983;
Deetz, 1982).	 Essentially, all 'seeing is theory laden' (Hanson,
1965) and as such all seeing is 'seeing as'. Culture, therefore,
develops as a process of shared attributed meaning, a process which is
accomplished via a variety of communication acts and media (Beyer &
Trice, 1988). As Deetz (1982) has argued, individuals' perceptions,
qua organisational constituents continually engender new meanings for
them and new concepts may thus arise:
"These become habitualised and part of
the background for new situations. As
these become sedimented as the 'way
things are', they become
institutionalised in various ways in the
organisation. This institutionalisation
may take place in preferred ways of
talking, stories, artifacts, physical
arrangements, new organisational
positions, and particular ways of doing
things. As such they orientate member's
perceptions and provide meaning for
organisational activities and objects.
From this assumed institutional
background activities are coordinated,
and new meanings are negotiated."
(Deetz, 1982, p.134).
The processes by which meanings come to be shared and translated into
the values and beliefs, perceptions and facts, of an organisation's
culture is arguably susceptible to conscious manipulation by
influential individuals. The development of organisational culture
is, thus, closely linked to the phenomenon of leadership (Selznick,
1957; Vain, 1982; Schein, 1985). According to Schein (1985)
organisational cultures are largely created by leaders, whose
principal leadership function is the creation, management and (if
necessary) the destruction of culture. Essentially, what this means
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is that the process of building culture cannot be separated from the
process of leadership which involves the identification of those
problems around which culture is eventually learned or evolved. While
it is important to realise that all leaders are influenced by their
own prior cultural learning, constrained by environmental and internal
contextual features of the organisation such as the attitudes of the
local workforce and friendship groups, and may not even be conscious
of their culture-building decisions, yet the role of leadership in
culture formation should not be under-estimated.
3.7 Approaches to the Study and Understanding of Culture 
A number of approaches to organisational culture have been adopted by
researchers in the field. Two of the most prominent are 'symbolic
interactionism l and l ethnomethodology', both of which significantly
influenced this research, and will thus be dealt with in some detail.
Symbolic interactionists (Bormann, 1983;. Mohrmann, 1982) focus on the
cultural use of symbols: their frequency, richness, inter-relatedness,
emergence, and transformation. Symbolic interactionism is, though, a
broad research tradition, and it would be a mistake not to consider
the diversity of interpretations symbols and symbolic activity have
been subjected to. Morgan, Frost and Pondy, (1983) have identified
four 'paradigms' for the analysis of cultural symbolism:
functionalism, interpretivism, radical humanism and structuralism.
Morgan et al suggest that a functionalist approach to symbolism
encourages a view of symbols as carriers of information and meaning,
and places emphasis on discovering the spontaneous functions which
they play in the maintenance of social order. In contrast, from an
Interpretive perspective symbols are viewed as the essential medium
through which individuals create their world, and the associated
theory and research is oriented towards understanding the processes
through which this occurs. 	 What they call the 'radical humanist
approach' focuses on how this process may have pathological
tendencies, with individuals enacting their realities through the
medium of symbolic forms in ways that are oppressive and alienating.
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Finally the 'radical structuralist' theory of symbolic forms studies
the way in which symbolic constructs are utilised as forms of
ideological control in the interests of ruling elites, and sustain the
status quo despite the pressure of inherent system contradictions
which favour social transformation.
Symbolic interactionists tend to limit themselves to an analysis of
culture as constituted and understood as a set of social symbols.
Researchers in this tradition see their task as one of interpreting
the 'themes' of culture which Opler (1945) has referred to as those
postulates or understandings, declared or implicit, tacitly approved
or openly prompted, that orient and stimulate social activity.
Culture is interpreted as a pattern of symbolic discourse which can be
explained in terms of the ways in which symbols are linked in
meaningful relationships to the -activities of actors in an
organisational setting (Manning, 1979; Turner, 1983; Van Maanen,
1973). Structural and psychodynamic theories of culture represent an
especially interesting version of the symbolic approach,
conceptualising symbolic activity as an expression of unconscious
psychological processes, the understanding of which will cast light on
the workings of the human mind (Gemmill, 1982; and Mitroff, 1982).
Ethnomethodology is a recent branch of sociological research which,
Bantz (1983) suggests, has its roots in the work of Garfinkel (1981)
and Cicourel (1974). While difficult to define succinctly Filmer
(1972) has posited that it is concerned with the process of what might
be called first-order objectification - that is, the everyday way in
which members make rational and accountable their everyday experience.
In other words, it is a sociology of everyday life. As with the
symbolic interactionists ethnomethodology is not a unitary school of
thought, and different authors have chosen to emphasise cognitive
mechanisms (Cicourel, 1974), behaviour patterns (Garfinkel, 1981) and
various aspects of social communication (Cushman & Whiting, 1972;
Cushman, 1977; Shimanoff, 1980).
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Ethnomethodologically oriented researchers interested in culture have
generally restricted their comprehension of the phenomenon to suit
their individual proclivities. There are authors who have insisted on
an understanding of culture as revealed by verbal discourse and
concentrated their attention on how social reality is 3reated and
sustained through verbal communication (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-
Trujillo, 1982). Others have attempted to define the concept of
culture from a cognitive perspective. According to this view culture
is a system of shared cognitions or a system of knowledge and beliefs
(Rossi & O'Higgins, 1980); it is a conceptual paradigm which
structures perception and behaviour.
3.8 Culture as Metaphor and Critical Lever 
Organisational culture has been conceptualised both as a metaphorical
tool which can aid insightful analysis and as an objective property of
organisations which can be linked to other variables and used as a
critical lever for improving organisational health. As Frost et al
(1985) have commented:
"...some see the term 'organisational
culture' as a metaphor - organisations
are like cultures - they try to
understand the attributes of culture
that might be relevant to organisations
in terms of a symbolic process. Others
see organisational culture as a thing,
an objective entity that can be examined
in terms of variables (independent and
dependent) and linked to other things
such as performance, satisfaction and
organisational effectiveness."
(Frost et al, 1985, p.18).
Researchers representing diverse schools have argued that scientists
(including social scientists) create knowledge about the world through
the teasing out of implications of different metaphoric
conceptualisations of their subject matter (Pepper, 1942; Kaplan,
1964; Brown, 1977; Morgan, 1980).
	 A similar hypothesis has been
postulated by Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), who
	 maintain that the
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metaphoric process (seeing one thing in terms of another) is basic to
human thinking. This notion has been further explored by Koch and
Deetz (1981) who argue that perception and knowing are linked in an
interpretive process that is metaphorically structured, allowing us to
understand one domain of experience in terms of another.
The significance of these ideas to researchers in organisational
behaviour seeking to understand the concept of culture is striking. A
considerable number of metaphors and images have been employed in the
study of organisations, and it is tempting to regard culture as merely
the latest in this series of images. Historically, two of the most
important of these metaphors are those of the 'machine' (Pondy &
Mitroff, 1979) and the 'organism' (Trist & Bamforth, 1951; Lawrence &
Lorsch, 1967). Other metaphors which have been used to elaborate
aspects of organisational life include the 'theatre' (Goffman, 1959;
Mangham & Overington, 1983), the 'political arena' (Crozier, 1964;
Pfeffer, 1981), 'cybernetics', (Rappaport, 1971), and the 'psychic
prison' (Fromm, 1942, 1962; Marcuse, 1955, 1964; and Habermas, 1972).
Indeed, in one sense at least, the term 'organisation' is itself a
metaphor referring to the experience of collective coordination and
orderliness (Smircich, 1983b).
Given the philosophical support for the metaphorical theory of human
lamildedge and the empirically observed tendency for organisational
theorists to rely on metaphors it is unsurprising that some authors
should have sympathies with the interpretation of culture as a
metaphor (Smircich, 1983b; Morgan, et al, 1983; Morgan, 1986).
Exemplar approaches to culture which implicitly make use of the
concept as a metaphor include both ethnomethodology and symbolic
interactionism. In essence, the cultural metaphor is used to focus
attention on the the way in which organisations can be seen as
miniature societies with a distinctive social structure, reflected in
various patterns of action, language, discourse, laws, roles, ritual,
custom, ceremony, norms, folklore, stories, beliefs, myths, etc.
(Morgan et al, 1983).
While the notion of culture can certainly be a useful metaphorical
tool, as this thesis seeks to exemplify, there are two important
points concerning its use in this field which should be borne in mind:
first, that there may be attendant dangers in borrowing metaphors from
other fields which divert attention away from organisations themselves
(Finder & Bourgeois, 1982); and, second, it is both legitimate and
valuable to recognise the explanatory value of the concept of culture
as a variable in organisational life (Deetz, 1982). It is to the view
of culture as an organisational variable, both externally derived and
internally induced, that this review now turns.
The literature of 'comparative management' has generally regarded
culture as an externally created variable that is imported into
organisations through their employees and which reflects national
beliefs and values (Ajiferuke & Boddewyn, 1970; Cummings & Schmidt,
1972). This national culture is held to be revealed in the patterns
of attitudes and actions of individual organisation members. However,
although the comparative management literature has devoted
considerable effort to elucidating the impact of the broader national
culture on organisational life (see the reviews/critiques of Roberts,
1970; Bhagat & McQuaid, 1982) little theoretical work concerning the
notion of culture itself has so far been attempted.
A more imaginative and diverse literature has burgeoned which
considers organisations themselves as culture-generating phenomena
(Tichy, 1982; Martin & Powers, 1983). Cultural artifacts such as
rites and rituals, legends, and idiosyncratic belief and value systems
are identified and used to explain the detailed functioning of the
organisations in which they feature. This view of culture, often
reliant on a systems theory framework, is in the same tradition as
those approaches which emphasise structure, size, technology and
leadership patterns as significant variables influencing
organisational behaviour (Woodward, 1965; Fielder, 1967; Pugh &
Hickson, 1976). The identification of culture as a 'critical key' or
'lever' (Smircich, 1983b) which can be used to control and direct the
course of an organisation and even changed in order to harmonise
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employee beliefs and work patterns with corporate objectives is
exciting but contentious.
This research was conducted on the principle that the use of culture
as a metaphor for studying organisations is legitimate and likely to
yield valuable insights into the operation of complex social
activities such as work. However, it is important to realise that
'culture' does refer to something which is empirically identifiable
and analysable: beliefs and values can be gauged, company histories
constructed and myths discovered. Furthermore, it is considered
plausible that an understanding of an organisation's culture can shed
light on other aspects and processes of organisational life, such as
its information and communication dimension, by highlighting the link
between the subjective realm of the collective consciousness and
corporate information policies and communication patterns.
3.9 Definitions of Corporate and Organisational Culture 
Concerning corporate culture, the organisational literature offers the
interested reader an embarrassment of definitional riches. There is,
however, little sign of an emerging consensus on the core meaning of
the term 'culture' with different researchers defining its parameters
to match their ideological sympathies, methodological assumptions and
focii of interest. This thesis, therefore, accepts the inevitable
conclusion that the concept of culture is polysemic, and, as different
authors often insist on competing synechdochistic interpretations
(taking a part of the meaning of the notion for the whole) a
'contested concept'.
Six of the most common conceptualisations of organisational culture
have been identified by Schein (1985). These are: observed
behavioural regularities such as language and rituals (Goffman, 1959,
1967; Van Maanen, 1979); the informal norms evolved in working groups
(Ho mans, 1950); dominant values (Deal & Kennedy, 1982); the
organisational philosophy towards employees and/or customers (Ouchi,
1981; Pascale & Athos, 1981; the rules that must be followed for
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personal success (Schein, 1968, 1978; Van Maanen, 1976); and the
feeling or climate conveyed by an organisation's physical layout and
interaction with outsiders (Tagiuri, 1968). None of these
characterisations can exhaustively account for all the diverse and
heterogeneous meanings which have been attributed to the notion of
organisational culture, as many of the authors cited above would
doubtless agree. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that
definitions of the concept of culture can yield valuable insights into
the various 'layers' and 'textures' of the term as it is used in the
academic literature, and Table 1 below provides a sample of the types
of definitions currently in vogue.
TABLE 1
1) "...man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself
has spun... culture [is] those webs, and the analysis of it [is]
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an
interpretive one in search of meaning." (Geertz, 1973, p.5).
2) "The culture of an organisation refers to the unique
configuration of norms, values, beliefs, ways of behaving and so
on that characterise the manner in which groups and individuals
combine to get things done. The distinctiveness of a particular
organisation is intimately bound up with its history and the
character-building effects of past decisions and past leaders.
It is manifested in the folkways, mores, and the ideology to
which members defer, as well as in the strategic choices made by
the organisation as a whole." (Eldridge & Crombie, 1974, p.89).
3) "Organisational culture' may be generally defined as the body of
customary beliefs and social forms within an organisation."
(Miles, 1980, p.47).
4) "Culture' as used here, is defined as learned ways of coping
with experience." (Gregory, 1983, p.364).
5) "I will mean by 'culture': a pattern of basic assumptions -
invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns
to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid
and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."
(Schein, 1985, p.9).
6) "In crude relief, culture can be understood as a set of solutions
devised by a group of people to meet specific problems posed by
the situations they face in common." (Maanen & Barley, 1985,
p.33).
7) "Corporate Culture is the 'implicit', 'invisible', 'intrinsic'
and 'informal' consciousness of an organisation which guides the
behaviour of the individuals and which shapes itself out of their
behaviour." (Scholz, 1987, p.80).
8) "Culture in the communicative context means the sum total of ways
of living, organising, and communing built up in a group of human
beings and transmitted to newcomers by means of verbal and non-
verbal communication. Important components of an organisation's
culture include shared norms, reminiscences, stories, rites, and
rituals that provide the members with unique symbolic common
ground." (Bormann, 1983, p.100).
3.10 The Concept of Organisational Climate 
The concept of corporate or organisational culture operationalised in
this thesis subsumes the notion of 'organisational climate' within its
sphere of meaning and application. Organisational theorists were
utilising the concept of climate at least ten years before the notion
of culture became popular. However, it is with the recent interest in
the idea of culture that the concept of organisational climate has
achieved broader recognition, largely as a narrower view of
approximately the same phenomena.
The phrase 'organisational climate' refers to the beliefs and
attitudes held by individuals about their organisation (Poole &
McPhee, 1983). According to Tagiuri (1968) climate is 'a relatively
enduring quality of the total environment that (1) is experienced by
occupants, (2) influences their behaviour, and (3) can be described in
terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or
attributes) of the environment' (p.25). Campbell et al (1970) have
described four major dimensions of organisational climate: 1)
Individual autonomy, or the relative amount of freedom the individual
has to make decisions and exercise personal initiative; 2) the degree
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of structure imposed on the position, or the degree to which superiors
establish and communicate job objectives and the means of
accomplishing them; 3) the reward orientation, or whether individuals
feel rewarded for a job well done and the organisation's relative
emphasis on positive rewards rather than punishments; and 4) the
consideration, warmth and support given by managers and supervisors.
Other factors have been suggested by other authors; for example, Payne
and Pugh (1976) recommend that a company's orientation to development
and progress be examined and communication researchers have listed
additional dimensions relevant to communication (Redding, 1972;
Muchinsky, 1977).
Similar conceptual and pragmatic problems afflict the organisational
climate community as are faced by scholars of organisational culture.
Foremost among these is how the concept itself should be interpreted.
One view of climate pictures it as 'a set of summary or global
perceptions held by individuals	 about	 their	 organisational
environment' (James & Jones, 	 1974, p.1105), i.e. a psychological
attribute of individual members. A second and competing
interpretation of climate considers it to be an attribute of
organisations as described by its members in terms of a number of key
variables (Campbell et al, 1970). Poole and McPhee (1983 suggest that
the gulf between those who seek to locate culture in individuals and
those who conceive of it as an organisational attribute can be bridged
by reconceptualising 'climate on the intersubjective level as an
organisational construct constituted by the supraindividual linkage of
members' perspectives, particularly their beliefs, attitudes, values,
and interpretations'. This intersubjective niveau is essentially the
theoretical platform on which culture (inclusive of climate) has been
subjected to analysis in this thesis.
3.11 Facets of Culture 
In attempting to give an exhaustive taxonomy of the facets of
organisational culture the first problem to be faced is what counts as
a facet and what should be interpreted as merely the manifestation of
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something more fundamental. After all, are rituals the essence of
culture or the values and beliefs which prompt them? Or perhaps it is
the historical emergence of those cognitive attitudes which is the
'facet' of primary importance, their symbolic significance or even the
language used to describe thc3e values and behaviour patterns. These
differences in emphasis obviously reflect the intellectual ferment of
contemporary cultural theory, and each approach will be briefly
considered here. First, a classification of cultural facets into
subjective, objective and linguistic will be attempted; and second,
Louis's (1983) classification of cultural facets into prescriptive,
descriptive and expressive categories will be examined.
Subjectively, the term culture refers to the widely held values,
beliefs and norms, and popular myths and legends which may be found
within organisations. Values and beliefs are the basic concepts of an
organisation, and as such they are at the heart of the culture,
establishing standards of achievement within the social context. In
the form of norms they form the basis for decision making and a
reference by which to judge the appropriateness of behaviour patterns
(Shaw, 1971; Turner, 1971). These norms and values may be enshrined
in myths and legends which dramatise and embellish actual historical
events and individuals. Where these myths involve individuals these
people may assume the status of corporate heroes, who personify the
culture's values and provide tangible role models for employees to
mimic (Deal & Kennedy, 1988).
Objectively, culture refers to an organisations's rites, rituals and
practices (standard operating procedures). Rites and rituals -may be
defined as more or less elaborate and planned sets of activities that
consolidate various forms of cultural expression into organised
events, which are carried out through social interaction, and which
are usually for the benefit of an audience (Beyer & Trice, 1988).
Rites and rituals include everything from managerial and occupational
training programmes to performance awards ceremonies and company
festivals. Practices are the accepted means of task accomplishment,
and range from a particular form of record keeping to the 'correct'
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way of looking busy when the work load is light (Pacanowsky &
O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982).
Linguistically the culture of an organisation is distinguished by the
vocabulary and concepts it employs. As Folb (1976, p.194) has
asserted, 'Because vocabulary is the part of language that is most
immediately under the conscious manipulation and control of its users,
it provides the most accessible place to begin exploration of their
experiences'. Useful displays of organisational culture related to
vocabulary are the metaphors used by organisational members, which
'may be helpful in understanding a sense of how members structure
their experiences' (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p.125).
Louis (1983) has suggested an alternative typology of cultural facets
in terms of what she considers to be three 'natural categories' of the
concept, namely, the prescriptive, the descriptive and the expressive.
By 'prescriptive' elements Louis refers to 'shared ideals', and it is
certainly the case that culture is not a hermeneutically neutral
social phenomenon; it is permeated by value elements which both
prescribe and proscribe action. But organisational cultures are
composed of more than mere morality and conceptions of persons and
purpose, they also include descriptive aspects or 'present images of
local life' which are coded in an organisational knowledge-base which
binds individuals together, facilitates working practices and unifies
the enterprise. As Salaman (1979, p.197) has observed, 'shared
organisational knowledge constitutes a significant bond between
organisational members, as well as reflecting, in non-evaluative form,
the preferences and philosophies of members'.
3.12 Acultural and Multi-Cultural Organisations 
While it is often convenient to refer to organisations as if they
possessed a single, unitary and homogeneous culture, most
organisations seem to bear multiple sub-cultures, and even counter-
cultures that may hold antithetical or competing views on the nature
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of situations within the organisation (see March & Simon, 1958;
Likert, 1961; Christensen, 1988). As Gregory (1983) has pointed out:
"...the small-homogeneous-society
metaphor is often inappropriate to those
organisations that are large, internally
differentiated, rapidly changing, and
only command part-time commitment from
members. Such organisations more nearly
resemble the complex society of which
they are a part.	 In large complex
societies.., the robustness of any group
as a culture is questionable....
Societies, and many organisations, can
more correctly be viewed in terms of
multiple, cross-cutting cultural
contexts changing through time, rather
than as stable, bounded, homogeneous
cultures."
(Gregory, 1983, p.365).
An additional problem for cultural research are those organisations in
which no appreciable culture appears to .have developed (Louis, 1983).
If the paradigm concept of organisational culture operationalised in
this thesis is to be widely accepted then both these empirically
validated points must be subsumed within its theoretical web.
Given the widespread finding that organisational cultures are
frequently so highly elaborated and intricate that multiple, nested or
over-lapping sub-cultures may be distinguished within them, a number
of authors have attempted to isolate those features of organisational
settings which contribute to this secondary cultural growth.
Opportunities for diverse cultures to develop are provided by
organisational structure (at subsidiary, department and sub-department
levels), and the structure of management and of its workforce (senior,
mid-ranking and junior managers may have vastly differing cultural
allegiances from each other and their workforce) (Etzioni, 1971,
p.231). Further, factors such as the stability of membership of these
'natural' groupings, their perceptions of the youth, size and nature
of the organisation, their tendency to identify with key local
personalities, the relative impermeability of the group (R.&.D lab
workers are, for example, more likely than most to be bounded by the
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less than permeable barriers of professional qualifications and
experience), and the history of groups, have all been implicated in
the process of sub-culture formation.
In contrast to the attention that has been paid to the phenomenon of
f multi-culturalism' far less work has been conducted on those
organisations which have little or no cultural edifice. There are at
least two prime causes of , aculturalism i : first, culture develops over
time, and a newly formed organisation cannot be expected to be as rich
in shared beliefs and values etc. as one which has been longer
established. As Schein (1985) has pointed out, culture, is a learned
product of group experience and is, therefore, to be found only where
there is a definable group with a significant history.
And second, the nature of the work performed and of the work
environment generally may not facilitate the development of culture.
Work processes which do not engender. employee commitment to the
organisation, and a work environment which restricts social
interaction can both stifle cultural development. Similarly, a high
turnover of employees may result in cultural denudation which
effectively erodes any culture which might have previously existed.
There are, almost without doubt, other features of organisations which
can inhibit the genesis and maintenance of culture which remain to be
identified through further study.
The existence of a multitude of subtly or even radically different
cultures within a single organisation does not undermine the cultural
approach outlined here. Rather, it demonstrates the need- to a)
interpret organisations, especially large ones such as the research
subject, as complex and heterogeneous phenomena and b) the necessity
of seeking to identify culture at more levels than the total
organisation. Furthermore, few cultures can be expected to exhibit
complete uniformity; sub-cultures and counter-cultures and conflict
between these and a recognisably dominant culture are the essence of
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the cultural approach adopted in this thesis, and the dynamics of
interaction between them form some of the most fascinating and
significant organisational behaviour open to researchers in the field.
The existence of acultural organisations represents a far more
searching challenge to researchers in organisational culture, and is
suggestive of the hypothesis that perhaps not all organisations are
best analysed by, or indeed are susceptible to analysis in terms of a
cultural perspective.
3.13 The Survival Value of Culture Within Organisations 
A strong, coherent and appropriate culture is of immense value to an
organisation concerned with preserving its health and continued
survival (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Louis, 1983; Drake, 1984; Buchanan &
McCalman, 1989). Specifically, cultural norms serve to define
patterns of accepted behaviour which can lead to conflict reduction,
diminished time wastage by employees who know what is expected of
them, and even better decision making, especially by lower ranking
managers. Moreover, a recognisable culture can increase the
meaningfulness of work of employees for whom it provides focii of
Identification and loyalty which both increase trust and confidence
levels within the organisation and provide role models for successful
career paths; lower rates of labour turnover and high workforce
motivation are possible concomitants. As Louis (1983) asserts:
"Culture provides for social system
continuity, control, identity and
integration of members. The stability
(through time) of shared ideals across
generations of social system members
provides continuity and serves	 a
homoeostatic function. The stability
(through space) of the standards or
goals conveyed in the commonly-held set
of ideals serves the control function of
deviance detection and reduction....
Further, ideals shared among members
provide	 for	 the	 integration	 of
individuals into the social group, a
kind	 of	 individual-to-institution
linking.... More diffusely,	 culture
embodies the identity of the social
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group. What we as members, stand for
and how we deal with one another and
with outsiders is carried in and through
our culture."
(Louis 1983, p.44).
While culture generally has survival value for an organisation a
changing business context - new laws, radical changes in market
structure etc. - can render an existing culture obsolete and
dysfunctional (Deal & Kennedy, 1988). This obviously invites the
question: are organisational cultures susceptible to conscious
manipulation and change? (see Section 2.14 below).
3.14 Cultural Energetics: obsolescence and change. 
A plethora of factors have been implicated as possible influencers of
cultural obsolescence, though little theoretical work has been done to
demonstrate precisely how they have their affect. Typical of the
expressions of ignorance is Vaill's (1982) assertion that:
"Beyond some unknown threshold, too much
change in this system of factors breaks
down the shared sense of what the
organisation is, why it exists, and what
its basic purposes are."
(Vaill, 1982, p.29).
A related question is, to what extent the culture of an organisation
is susceptible to conscious modification and change ?. A number of
popular authors like Peters and Waterman (1982) have implied that
there does exist the potential for managers to induce and- alter
culture. Yet scholars of organisational culture so far exhibit no
consensus on the question of whether or not corporate cultures can be
deliberately created and subsequently manipulated by senior management
teams. This issue is of extreme importance to this thesis. If the
information policy and patterns of communication found within an
organisation are indeed intimately interconnected with that
organisation's culture, and that culture was not amenable to
deliberate modification, then the practical utility of research work
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which seeks to explore the cultural dimension of organisational
information/communication behaviour can be questioned. On the other
hand, if culture is considered to be more malleable, at least in some
respects and to some degree, then a cultural perspective on
information and communication patterns and policies can be vindicated
as providing insights to senior managers who can then take appropriate
steps to ameliorate any problems that may have been detected.
Numerous authors have emphasised the difficulties inherent in
attempting manager-induced change and foisting executive control over
an organisation's culture, (Uttal, 1983; Schwartz & Davis, 1981; Deal
& Kennedy, 1988). Other researchers have gone further and argued
that as culture is fundamentally a spontaneous creation of ordinary
people it cannot, therefore, be imposed from above (Dorson, 1972).
Empirical observation of failure has been made by Deal and Kennedy
(1988) who catalogue the attempts made by A.T.&T's management to
adjust the company's culture to 'fit' the new commercial environment
following deregulation of the industry and the inability of Sears to
engineer the sort of cultural change necessary for the company to move
its sales operation 'up-market'. Similar17, $ttI st al OcYiY5)
have described how the attempted cultural integration of two banks
unintentionally resulted in the domination of one culture by the
other. This body of thought inclines towards the view that
organisational culture is a dependent variable, though one not
responsive to conscious interference.
Those scholars who have argued the case for viewing organisational
culture as a phenomenon susceptible to manipulation occupy e broad
confidence spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are those researchers
who contend that cultures can probably be altered by the efforts of
management, but only in minor ways (Martin & Siehl, 1983). At the
other end of the spectrum are authors such as Scholz (1987), who cites
the case of Pepsi Cola as proof that cultural metamorphosis, while
time-consuming, difficult and expensive, is certainly not impossible
to accomplish. A more realistic position, and one this thesis is in
sympathy with, is that suggested by Jones (1983) and Beyer and Trice
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(1988) who argue that like other social forms and processes cultures
inevitably change, and that it is natural for managers and others who
seek power to initiate and manage this natural evolution.
Part of the reason for disagreement on this issue is that authors have
tended to operationalise different conceptions of 'culture' itself.
Broadly speaking, those who have defined culture as deeply rooted in
the cognitive, emotional and behavioural domains of organisational
life are less sanguine about the possibility of controlled cultural
change than authors who have emphasised relatively superficial
cultural manifestations, such as espoused values, reward structures
and dress codes. A further fundamental reason for disagreement is
that while some authors have concerned themselves with large scale
cultural revolution, others have focused on changes of a more limited
nature. A third cause of the diversity of view is that organisations
differ in a multitude of respects, and the size, structure, history,
and market conditions (to name but a few) within which an organisation
subsists, may have a profound influence over the feasibility of
inducing cultural change.
The extent to which deliberate manipulation will be successful in any
individual instance will, though, be contingent on an array of factors
- the skills and abilities of the staff, the business context, the
history of the organisation, the employees' perceived need to change,
and so forth. This represents a compromise position in which change
and even transformation of a culture is considered possible given the
'right' circumstances and intelligent handling. As Schein (1985) has
asserted, culture can be changed, but only through an understanding
of the dynamics of the learning process, and familiarity with the
strategies by which individuals come to learn (and unlearn) the
complex beliefs and assumptions that underlie their social behaviour.
3.15 Typologies of Corporate and Organisational Cultures 
A number of general typologies of organisational cultures have been
developed (Etzioni, 1971; Handy, 1978). Of these Handy's description
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of four basic management styles is probably the most widely known.
The first of these is the Club or Zeus culture which is a club
culture dominated by a single omnipotent individual. It is focused on
the building of useful relationships, and oriented towards individuals
enhancement of their positions of influence through actively building
political alliances and developing personal charisma. The Zeus
culture is a basic activity culture notable for the speed with which
decisions can be made. This speed is achieved through emotional
empathy between the Zeus figure and his team, empathy which relies
heavily on trust and confidence levels within an organisation. Almost
inevitably communications within such organisations are oral and where
possible face-to-face.
Second is the Apollo or Role culture 'which bases its approach around
the definition of the role or the job to be done, not around
personalities' (p.20). The dominant ethos here is one of rationality
and the 'logical approach' to problem solving. Such a culture Handy
suggests will be most successful when the external environment
exhibits a high degree of stability and predictability, and these
traits are reflected and encouraged inside the organisation. In
effect individual employees become part of the corporate machine,
subservient to the organisational ethos which insists on conformity to
role requirements. Thus the Apollo culture is secure both
psychologically and contractually, with individuals holding their
positions without the threat of premature termination of employment.
Third is the Task or Athena culture which is another activity culture
concerned with 'the continuous and successful solution of problems'
(p.25). The task culture decentralises power to several self-
contained teams which pursue their own sub-objectives, though within a
common overall strategy. The culture recognises expertise as the only
base of power, and venerates intuition and creativity. The culture is
characterised by high levels of commitment and enthusiasm among
employees who also have considerable respect for their peers, making
formalised procedural niceties almost irrelevant.
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Fourth is the Existential or Dionysian culture which, uniquely among
Handy's cultures, views the role of the organisation as a facilitator
of individual participants' goals. This is often a commune culture in
which individuals cooperate in order to promote utilitarian ends
without being highly mutually interdependent. The Dionysian culture
is one of independent professionals who agree to coordination for
their own long term convenience. The generation of such a culture
presupposes a need for a considerable amount of talent which must be
allowed to flourish.
Handy's four styles of management are supposed to be applicable to
organisations generally; rather less attention has been given to the
classification of specifically corporate cultures, with Scholz (1987)
being one notable exception. Scholz has suggested that corporate
culture can be classified along three.
 dimensions: evolution, internal
factors and external factors. From the evolution-induced perspective
culture is regarded as a function of the particular stage (along some
imaginary company 'life-cycle') that any given commercial organisation
has reached. According to the internal-induced viewpoint culture is
pictured as a response to circumstances prevalent within the subject
company, especially with respect to its problem-solving attitude.
Finally, the external-induced framework posits culture to be
determined by the particular business environment in which the company
subsists. These three criteria for classifying corporate cultures are
reviewed in detail below as they reveal some of the most important
factors currently thought to influence the nature of a company's
culture, and some of the gaps in this thinking.
Within the evolution-induced dimension Scholz identifies five cultures
(borrowed from the literature of strategic management), each
representative of a different stage in the evolution of a corporate
culture. These are: 1) the stable culture, which is fundamentally
Introverted and oriented towards the past. This stage displays
aversion to risk, with no discontinuity or change being considered
acceptable; 2) the reactive culture, which is also introverted, but
oriented towards the present and accepts 'minimum risks'; 3) the
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anticipating culture, which is partially introverted and partially
extroverted, allows for familiar risks and accepts instrumental
change; 4) the exploring culture, which is strictly extroverted and
behaves according to a risk/gain trade-off which implies a great deal
of change; and 5) the creative culture, which is also strictly
extroverted and has a large preference for unfamiliar risk taking in
its attempts to 'invent the future' through a continuous search for
novel changes.
For the internal-induced dimension Scholz uses a classification scheme
which draws heavily on the idea of property rights. Three types of
culture are distinguished: 1) the production culture, in which the
production process is basically rather constant, has a high
standardisation of the work process and low skill requirements. The
property rights in this culture are,- therefore, rather weak; 2) the
bureaucratic culture, in which there is more non-routineness,
resulting in the specification of certain rights and obligations of
various role holders from which property rights are derived, i.e.
property rights are derived from the positions individuals hold; and
3) the professional culture, in which the non-routineness, both in
terms of task variety and difficulty, is most pronounced. And since
the involved employees are specialists in their particular fields, the
property rights are vested in individuals rather than positions they
occupy.
The external-induced dimension is captured by Scholz with a
classification scheme which distinguishes between four types of
culture borrowed from Deal and Kennedy (1988): 1) the tough-guy/macho
culture which is characterised by a high risk environment with quick
feedback on the appropriateness of actions. This environment needs
individualists who are able to cope with these risks in an all-or-
nothing climate; 2) the work-hard/play-hard culture is associated with
an environment with relatively low risks combined with quick feedback
on the merits of actions. This culture is based on team spirit, and
fun and action are the rules of the game here; 3) the bet-your-company
culture is created by an environment which calls for major high-stake
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decisions, where employees have to wait many years before they learn
the consequences of a decision; and 4) the process culture reflects an
environment which has little or no feedback and hardly any risks.
Predictability and continuity are the basic values here.
This typology of corporate cultures is obviously not the only possible
means of classifying corporate cultures. It does, however, illustrate
that it is possible to give meaningful descriptions of types of
corporate cultures. It also provides some indication of the range of
variables that may be relevant if organisational culture is to be used
as an explanatory tool in our study of information and communication
within organisations. But what it manifestly does not do is imply any
role at all for information/communication issues in the development of
a typological classifications of culture, and this is a failing that
this thesis seeks to rectify (see Conclusions).
3.16 Information, Communication and Organisational Culture 
Given the immaturity of the discipline of Information Science and
organisational communication research, the concept of 'corporate
culture' may represent a 'first step' towards a comprehensive, unified
paradigm for studies in this field. There are two basic ways in which
the notion and theory of corporate (organisational) culture may be
employed for the benefit of scholars interested in the information/
communication dimension of organisations: first, as a metaphor for
organisational life it can be a useful means of furthering our
understanding and sensitising us to the complexities inherent. inthe
social processes of information and communication issues, (Pacanowsky
& O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Putnam & Pacanowsky, 1983). Second,
interpreted as an organisational variable the notion of culture can be
used in a descripto-explanatory role with respect to aspects of an
organisation's information/communication dimension. While this thesis
accepts the validity of the cultural metaphor as a conceptual tool for
elucidating the 'deep' structure of organisations, it is primarily as
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an organisational variable that the theory of culture is
operationalised here.
The literature linking the concept of 'culture' to information issues
within organisations is not vast (see, for example, Drake, 1984;
Horton, 1987). Considerably more attention has been paid to culture
and the social processes of communication (Birdwhistell, 1970;
Keesing, 1974; Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 1983a, 1983b; Tompkins &
McPhee, 1985; Poole, 1985; Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988; Beyer &
Trice, 1988). From these literatures two central questions (which are
really two sides of the same problematic coin) emerge. Firstly, it
has been asked how information and communication processes help to
shape and structure culture; and secondly, there is the question of
how an established corporate culture influences and conditions the
information/communication processes/activities of an organisation.
Information and communication policies and processes have their
primary impact on an existing culture through socialisation, for it is
through a complex social system of information exchange that
individuals become absorbed into the cultural life of an organisation
(see Section 3.5). In addition, it has been suggested that more
specific facets of an organisation's information/communication
dimension, such as its information management policies and information
technology,	 will have an impact on culture (Horton, 1987; Drake,
1984):
"Information and its distribution are
important attributes of a corporate
culture and constitute one of the more
critical factors forcing change in
corporate cultures."
(Drake, 1984, p.263).
Horton has theorised that the introduction of the notion of
'information management' into an organisation has a cultural impact in
terms of its implications for everything from organisational structure
and the redistribution of power, to the image and personality of the
organisation, and the style of the Chief Executive. 	 Unfortunately
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Horton declines to specify what he understands 'culture , to be, or
even the precise details of how information management influences an
organisation's cultural existence. Yet, despite Horton's lack of
sophistication the paper is a useful indicator of the range of effects
information and communication variables may have on an organisation's
culture, and is valuable insofar as it implicitly makes the case for a
thorough treatment of the themes it touches on.
This thesis recognises that the information and communication
dimension of an organisation will reflect the influence of its
culture. As Eldridge and Crombie ( 1 974, P.90 ) point out, the
distinctive characteristic of organisation at the social level is the
availability of choice, and 'the character of organisational choice is
one of the major manifestations of organisational culture'.
Organisations, we may hypothesise, will therefore get the
information/communication dimension they choose to possess, though
naturally within the constraints imposed .by resources such as time and
finance (Boddy & Buchanan, 1986). It should also be recalled here
that these 'choices' may not always be the result of conscious
deliberation, and are unlikely to be made with the concept of a
company information/communication dimension in mind.
Deal and Kennedy (1988, p.31) have argued that the beliefs and values
of a corporate culture 'suggest what kind of information is taken most
seriously for decision-making purposes - experienced judgement of "old
hands" in one organisation, detailed "number crunching" in another'.
But it seems more plausible to suggest that all aspects of information
and communication activity within organisations will be subject-to the
Influence of their cultural milieux.	 For example, culture may
determine whether communication within an organisation is
predominantly oral or written: if oral information exchange is
favoured the prevailing cultural norms could support either face-to-
face meetings or extensive use of an internal telephone network. If
written modes of information transmission are more acceptable then
either memos or reports may predominate.
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It is, however, not merely the predominance of a particular class and
type of communication which organisational culture can influence, but
a whole host of related variables, such as their structure,
duration/length, standardisation throughout the company and degree of
formality. Other elements of an organisation's formal
information/communication system - the use of ad hoc committees,
special 'task forces' and briefing groups, the extent to which new
information technology has been adopted and effectively implemented
and utilised, the scope for upward communication from junior
management and shopfloor operatives, resources devoted to collecting
and analysing externally derived information, and so forth, will all
reflect choices influenced and conditioned by cultural beliefs and
mores.
A limited amount of work has been conducted by researchers looking at
communication and culture in different types of organisation (rather
than corporations, which tend to be considered as a homogeneous set).
Etzioni's (1974) analysis of communication patterns in what he calls
'utilitarian' cultures represents an early attempt to match a specific
communication pattern to industrial concerns. Etzioni postulates that
in utilitarian organisations vertical instrumental communication (in
the guise of blueprints, technical textbooks, the directives of
experts etc.) will be emphasised as a condition of effective
production. In contrast, vertical expressive communication (in the
form of preaching and praising) is characterised as 'limited'.
Utilitarian organisations are considered a 'rational' organisation
type in which coordination, planning and centralised communication
are required as much as downward instrumental communication (see Read,
1959). In other words the red tape, files and archives that Weber
Interpreted as central characteristics of bureaucracies are recognised
byEtzioni to be indicators of an extensive instrumental communication
system. This analytical framework is too unidimensional and
restrictive to be used directly in this thesis; yet while limited in
terms of their scope and depth of analysis Etzioni's ideas do at least
provide a platform for further research and an indicator of the ways
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in which communication and culture can be juxtaposed in a theoretical
model.
Boisot (1987) offers a very different theoretical model for the
analysis of information and communication in organisations from a
supposedly 'cultural' perspective. His conceptualisation is heavily
dependent on two concepts, namely 'codification' and 'diffusion'.
Codification refers to the extent to which information is structured
or compressed, where spoken words and gestures are less codified (more
ambiguous) than writing, and writing less codified than expressions of
higher mathematics. Diffusion refers to the spread of information
throughout a population. While in theory the more codified a message
the larger its potential target audience, at the same time the greater
is the training required to understand it. According to Boisot:
"The two dimensions of codification and
diffusion create a culture space (C-
space) in which communication strategies
may be studied."
(Boisot, 1987, p.73).
Within this C-space 'knowledge' cycles, or patterns of information
flow are identified. Organisations, according to Boisot, are social
attempts to manage information flows, and an understanding of
lamledge cycles and how they work can only improve their performance.
His contention is that by placing the cycles in C-space the cultural
dimensions of knowledge creation are affirmed, and a link established
between the cultural strategies through which knowledge is structured
and shared, and the effectiveness with which organisations are
managed. Moreover, Boisot adds that the C-space defines an
information environment for the development of social conduct.
Boisot provides a picture of information exchange in terms of a simple
transaction model, or as he sometimes prefers to call it, a political
economy of information. He recognises four transactional strategies:
1) market transactions, where information is diffused and uncodified;
2) bureaucratic transactions, where information is codified and
unoiliffused; 3) fief transactions where information is both uncodified
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and undiffused and 4) clan transactions, where information is
uncodified but diffused. Transposed into an organisational setting he
posits the following analysis of the relationship between
codification, diffusion, information transactions and function:
codified
bureaucracies
(production dpt)
markets
(sales dpt)
fiefs	 clans
(R&D dpt)
	
(the board)
uncodified
undiffused diffused
Boisot proceeds to state four hypotheses based on this model:
1)Effective R&D departments are managed like fiefs;
2) Effective production departments are managed like bureaucracies;
3) Effective sales departments are managed like markets; and
4) Effective boards are managed like clans.
His contention is that a mismatch between the required position of
these functions as prescribed by his model and the actual management
style of these functions in organisations can be ascertained and
rectified to ensure their continued effectiveness.
3.17 Information and Organisational Decision Making 
Organisational decisions are classically seen as derived from an
estimate of uncertain consequences of possible actions and an estimate
of uncertain consequences of uncertain future preferences for those
consequences (Luce & Haifa, 1957; Taylor, 1975). Given this
=certainty, organisations make explicit and implicit decisions about
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seeking and using information that might improve estimates of future
consequences and future preferences. These decisions are also
presumed to be based on estimates of the expected benefits and costs
of particular information, information strategies, or information
structures.
Within this basic framework, search behaviour, investments in
information, and the management of information are driven by the
desire to improve decisions. The value of information depends in a
well-defined way on the information's relevance to the decision to be
ma* and on its precision, cost, and reliability. Information has
value if it can be expected to affect choice; it is a good investment
if its marginal expected return in improving decisions exceeds its
marginal cost (Raiffa, 1968; Marschak & Radner, 1972). This
perspective on decision making leads . to some simple expectations for
information utilisation. For instance, relevant information will be
gathered and analysed prior to decision. making; information gathered
for use in a decision will be used in making that decision; available
information will be examined before more information is requested or
gathered; needs for information will be determined prior to requesting
information; information that is irrelevant to a decision will not be
gathered.
Studies of the uses of information in organisations, however, reveal a
somewhat different picture. Feldman and March's (1981) observations
concerning the anomalies between the theory and the observed
information practices of organisations provides ample evidence of the
need for cultural factors to be taken into account by any more
sophisticated theory:
1) much of the information that is gathered and communicated by
individuals and organisations has little decision relevance;
2) much of the information that is used to justify a decision is
collected and interpreted after the decision has been made, or
substantially made;
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3) much of the information gathered in response to requests for
information is not considered in the making of decisions for
which it was requested;
4) regardless of the information available at the time a decision is
first considered, more information is requested;
5) complaints that an organisation does not have enough information
to make a decision occur while available information is ignored;
6) the relevance of the information provided in the decision making
process to the decision being made is less conspicuous than is
the insistence on information; i.e. most organisations and
Individuals often collect more information than they use or can
reasonably expect to use in the making of decisions.
Conventional explanations of the reasons why organisations are less
than informationally rational implicate human cognitive limitations,
organisational structures which separate information-gathering and
information-using functions, and a variety of communications problems
which have their origins in factors as diverse as politics (Pfeffer,
M), distance, technology and a host of personality variables.
While these aspects of organisational life are obviously important
this thesis maintains: 1) that their impact is usefully understood
within the embrace of the cultural metaphor and 2) that cultural
phenomena revealed by the cultural metaphor can enhance our
appreciation of the non-rational aspects of information and
communication activity within organisations.
It must be realised that information not only possesses symbolic value
(status, power etc.) but is itself susceptible to interpretation as a
symbol. Feldman and March (1981) have suggested the attractive
hypothesis that intelligent choice based on a 'rational' approach to
information is a central ideological construct of modern Western
Civilisation to which its organisations are fully committed:
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"The gathering of information provides a
ritualistic assurance that appropriate
attitudes about decision making exist.
Within such a scenario of performance,
information is not simply a basis for
action. It is a representation of
competence and a reaffirmation of social
virtue. Command of information and
information sources enhances perceived
competence and inspires confidence. The
belief that more information
characterises better decisions engenders
a belief that having information, in
itself, is good and that a person or
organisation with more information is
better than a person or organisation
with less. Thus the gathering and use
of information in an organisation is
part of the performance of a decision
maker or an organisation trying to make
decisions intelligently in a situation
in which the verification of
intelligence is heavily procedural and
normative. A good decision maker is one
who makes decisions in the way a good
decision maker does, and decision makers
and	 organisations	 establish	 their
legitimacy by their use of information."
(Feldman & March 1981, p.177-178).
Thus information gathering processes possess symbolic value in the
decision making process as an indicator that the 'correct' methods and
tools have been utilised; it follows that when the legitimacy of
decisions may be questioned or their future effectiveness contested,
the conspicuous consumption of information is a sensible strategy for
the decision makers. According to Feldman and March (1981)
information use has most symbolic value as a signal of professional
competence and decision legitimacy when performance criteria for the
decision are obscure, i.e. the intrinsic quality of the decision is
difficult to assess and/or when decision quality requires a long time
to establish. This is a particularly interesting consideration that
is further discussed with reference to case study material in Chapters
11 and 12
The dynamic and inter-causal role of the organisational variable
! information as symbol' requires some attention. Symbols create
beliefs and beliefs stimulate the discovery of new realities and the
exploration of new behaviour patterns. It follows that when
organisations invest in information or establish information systems,
however symbolic the initial reasons may be, they create a dynamic
that may reveal new justifications, new opportunities and new
behaviour possibilities. On the individual, as on the organisational
level, tactical uses of information may be used to mould beliefs and
shape the nature of cultural reality. One interesting consequence of
this analysis is that as organisational norms change, the relevance of
information as a symbol will also modify; while contemporary
commercial organisations demonstrate a broad commitment to reason and
rational choice based on information as a strategy for reducing
uncertainty, this mode of thinking may not remain culturally dominant
for ever.
3.18 Criticism of the Concept of Culture 
Allaire and Firsirotu (1981) have argued that organisational culture
is often treated as a cover term, inclusive of a multitude of
organisational features from norms and beliefs to values and customs,
and as such is of dubious utility. According to this view the concept
of culture awaits a theory and a method for displaying the complexity
of an interpretive system before it can be usefully exploited by the
researcher. There are two points of rebuttal to be made here:
1) just because culture is a difficult and inclusive concept does
not mean that it lacks explanatory or descriptive power, merely
that it must be used carefully with ample consideration given to
any definitional constraints imposed upon the notion within the
context of a particular piece of research; and
2) while it is certain that there is as yet no consensus on either
the theories or methods of cultural research in organisations
there are theories which can be used and methods which can be
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appropriated. They may not be perfect, but what theories and
methods in use in the social sciences could make such a claim?
In short, it is surely justifiable to adopt the theories and
methods currently used in the study of culture in an attempt both
to delineate their problems and limitations and to explore their
potential for yielding insights into organisational behaviour.
3.19 Conclusions 
While this review of the literature has sought to explicate the
intellectual traditions from which cultural theory has emerged, and
the diversity of views and contradictory stances promulgated by
scholars working in the field, no attempts have been made to evaluate
It as a research tool. Indeed, to do so here would be premature.
Instead, a detailed consideration of the merits and problems
associated with the cultural paradigm and the opportunities it has
opened up to students of organisational •behaviour is given as part of
the conclusions to this thesis. A further major omission from this
review is any attempt to define and elucidate precisely what is meant
by the concept of a 'cultural paradigm' as used in this research, and
this issue is also given a full treatment in Chapter 13.
What has been demonstrated is that culture is a useful metaphor which
enlarges and deepens our understanding of organisations by allowing us
to focus on those features of organisational life which other
metaphors fail to highlight. These aspects, facets and processes
emphasised by the cultural metaphor themselves form a set of variables
that have tremendous descripto-explanatory potential. 	 Furthermore,
this thesis maintains that the cultural approach to organisations may
constitute a social scientific paradigm and seeks to examine its
utility for researchers interested in information and communication
Issues in industrial concerns.
3.20 The Cultural Model as Understood in this Research
The cultural metaphor is too rich, too diverse, and too heterogeneous
to be used in a study such as this without considerable refinement.
The cultural metaphor as understood and employed in this research is
defined by the following theoretical propositions, which have been
abstracted from Chapter 2 and owe a special debt to Louis (1981):
1) the primary locus of culture is shared meaning or collective
understanding;
2) culture is, therefore, explored in its subjective guise, as
commonly held values, beliefs, norms, and widely known myths and
legends;
3) the cultural paradigm is oriented toward diagnosis and in-depth
understanding of social systems;
4) it s methodological and analytical predisposition is holistic;
5) culture is understood as a metaphor by which organisational and
organisation-related structures, events and processes may be
interpreted by those individuals who share in the cultural
system; and
6) cultural understanding and appreciation is achieved (both by
organisational employees and academic researchers) through a
complex process of interpretation.
3.21 The Information/Communication Dimension of Organisations as 
Understood in this Research
The following aspects of internal organisational information were
examined: its accuracy, timeliness, relevancy, sufficiency of detail,
amount, ease of location, and oral/written forms. Communications
within departments, whole subsidiaries and the Group itself were
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considered, as were the impact of new technology, the structure of the
management information systems (M.I.S.) and informal (grapevine)
information. For a complete list of all the questions on the semi-
structured interview schedule see Appendix 2.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CASE STUDY ORGANISATION
"...the same principles that animated
[the founder of the Group] animate his
successors today.	 Central to those
principles is	 recognition of the
Company's simultaneous obligations to
its consumers,	 customers, employees,
shareholders and the communities in
which it works. Implicit in such
recognition is the concept of management
not as the employer - that is the role
of the consumer - but as an agent whose
function it is to serve the interests of
all these parties and to weld them into
a harmony that provides pleasure for
all. For in a competitive economy those
who live to please must please to live."
(Johnson, 1968, p.31).
4.1 Introduction to the Group 
The Group consisted of a Holdings Board and five principal
subsidiaries. In addition to the main subsidiaries the Group owned a
small distributing company in the United States and part-owned two
others in West Germany and Hong Kong. The Holdings Board was
composed of four executive and two non executive directors the most
senior of these being the chairman and chief executive. The Group
employed approximately 3000 people of whom the vast majority were
women and more than half of whom were part-timers. The shareholder
profile for the Group revealed that no single individual or
institution owned more than 10% of the issued share capital, with
private individuals being the largest share-owning sector with 38.88%.
The principal activities of the Group were the manufacture,
distribution and sale of confectionery world wide. Within the U.K. it
had two products in the top twenty selling sugar confectionery brands
(The Grocer, 2.7.88). The Group's place in the industry was as one of
the leading manufacturers of sugar confectionery (after Trebor and
ffimmtree who accounted for 27% of sales between them) in a market
dominated by manufacturers of chocolate. While some sectors of the
market have contracted steadily over the past decade in 1988 the U.K.
market for sugar confectionery was still worth approximately V
Union, with medicated sweets, gums, jellies and pastilles showing
promising rates of growth. Nevertheless, nothing can disguise the
fact that this has been a declining market, and in 1988 there were 40
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fewer manufacturers of sugar confectionery 	 registered with the
Confectionery Alliance than in 1980.
4.2 The Impact of History
Culture is a constantly evolving feature of organisations, and any
attempt to understand the culture of an individual company must be
predicated on an understanding of the historical conditions from which
it has emerged. Interestingly in 1978 a written history of the
organisation had been produced by D.G. Johnson, the grandson of one of
the two men who had founded the company in the 1860's. This document
describes how in 1862 the company employed nearly 150 people. The
years immediately following the end of the first world war saw the
most striking expansion in the firm's history up to that time, with
profits reaching a level not attained again until 1950. The business
was converted to a private limited company in 1919. The death of the
last surviving partner was the prelude to the flotation of the
business as a public company in June 1926 with a capital of £250,000
in ordinary shares and £100,000 in preference shares. The £ ordinary
shares were marketed at 35/-, while the preference shares were
retained by the family who effectively continued to run the business.
By the time of the outbreak of the second world war the labour force
had increased to approximately 900 persons. Following the war, and
the abolition of rationing and other controls over raw materials in
1953, the business was built up through acquisitions and organic
growth to its present proportions.
Unfortunately the history of the company ends in 1978 and no updates
to the original document have so far been produced. While this fact
in itself is important, reflecting the change from an old family run
operation for which history and personalities were primary, to a more
modern, professional company, it also means that the significant
events of the last ten years have not been catalogued. During the
years from 1978 to the time this study was conducted in 1988 the
company had experienced a variety of events which had had a major
impact on its cultural life. The most important of these were a
recognition of the failure of the old diversification policies, a
takeover bid and a radical restructuring of the Group. Sufficient
time had also elapsed to allow a reappraisal of the former family-
oriented culture which many respondents recognised as being very
different from the contemporary phenomenon. These recent events were
widely known throughout the company and were salient features of the
cognitive landscape, and will, therefore, be considered in detail
here.
The company was essentially run as a family business until 1978 when
the last family Chairman retired. The dominant characteristics of
the pre-1978 family culture, which still held more than a residual
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influence over the Group, included a dominant 'Zeus'-figure Chairman
(see section 3.13), a preoccupation with status, and a destructive
amount of political in-fighting:
"It takes a long time to change the
corporate culture of a company. Status
was all important in the 1970's; you
know, you just had to be important....
I think [the company] had more managing
directors than any other company in
terms of how people described
themselves; you know, the Marketing
Director would describe himself as M.D.,
the production director would change his
name to manufacturing director so he
could describe himself as M.D..	 I'm
trying to get that out of the system."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.16,
no.79).
These characteristics were still recognisable, though fading, within
the Group's largest subsidiary (Company 1) which had the largest
coterie of long-serving senior managers of any of the subsidiaries
(see Chapter 5).
From 1956 until 1961 the company experienced a continuing decline in
profits due to increasing competition, especially from the chocolate
manufacturers, and while profits took an upward turn in 1961 they
remained shaky throughout the 1960's, compelling the Board to
reappraise its future policy:
"Faced with the continuing contraction
in the home market for sugar
confectionery after 1955 we seemed at
first sight to have only two
alternatives open to us: either a
progressive decline in our home sales
volume in common with the sugar
confectionery industry or an increase in
our share of a contracting market by
uneconomic advertising and promotional
expenditure. Either course would lead
to a further decline in profits and to a
future very different from that
envisaged in the years immediately
following the end of rationing in 1953.“
(Johnson, 1968, p.20).
At first the company sought to strengthen itself by consolidating its
position in the liquorice market and broadening its manufacturing
base, notably by acquiring a specialist company in the children's
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'own purchase' market in 1966. However, from 1976 the Board embarked
on a disastrous policy of diversification into other markets,
Including the importation of toys, audio and T.V. games, electronic
hand-held toys and calculators. The consequence of this haphazard
diversification programme was that in 1980 the company declared a loss
of £1.22 million. There followed a period of considerable change: the
Board was largely replaced with a younger team at a cost of £250,000
In redundancy money, many of the more recently acquired companies were
sold, and the core of the sugar confectionery business was
restructured and modernised ('Marketing' 15.3.84; 'Financial Times'
27.1.84). The cultural impact of this traumatic era had left scars
which had not healed eight years later, with caution and careful
consideration the dominant attitudes shaping the Group's strategic
planning; 'if I said they [plans] were 90% rigid that indicates a
conservatism which is borne out by the history and the image with
which this company is held.' (Chairman & Chief Executive, p19,
no.102).
Under new management the company's profitability began to improve
dramatically, which in 1984 led a local Yorkshire paper to assert that
'the board of [the Group] has done wonders in the last couple of years
in reviving what looked like a shipwreck of a business in the
seventies into the viable concern it is today' (Morning Telegraph,
26.1.84). The organisation's success did not go unnoticed and in 1984
Avana launched a hostile takeover bid for the company which valued it
at £16.5 million.	 The Board opposed the bid, incurring costs of
£271,000.	 Ultimately the shareholders did not find the offer
sufficiently attractive, and Avana managed to acquire less than 8% of
the company's shares. However, the cultural significance of this
mint should not be under-estimated; it made the company aware of just
how vulnerable it was to a determined predator and reinforced the
Board's emotional attachment to remaining an independent business.
Interestingly, senior and middle ranking managers in the subsidiaries
exhibited more ambivalent attitudes towards the prospect of being
taken over by the 'appropriate' company, many of whom anticipated that
this would lead to an increased resource allocation for their
subsidiary and enhance their opportunities for promotion.
The final major influence on the Group's corporate culture were the
restructuring programmes to which the Board had periodically subjected
the company. Until the late 1960's the Group was organised as a
federation of largely autonomous companies coordinated only at Board
level. A sudden change in philosophy initiated by the P.A. Consulting
Group which had been called in to recommend how the business could be
made more efficient, led to the large scale integration and
rationalisation of the company's manufacturing facilities and sales
forces. The result was that the Board of Company 1 gained effective
control of the day-to-day operations of the Group from 1971 onwards.
- 86 -
This massively centralised authority structure prevailed until the
180's. In 1984 Company 4 was purchased by the Group and allowed to
maintain considerable independence from Company 1 with favourable
results. The success of Company 4 and a growing dissatisfaction with
a Group structure which placed such a heavy responsibility for
maintaining profitability on a single subsidiary gave rise to a second
radical restructuring of the Group. In 1986 Company 2 and Company 3
were 'extracted' from Company 1 and total profit responsibility for
its own operation was devolved to Company 5. In 1988 each company had
Its own management team under its own managing director, and each
company was encouraged to build up and maintain the identity,
management philosophy and traditions which it had developed (is
developing) over the years; each was a profit centre seeking to
maximise its own profits subject only to the overriding authority of
the Holdings Board, which performed coordinating, liaising and
strategic management roles. The impact of this restructuring on the
Group's culture has been vast and complex, and is dealt with in
subsequent chapters.
4.3 The Cultural Impact of the Business Context 
The nature of the sugar confectionery industry within which the Group
operated was undoubtedly an influential factor determining the
structure and contours of its cultural life. It should not be
forgotten that the environment initially determines the possibilities,
options, and constraints on a company, and thus forces it to specify
Its primary task or function if it is to survive at all (Homans, 1950;
Schein, 1985). Fundamentally the business environment was perceived
to be largely unpredictable and almost totally uncontrollable,
perceptions which generated immense insecurity on the part of the
senior management team. The most important unpredictabilities in the
environment involved the costs of raw materials and the value of
Sterling on the world currency markets:
"Well, like anybody we're extremely
susceptible to the cost of raw material
variations	 and	 the	 currency
fluctuations. Yes, we are very
vulnerable in certain areas. We have a
major export business which is extremely
vulnerable to currency variations....
It's a slightly uncertain environment
but I don't think it's any worse than
probably any other commodity.
	 the
producer has to cope."
(Company Secretary, p.25, no.56).
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The environment was considered to be as uncontrollable as it was
unpredictable, partly due to the comparatively small size of the Group
relative to its principal competitors:
"We're a comparatively small fish you
know. We rate fairly high in sugar
confectionery, but sugar confectionery
itself is very much the poor relation of
the chocolate people. We're a brand
leader in some respects, and so on
occasions I think that the brand leader
has to perform like a brand leader, and
call the shots, but generally speaking
we have to swim with the tide."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.20,
no.95/96).
While many environmental variables were beyond the control of all
companies in the market the subject Group had the added problem that
only one of its products was sufficiently profitable to justify T.V.
advertising; its influence over market trends was therefore marginal,
adding to the Group's sense of vulnerability. The unpredictability of
the business context and its lack of amenability to control by the
Group were two causes of its historical tendency to introversion and
reliance on a production rather than marketing-led strategy, points
which are elaborated in succeeding chapters.
4.4 The Group and Data Analysis 
Three items of data that deserve special mention are:
1) that the company, in contrast to nine others approached, was
extremely enthusiastic about the possibility of taking part in
this research;
2) that the company was keen both to help a university researcher
and to gain feedback on its operations; and
3) the impressive degree of cooperation and apparent interest
manifested by the respondents interviewed.
To some large extent this openness reflected the enthusiasm of the
Chairman and Chief Executive of the company who was responsible for
sanctioning the conduct of the project and enlisting the help of his
Main Board colleagues and the managing directors of the subsidiary
companies. This is, however, not a sufficient explanation: that this
project was conducted in this company and at this time was also
indicative of the widespread belief that the Group as a whole was
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meeting the challenges of the market and confidence in its continuing
ability to expand and succeed.
The following six chapters of the thesis represents an interpretation
of the data according to the guidelines laid down by grounded theory
and ideas derived from the interpretive/organisational culture
literature. Chapters 5 to 8 provide an account of four of the Group's
principal subsidiaries, while chapter 9 is concerned with the culture
of the Group as a whole. Chapter 10 provides an overview of the
Group's culture, its strengths and weaknesses, the Holdings Board's
attempts to exert control over it and the forces for stability and
change both within and external to the organisation. Chapters 11 and
12 describe a new product launch at Company 2 from an
information/cultural vantage point, and seek to examine the
analytical/explanatory utility of this approach to organisational
behaviour.
These next eight chapters represent an exploration of the value of the
cultural paradigm for the critical understanding and elucidation of
the information and communication dimension of industrial
organisations. The emphasis of the analysis is on the problems and
difficulties	 the	 subject	 organisation
	 experienced	 in	 the
information/communication area and especially	 the question of the
extent to which cultural factors could account for them. It also
represents an attempt to provide a 'picture' of, inter alia, how the
organisation regarded information, how conscious it was of the role
played by information in its successful operation, the information
systems it employed, the quality of its internal communications, and
the information objectives it held and the strategies it had devised
for attaining them. This analysis naturally makes constant reference
to the cultural profile developed above in an attempt to evaluate and
to explain information and communication-related beliefs and values,
for the fundamental hypothesis of this thesis, that the cultural
paradigm is a useful tool for information scientists and scholars of
organisational communication, is here under test.
SUBSIDIARY 1
5.1 Introduction
Company 1 was the largest Group subsidiary, which in 1988 achieved
sales of £55 million and a trading profit of E2 million. It employed
approximately 1900 people of whom 700 were full time workers and 1200
were part timers; all 450 male employees worked full time while only
250 women enjoyed full time status. Until 1986 the history of the
Group and Company 1 were more or less synonymous (see Chapter 4).
Following the restructuring programme of 1986 Company 1 was faced with
a mister of problems resulting from a surplus of personnel and a
(levee of ill will among some senior employees whose responsibilities
had been diminished:
"Because this site was the Head Office,
and the chairman, M.D. and everybody
were here, I think we allowed overhead
to build up when this was the Group....
You really can't knock the top off a
building; you really can't clear people
out for clearance sake - it needs half a
generation or whatever to do that....
So I think it has its own specific
problems being the body that's left when
people keep tearing the arms and legs
off it, and there's a limit to how fast
you can react.... It's also a problem
for the senior management who came to be
managers of a multiple business: now
they are managers of one site."
(Managing Director l , p.14, no.16).
During the time period this study was conducted (May 1988 - Jan. 1989)
Company 1 was still reeling from the shock of the reorganisation, and
was only just beginning to focus on the challenges posed by the need
to reorganise itself, invest in modern information systems and set
realistic market objectives. The cultural ambiance was thus one of
reconsideration and refocusing on its image and 'mission':
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"I think it [the company] has got a
certain image as perceived on a local
basis and I think that's because we've
not made up our minds as an organisation
what we perceive it should be.... There
are directions being set, but again I
don't believe they're positive enough.
We still seem to be flying around and we
don't seem to have sorted out quite
where we want to go. Now I'm not saying
we should have, I'm just saying we seem
to have been in No Man's Land a bit too
long."
(Operations Manager% p.20, no.30/31).
Interestingly, some action had been taken to improve the internal
organisation of the largest department, the production function,
action which mirrored developments then taking place on the macro
(Group) scale. In 1984 the productidn director% in conjunction with
his colleagues on the Board of Company 1, decided to split the then
monolithic production department into three quasi-independent
manufacturing units. The restructuring of the department concerns
this research for two principal reasons: first, one of the motivations
for the restructuring was informational; and second, such a radical
alteration has, inevitably, had a significant impact on the production
culture within the company. A variety of memos and reports issued
between May 1984 and April 1985 provide a vindication for the plans to
restructure the department from an information/cultural perspective
in terms of the following points:
a) it was considered that the breadth of management within any one
unit should not be so wide that due attention could not be given
to 'all necessary matters'. Instead, a more compact span of
control was desired, which permitted individual managers to gain
a deep understanding of the affairs relevant to them;
b) it was thought that the distance between the workplace and the
senior managers should not be so great that ideas did not
penetrate all of the layers in the hierarchy in-between the
stuppfloor and the operations manager. 	 Rather, a far closer
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relationship was desired between all levels of management and
line workers, such that chains of communication which permitted a
faster and more open two-way dialogue were to be generated.
c) it was hoped that the restructured department would preserve and
enhance workforce loyalty towards their unit by defining their
work space more formally, hopefully ensuring that everyone who
lad a bearing on manufacturing would feel 'deeply and keenly
involved' in the products they helped to produce.
By the time this research was conducted the objective of establishing
two principal business units (one producing gums and jellies, the
Wier producing liquorice products and boilings) and a smaller similar
business unit producing powders and nougats, had been accomplished and
operational for approximately two years. Each business unit had been
developed as if it were a self-contained factory, having its own raw
materials storage. production and packaging facilities, and a range of
technical and other manufacturing services. In addition, the
management structure had been altered, Shortening the lines of
command; the operations managers were appointed as heads of the new
units and were answerable directly to the production director, just as
teems of four senior managers (a production manager, an engineering
manager, a quality control and hygiene manager and a manufacturing
services manager) were answerable to them. Many functions, however,
such as personnel, accounting, some technical services, warehouse and
distribution, stores, and purchasing remained centralised, and
serviced all three production units. Nevertheless, the original broad
strategy to provide each business unit with the resources sufficient
to develop its own production plan, to produce to that plan following
each order through to completion, to control its own quality, to
monitor its own costs, to maintain its own plant and machinery, to
identify and carry out its own technical improvements and to make its
own forward plans, had been realised.
The restructuring had generally been welcomed by the management teams
who felt that they were now more independent, confident and self-
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reliant. There was also some evidence that the smaller units were
becoming more cohesive, individuated, and '7..11turally distinct, with
individuals being very much aware of territorial boundaries between
units and the quite separate lines of authority and dependency which
had been instituted. Several respondents noted the dangers associated
with this new order, citing lack of coordination and integration of
ideas (see the comment by the unit engineer% directly below), and
intra-cultural/communication conflicts as actual or incipient problems
that required attention.
"The	 against	 [i.e.	 against	 the
restructuring] is that you don't have a
central	 engineering	 function,	 in
particular a central development
function, whereby we've got a packing
department here, gum unit have got a
packing department, and to a lesser
extent powder have *got a packing
department. In an extreme case you
could get three people working on
similar things and coming . up with three
different answers. So you could end up
with three different machines on site
needing three different lots of spares
keeping in stock, you know, things like
that....	 The advantage is that you're
given tighter control, you can react
quickly to problems; they're more
apparent, they come to the surface
quicker, you've less of them because
you've less machinery, less people to
look after. It has worked, I mean I
think the facts and figures that have
been produced will show that."
(Unit Engineering Manager% p.12,
no.71/73).
5.2 The Cultural Profile 
5.2.1
	
Personnel Orientation 
The company was concerned with the rights and working conditions of
its employees, had benevolent intentions towards them, and took pride
in its ability to provide so many people with jobs:
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"If nothing else there's a feeling that
it's a company that is available to them
as employees."
(Managing Director l , p.13, no.1).
However, some middle ranking and senior managers noted a number of
'problems' with the company's personnel orientation, indicating an
oppositional sub-culture. These individuals pointed out that while
poor performance was tolerated, high achievement was treated with a
similar indifference, making for a philosophy of 'low expectation
paternalism':
"We're paternalistic, but we are a low
expectation paternalism, so the
paternalism will mean that on the one
hand we will put up with a poor
performance for years and years, but the
other side of that is that you don't
reward the high performers, so the
paternalism is only one way. You're not
overall being warm and everybody being
people-oriented, because we're not. The
people orientation occurs by the fact of
not expecting. enough of people I
believe."
(Assistant Production Manager 1 , p.26,
no.47)•
"We certainly accept ourselves that we
care a great deal and we are very proud
of telling other people that we care a
great deal, and we do care at a certain
level. I'm not suggesting that the
hierarchy throughout the organisation
has a different degree of caring, we do
care about the basics of providing bread
and butter. I'm not sure that we are
sufficiently [caring] about the jam....
I think that we are a caring
organisation in that we would not want
to tear up a person's livelihood... but
I'm not sure that we are as sensitive to
the needs to provide the living
standards. I have a particular thing
about this that I think that a person
who does a good job, consistently,
deserves to increase his reward package
fairly routinely."
(Production Director 1 , p.26, no.25/26).
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In sum, Company l's personnel orientation was based on strong
egalitarian principles, which stressed the equal value of individuals
and individual rights, and was far less concerned with their abilities
and motivation.
5.2.2	 Loyalty
There was intense loyalty to the company and to its products. This
1.(milty was evident at all levels in the hierarchy from the shopfloor
operatives to the managing director. The high levels of loyalty had
developed largely because of the considerable numbers of long serving
individuals employed by the company. The relaxed, casual,
uncompetitive and caring culture of the organisation were also
undoubtedly conducive to this end:
"Being an employee of [Company 1] for 25
years, I have got to say that they have
been very good to me and they are
conscious that they have people working
for them, and they're good to them, and
if they can do anything to help they
will."
(Production Planner% p.13, no.48).
"The people care, and they're proud of
the product and they're proud of the
packaging."
(Managing Director% p.13, no.1).
5.2.3	 Informality
The culture was characterised by a high degree of informality. This
informality was associated with a perceived lack of clear lines of
minority, democratic norms which effectively precluded management by
threat, fear or cajolement. There was also a cultural preference for
face-to-face communication, relatively unrestricted access to
information resources, and informal and ad hoc information exchange
which encouraged individuals to use each others' first names rather
than job title or surnames:
"We have a department which is very
loose, there's no formality, there's no
— 95 —
The informality sometimes does
lead right the way through the
structure, of people not perceiving
where their bands of authority start and
where they finish.	 What I'm really
saying is that informality actually can
work against the hierarchy of
management; 'cos you try to impose a
hierarchical structure on a structure
which has been very much informal, very
democratic. If somebody's wanted to
know something then they've been told,
but maybe that should have been the
case, maybe they shouldn't have known
that anyway because it's not their job
to know it because if the knowledge of
pooling information is fairly general
within any working group of people, if
you try and impose a structure which
says 'I'm responsible for the totality,
immediately below me is responsible for
a bit less than that l ithen you start to
get people saying 'I'm not motivated
because noone's telling me what's going
on above me'."
(General Manager, Trade Development%
p.11, no.56).
From the point of view of this thesis the most interesting
manifestation of the cultural preference for informality was the
tendency to rely on informal, unplanned communication:
"The only planned meeting I have lasts
for about an hour and a half once a
week, apart from the morning coffees....
That's because I believe in arranging
meetings for specific topics rather than
just sitting down having a meeting where
people can get into a mode of just
preparing answers for meetings rather
than getting on with the job. If
something needs solving as a group then
we will form a meeting quite quickly
because we're all within eye-shot....
So it has to be pertinent, but again I
know lots of industries who live on
meetings. Personally I'm dead against
that, that's totally negative; people
try to behave positively in meetings and
not on the shopfloor."
(Operations Manager% p.4, no.29).
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"The situation close at hand is that if
I'm not telling someone what they need
to know they'll come and ask me. We are
a fairly close-knit team in that
respect.... But it's very informal."
(Unit Engineering Manager', p.10, no.62)
Informality was not only linked to democratic and consensual norms
(see section 5.25) but the relaxed and casual approach to work
sanctioned by the more general company culture. Conjunctively these
traits forged a work environment which permitted individuals to avoid
taking responsibility and making decisions and an ethos which
mitigated against corrective and remedial action being taken with
respect to those individuals who failed to fulfil the remit of their
duties. Almost inevitably difficulties occurred which could at times
trigger a breakdown of normal company cooperation, with conflict
supported by individuals political and promotional aspirations finding
vent in the withholding and distorting of information.
5.2.4
	
Lack of Professionalism
Company 1 possessed a culture lacking in professional values and
ability. Outside the senior management team the level of professional
competence was especially low. This reflected the low priority
training had in the past received from the company, a fault which had
been recognised and for which remedial treatment was being taken:
"It's [the Sales and Marketing
Department] become more skilled, I think
probably the training is better."
(Product Group Manager, Development%
p.3, no.21).
"We're quite heavily involved in
training. Basically the lower levels of
management at the current time, the
supervisors, forepeople etc.... And the
response has been exceptionally good
because bearing in mind that most of
these supervisors are middle-aged ladies
who've never been on a course, [and]
were exceptionally worried to
	
start
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with, the response has been phenomenal
when they come back."
(Operations Manager% p.12, no.60).
Lack of professionalism was not, however, restricted to shopfloor
operatives, clerks and junior salesmen. There were also some long
serving senior managers nearing retirement whose professionalism was,
to say the least, questionable. In this case, it was not so much a
lack of training as a tendency to promote from within (rather than
bring talented outsiders into the organisation) that was a primary
cause of this state of affairs:
"Relaxed is a nice way of putting it.
It's not really relaxed, it's 'does it
matter? - it doesn't matter to me'. The
age structure doesn't help. We've got
quite a few senior managers who are on
the glide path to retirement now and are
not striving for anything for themselves
anymore; therefore, what they want is a
relatively quiet life, but it's at the
expense of any kind of drive or success.
There is nOne throwing up trees out
there."
(Assistant Production Manager% p.27,
no.57).
This cultural trait was manifested in diverse ways:
a)	 A reliance on out-moded systems and a resistance to change:
"Well I think it [the company] has got,
well, the feeling that comes across to
me, again going back to the older
element in particular is this feeling
of, 'we've been like this for 20 years,
it's always worked like this, it still
works, we don't have to cange'."
(Unit Engineering Manager', p.23, no.60)
b) A casualness in approach, in terms of
goals set and control mechanisms:
"I don't think we set ourselves too
tight objectives and the repercussions
aren't there should we fail to meet
them.
c) Painstakingly slow decision making processes:
"The decision making process here is
rather subtle. you start off by saying
well, 'what decisions?'.... Whether by
design or accident, I'm not quite sure
which, it tends to happen that decisions
which aren't made and which one might
get wound up about at not being made, it
tends to be that the root cause for the
decision actually goes away, so it is
not wrong not to have made the decision
in the first place, which is
interesting. You could say it's rather
subtly clever. Decisions that have to
be made, I think probably do get made.
Those which folk might jump at making
perhaps prematurely, are seen for what
they are."
(Production Director 1 , p.27, no.30).
d) An unwillingness to make decisions and take responsibility
"A lot of people expect decisions to be
taken for them, and to not really have
to put any effort into that decision
making process, because it's outside
their control, they can't have any
influence on that decision, whereas the
opposite may be true."
(Unit Engineering Manager, p.24, no.82)
"It comes back to the whole style. Some
people are frightened to actually admit
to themselves that they are responsible
for something not having gone right; and
because historically they've never been
found out in that sense and nobody's
really slapped them down really
hard...."
(General Manager, Trade & Development%
p.12, no.63).
(Operations Manager% p.25, no.63).
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5.2.5
	
Democracy and Autocracy
The culture of Company 1 was democratic, featuring both consensual and
participative norms and values. The democratic nature of the the
culture was apparent from a variety of beliefs:
a) that there was and should be a general openness of style:
"I think we operate in a very open
style, so yes, it's an open operation."
(General Manager, National Accounts%
p.9, no.66).
b) that decisions should be made in teams or by committees:
"We tend to make a lot of decisions by
committee, which can prove dangerous."
(Product Group Manager, Development%
p.3, no.23).
"I see myself as a leader and co-
ordinator; I'd sooner the team made a
decision rather than me saying 'we are
doing that'. I mean I can only think of
2 occasions where I've had to say 'I'm
sorry, I win the shooting match, we're
going to do it this way to start off
with'. That has happened a minimum of
times."
(Operations Manager l
 p.14, no.74).
c) the preference for an 'inclusive' decision making process,
involving as many people as possible in pre-decisional
discussions:
"I must admit that the democracy within
the department, you know, we do discuss
things right down to clerical level."
(Wages Manager l , p.17, no.33).
I would like to think that people are
consulted before decisions are made."
(Management Accountant', p.18, no.62).
d) the decentralisation of authority, especially within the
production department:
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"Decisions, say, regarding investment,
in buying machinery, is very definitely
devolved; it's autonomous within the
unit. We make our own decisions about
machines, what we want, what we are
going to do, etc.... I must say that in
9 times out of 10, 99 times out of 100,
I find that authority, I would say for
me, is devolved.... In terms of my
operational decisions I think it's
fairly well devolved."
(Assistant Production Manager, p.29,
no.68).
Given the extent to which the company was democratic there was an
almost inevitable reaction against what was perceived to be
'excessive' democracy, which was linked by some respondents to the
organisation's casualness and lack of professionalism:
"At the moment I think it's very
democratic in that people are consulted
quite a lot and things,, policies, are
thrashed quite a bit before a decision's
made. I suspect it's probably a little
bit too democratic at the moment. I
would personally prefer [a] little bit
more dominance if you like, because I
think people respond to it; they like to
feel that the Board are making decisions
rather than asking them all the time."
(Finance Director, p.22, no.57).
"...we hold it as a good thing to be
democratic. I'm all for democracy,
[but] at the end of the day somebody's
got to have hold of the reigns — make a
decision. I think in Company 1 we tend
to be too democratic and things slide
for too long."
(Operations Manager, p.25, no.63).
Moreover, the democratic style could be distinctly 'combative', with
emotion substituting for rational discussion and debate flavoured with
political and personal animosities:
"...have I used the word 'adversarial'?
- there is a tendency within [Company 1]
to debate and discuss issueu, not by
reference to the broad issues on the
table, but by reference to a stream of
specific examples, and discussion has to
be adversarial in nature."
(Production Director 1 , p.18, no.86).
5.2.6	 Competition and Cooperation 
The cultural values of Company 1 favoured internal co-operation over
competition, though again there was an oppositional sub-culture:
"I	 think	 it	 is	 unhealthily
collectivist."
	 •
(Production Director% p.10, no.43).
To some extent this emphasis on co-operation was determined by the
executive directors of the company who saw their own 'collectivist'
work ethic reflected in the cultural fabric of the organisation:
"If the Board set themselves up as
individualists who are battling against
each other for recognition or something,
then I guess that permeates all the way
down. If the Board tend to see
themselves as a team, then that will
work its way down. I think that we are
seen more as a team than perhaps the
Board used to be seen as"
(Finance Director', p.22, no.56).
Perceived functional necessity also played a role, in that the need to
cooperate to ensure task achievement effectively constrained the
development of a competitive ethos. Thus while some attempts had been
made to introduce an element of competition between shopfloor
operatives in production (for example, by posting up machine
efficiencies), these were extremely small-scale and limited, as
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cultural beliefs failed to attribute significant merit to competitive
action:
"Other than the pride they have in their
own section it [competition] wouldn't
be, you wouldn't gain anything, because
they are so closely inter-knit that you
really want one end result, you wouldn't
want four good results making one
result, you're after one result."
(Operations Manager2 , p.2, no.6)
In sales and marketing a competitive ethos was more actively
encouraged by means of a system of information bulletins which
informed salespeople which of them had performed best against a
variety of criteria, and a performance related bonus scheme. But this
competition was restricted to the salesforce in the field rather than
the managerial team resident on site:'
"If you are saying 'do individual sales
managers compete against their other
sales territories?/, yes of course they
do. This is what the name of the game
is. It's inspiration, if a guy can beat
another one or a girl for that matter,
then that's what it's about. Regular
bulletins are issued saying who's top of
the pile this week or next week and so
forth."
(General Manager, National Accounts%
p.10, no.68).
The finance department was the most cooperative of all, with no
cultural support for competition at any level in the management
hierarchy being evident:
Q: "Is competition encouraged between individuals?"
A "No, it's probably more than any other job a team job.... We're
all aiming for the same thing, to get people paid on time. We
know that if we drop behind we're not going home.... And there
is closeness between the girls, they're always helping one
another because of the common objective, and the common having to
stay at night if you don't achieve the objective, or work through
your dinner....
	
I wouldn't say there's competition between
people." (Wages Manager', p.10, no.67).
Q: "Is competition between sections within finance encouraged?"
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A: "I wouldn't say it's encouraged, I don't think it exists."
(Sales Ledger Manager% p.2, no.7).
Company 1 possessed a highly cooperative and collectivist culture, the
values and beliefs of which eschewed competition at all but the most
junior levels. A newly arrived manager who had previously been
socialised into a culture which demanded competitive action voiced his
frustration at the lack of competitive inclinations of Company 1,
providing us with a qualitative observation of the strength of the
cooperative values espoused by its culture:
"The important thing about
competition... is, of course, though you
wouldn't notice it from looking at
Company 1, actually we are in a deeply
competitive marketplace.... I don't see
the evidence of this competition. There
are just a few people who are trying to
compete with themselves, with other
areas	 within	 the	 factory,	 other
departments, other managers, and in so
doing... succeeding.... In fact, the
converse where you get someone who is
trying to compete it's usually regarded
with suspicion."
(Assistant Production Manager% p.13,
no.72).
5.2.7	 Conflict and Confidence 
Among senior managers levels of trust and confidence were now
generally high, a cultural feature that had changed quite recently:
"I think for a while there was an
element of fear within this business -
that's gone."
(Managing Director% p.16/17, no.86).
However, more than any of the other Group subsidiaries there was
considerable variation between the departments in terms of their
conflictual activity. Within production there was little evidence of
conflict between higher ranked managers in each of the three
manufacturing units, which were operated by small teams who met
regularly during the course of a working day:
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"We have a social coffee meeting every
morning. We, [operations managerl]
myself and the other managers get
together to have a drink of coffee and
we discuss work, we discuss families,
everything
	
gets	 discussedit's...
really. It's quite a good way of
getting people together, and getting
people to trust one another. Possibly
when you trust one another you're not so
worried about letting little secrets
out."
(Unit	 Engineering	 Manager 1 ,	 p.11,
no.68).
"...we are a relatively small team and
we talk to each other fairly frequently,
and there is a professionalism as well.
Despite all the things I've said about
what is actually making people tick and
blow the world apart or not, nonetheless
in terms of professional relationships.
I think we are quite confident at
passing information to and fro
accurately."
(Assistant Production Manager 1 , p.16,
no.89).
Mere was greater scope for misunderstanding and conflict between
senior production managers and the junior managers, shopfloor
operatives and their representative unions, who had not been so
successfully socialised into the high confidence culture:
"...when dealing with shop stewards,
'production director said....' Now
production director didn't say anything
of the sort, or if he did he said it in
a context quite different to that in
which it is being quoted. That happens
obviously not infrequently."
(Production Director l , p.18, no.89).
"I think management withhold far too
much information. I mean they do tell
us news but I don't think they trust us
fully, you know, I think they just tell
us what they want us to know."
(Despatch transport% p.2, no.8).
The scope for conflict between the three manufacturing units was also
quite considerable, partly because of the dependency of Unit 1 on Unit
2 for some of its products, while fully independent of Unit 1
itself. In addition, individuals were already beginning to identify
with the unit in which they worked, and were coming to consider the
area, equipment and products they produced as somehow more meaningful
and significant than the others. In short, the three manufacturing
units were beginning to develop distinct cultural identities which
harnessed the energies and loyalties of the personnel who worked
within them.
There was also evidence of tension between production and engineering
managers:
"...we're going back to this
production/engineering thing again. To
a production person engineering is just
telling that bloke to do that job, and
he does it there and then, that's it.
It's not quite that easy. They can't
understand that it can take an hour to
get a part out of the Stores, things
like this. They can't understand that
if a fitter's stood in the workshop he's
not idling his time. And I suppose
being fair about it, it's difficult for
me to see why a woman can't press the
buttons on the machinery every time; and
if she doesn't do it why she can't have
a kick up the backside sometime to make
sure she does it right next time."
(Unit Engineering Manager 1 , p.26, no.99)
Such tensions were, though, of minor significance compared to those
conflicts which could develop between the sales and the marketing
sections of the sales and marketing department where actions could
take on a quasi-political guise:
"Let's be honest, the theory of
marketing is a dream-world, and the
theory of selling is reality. Putting
together the dream and the reality can
be an awful bloody nightmare sometimes."
(General Sales Manager% p.3, no.17).
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"There is quite a lot of aggression
between sales and marketing,
occasionally arguments get heated."
(Product Group Manager, Development%
p.2, no.12).
Here channels of communication could occasionally break down, with
information being manipulated for sectional advantage, or deliberately
held-up:
"[Before the two departments were
conflated] we didn't always communicate
all the things, and there sometimes
were, not politics in the real sense of
the word, but there were departmental
politics, and so you didn't always get
the whole truth and nothing but the
truth."
(General Manager, Sales & Marketing%
p.11, no,50).
"It's basically the sales side, because
we do have clashes and when we have
clashes about certain things it makes
you less inclined to communicate with
them for a length of time."
(Product Group Manager, Development%
p.3, no.14).
Nevertheless, there was a general consensus that the binding forces of
mutual dependency which held the two sections together were far more
powerful than the tensions which sometimes arose between them,
especially since both departments had been placed under a single
combined marketing and sales director:
"...there is a slight inhibition I
suppose, or difference between sales
people and marketing people, by the very
nature of their basic jobs. But what is
totally understood I hope is that one
cannot do without the other. I mean
it's mutually beneficial.., and the
lines in modern times are getting more
and more blurred anyway, so they've got
to be good."
(Sales & Marketing Director 1 , p.9,
no.63)
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Idliat is interesting here is that for a meaningful analysis of Company
Vs cooperative and competitive cultural characteristics to be made
separate accounts of the three main functional areas investigated have
had to be given. This has important implications for the initial
hypothesis that a single corporate culture could be identified for
each individual company. In fact, in the view of the author Company 1
can be described as possessing an essentially cooperative culture, but
as has been demonstrated this broad generalisation leaves much unsaid.
5.2.8	 Narrowness and Introspection 
Individuals knowledge and experience within Company 1 tended to be
bounded by their functional speciality, which in many cases meant that
employees had little knowledge of the business outside the specific
task they performed in one area of one department. Cultural norms
dictated that senior managers based in one department did not
'Interfere' in the operation of the others, and had little idea what
problems they faced. The narrow and introspective focus of
Individuals was cemented by the use of technical vocabularies and
jargon terms that made inter-departmental understanding exceedingly
difficult:
"Unfortunately we are a typical role
culture, and particular functions keep
fairly separate, and having their own
specialisms; and because of this we tend
to operate with jargon. Therefore,
engineers may talk one language and
marketing people [another]; people can
start using terms which others don't
understand."
(Assistant Production Manager 1 , p.4,
no.20).
One reason for this cultural trait was the sheer size of the company
and its departments:
"It's too big a company for people to
Intermingle. It's like catching
different buses and seeing different bus
conductors;	 they're all doing the same
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job, but they're all on different
routes."
(Secretary to Finance Director% p.2,
no .6).
But narrowness of outlook was also the result of a deliberate company
policy not to move people across a broad range of functions:
"I think that the way in which the
personnel ethos [works] is quite
important as to how people react to each
other and how open or closed they are.
I think people are normally quite open
with each other; they're probably more
open within functions than across
functions. A lot of that is to do with
the company being very much functional
specialists, which I suppose comes back
to one of my personal angles, that we
don't have this personnel policy of
trying to cross-fertilise people. The
personnel policy seems to be directed
more within the functions than across."
(Finance Director1 , p.24, no.78).
5.2.9	 Production-constrained and Marketing-led 
The company was obviously constrained in terms of what it could
manufacture and how efficient the production runs were by the
facilities and skills of the production department. Given. these
constraints, it was a company that, at senior management levels,
recognised the need to be responsive to the demands of the market.
This perception of the need for the company to pursue a fluid,
marketing-led strategy was even evident at more junior levels within
production:
"The main objectives are rigid; that we
endeavour to perform to standard or
better than standard as a routine basis.
But the plans to achieve that are
reasonably fluid because the business is
quite fluid. So we constantly review it
to see if we can put together a better
format to perform more efficiently. If
you look at the future then again it's
quite fluid, because being a marketing-
led company then we have to be as
— 109 —
responsive as possible. So that I can
perceive that I need to enable me to
produce to forecast, and what I see in
the future,	 then that can alter
dramatically	 with	 new	 products,
whatever."
(Operations Manager l , p.22, no.50).
While it was recognised that there was a need to be responsive to the
demands of the market and to create 'brands' rather than products that
could not be easily distinguished from other similar items, the
company was not wholly marketing-led. The production department was
by far the largest of the functional areas, the production director
was extremely influential and traditionally the company had relied on
the skills of the production team and the quality of its products.
All these factors combined to forge a culture which made it difficult
for the marketing and sales department to take control of the
direction of the company. This is not to say that the department had
not had its successes, the recent re-launch of the organisation's most
famous product was, for example, widely positively regarded within the
company. But the organisation continued to rely heavily on products
it had developed years ago, and although steps were being taken to
strengthen these in the market and the appointment of a separate
marketing director was imminent, the constraints imposed by production
seemed likely to prevail for some time to come.
5.2.10	 Pace of Activity
The corporate culture of Company 1 supported a relatively slow pace of
work activity for individual employees and of progress for the company
asawhole:
"I think it [the company] always seems
to move only when it is safe to do so,
and always with balance;	 the great
corporate phrase is 'balance'. It is
not a risk management organisation....
I think we are generally slower to adopt
change, and I think that we should be
further down the road than we presently
are.	 If we were more aggressive and
more ready to
	 take	 on	 more
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reorganisation, we would be further
forward."
(Production Director 1 , p.25/26,
no.20/29).
"It is a fairly relaxed company compared
with the companies I've worked in."
(Secretary to Finance Director 1 , p.1,
no.5).
Interestingly, there were a few respondents who rejected the idea that
the company culture milil-ated against quick responses:
"I think we're perceived externally as a
relatively slow moving company....
think internally we can actually be a
lot more responsive than that, and
occasionally we are	 but it takes a
long while for the perception to
change."
(Finance Director% p.22, no.60).
Possibly the least relaxed department was sales and marketing, the
high external profile of which encouraged a more vigorous approach to
their work tasks. However, the difference was not so marked as might
have been expected, and it was evident that the all-pervasive company-
wide bias towards a 'measured response' combined with the department's
dependency on other areas of the business which made it futile to move
too quickly, were restraining forces:
"The information I seek and search for
is usually perhaps filling in prices,
recipes.... There is a lot of work
behind the scenes in these areas and I
think rather than me describing it as
being late I think it's me putting the
pressure [on] in terms of saying, 'look,
I'd like that yesterday'; and generally
speaking I find that people are
responding well with that and therefore
it is not a cause to complain, it would
be unfair to judge them being late."
(General Manager 1 , p.4/5, no.19).
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5.3 Information/Communication Profile 
5.3. 1	 The M.I.S.: evolution 
The M.I.S. in place at Company 1 had developed, with continuous up-
dating over a long period of time. The most recent changes that had
been implemented had been made necessary by the restructuring of the
Group. However, the basic structure of the M.I.S. had a long history,
and was in sympathy with the culture of the subsidiary.
5.3.1.1	 Description
Board meetings held every two months were complemented by business
development meetings for all senior executives and senior managers;
these represented an opportunity for the managing director to give a
monthly overview of the business and for problems and opportunities
affecting the whole business to be discussed.
The sales and marketing department relied heavily on a large number of
pre-arranged meetings, many of which were minuted, rather than the
production of detailed written reports. The most important reports
taat were generated were: 1) the national accounts manager's monthly
report on each of his accounts, which gave a summary of year on year
comparisons for them together with information on recent innovations
and projected trends; 2) a four weekly forecast of sales six months
ahead, largely for the benefit of production and stock control and
notoriously inaccurate; and 3) a board report, produced by the sales
and marketing director for Company 1 board meetings. A large-number
of&thoc reports were also produced concerning various aspects of the
market.
The department thrived on meetings. The four general managers met
weekly, with every fourth meeting being chaired by the sales and
marketing director. These meetings were complemented by six-weekly
meetings of senior sales and marketing personnel. There was also a
new product development meeting involving all the marketing and senior
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sales personnel. Specifically for the field salesforce, the general
sales manager held six-weekly meetings with his three divisional
managers and met his twelve area managers for a development meeting
two or three times a year. A number of training and ad hoc meetings
were also normal.
The finance department produced annual statutory accounts and an
annual budget. The main report compiled was the four weekly
management accounts, which was an extremely detailed document of circa
50 pages detailing the sales and expenses by department and function
OPUS the company. A number of smaller subsidiary reports fed into
the management accounts. Financial forecasts were made concerning the
cashflow (weekly for the next four and twelve months), capital
expenditure forecasts and less regular profit forecasts. Within the
department the financial director was involved in just two bi-monthly
meetings, the first with the senior computing staff and the second
with senior financial staff. These meetings were not usually minuted,
though action points were noted if exceptional problems arose. Due to
the spatial proximity of the individuals concerned more formal
meetings were considered unnecessary.
A series of regular meetings kept the production director in touch
with his senior production team in the three manufacturing units.
Each unit produced an annual budget. Within the units a variety of
:worts aimed at facilitating day-to-day operational efficiency were
produced, such as production plans, labour cost control documents,
efficiency figure reports and plant maintenance reports (for the
benefit of engineers). Some ad hoc reports, justifying the purchase
of new equipment for instance, were also produced.
5.3.1.2	 Problems of the M.I.S. 
Despite the concerted effort that was being made to improve the
wasting formal information systems and to develop new ones the fact
remained that there were still considerable problems with Company l's
M.S.. This was recognised throughout the organisation:
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"Our systems are not up to the rate of
change that we are trying to achieve.
The detailed major quality time limits
of the information which we need is not
up to the sophistication and complexity
of the market place."
(Production Director 1 , p.30, no.47).
"If we talk about information systems
within the company, it's a recognised
fact that the information systems within
the company suffer from having been left
alone for between 7 and 10 years because
the investment required to put in new
computers and so on was not forthcoming.
We were having difficult times, we were
behind."
(General Manager, Marketing & Sales%
p.2, no.3).
Within the production units problems frequently arose because the
systems could not cope with the large amounts of small information
Items that needed to be transmitted:
"I suspect it's [communicationl quite
poor... because seldom in terms of
measurement of our business success do
we do things right first time; do we
provide customers with all of their
orders all of the time or alternatively
make other arrangements? I think the
answer is that no, we tend not to. We
fall down quite a lot of the time
because we tend to work in a fairly
compartmentalised sort of way, and it is
such a complicated business with such a
large amount of small information items,
ideally being required to be passed
around the business, and there isn't
sufficient time in the day for all of
those items of information that need to
be passed and therefore folk guess that
something is happening, and they haven't
heard to the contrary, and of course
it's not happening. At the end of the
day in terms of manufacturing the
customers orders, most of the problems I
think arise not from or a lack
of effort but rather because of systems,
which I think perhaps are overloaded for
the purpose and information 'float'
which tries to by-pass systems in order
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to pass through the system bottleneck.
That's when I think problems start to
occur - when that verbal information
breaks down."
(Production Director 1 , p.17, no.78).
A major problem was that some internally produced information was
lallown to contain a high margin of error, making reliance on it for
planning and decision making purposes extremely problematic. From the
point of view of production both financial and sales forecast
information could pose difficulties:
"People in the engineering department
are generally able to be reliable in
what they say about what they are about;
the administration department
(personnel) are high percentage accurate
in what they regard as items of
administration, and don't often get
things wrong regarding people. The
financial data we get, the financial
information with which we are provided
regarding our performance, and indeed
our own information regarding
performance is not as reliable as we
would like, but we know often in which
areas it's not reliable. We don't know
why. The least reliable information
comes without doubt from sales and
marketing who are quite often fairly
substantially inaccurate; for instance
sales forecasting."
(Assistant Production Manager% p.1/2,
no.8/9).
A further difficulty for the production teams was that, because of the
Inefficiency of the information collecting and processing systems much
Information produced by the finance department was very untimely:
"...if you take for instance the
management accounts analysis of a
particular period, it is always at least
two weeks and usually three weeks after
the end of the period, so it's actually
seven weeks old in relation to the
beginning of the period, and that is an
extremely wide gap if you are going to
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take any kind of action related to those
figures."
(Assistant Production Manager l , p.3,
no.14).
There was a lack of information in certain areas, notably concerning
the profitability of product lines which made production planning and
marketing and sales strategies impossible to develop economically
rationally:
"Because of the way we manufacture foam
if you sort of think it through, we
manufacture foam by the trayful, but
different types of foam products, we
have different quantities per trolley
and they sell at different profit
margins, so the real question is if
you've only got a limited number of
trays that you can process, we ought to
look at the profitability per tray for
the various types of products and see
which products give us the blzgest pence
per tray. The information Isn't really
available. Having thought the thing
through what we need to do is to get
this information through."
(Production Director 1 , p.5, no.24).
There was a wealth of information that had not yet been extracted from
the memories of individuals and keyed into a computer database or even
written down:
"The thing that struck me I think when I
first started, was how much information
is kept in peoples' heads, on the
production side especially. We've got
sort of experts who can poke and prod at
the product and say 'oh yeah we need a
little bit more of this, or a little bit
more of that'. There are recipes
written down, but I've never seen
anything that really goes into - if you
prod it and your finger goes in half an
inch it's alright.... Again, from the
engineering point of view, we need to
get the processes broken down more
technically and define the parameters
that make up the systems. You know we
might say it's a very humid day so line
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two won't run very well. Now as we go
further down the route of automating the
plant I need to know is it the R.A.H.,
is it the amount of moisture in the air
that causes the problems, and if that's
the case what do we do to overcome it
and make the parameter consistent for
our process. A lot of that kind of
information is not readily to hand, has
to be prized out of people's heads."
(Unit Engineering Manager% p.10,
no.63/64).
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, a vast array of day-to-day operational
information/communication problems were exemplified by the respondents
ranging from an inability to locate desired information to an
inability to keep track of the workforce:
"There was a privately owned customer
called *** we got an order from. When
we get orders we check on the computer
to make sure that if there is some stock
in we may use it if it doesn't belong to
another order, and the computer was
showing that we had some stock, so we
tried to locate the order that the stock
would be used for, because with *** we
only pack to order. It took ages and we
never located it, and there must have
been an order in the first place. So
whether it just had not been despatched
or not I just don't know, and we didn't
find out either."
(Production Planner 1 , p.3, no.28).
"We get a lost tribe every shift. There
are 4 or 5 people we can't account for.
They are out there somewhere. Well you
are paying them. Their clock cards have
been clocked, but we just don't know
where they work. It's a problem of
information."
(Assistant Production Manager% P.24,
no.31).
The sales and marketing department was heavily reliant on computer-
derived information provided by the central data processing unit, with
two managers claiming that as much as 25% of the information they
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received came in the form of a computer printout. While the views of
the respondents varied greatly there was a general underlying
dissatisfaction with the computer system as it existed at that time,
combined with considerable optimism that within a two-year time span
many of its inadequacies would be rectified:
Q: "How could the computer system be developed to help you in sales
and marketing?"
A: "It can be and it will be and is planned to do. It's well
documented what we want to do , and how we're going to do it.
it's got to be much more instant; it's got to be intelligent,
user-friendly, accurate and readily accessible - and these are
things it isn't at the moment."
	 (General Manager, Sales &
Marketing, p.16, no.83).
The most significant difficulties associated with the computer-based
Information retrieval systems were:
a) that information was not always presented in the most easily
understood or useful form:
Q: "Is there a particular source which provides information in not
the most easily understood form?"
A: "I suppose again it's the computer, the involving of the
computer... which is going to take a good few years to sort out
and therefore I don't expect to receive the information I want
for a few years, until we have got the information sources
correct which we can then extract from.... A good example this
morning was we got a tabulation on free-of-charge and live
discount which gives you a monthly summary but doesn't give you a
cumulative, so if you want a full year's figure for a certain
product you've got to actually add each period together."
(Product Group Manager, Development% p.1, no.1).
b) sometimes the information could be derived from the computer, but
the difficulties and time cost of doing this could be
prohibitive:
Q: neat about profitability by outlet type information?"
"That comes back to what we can get out of the computer; the
information is there but the amount of time to get the
information is hopeless, it would take far too long to collate
the information." (Group Product Manager l , p.2, no.7).
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c) the accuracy of some items of information was highly
questionable:
"The information that we get.. is not
always accurate, but it's well
understood what the limits of their
accuracy is. Rather like marketing
surveys, they give you trends rather
than perhaps accurate information."
(General Manager, Marketing & Sales%
p.2, no.3).
The operational difficulties that could be caused by system
Inefficiencies were immense:
"Somebody phones me up and says 'this
Woolworth's branch hasn't ordered, can
you tell me what their sales have been?'
And I say 'have you got the customer
order', 'no'. So I phone [the stat's
clerk] and I say 'dig me up customer
unique number please for this particular
branch of Woolworth's'. She wades
through all the printouts to find the
Woolworth's printout, which is thick
because there are about 1000 branches,
then she wades through that and they're
probably not in alphabetical order, and
they're as they were opened and she
eventually finds the unique number and
phones me. Then I ask 'what did they
order last week?' and have to go to the
daily order report and go all the way
through that; and what have they ordered
for the whole year? Well I can't tell
that, I have to fill in a form and ask
the computer department to produce a
printout which will give you their sales
by line and by pack throughout the year,
and it will take them two days to run
that off because they've got other
things to do. So all the information's
there but you can't get at it."
(General Manager, Sales & Marketing%
p.16, no.83).
The finance department, was the most heavily dependent on the central
data processing unit of all the departments.
	 Its main complaint
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against computer derived information was that it was not always in the
most easily accessible or usable format:
"From the computer system we must get
now... I would say 60% must come off;
I'm not saying it's in the format in
which we require it."
(Management Accountant% p.13, no.15).
The may other general problem with the company M.I.S. experienced by
the finance department was that it tended to receive information from
other departments at later than agreed dates:
Q: "Do you receive late information here?"
A: "Yes, but with it being a confectionery company there are so many
different departments, and particularly now we've set up into
different units, you might get a manager who is very good at his
job and spends a lot of time on the shopfloor because that's
where he feels he is going to benefit; so he comes into his
office at 5 O f Clock and thinks 'oh I'll see to that in the
morning', gets called to a breakdown at factory. So there are
time delays; I would say that there are more time delays than
there are things getting in before time, particularly as we wait
for figures from all the departments.... 	 They're [the
departments] all as bad as each other." 	 (Secretary to Finance
Director 1 , p.1, no.1).
Oriamore global, company-wide scale, both the sales and marketing and
finance departments' complained of a lack of formal information/
communication systems linking them to the production function:
"...we need to talk to people more who
receive information - that sort of
thing.... I think really what we are
thinking about, whether we actually
could have, meetings with production
people every month instead of just
throwing reports out and then doing it
informally which is what we do now. We
tend to put figures out or ring them up
and say 'oh good God there's something
wrong there you'd better come across and
see us before we publish it - that sort
of thing. Whereas perhaps we could say
'well, we'll get the account out every
four weeks, publish the papers and then
have a formalised meeting, I don't know,
perhaps that might improve it; and then
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you'll get all the people round the
table."
(Management Accountant% p.13, no.13/14)
This thesis contends that the analysis given above provides good
qualitative evidence in support of the hypothesis that the nature,
efficiency and effectiveness of an organisation's information and
communication systems, including those which are computer-based, is
heavily dependent on that organisation's cultural proclivities. And
therefore, that an appreciation of the history and culture of a
company can yield insights into the problems associated with an
organisation's information dimension which can in turn be employed in
the formulation of remedial strategies.
Historically Company 1 had experienced extreme financial difficulties
which had until recently precluded investment in computer
hardware/software and the time and effort required to make a detailed
study of the problems.	 After several years of increasing
profitability the company had recently turned its attention to its
information needs and large-scale investment in computer facilities
had been made. Nevertheless, considerable problems remained unsolved,
which were most pronounced in the areas of sales/marketing and
production. Culturally the company had long fostered beliefs and
values which had made the transmission of late, insufficiently
detailed and inaccurate information the accepted norm, had created a
climate in which it was well understood that certain information was
just not available and that even in those instances where it did exist
that the systems that had to be operationalised to find tt were
possibly time consuming and laborious.
Given this cultural milieu the mere addition of more sophisticated
computing facilities had so far had little obvious impact. With time
it was hoped that more management information would be available from
the computers and this at least seemed plausible. In addition, the
systems for the generation and manipulation of information may also
become simpler. But the speedy and efficient transfer of good quality
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information around the organisation, and especially between
departments required less the introduction of' new technology than a
cultural shift in values and expectations. Yet while attention was
being given to the information systems themselves no thought had so
far been devoted to how individual employees could be persuaded to
make more effective use of them, to take information deadlines
seriously and to take every possible measure to ensure that their
information was high quality and accurate.
5,3.1.3	 Computer Systems 
Until 1987 Company 1 had pursued a strategy of centralised computing
facilities, with information services being provided by an old ICL
system and two Honeywell mini computers housed in and maintained by
the computer department. In addition, during the early-mid 1980's a
growing number of stand-alone micro-computers providing facilities
such as word processing, spreadsheet planning, graphics and small
database systems had been purchased. Computing facilities were
available in six broad areas of the business: stock control, sales and
marketing, accounting, budgeting and forecasting, payroll/personnel
and production.
A report produced in 1987 recognised two broad categories of problem
with the then current highly centralised computing strategy. First,
the company was no longer charged with providing services to the Group
generally, and with the autonomy that had recently been granted to
Company 2 and Company 3 in particular, there was a perceived need to
re-adjust the type and scale of Company 1's operation accordingly.
Second, detailed investigation of certain application areas had
revealed the extent of the poor fit of software packages to task,
together with the unacceptable costs attached to any modifications
that needed to be carried out, forcing a re-think not only of the
software involved but also the associated hardware.
The existing stock control system was recognised to be unsatisfactory,
and new facilities had to be agreed to provide a central warehouse
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stock location system and a remote depot system. These would yield
more timely information regarding stock levels and variations within
each remote depot, and facilitate the electronic transfer of data.
The sales systems were in fact being up-dated during the course of
this study, with the first phase of a new sales order processing
system already having been implemented before data collection
commenced. Nevertheless, there was still considerable reliance on the
oldI.C.L. system. Probably one of the least satisfactory elements of
the total sales related systems was the historical statistical
database, which was not easily manipulated using the existing tools,
and for that reason had never been allowed near the end users.
There were further problems with the accounting facilities. While the
nominal ledger had been in operation on the Honeywell computer for
some time, modifications to it in order to provide acceptable purchase
ledger routines were likely to prove so costly that an alternative
approach was considered necessary. •Likewise, the budgeting and
forecasting software was in need of review while the payroll/personnel
function was also not totally satisfactory. Further problems
afflicted the systems used in production, which had been developed
separately in a number of disjointed projects, using both stand-alone
micros and the Honeywell machines.
These difficulties impelled Company 1 to reconsider its global
computer strategy, and to adopt a policy of distributed computing as
had originally been proposed by Touche Ross in 1982/3, at which time
it had been rejected as uneconomic. Given the evolution of computer
technology and considerable cost reductions that had taken place
during the past four years, distributed computing was now thought of
as an approach that:
"would enable us to provide elements of
computing capability at the point of
need, and of the type, size and power
necessary to provide an acceptable
service."
(Computer Systems, p.2, 1987).
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Moreover, it would remove the conflict which naturally occurred as a
result of so many departments and applications competing for central
resources and would allow the costs of such systems to be clearly
identified and allocated directly to the relevant users. Major
savings were anticipated in respect of development resources and
timescales as a result of a parallel move into the newer methodologies
now available for the plroduction of systems.
	
These 'tools' would
complement the
	 distributed hardware policy due to their inbuilt
portability across types of machine (mainframe, mini and micro) and
differing operating systems. The overall affect, it was proposed,
would be to offer a much more acceptable service to individual
departments, with dedicated machines providing the processing
capability and the use of new fourth generation tools resulting in
mot:faster and less expensive application developments. Furthermore,
the combination of distributed, less expensive hardware and software,
together with less expensive and time consuming developments, would,
It was suggested, lead to a major reduction in the total costs of
providing information services.
5.3.2	 Ad Hoc Communications 
Company 1 exhibited a general tendency to rely on ad hoc
communication. Within production this was related to the cultural
reliance on experience rather than formal sources of information or
information systems:
"The sort of job I do, the sort of arena
in which I work, the sort of experience
which I have, and I shall be talking a
lot about experience, because you talk
about information and decision making
arising there from; I have a view that
at certain levels of the organisation it
is experience that leads to decision
making rather than information and with
an experienced guy you see what's
happening. The information tends to
confirm your thoughts."
(Production Director% p.3, no.13).
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There were a variety of problems with ad hoc communications within the
production function:
a) Mere was a feeling that some production employees were not
'natural communicators', who instead preferred to keep
information to themselves and use it tactically:
"I think generally tae information could
be a lot better. I have experience
myself where even though you pass
information down you've got to ask the
right questions to get the information
back, there isn't an automatic two-way
flow of information; and everybody else
is waiting for everybody else to inform
people. having said all of that there
are limits.	 If each person, if they
were party to that information and if
they felt obliged . to give that
information to the people who should get
it then there wouldn't be as big
problem. But I do feel sometimes that
whichever group gets that information
there's a bit of 'I'm alright Jack I've
got it, I'm happy'. But what they don't
think about is the level below."
(Operations Manager2 , p.4, no.16).
b) There were problems with insufficiently detailed information
being passed from junior managers to shopfloor workers:
"When we've changed product, or if we've
been changing product, they've
[supervisors] not told us exactly what
we're going on. Say if we're going on
'Home trade', if we didn't know what we
was packing then we might be down for a
while.	 At one time we used to get
specifications of what we're going on,
but that's all gone now.... If we're
going on 'Export' then they'll just come
up and say 'oh you're going on 113
gramme Spanish'. Now I know what line
change it is but some team op's, they've
no ideas....
	
So we're supposed to get
the specifications, the supervisor is
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supposed to bring them - they don't
always."
(Machine Operator Instructor% p.1,
no.2).
0 Mere were communications problems between the three production
units:
"There is no motivation for accurate, timely and motivational
information to be passed between the units because there is
nothing to be gained on the part of either unit to perform well
in this area."
Q: "Is anything being done about this?"
A: "There are no formal plans which I know of at all. On the
contrary, the situation is getting progressively, if you like,
worse.... At the moment you've got an almost combative spirit
between the units where the information that's passed to and fro
is often inaccurate, and one wonders whether absolutely full
effort is made to make it accurate." 	 (Assistant Production
Manager 1 , p.11/12, no.61-68).
cl) There were also communications problems between production and
engineering:
"You still tend to get some degree of
'us and them' between production and
engineering. But by and large they are
willing to work in parallel these
days.... But it may be when the
pressure's on you will get a bit of
bickering saying it's the product that's
wrong rather than the equipment that's
wrong."
(Operations Manager, p.13, no.64).
"The information that comes upwards
[from production] comes through a couple
of channels, and I think the information
is sometimes slightly biased, and this
is the engineer talking I suppose. It's
very difficult for us to prove
otherwise."
(Unit Engineering Manager% p.12, no.80)
A similar plethora of problems afflicted ad hoc communication within
the sales and marketing department:
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a) much information within sales lacked the specificity and detail
required to be of real utility:
"I think that in all cases when you're
briefed against specific, even if it's
low quality information, sometimes if
you're briefed specifically you can
respond in specifics. We tend to be
briefed very generally, far too often,
and there's a lot of assumption been
given in that.	 Consequently the
information you give back is not really
what's been asked for. So it takes
longer to get it than it would have
done. I think we're constantly briefed
badly by everybody because we're not
briefed specifically. People are always
too general, and I think in many ways
because sales is the sort of set-up it
is, people are sometimes afraid to ask
specific questions because of what they
might hear back - the truth hurts."
(General Sales Manager l , p.13, no.3).
b) because of the reliance on ad hoc communications there was the
danger that information resources were being trapped behind
closed doors, resulting in the duplication of work:
"Communication within marketing I would
say is satisfactory, it's not excellent,
but it's not less than satisfactory.
There could be, I feel, more
communication within the department;
less, not treading on toes, but less
crossing over in products etc. etc....
We're very open in where we speak, I
speak to people on a level with myself
and above myself. The formal system
hasn't always been in the past that
good. I think it is a recognised fact
that it needs to be slightly better....
People have got closed doors...
[information is being trapped] which
could be of use to myself or which could
stop problems or could remove
duplication of effort, work, etc. etc..
Less looking after one's own court and
looking more corporately."
(Group Product Manager, Barrett
Division 1 , p.3, no.9).
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c) the tendency for information to be transmitted on an ad hoc and
oral basis placed a great burden on individuals, who had to
member to communicate with everyone needing to know a
particular item of information. This was particularly
problematic as members of the department often spent large
amounts of time away from the main company site:
"The main problem is that
time people aren't here; or
one person isn't here and
the next day and they're
thing, so you miss people,
a bit	 difficult	 to
communicate all the time
happened."
(Product Group Manager% p.2,
Ad hoc communications within the finance department suffered because
historically the different functions were not encouraged to interact
and communicate with each other. This was a problem that had been
recognised by the finance director and for which remedial steps were
being taken:
"I am quite keen to integrate a lot more
of the functions which I control. We
can have management accounts and the
cost office in one corner and credit
control in another, and never the twain
shall meet. And I think historically...
well that's more or less the situation
which I inherited, in that every person
did their own little bit and didn't talk
to each other a great deal. That was
certainly a problem within finance."
(Finance Director 1 , p.9, no.66).
This general problem was reflected in the fact that few individuals
had experience of working in more than one section, with consequent
negative implications for intra-departmental communication:
"While we've been going through this
changeover we've been altering the
payroll, and the way that we analyse the
payroll etc. etc.. And we failed to
notify certain people that we didn't
even realise used the analysis. 	 We
most of the
I should say
you're away
here sort of
and thus it's
remember to
as to what's
no.10).
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produce the analysis for somebody, costs
office and accounts, and we didn't
realise that somebody else borrowed the
analysis."
(Wages Manager 1 , p.11, no.79).
"They [communications within the finance
department] can be improved. Even
though the whole of the finance
department is under me and that has
separate functions within it, there's
not a lot of people who have worked in
management accounts and credit control,
and credit control and payroll and
payroll and management accounts.
would like more movement, but it is
difficult to achieve."
(Finance Director 1 , p.10, no.67).
The extent to which ad hoc communication was favoured was a further
indication of the impact of a culture which stressed informality and
non-systematisation on the company's information/communication
activities. The problems and imperfections associated with ad hoc
communication also reflected cultural traits, most especially a lack
of professionalism which meant that much inaccurate, untimely and
insufficiently detailed information was transmitted within and between
departments.	 Personal and political conflicts and tensions also
interfered with the freeflow of information within the organisation,
especially between the three production units, production and
engineering and between marketing and sales. Finally, there was not a
general cultural bias towards communication, of keeping others
informed of events and interacting with individuals performing other
and functionally distinct roles. Only at the very highest levels did
the marketing/sales, production and finance people meet and discuss
matters on a regular basis. The inevitable result, some suspected,
was a large amount of duplication of effort, of things not being done
correctly first time, and of general inefficiency.
5.3.3	 Information Culture Type 
Company 1 possessed an oral information culture that was more
pronounced in the sales and marketing and production departments than
in finance. The employees not only preferred to transmit and receive
Information by word of mouth, but firmly believed that this was the
most appropriate form of information exchange within the department.
The reservations expressed by the respondents concerning the efficacy
of mil information transmission were almost wholly founded on
functional necessities, such as the requirement to write down certain
figures for further analysis or for statutory reasons. Indeed, where
information was communicated in written form such communicative acts
were often preceded by oral transmission of that information:
"You've got to be a little bit wary
because there's a very strong cultural
thing about being a paper manager who is
much keener on sitting down and writing
memos than actually getting out and
doing something. Memos can be a fairly
good substitute for action and that is
something to beware of."
(Assistant Production Manager% p.6,
no.32).
The strength of the oral culture was indicated by a variety of widely
held beliefs, ranging from a simple preference:
"I prefer information to come to me
direct by word of mouth. I prefer the
personal communication, the personal
contact."
(General Manager, Trade & Development%
p.7, no.28)
to complex perceptions of the value of word-of-mouth communication.
For example:
that oral communication provided an opportunity for interactive
feedback, with the result that ideas could be 'unravelled' and
'restructured' as desired:
"I	 don't	 necessarily	 prefer	 it
[information] to be transmitted orally;
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I like to see some facts in front of me,
but I prefer them to be through
discussion and I certainly have one
particular way in which I can absorb
information in terms of order of
presentation. Part of the presentation
maybe an opportunity to unravel and
restructure the facts which are
presented."
(Production Director 1 , p.8, no.37).
b) the possibilities it allowed for senior management to persuade
subordinates to accept and pursue their strategies and
objectives, while also making them feel that these policies were
ones they had helped to formulate:
"It is important that a whole group of
people who are involved are involved in
the actual acceptance and implementation
of whatever decision is arrived at, are
party to it, feel party to it, and feel
that it is part of their decision making.
that has led to the course of action.
So it has to be by meeting, not a one-
off type of conversation. And the look
in the guy's eye is even more important
than the written word and so it has to
be face-to-face."
(Production Director% p.9, no.39).
0 people, it was suggested more readily understand and recall
things they have heard rather than read:
"I believe that people absorb less
trivial things easily through ears than
putting glasses on to read it."
(Operations Manager% p.4, no.28).
cl) it was thought that the speed with which oral communication could
be accomplished had a beneficial impact on the pace at which work
activities could be conducted:
"I would prefer it because it is quicker
by word of mouth, with the export
orders, that's the prime example. If we
can get an order to phone straight away,
I can ask the stock controller if he has
got packing material to do this order;
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if he hasn't we can get it in so we can
be prepared before this order comes in."
(Production Planner 1 , p.4, no.39).
"I think inevitably there's an awful lot
of oral conversation goes on in a big
place like this. I think a majority of
the departments do tend to confirm most
of the major stuff on paper as well as
verbally. But for the speed again they
come and knock the door. It would be
nice to be able to discipline all of us
not to knock each other's doors as often
as we do, but the very nature of the
place and the way it works really adds
to that opportunity."
(General Sales Manager% p.6, no.43).
oral communication was considered necessary given the
absence of formal systems able to cope with the volume and
complexity of information exchange:
"There are numerous conversations
between, say, production planning and
sales where there can be promises made -
there are so many I don't think you
could put them all down on paper - and
there are so-called promises made and
then later on when it gets a little bit
acute, they then suddenly disappear
(those promises) and it all becomes
something else. It's at those times you
wish they'd been put in writing in the
first place. All I can say is if all of
that information is going to be in
writing you'll need a pretty good system
to deal with it, there is a hell of a
lot.... How important is it always to
be perfectly accurate with the
information versus the type of culture
that people want to operate in? Quite
frankly they should be able to feel
completely free to operate in a fairly
liberal	 manner.
	
You	 get	 the
complications	 when,	 unfortunately,
everybody cannot run by that code."
(Operations Manager 2 , p.2/3, no.11).
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f) trust and confidence levels were believed to be sufficiently high
for a large amount of information to be transmitted orally
without fear of distortion of manipulation:
"...if I am working with national
account managers, [or] if I am working
with, shall I say, marketing in Head
Office, I'm quite happy for
conversations to be conversations, and
I'm quite happy that people can be
trusted to say what we agree and do what
we agreed, and I'm happy there."
(General Manager, National Accountsl,
p.5, no.28).
"When working upwards there is not a
need to put, with the team of chaps
that I am fortunate enough to work with,
to put things in writing, except that
facilitates them either considering it,
taking it further, passing it on for
other people to act upon; but there
isn't a need of this sort of belief
issue in having it in writing, that's
not an issue.... In the normal day-to-
day it comes back to this question of
trust, and I think that the first
question that you raised, that people
who currently work with me and above me
and below me in Company 1 are basically
trustworthy people."
(Production Director, p.10, no.43).
oral communication was valued as a far 'richer' medium of
information exchange than the written word which promoted group
problem-solving and decision making:
"But day-in, day-out, week-in, week-out,
we are across this office sitting down
across the desk with people talking to
them about their accounts, about the
information, what can we do to help
them. Now that sort of thing is
unplanned, informal, ad hoc, all the
things which theoretically precise
Information is not. You could formalise
It. But formalisation will inevitably
mean that you're asking people to fill
in forms; you're asking people to
involve themselves in shipping paperwork
about the place; and our style very much
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is we can achieve far more with the door
closed, the telephone switched off and a
couple of hours addressing ourselves
round the table to one problem, rather
than mountains of paperwork flowing
round this company with 1500 people on
the circulation list."
(General Manager, Trade Development%
p.6/7, no.26).
Two costs of reliance on oral communication were recognised by
respondents: first, problems associated with the distortion of
messages, both deliberately and inadvertently:
"I think yes, there is inevitably a
different connotation put on it by
divisional managers when they brief area
managers, and when their area managers
brief the salesmen, so it does get
filtered, the message is different when
it gets to the salesforce than the one I
would have given. But it's not majorly
different, it's just an emphasis."
(General Sales Manager l , p.11, no.83).
While this phenomenon was not considered to be of particular
significance, awareness of it did lead senior managers (especially in
sales and marketing) to make secondary evaluations of information
yielded to them by their subordinates on the basis of their past
experience and perception of the personality and abilities of the
individuals concerned:
"PaT you aware of oral information being distorted?"
A: "Yeah, in selling all the time. People will forever, because
salesmen are salesmen. Say we're got 10,000 cases and in reality
we've got something like 6,000. It's a question of knowing the
individual so that you can actually put a price on what he's
said." (General Manager. National Accounts, p.11, no.78).
Second, as so much information was conveyed orally when particular
difficulties arose it was often impossible to trace the initial cause
(where defective information was suspected) or to make individuals
responsible and accountable for their mistakes, as written evidence
was not always available:
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"The down-side is that at the end of the
day you might be giving people the
freedom to, having interpreted something
or misinterpreting something which has
resulted in action, that action has
resulted in money being lost. But when
you actually try to find out why, you've
no source, no route, nothing in writing;
it's your word against somebody else's,
and that's where it starts to get
bitchy. Whereas if you actually set out
a course of action, confirm that course
of action, plan that course of action,
confirm that course of action in
writing, if anybody tries to do that to
you at the end of the day.... I can't
quote specifics, because of the
informality of the situation, you're
never totally aware of it."
(General Manager, Trade & Development%
p.13, no.68/69).
Interestingly the finance department did not share the company bias
towards oral communication, although the financial director did
assert:
"Generally I rely on conversation."
(Finance Director% p.5, no.31).
The finance function did not possess an oral information culture; the
nature of the information it dealt with [largely complex numerical
data] and legal requirements created functional imperatives which
demanded that considerable amounts of information were recorded in
written form. These functional imperatives had engendered beliefs and
values which supported written culture and emphasised the dangers of
relying on word of mouth communication:
"I tend to think that people sometimes
over the telephone or in the corridor,
suddenly forgets and says 'oh I've done
that for you', and they'll suddenly
change their minds and say 'oh I didn't
mean that', or 'I didn't tell you to do
that'. So I tend to think sometimes
that people's memories are not as good.
Having been at this game quite a long
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time you get suspicious sometimes I
suppose."
(Management Accountant l , p.5, no.30/31).
"Verbal information - it's your word
against theirs, I like things in black
and white, and I always tell my clerks
to get things in black and white.
Somebody comes to you 3 months ahead and
says 'did you do this?', [I] can't
always remember. You might think you
can remember, but you can't prove that
that is what happened; whereas if you've
got it on paper you can say 'that's what
happened'."
(Sales Ledger Manager, p.1, no.2).
5.3.4	 Informal Communication 
The cultural attitude of the senior management of Company 1 toward
gossip, speculation and hearsay was dismissive, rather than for
wimple manipulative. The company possessed very poor systems for
disseminating information downwards, especially to junior managers and
shopfloor operatives. 	 The result was the growth of a luxurious
grapevine system that was allowed to flourish unimpeded:
"I think we could reduce quite a bit of
it [gossip]. Information concerning for
instance, hot potatoes like gradings
which are always going round the company
at twice the speed of light....
Information is sometimes held back and
they think it's never going to be known,
but I'm yet to find out anything that
doesn't eventually come out; so I think
it ought to come out via the official
organ, and then you wouldn't have as
many of these grapevines going round."
(Operations Manager2 , p.3/4, no.15).
The wider-development of mechanisms for feeding information downwards
was symptomatic of the quasi-paternalistic beliefs of the senior
executives who saw no need to keep the workforce well informed of
company developments. It was also indicative of senior managers‘
obsession with being in complete control of the organisation, which
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may have been intensified by the most recent restructuring of the
Group in which they lost much of their authority. However, it should
be borne in mind that the company had long possessed a vast and
complex grapevine network, and that the workforce had never been
privileged with much information 3oncerning either developments in
their own area or the company as a whole. The sheer size of the
company, the fact that so many employees were part time workers and a
lack of spare resources also played a role in limiting communication
to the junior management and shopfloor workers, but these factors were
underpinned by	 cultural prejudices which made downward vertical
communication a low priority.
5.3.5	 Information Consciousness 
Individuals were generally appreciative of the value of information to
them in the performance of their roles, and there was enthusiasm for
devoting scarce resources to the development of more sophisticated
information systems. This cultural recognition of the need for
information was manifested in an increasing investment in terms of
time and finance in developing a new distributed computer system, in
Wring valuable data in computers and purchasing new software for
manipulating the data and generating reports. However, the cultural
support for information investment obviously had a low ceiling, as
indicated by the complete absence of central or departmental library
facilities or information professionals:
"I would say decentralised information
resources; they are all over the place,
they are not just in one area — you've
got to go to quite a few different area
to get that information."
(Product Group Manager, Development%
p.4, no.25).
Thus while the sales and marketing department was considerably
'information aware', and because of its need to purchase information,
WTO Ole than most departments to put a cash value on it, yet still
there was evidence of a lack of commitment to performing certain basic
information gathering roles:
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Q: "Would you say that Company 1 was an 'information conscious'
=Tally?"
li: "No, not totally.... A lot of our competitors, they have
specific people looking at specific areas, such as a person able
to concentrate on trade and development, which itself needs
information on where the markets are going and so on and so
forth. Somebody actually looking at research and information,
extrapolating it and giving it to us in a more useful format such
that I don't have to read through everything I receive. That
sort of... I think there is a case for somebody looking after
market data, be it anything to do with competitors, be it claims
of size, what products they're launching, and so forth. I mean
to an extent we all have to do it now anyway, we do now, but it
would be nice to have one person in charge of marketing
information." (Product Group Manager% p.5, no.24).
In addition, when lack of resources was a limiting factor information
seeking activity was one of the first casualties:
"I think we have limited resources, and
because we have limited resources you
tend to collect only that information
which you know will be useful to you in
supporting whatever you want to do. I
mean there is literally lots of other
information you could get, you could
work on, but we haven't got the masses
of resources to deal with that
information anyway."
(Operations Manager 2 , p.1, no.3).
Consequently some, though generally less significant decisions, were
taken with less than adequate research having been conducted:
"I'm sure there have been occasions like
that when you think if I had that and
that maybe I would have arrived at that
decision. I don't think for the
critical ones, because the tendency is
that if you've got a major decision to
make then you do it in your own time.
you make sure that you've counted and
looked and checked....	 Lower priority
stuff, yes, maybe, noone's perfect and
expediency	 sometimes	 has	 its
casualties."
(General Manager, National Accounts%
p.7, no.42).
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Traditionally Company 1 had managed to produce good quality products
which had achieved reasonable market penetration without investing in
either sophisticated internal information systems or large amounts of
externally available market information. The culture which had been
formed under these conditions still exercised more tnan a residual
influence over the company. Thus despite a widespread recognition
that if the manufacturing processes were to be made more efficient and
the market tapped more intelligently then investment in the modern
information and communication tools and systems had to be made, the
will and the ability to implement these systems and use them to their
full potential was not uniformly available. Company 1 was not an
information conscious company and its metamorphosis, if it was going
to occur, appeared to be a long way from completion
CHAPTER SIX 
SUBSIDIARY 2 
6.1 Introduction 
Company 2 had been formed from an amalgamation of two separate and
distinct businesses, W. and A.B.. W. was an old family business that
had been purchased by the Group in May 1961. Until the late 1960 ' s
the company operated as a profit centre within the Group umbrella.
Attempts to rationalise the organisation under pressure from
deteriorating Group profitability then led to W. being stripped of its
salesforce and most of its finance department. In effect the business
was operated as a factory facility and cost centre under the control
of the board of Company 1. This situation prevailed until extremely
recently. In November 1985 the Group • acquired the goodwill stocks
and shares of A.B. from Company R. (a major U.K. confectionery
company). Four months later on 29.3.86 Company 2 was established as
an autonomous profit centre using the sales force acquired with A.B.
to sell and distribute both the A.B. and W. product ranges.
The newly formed Company 2 faced a number of problems in the first two
years of' its existence, some of which had still not been fully
resolved before this study was conducted. Possibly the most
Important of these was its heavy dependence on Companies 1 and 3,
which accounted for 67% of its sales in 1986 and 53% in 1987. The
reason for the 14% decrease in intra-Group sales in 1987 was lower
than planned sales through Company 3 to the Middle East, rather than
deliberate planning. However, it was Group policy to diminish the
reliance of Company 2 on Company 1, and a gradual lessening of its
dependency on intra-Group sales could be safely predicted.
A second problem was the limited penetration of the market achieved by
its sales force, which at the company's inception serviced only 980
outlets, though by the end of its first year of trading this had grown
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to 1320 outlets. The fundamental difficulty was that the sales force
it had inherited from A.B. was extremely narrowly focused on the
wholesale cash and carry sector of the market. Within twelve months
Company 2 had entered the multiple C.T.N. and private label arenas,
but it would be a long time before its sales force was sufficiently
large to enable it to successfully service the independent C.T.N. s.
A further problem faced by the company was its need for heavy
investment in new production and packaging machinery. This
requirement was being met by the Holdings Board which had sanctioned
the expenditure of £750,000 on a liquorice extrusion plant and the
purchase of new packaging equipment.
There was also a need to develop and invest in new information
(including computer-based information) systems, which was an on-going
project during the course of this study. At one time the company was
linked to the systems at Company 1 at Sheffield, but this was
considered to be an unsatisfactory arrangement both in terms of
service and operational requirements. As a temporary measure to
satisfy the immediate needs of Company 2 for a sales administration
system a proven package from OMICRON running on an Apricot Xen 20mb
Hard Disc machine was purchased and installed during January 1986.
This configuration had been upgraded to multi-user and the disc
capacity increased to 100mb in order to cope with the increased levels
in trade and range of products. Mechanised support for the planning
and control of the business was provided by a Phillips P320 visual
record computer that was 14 years old and very difficult to maintain.
Given these problems and palpable limitations it had become
increasingly obvious to the company that the then current disjointed
and outdated management information facilities were not adequate to
meet their existing requirements, and a major exercise was launched by
the finance director to find an appropriate set of replacement
systems.
In addition, many of the senior executive and management posts had had
to be filled extremely quickly, and while a majority of these
individuals had experience of working on this site, others such as the
Co,\<\60.(,,	 C\Jater, % -) 9%-•
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finance director, sales and marketing director and marketing manager
had been brought in from outside. The development of Company 2 was
obviously at an early stage, and the difficulties of these formative
years were reflected in the sales and profitability achieved by it in
its first two years, both of which remained static, with sales of
CiNM £13 million and a trading profit of around £600,000. The
cultural evolution of Company 2 was also in its infancy; though the
long history of Company W. and the 28 year history of the business as
part of the Group had left their imprint. The company was, therefore,
In the interesting position of being both t old t in traditions and
'new' in concept.
Despite the newness of Company 2 the long history of sugar
confectionery manufacture on the site meant that sufficient time had
elapsed for a corporate culture to develop. The company possessed a
strong spirit of tradition which expressed itself in the form of an
emotional attachment to the old company name, W., and its products and
a high degree of homogeneity of beliefs, attitudes and values. The
Pontefract site had in fact long desired independence from Company 1,
and even when used as a factory unit for Sheffield had considered
itself a quite separate and distinct entity. The inception of Company
2asaquasi-autonomous subsidiary within the Group thus witnessed the
release of a vast amount of pent up energy and enthusiasm which had
subsequently achieved some commercial success during its first two
years of operation:
"Attitudes and beliefs, the philosophy
bits were mainly [supportive] of the
operations because dear old W. in its 25
years had stubbornly refused to
acknowledge that their masters were
Company 1 and had carried on, although
it received its programme, had carried
on with a sort of whimsical U.D.I. in
its attitude. There was an enormous
rivalry; it wasn't just one company that
was a subsidiary of another receiving
its [instructions] there was a burning
desire still to succeed, everyone within
the company from shopfloor virtually
right up through middle management to
most of the senior management, maybe
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that's unfair, maybe all of it, very
much saw themselves as W. people and
never forgot the past. And therefore
the platform was a good platform to let
the phoenix come out of the fire and to
build in the new company."
(Managing Director2 , p.1, no.1).
However, during the twenty-five years of its role as a factory unit
producing for Company 1 Company 2 had become extremely dependent on
the skills and expertise of Sheffield's managers, while its own
commercial acumen had become vestigial. In many cases employees in
the production and stores and warehouse departments were still
learning the new 'rules of the game', while the personnel manager
could still forget that the company now possessed sales and marketing
and finance departments:
"We're still learning ourselves because
we've not been doing this job long. All
we used to do until 2+ years ago was
come down, ship it all to'Company 1, end
of story.	 Now since we've become
Company 2 we've started shifting
everything for ourselves, and as I say
since it was formed as Company 2 ours is
virtually a new department. Everybody's
learning at the same time."
(Stores & Warehouse Manager2 , p.2,
no.?).
"The number one criterion was output and
efficiency variances. Now all of a
sudden that is tempered with if I want
to make that and that because that's
what we can make best and fastest and
cheapest, but our customer doesn't want
it, he wants that and that, where we've
got to deliver on time. So the
commercial decision is balanced between
the efficiency we make, the output we
make and the fact that we might not sell
that to our customer, and there has to
be a balance. Whereas on pre-Company 2
as far as I was concerned Company 1 got
what I could make fastest and quickest
and best, the decision becomes more
complex because in those days Company 1
paid for all the storage, the cold
store, so if we made 20 tons of 'DM' and
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put it into cold store we got the
benefits of the efficiency and the
output and Company 1 bore the brunt of
paying for cold store. Now if I want
the efficiency of the production I pay
for the cold store, so the commercial
decision becomes a little more
balanced."
(Production Manager2 , p.12, no.88).
In keeping with the Group as a whole Company 2 had a keen sense of its
mm vulnerability in an unpredictable marketplace, despite its
apparent buoyancy; and in part at least this was recognised as being
an information problem:
"The arena in which we trade is very
changeable.... The unpredictable market
is very much the kids market which is
also the boom time." .
(Finance Director2 , p.51, no.72/74).
"We [as a company] are at the whims of
too many people.... In truth if we had
more external information we could
probably predict and cover our options a
bit better."
(Marketing Manager2 , p.8, no.41).
While the company desired expansion in terms of turnover and
profitability it was loathe to take on more staff than could be
justified assuming a sudden down turn in the market. The feeling that
success could slip away from them as easily as it had been achieved in
the first two years exercised considerable influence over the culture:
it provided a motivation for individuals to cooperate with each other,
to communicate fully, not to indulge in political games and to Work at
a frenetic pace; these and other cultural traits are examined in more
detail below.
6.2 The Cultural Profile 
6,2.1	 Personnel Orientation 
The company undeniably placed a high value on its personnel, but in
contrast to the dominant Group philosophy employees were valued not as
human beings but as economic assets akin to land, labour and capital;
and if people were valued more highly than these other factors of
production then it was because it was they who were the most costly
and who made the greatest contribution to company profitability:
"...we do encourage excellence, and some
people are more excellent than others of
those at the same level; if you look at
departmental managers, some are better
than others, and we are doing our level-
headed best to encourage those people by
internal praise, internal honesty, and
financial reward in the end, all people
aren't paid the same any longer. It
used to be very much an 't all people are
equal' situation. I vehemently believe
in the strength of the people. If I
have a single philosophy it is to accept
that buildings, capital equipment, cars,
tools of the trade, are just what they
are, and just what they sound, and
although our capital investment
programme is huge at the moment, very
considerable, and our plans are very
ambitious and the equipment that we buy
is of	 very high standard, and
increasingly buy, all of that falls
completely apart if you don't
concentrate to a very large degree on
your prime asset, and effectively your
most expensive asset, and that is
people.... My objective is not to have
the fancy printer and V.D.U. on my desk,
my objective	 is	 to	 continue	 to
strengthen and develop the people, the
team." (Managing Director2 , p.4, no.22).
Employees of the company tended to feel that there was a veneer of
generalised benevolence that was associated with the old culture
dominant before Company 2 emerged as an independent entity with a
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profit responsibility of its own, but that it was an increasingly less
salient feature of the new ethos:
",Is there a benevolent attitude towards personnel taken here?"
"Yes, yes and no funnily enough. On the surface yes, but I'm not
quite sure how benevolent it is in truth. It's certainly not as
benevolent as R.(a major confectionery company); it's certainly
more benevolent than T. (a large pharmaceutical company).
Underneath, because it's small, because everybody knows each
other it cares very much when somebody is ill. It does care
about the individual. But at the end of the day if that person
wasn't performing that function according to the requirements of
the company, that their function was superfluous, I don't think
there would be too many qualms about getting rid of somebody."
(Marketing Manager2 , p.7, no.36).
The company's attitude towards its employees was largely governed by
the managing director, and it was his opinions and prejudices that
shaped this and other facets of the organisation's culture. In fact,
no litmus test for the 'new' personnel orientation had so far
occurred, and the doubts concerning the continuing cultural
benevolence expressed by middle ranking managers were speculative
mly. Nevertheless, that a large body of managers detected that a
cultural shift had taken place, and that it was only a matter of time
before it became manifest, is important. Indeed, some individuals
were becoming increasingly cautious in terms of what they said and to
whom, while others were more aware of information being withheld from
ttm%
6,2.2	 Loyalty 
-
There was a tremendous amount of enthusiasm, commitment and loyalty to
the company from employees at all levels:
"There is a peculiarity about the
company, it is very rare I believe in
that it has very strong loyalty, it has
something you cannot put your finger on
which is very positive. It stems a lot
from loyalty, there is a close-knit,
there is team work, there is little
inter-departmental rivalry. Yes we get
pissed off with production and they get
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fed up with sales and yes I complain
left, right and centre, but overall
there is a real spirit, certainly within
the management and certainly with the
girls out there [in the sales office].
Those girls are absolutely demotivated
sometimes, and yet there's still
something there that they will work
oiertime, they will work late.... there
13 a loyalty, there is an energy the
company has which I think is very
important."
(Marketing Manager 2 , p.6, no.30).
To some extent this was loyalty which had been built up over the years
and expressed itself in the form of an emotional attachment to the old
name, rather than Company 2 itself, though it was of course
Company 2 that reaped the rewards in terms of low turnover of labour,
employee faith in the products and willingness to work long hours when
required. This is, however, only one part of the total picture: there
was also considerable commitment to a successful Company 2, especially
amongst the more senior employees, many of whom had benefited from the
promotion opportunities its creation had brought:
"We do believe that there is a nucleus
of us who have worked tare, are
approaching 50 years of age and worked
here the best part of our lives; we do
feel that we've got something special to
offer, we do feel a little bit of a
family. That might not be what a
newcomer to the place thinks, but that's
my opinion of it. I think we've got
certain people on our staff with one
hell of a commitment to the place. I
think they will be replaced, but whether
the commitment that these people have
got, with the newcomers one will never
know."
(Production Manager2 , p.11, no.77).
Moreover, not only were the future promotion prospects of these
managers (within the Group at least) tied to the success of the
venture, but because of the size of the company individuals could more
easily identify their contribution with the overall performance of the
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business than in the larger subsidiary 1. Obviously the new corporate
attitude to personnel had yet to have an impact on employee
commitment, though it is interesting to speculate whether these high
levels of unquestioning loyalty could be maintained given the change
in company philosophy, and the greater exposure to the vagaries and
exigencies of the market the organisation now faced.
6.2.3
	
Lack of Professionalism 
The culture of company 2 was characterised by a lack of
professionalism, most noticeably among middle and junior managers, and
which had developed before it had become an independent company. The
principal causes of unprofessional values and outlook were typical for
the Group, namely, lack of staff training and a tendency to promote
from within rather than introduce morte experienced outsiders into the
team:
"Promotion and management development
had undoubtedly suffered in the company
over previous years through in-breeding
and always promoting from within, over-
promotion in many cases etc. etc.."
(Managing Director2 , p.4, no.20).
In the case of Company 2 its recent history as a manufacturing unit
rather than a fully fledged company was also a contributory factor to
low levels of professionalism:
"We have got people here who are
extremely good and willing. Their
technical ability is limited - again
that's knocking them down. They've
lived in an environment where they were
a manufacturing division, and the
abilities that were required put them on
a level...	 They are not capable of
doing to the level I would like."
(Finance Director2 , p.22, no.98).
This lack of professionalism manifested itself in a number of ways:
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a) There was a strong element of traditional and conservative
thinking that made new ideas more difficult to surface and once
floated, to become accepted, especially within the production
department:
"The company has mushroomed fairly
rapidly but it's still reliant on old
services, old methods - and they are
archaic. Most of the people here have
been here their life, they have no
recourse to any other company, any other
system.... There is still an element,
particularly within the factory, that
'we have always done that'."
(Marketing Manager 2 , p.6, no.25).
W Some managers were recognised as being less information-competent
than had become acceptable given the new 'amands being made by
the company;
Q: "Do you think that most other managers understand what
information they need for decision making?"
A: "No, I'm not necessarily sure that they do. And I think that's
partially the result of being here for an awful long time and
partly a result of the need for a re-education programme in some
areas." (Production Director 2 , p.5, no.21).
0 Mere was a general unwillingness to take responsibility for
actions and decisions:
"There's still a lot of 'oh it's not my
job let them deal with it'.... I think
some people are afraid to make decisions
because they are afraid of making wrong
ones."
(Buyer & Packing Manager 2 , p.3/4,
no.8/13).
The lack of professional values and competence was not restricted to
any one department or area but permeated the whole of the company.
While some respondents felt that the characteristic reflected lack of
financial and material resources (which it did), the extent to which
this was a cultural trait should not be under-estimated. Too many
Individuals were long-serving, narrowly focused, unused to having to
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thml with the economic realities of the market and insufficiently
imaginative in their approach to problem-solving.
6.2.4
	
Democracy and Autocracy
The culture was participative and consensual to a degree, without
really being democratic:
"...we are democratic in what we put in
[to the decision making process], with
autocratic in at the end of the day -
someone has to make a decision and
democratically we are not into votes; we
are trying to create a company that is
moving ahead."
(Finance 2Director , p.44, no.29).
"...it's democratic in many of the
normal day-to-day functions. Democracy
rules in many ways; I mean we don't push
with a rod of iron at all. But at the
end of the day, if you wanted an overall
picture that mattered then it's got to
be autocratic."
(Production Manager 2 , p.11, no.78).
Thus individuals with relevant interests, responsibilities and
experience were invited to voice their opinions in the decision making
process:
"You've always got your two-penny-worth,
but obviously somebody has to make a
decision in the end."
(Stores & Warehouse Manager 2 , p.2,
no.10)
"The managing director is a strong
character, at the same time you're able
to have your say; he may not agree with
it, you may not get your own way, but
you are allowed and expected to give
your opinion."
(Production Director2 , p.6, no.24).
But ultimately the managing director had little confidence in group
decision making, and insisted on forcing through those decisions which
he believed to be correct:
"Committees design camels, committees
come to compromise decisions with
everyone's input into some situation,
everyone makes a contribution, and
designs an animal which is beyond belief
to look at.... I don't like compromise
solutions."
(Managing Director 2 , p.5, no.27).
On those issues with which the managing director was not involved then
decision making could be more consensual and compromise decisions
could be reached:
"What the managing director says is; but
other than that, take that level away
then yes it is fairly democratic."
(Marketing Manager 2 , p.7, no.32).
In general terms this state of affairs represented Company 2's
attempts to gain from the advantages of considering competing ideas
and allowing dialogue and debate on the one hand, and swift, effective
decision making on the other. The fact that there was a cut—off point
to debate determined by a single unassailable person was, though, a
source of tension and conflict:
"I feel that sometimes he [the managing
director] wants to rule it [the company]
himself when he's got a team of
directors who should run it as a team,
and not him as the managing director and
'we will do'."
(Sales & Marketing Director2 , p.4,
no. 21).
The managing director had, in this area of the company culture as with
so many others, shaped the prevailing norms to fit his personal vision
of how the organisation should function. The loose reigns by which
the Holdings Board sought to exercise control over the subsidiaries
made this a relatively easy task.
	 Company 2 was possibly the best
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example of the four subsidiaries analysed of Schein's (1985) thesis
that the development of a corporate culture and the leadership
function are intimately linked.
6.2,5	 Competition and Cooperation
The culture of Company 2 emphasised cooperative values over
competitive ones. So alien was the notion that internal competition
between individuals and groups could enhance performance that the
Implication that a competitive ethos might have been valued was met
with incredulity:
Q: "Is competition encouraged between departments here?"
qthy should we want to introduce competition?" (Sales Director2,
no.14)
The idea that competitiveness meant 'political' activity and internal
'warfare' was firmly fixed in individuals minds; and this seemed to be
related to people's experiences at Company 1:
"The end objective is to sell more boxes
at a higher contribution of profit
tomorrow than it was today; and you
can't do that with warring factions each
trying to achieve their personal
objective."
(Managing Director2 , p.4, no.21).
Employees perceived themselves to be members of a team with an
identifiable team spirit, the central ingredient of which was a belief
in the merits of cooperation:
Q: "Is competition between individuals encouraged?"
"Not really, you work together. I think that's correct, we're a
team." (Marketing Manager2 , p.5, no.18).
"You are certainly looking for team spirit in an organisation
like this rather than one person constantly trying to do better
than the other; I think that can backfire in a bad way." (Chief
ammist 2 , p.2, no.8).
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6,2.6	 Conflict and Confidence
Company 2 was characterised by relatively high levels of trust and low
levels of conflictual activity, especially among the directors and
senior managers:
@: "Is this a high trust high confidence, medium trust medium
confidence, or low trust low confidence place to work in?"
A: "I would say high trust high confidence....
	
I think it's
certainly true for the directors and senior management; I think
it is less so for the middle managers. And I think that is
something which we are conscious of and which is historical.
Sure there are barriers to be broken down which if you like you
can't change overnight." (Production Director 2 , p.6, no.25).
These levels of confidence deteriorated further down the company
hierarchy and resulted in almost an 'us' and 'them' situation between
the senior management team and shopfloor operatives:
Q: "Are you aware of any instance where fear, hostility or distrust
has inhibited the flow of information?"
A: "Yes, particularly to the unions and the way they want me to give
a quarterly review of our figures. There is a slight problem on
that in that we have got to make sure that the story is
consistent.— We are very keen to get the information down to
the shopfloor level, but we can't possibly do it for 700
employees—. We try and do it into the works council and the
union, and that becomes a slight problem - mistrust."
Q: "Your mistrust of them?"
A: "No, it's their distrust of us.... The mistrust with them, if
there is any, is that they take the information wrongly. The
mistrust is that we know they have mistrusted us. they say 'what
the hell are they screwing around these figures for?'" (Finance
Director2 , p.26/27, no.26-28).
"I think one of the biggest areas of danger there is on the
trade union side. Trade union communication is notoriously
dangerous sometimes because I think the people you are dealing
with don't understand what you say, and therefore that makes it a
hell of a lot more difficult for them to communicate. And we are
very conscious of and wary of communication to the shopfloor
through unions." (Production Director 2 , p.4/5, no.15).
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Palacog senior managers cultural norms made prolonged conflictual
activity difficult to sustain:
"We've had rows but an hour, hour and a
half we're on friendly terms. Nobody on
the whole attempts to take the bat and
ball home with them because of what's
said at meetings."
(Works Study Manager 2 , p.1/2, no.6).
"I don't think there is anything
political here."
(Buyer & Packing Manager 2 , p.4, no.10).
"I firmly believe that one of the
strengths of this company is that we do
not play political games. There is very
little instances of back-biting, people
getting together, ganging up on people,
people discussing how they're going to
get to that job if X moves here, there
and everywhere...."
(Sales Director 2 , p.4, no.20).
There were indications that the growing size and maturity of the
company were beginning to impact negatively on levels of trust and
confidence, and that hostilities were becoming more prolonged and
politically focused:
"I would say that the communications
between.., sales and finance is less
than satisfactory.... The sales is the
one that is less than satisfactory - and
that's geographical, as well as the new
blood.... I think there is certainly a
degree of animosity between both
parties."
(Finance Director 2 , p.23, no.6-9).
"[The company is] high trust, high
confidence, unfortunately going down to
medium again, you know, 	 political
comments coming in. I don't know,
perhaps it's going through a hiatus
because it is mushrooming and so much
has happened that it needs a settling
down period. But unfortunately yes it
is going from high trust high confidence
down, losing that, which is sad."
(Marketing Manager 2 , p.7, no.35).
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Despite these trends the underlying cultural values were still
strongly supportive of 'limited conflict' and close cooperation, which
precluded allowing personal antagonisms to interfere with work
activities.
6.2.7	 Production Constrained and Marketing-led 
The company was severely limited in terms of what it could produce, in
what amounts and with what efficiency, by the production equipment and
the skills and knowledge of the production team:
"I think more production-led because we
are virtually a batch process. So we've
got to move with what we can make and
not what marketing want to make. It's
within the constraints of production
that we have to work."
(Buyer & Packing Manager2 , p.4, no.12).
This is not to say that marketing was without influence, especially
with regard to the design of packaging and deciding which products
were going to be given most attention:
"I think it's very much marketing-led in
respect of the products that are going
to make it. The products are
essentially fed-in by the production and
obviously there [needs to be] space to
produce the product. In other words 'we
can do whatever you want, but it needs
to be that product because we are having
a problem producing it'. In respect of
marketing I would say 'yes' for the
packaging	 design,	 and	 product
innovation.	 There is a constraint on
marketing effectively."
(Finance Director 2
 , p.43, no.20).
But there was a tendency for production to act in ways that it
considered to be most beneficial to the company, sometimes making
major strategic decisions, without liaising fully with the marketing
manger:
"There are too much of things that go on
in the factory on machinery where there
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is no recourse to marketing, and then
you're expected to sell. They invested
in a huge Comfit machine, and then
because you've got it you were told to
put Comfits in your budget."
(Marketing Manager2 , p.2, no.4).
But there was a sense of real frustration on the part of the marketing
manager concerning the subsidiary role of the marketing function
within a company that was fundamentally production-constrained:
"In truth, in the real world, marketing
should be at the corner of everything.
It isn't here, we're too
manufacturing/production-oriented, which
is a problem.... This is a production-
oriented company."
(Marketing Manager 2 , p.6, no.27).
Interestingly there was evidence of understanding on both sides, with
production and sales and marketing personnel both indicating an
awareness of the other's problems and a willingness to accommodate and
compromise for the benefit of the company:
"I do understand that to sell into
certain markets she needs a range of
products, and it might mean a couple or
more 'loss leaders'. It might be that
it gives me one hell of a headache
making them, but if I didn't make them
she probably couldn't sell the other
five in the volume she des."
(Production Manager', p.13, no.89).
"Personally I believe now that it is
invaluable for a salesman to have a
working knowledge of the factory, to
understand their problems and to share
in their problems; and that it is as
important to sell what the customer
wants and the marketplace wants as to
what is practical and efficient for your
factory.... It is now an element of my
job which I consider to be important
i.e. is it conducive to our business to
supply this product, is it not conducive
to our business to supply this product -
and also little things which go to size
of unit, efficiencies, contributions per
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shift in the factory, I think are very
important."
(Sales Director 2 , p.2, no.8).
The productive capability of the company was the major constraining
force on the development of new products and packs; from a technical
point of view company 2 was not so much 'production-led , as
'production-restricted'. The culture largely reflected the technical
position; with the vast majority of the workforce employed in
production and only one trained marketeer, combined with a recent
history in which neither marketing nor sales departments had existed
at all, this was perhaps unsurprising. The fact that there was so
little evidence of conflict between sales and marketing and production
was a tribute to other facets of the corporate culture notably the
closeness and familiarity (see below).
6.2.8	 Pace of Activity
Of all the manufacturing subsidiaries in the Group the culture of
Company 2 supported the least casual and most fast-moving pace of
activity:
"One of the things we are very conscious
of is that people are pushed."
(Finance Director 2 , p.5, no.19).
"I believe that we are pushing some of
our people too hard.... I'm not talking
about sales and marketing I'm talking
about the company; and I think it stems
not only from the management I think it
goes right down to the secretaries.
Everybody in this company works bloody
hard. I think we've got very few
hangers-on."
(Sales Director2 , p.5, no.23).
This trait was part of a self-conscious company philosophy which had
as one of its objectives the exploitation of market opportunities at
the fastest possible speed;
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"We will come up with new ideas and have
them in the marketplace quicker than
anyone else."
(Buyer & Packing Manager 2 , p.4, no.11).
Inshvt, there was a perceived need to move quickly in response to a
rapidly changing market:
"I'm dealing in a fad market."
(Marketing Manager 2 , p.3, no.11).
A further aspect to the company philosophy was a commitment to
maintaining 'overhead' positions such as secretaries and clerical
support staff to the absolute minimum required to run the business
effectively. Consequently, as the amount of work had risen over time
Individuals were naturally beginning to feel pressurised:
"[Success] could have been achieved...
by throwing hands at it. And I set us
an opening philosophy that I wasn't
going to throw hands at It. I was not
going to have a company that was going
to be crippled by its damned overheads
while it was still going through its
birth pains. And I hope to God that
when I'm booted out or retired or
whatever, that we still have the same
philosophy of restricting our overheads
back to the very very minimum of
commercial necessity."
(Managing Director 2 , p.1, no.4).
"I think that many individuals here
recognise, it's certainly part of the
policy that one of the dangers of any
company and particularly one that is
growing is that, particularly if one is
successful over any particular span of
time is that it is very easy to start
expanding in terms of numbers of
individuals, because you seem to be on
the crest of a wave.... And one of the
things that we are very conscious of
here I feel is that we've seen the
dangers of that before at Company 1 with
regard to, if you like, the empire
building, the expansion of the
overheads, and we try to avoid that.
There is a very tight control, not only
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by the directors and the managing
director in terms of numbers of people
here, but also in all managers - they
are consciously thinking 'before we
recruit, can we get away without it?'
It's a case of proving the need...."
(Production Director2 , p.6, no.22).
This philosophy could and did lead to problems. An example of the
sort of difficulties this cultural bias for fast-reaction activity can
create was given by the chief chemist:
"We're trying to develop a soft-eating
'Comfit' which is not that easy to do,
but there are big export potentials for
it, and we're actually trying to
conclude production trials this week.
We're in a situation where really we're
looking for costings last week.... That
is a case as I say . where we've not
finally developed it yet, and yet we're
actually looking for costings to be able
to go out to the market.... Pressure's
not a bad thing, it keeps things moving,
but I think sometimes it does lead to
mistakes. Sometimes we take guesses at
products which don't always stack-up a
few months later. You know, you can
virtually find you are selling the
product at the cost, or you are having
to put the price up in the marketplace."
(Chief Chemist2 , p.1, no.1).
A second problem that had not yet fully developed was the potential
the insistence on servicing as many customers as quickly as possible
could have for conflict between the sales and the production
departments:
"Sometimes I think a little more
discipline in the area of order-taking
as regards to accepting delivery dates
which may or may not be practical would
be helpful. Certainly over the first
two years of the company's existence we
were trying to manage rather by almost
fire-fighting rather than planning and
we tried to react to every damned order
when it came in and tried to get it out
as quickly as possible.
	 Now that was
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good on the one hand, particularly in a
company that's growing and is new, the
faster you can react to the customer's
order the more likely you are to get a
repeat order and therefore to generate
additional business. At the same time
there comes a point when if you are
going to be able to plan the factory and
improve efficiencies then it's got to be
done on a more planned sort of basis;
and in that instance I think it's a case
of discussing with the appropriate sales
and marketing people restrictions that
the factory has placed upon them."
(Production Director2 , p.1, no.4).
Finally there was the problem that even the most senior executives did
mAnael that they had adequate time to discuss opportunities for the
company with their fellow directors:
"My peers, that is [the sales director],
[the finance director], are all, as well
as myself, working long, hours..., and
communication between us is not as, does
not take as much time up as I would like
to. I would dearly like to spend more
time in discussion with [the finance
director] or [the sales director] on
different aspects of the business, but
again, and I think indeed, they would
wish the same - but time does not permit
that."
(Production Director2 , p.3, no.11).
"I think there is at the moment, by all
three of us [directors], they would say
exactly the same, a slight tunnel
vision, not intentional. It is just
there in that there is an awful lot of
work to get done in our own areas.
Neither of the three of us has yet sat
on top of what we are doing and looked
across, if you like, at the other three
tunnels. We are still climbing up there
- about 75% up - but can't yet see
what's going on on the other side....
In 12 months time, I'll be there; happy
on that."
(Finance Director 2 , p.19, no.87).
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Company 2 was a young, enthusiastic business whose culture exuded
energy and initiative; hard work at a forced pace was thus a wholly
appropriate and predictable norm. But the cultural norms which
supported action were not unequivocal. There was a recognition that
mistakes were being made, inefficioncies incurred and decisions not
being fully considered. Executive directors had assumed roles as
executive managers with widespread responsibilities for day-to-day
operational activities rather than concentrating their energies on the
future evolution of the company infrastructure and long term planning.
6.2.9	 Closeness, Familiarity and Friendliness 
The culture of Company 2 was one of closeness, familiarity and
friendliness, that was intimately bound up with its history and
traditions; and it was a characteristic that was highly prized by its
employees :
"Because we i rs not, I know we're growing
all the time, but we've never been a
really big concern, and we've always had
a friendly atmosphere, like a friendly
atmosphere here.... I think that is one
thing we have kept. As people progress
things change, it tends to wane a little
bit, but I still think it's got a good
family atmosphere here."
(Stores & Warehouse Manager 2 , p.2, no.9)
This trait had developed as individuals had decided to spend their
working careers on this site:
"I see it as a very close company in
terms of individuals. I think a lot of
people that work here now, particularly
in production, but there are a number in
the management below have worked here
for quite a long time, and I think this
tends to create an image anyway if the
people are there for a long time, and I
think it's a very positive thing, I
think it's certainly to the credit of
Company 2."
(Chief Chemist & Product Development
Manager2 , p.3, no.10).
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The closeness and familiarity was also linked to the small size of the
senior management team; though there were worries that with burgeoning
numbers of employees the bonds of friendship would be weakened:
"The fear that we have is that as we
grow we will lose some of what we have
created. I think that is inevitable.
You are forced to lose some of the
closeness and information as you get
more and more people because you get
more and more levels; and we will strive
long and hard to make sure we can keep
that together because I think that is
crux to our business. You know, the
fact that I talk to the production
director, we get on well, the financial
guy, personnel.... I mean we're a small
team, we can get together very quickly,
and I think that's a great plus."
(Sales Director 2 , p.2/3, no.10).
Other factors such as the spatial proximity of individuals' offices,
pint social activities, and the inforthality and approachability of
people generally all played a part in this aspect of the company
culture:
"...we have the advantage of being a
relatively small place, and certainly
the senior management, we meet, you can
see how close we are, we're on top of
one another....	 Currently there's no
demarcation lines. I don't know if
that's come across to you from other
people; whatever our function — [the
finance director] is accessible to me
though he's finance, [the managing
director] will come and sit in my
office, he'll walk through it ten times
a day, [the production director] and I
are close together. It's not
sectionalised. In many instances we're
talking to friends as well as work
colleagues.... So everything that has
to be said can be said with ease. It's
a good working relationship."
(Production Manager ` , p.2, no.6).
There was a cultural acceptance of the need for intimacy in order to
promote the achievement of the organisational profit objectives. But
the closeness and familiarity were in no way forced or contrived
solely to satisfy economic goals. There was an unconscious acceptance
that work colleagues needed to be friends and conflictual activity was
limited by this recognition. Good quality, fluid, working
relationships were thus legislated for by cultural fiat, which
individual personalities found difficult to contravene.
6,2.10	 Secrecy 
The under-developed formal information systems and exclusiveness of
the 'director-set' gave rise to fears on the part of less senior
managers that information was deliberately being withheld from them.
This air of secrecy was considered to be an inevitable concomitant of
organising for commercial purposes by the managing director:
"It is an unfortunate faet of life that
there are some things that people
shouldn't know. It's strategically
important that they shouldn't know,
perhaps at that time. There are some
projects which are so damn confidential
that only I know of them; and there are
some projects which are so confidential
that only I and my board colleagues know
of them."
(Managing Director2 , p.4/5, no.23).
But even some directors recognised that there might be some instances
In which the need for secrecy was over-stressed;
"I would be prepared to debate whether
we should share more of our information
with some of our senior management than
we currently do, I'm not convinced
either way. I would say the senior
management of the company, not the
directors, would feel that they are
sometimes kept in the dark on certain
things; and I sometimes feel that maybe
we should inform them more of what is
happening to prove that we are not
keeping them in the dark.	 There is
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nothing clandestine going on which some
people think there is."
(Sales Director 2 , p.5, no.24).
The result was an abundance of expressions of frustration and
annoyance by managers below director level:
"Regarding other aspects of the company
there's a lot which I don't find out,
there's a lot going on that we don't get
told, which I think it would help, you
know, just to specify exactly what's
going on."
(Stores & Warehouse Manager 2 , p.2, no.6)
"A year ago I used to know what went on
here, there and everywhere.
Increasingly I don't. And yes, there is
a problem brewing I believe."
(Marketing Manager2 , p.5, no.19).
This cultural trait exemplified the essentially authoritarian nature
of the organisation. The centralisation of significant information
resources in a few senior people reflected the manner in which the
business was operated; the four executive directors treated the
company very much as their own, and made nearly all the major
decisions between them, with the managing director having a dominating
influence. Thus while a certain amount of secrecy was undoubtedly
commercially necessary, the style in which the company was run
naturally accentuated these secretive tendencies. The inevitable
result was a build-up of tension among second-ranking managers who
felt excluded from the information resources that would allow them to
participate in the process of decision making, with the real
possibility that conflicts between them and their director superiors
may develop as the company evolves.
6,2.11	 Zaniness 
Company 2 possessed the most idiosyncratic personality of all the
Group's subsidiaries, which reflected its aspirations in the children's
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sector of the market where unusual and 'off-beat' products and
packaging were advantageous:
"We are seen
someone who is
off-beat, who
create a niche
(Sales
in the marketplace as
different, a little bit
is certainly trying to
in the marketplace."
Director2 , p.5/6, no.29).
That this trait was also a cultural characteristic was indicative of
the strength of the commercial orientation in determining cultural
type and, possibly, the personalities of the senior management team:
"In the marketplace it's a culture of
zaniness, of innovation of, if you like,
game for a laugh. A reporter the other
day asked me what the company was all
about and I just said off the top of my
head that everybody in confectionery was
'slightly cuckoo'... We tend to project
that into the marketplace with
commercial success and we tend therefore
to project it internally; work hard,
fall out, shake hands, kiss and make-up,
bit of humour."
(Managing Director 2 , p.2, no.7).
6.3 Information/Communication Profile 
6.3.1	 The	 evolution 
At its inception the only useful formal information systems possessed
by Company 2 were in production; there were no systems in the areas of
sales, marketing or distribution and those in finance were geared
towards providing Company 1 with the information it needed to operate
the site as a factory unit. Given that so many functions were dealt
with by Company 1 there had been no incentive for the Group to invest
in new technology at Pontefract which consequently had no worthwhile
computer facilities. This absence of preconceived information systems
In departments would have seemed to have provided an opportunity
for the senior executive team of the new company to develop an M.I.S.
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without making compromises with tradition. The influence of culture
is, however, not easily overridden. In addition to financial
constraints, a desperate need to evolve workable systems immediately
and a lack of' familiarity with and experience of computer—based
information systems meant that temporary solutions to complex
Information problems had at first been generated. These 'skeletal'
systems were still in situ more than two years after the birth of
Company 2, though continuous modifications were being made and plans
had been formulated to purchase a major new computer system.
6.3.1.1	 Description 
The number of formal communication documents and channels (including
meetings) was extremely limited. Concerning the commercial position
of the company as a whole a management account document and a 'period-
end package' were produced by the financial director, which were
discussed in four weekly meetings of the.four executive directors.
The sales department produced a few basic reports and forecasts. They
were, however, limited by the primitive Omicron package which ran on
Apricot micros and produced little management information other than
invoices. An annual budget forecasting yearly sales and regular
monthly updates with comparisons against the preceding month and the
same month last year formed the basis of the sales and marketing
Information. This information was then re-packaged for compilation
In the monthly managing director's report, for Company 2 board
meetings and for sales forecasts, from which production schedules
could be decided. The sales director held weekly meetings with the
field sales manager and regular meetings with the national accounts
managers. There was also a new product development meeting involving
sales, marketing, the chief chemist, the works study manager and other
Interested senior personnel.
The production function (including engineering and distribution) had
evolved a more complete and complex set of information systems. The
most important reports were:
— 166 —
1) daily information from the distribution company employed by
Company 2 concerning which product lines needed replenishment;
2) the production control manager's report concerning actual
requirements against sales and budget requirements;
3) the works study manager's labour cost control report; and,
4) the forecast of labour requirements for the coming 3-4 months
compiled on the basis of sales forecasts.
Formal documents regarding engineering mostly concerned capital
expenditure and formed part of other documents, such as the management
account. The works study manager and production controller both made
contributions to a weekly information- sheet produced by the financial
director. The production director used these documents to compile a
report for the Company 2 board meetings, a factory report for each
accounting period and the production component of the managing
director's report.
The production manager chaired two daily meetings, one at 8.30am which
reviewed the previous evening's shift and one at 11.30am which planned
the next 24 hours packing. There were weekly meetings scheduled
between sales, despatch/distribution and the production control
manager; monthly meetings of the production director, production
manager and chief engineer for the purpose of discussing performance
against budget; and 4-6 weekly meetings of the production director and
senior production and engineering personnel in order to discuss means
of improving productivity.
6.3.1.2	 Problems with the M.I.S.. 
The formal information systems had often proved to be unreliable and
the managerial team tended to treat internally generated information
with some suspicion:
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would be less than honest if I said
there was any [information] system that
I truly trusted.... I don't think that
information systems should be implicitly
trusted, I really don't, I think they
should be constantly questioned in their
accuracy.“
(Managing Director2 , p.1/2, no.5).
"At the moment I have got to say that
there is a question mark over the
information that is provided. I would
say that 80% is accurate, 20% is
suspect."
(Finance Director 2 , p.3, no.10).
Mere were a variety of reasons why company information could be
Inaccurate untimely or otherwise unusable:
a) human error:
"Any sort of [sales] statistics that
needs to be done is done by me and done
manually, and obviously that is a hell
of an exercise to undertake, and as such
there are bound to be human error in
them."
(Finance Director 2 , p.3, no.10).
b) lack of technological sophistication:
"The sales and marketing systems are
less trustworthy not because of the
people who are inputting the information
but because there is... the 25th hour of
the day has been worked and... the small
Apricots.., do not adequately supply the
information, the control of the
monitoring that the new integrated
computer system will give us and
therefore it's not so much that I don't
trust them - the information ain't
there." (Managing Director2 , p.2, no.6).
"...we are in a situation where we have
very little management information, I'm
talking now about sales statistics, and
because of the history of Company 2 we
currently have a computer system which
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does a basic function of invoicing; it
gives us no information regarding sales
by territory, by customer, by line, by
pack. It therefore means that anything
to do with targeting of salesforce is
judged in a total basis from their
reported sales, not the actual sales
invoice by territories.... The basic
information we currently produce is
produced manually, it's long, laborious
and because it is produced manually it's
too late on many occasions. We get the
simplest information, being only
sterling turnover, no breakdown by line
and pack."
(Sales Director2 , p.1, no.2).
0 inefficient and ineffective information gathering and processing
systems:
"The company has mushroomed fairly
rapidly but it's still reliant on old
services, old methods - and they are
archaic."
(Marketing Manager2 , p.6, no.25).
"In the one area where we had a
tradition of systems, in the one area,
that was production and stock control,
there we have had really the roots of
the system for 15-25 years, that's
probably our most nightmarish area,
because that is the most difficult area
to turn over."
(Managing Director2 , p.1/2, no.5).
(I) a dearth of inter-departmental meetings and briefing sessions:
"I certainly think there should be a
greater emphasis on senior management
operations reviews meetings to
understand the problems that the factory
has, so you aren't just isolated.
think within the group there should be
an awareness of information available
within departments."
(Marketing Director2 , p.8, no.42).
many systems were geared towards producing information relevant
to the company's past rather than present operational needs:
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"We haven't really had a chance to do an
in-depth analysis of the traditional
information; an awful lot of traditional
information requires one hell of a
survey, and I'm pretty convinced that
40% of it could go through the window,
because it is traditional information
that is generated.... It was
Information that was generated as a
result and as a need for being a
manufacturing division of Company 1 as
opposed to as a need and as a result of
being Company 2. Therefore it's got to
be questionable."
(Managing Director 2 , p.2, no.9).
Given Company 2's history and culture these are precisely the
Information problems one would expect to find. Historically, it was
because the company had until just two years ago been a manufacturing
unit starved of investment in information systems and without any real
need for great sophistication, that its information systems were
primitive and incomplete. A myriad of cultural factors have also to be
Wm.' into account. Senior individuals were so heavily engaged in
their everyday work programmes that formalised information exchanges
in the nnn of regularised meetings with their peers and immediate
superiors/subordinates were not feasible. 	 This same preoccupation
with 'doing' rather than 'planning' meant that little attention had so
far been to the construction of efficient and effective manual
information systems and that therefore the amount and quality of
control information was extremely limited.
Similarly, the value of external and especially market information,
while explicitly recognised by the sales and marketing staff, was in
no way a priority. This can be partly accounted for by the
company's lack of resources, i.e. even if there was valuable market-
type information to be purchased there was a question mark over
if/let/mit could be afforded. However, it also reflected the cultural
conviction that as the potential market for the company's products was
m great and their productive capacity and market share so small,
there was no pressing reason for investing time and money in
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Investigating the market. Add to this the familiarity of the sales
director, marketing manager and managing director with the market, and
the constant up-dating function performed by the salesmen in the
field, and the senior executives thought they saw a prima facie reason
for diverting scarce resources to other and more immediate problems.
A further reason why the company was prepared to put up with
inefficient and ineffective manual information systems in the short
term was that a new set of computer systems were in the process of
being purchased and installed, and there was confidence that these
would obviate many of the difficulties then currently being
experienced. Thus it cannot be argued that the company was totally
constrained by its culture viz, information/communication problems.
Ameliorative action was being taken,- though it had taken two years,
and responsibility for overseeing information systems had been
devolved to the finance director who had not been fully socialised
into the prevailing culture, allowing him to look afresh at what was
required. It should, however, be borne in mind that these planned
computer-based information systems were primarily going to be for the
use of finance and to a lesser extent the sales department, that is,
the more recently bolted-on sections of the business. The production
department including works	 study	 and	 the	 warehouse	 facility
where the systems and individuals who worked them had been in situ far
longer were not going to be greatly affected by these innovations.
6,3.2	 Information Culture Type 
Company 2 possessed an oral information culture, with many individuals
expressing a preference for information transmission within the
company to be conducted by word of mouth wherever possible. There
was, though, a noticeable bias towards preferring information to be
passed to them in written form while they themselves expressed a
preference for communicating their information orally. This
attachment to oral communication was evident from the managing
director downwards :
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"I have a preference for as much
information as possible to be passed by
word of mouth. I have an obsessive hate
of this bloody rubbish, of the written
word. I have an acceptance that there
is a degree of it that is absolutely
inevitable.... I suppose you tend to
communicate orally with those you have
implicit trust in and more of those that
you admire their professional skills and
their managerial ability and one tends
to communicate in written form just
because you think relatively lowly of
them and that it's necessary to remind
him either of what you've just said or
not just said, because 'there you are
mate, you've got it in writing now'. I
think writing is, written communication
is in some ways moving towards an insult
to the integrity and ability of the true
professional. The person who has not
quite got that skill, and obviously
there are many shades of grey...."
(Managing Director 2 , p.2/3, no.10/13).
Thus while large amounts of complex information, financial data and
legally necessary material was written down for obvious reasons -
limited memory space, ease of analysis and legal imperatives - these
were the exceptions rather than the norm. Similarly, while there were
Individuals who were not natural oral communicators these people, such
as the chief chemist, finance director and marketing manager, had
recently worked outside the company, and presumably had yet to be full
socialised into the culture. Alternatively, it might be hypothesised
that the chief chemist and finance director had functions that
determined that much of the communication they were involved in had to
be written, and that therefore they may never become fully
enculturated into this dominant oral communication culture.
Interestingly, where long-serving individuals had not developed oral
communication tendencies they regarded this as a fault:
Q: "How do you prefer to transmit information, by word of mouth, in
written form, or do you have no preference between the two?"
A: "By written form, - it tends to be a fault of mine." 	 (Works
Study Manager 2 , p.1, no.3).
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There was a perceived need to communicate orally due to the forced
pace of activity within the company, which meant that individuals
spent much of their time 'trouble-shooting' and 'fire-fighting' rather
than engaging in longer term planning under the influence of peer
pressure to be active rather than .to codify problems in memos and
reports:
” ... most of it [the work] as I say
[is]... trouble shooting, chasirls-up."
(Stores & Warehouse Manager ` , p.1,
no. 3).
"We will do rather than think about it.
We are doers, we are active, we are
doers and troops; and a memo is in a way
a non-productive thing. It isn't, but
it is that sort of sense of 'we will get
on and do it rather than write about it,
hear about JAI."
(Marketing Manager 2 p.7, no.38).
The inevitable result was a certain amount of information distortion,
misunderstanding and tension:
"I give a lot of information out to
certain people whereby the information I
give ends up being distorted. The whole
thing is changed round and is not what I
said. I wouldn't say it is done
deliberately, I would say more often
than not it's done because the people
I've been talking to have not been
listening properly."
(Buyer & Packaging Manager 2 , p.3/4,
no .9)
Persistent problems in some areas of' the business had led to the
development of mistrust, and consequently of them insisting that
written confirmation of all important points be provided to them:
"There's a bit of inherent mistrust in
that respect between individuals and
that does happen.... Our production
planning department always insists on
having orders with the changes to orders
in writing. In those instances I think
that is probably right and proper, but
in other instances I think it is to a
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certain extent comes from mistrust, or
perhaps insecurity as opposed to a
genuine need."
(Production Director 2 , p.2, no.5)
6.3.3	 Ad Hoc communications
The cultural beliefs of individuals in senior managerial positions,
favoured informal and ad hoc communication, and this had effectively
restrained the extent to which channels of information flow had become
formalised, regularised and systematised:
Q: "Would you like to see your M.I.S. made more formal?"
A: 'To, I'd like us to do our informal communication a damn site
better than we can; and for the immediate short-term future I'd
be a bit wary about setting up a more formalised situation - they
mean more meetings, more committees, more communications on one
side of the coin, the other side of the coin, is very small
overheads, very tight team tightly managed. If I've got the
buggers in committee stage 7 hours a day I'm losing the
commercial reality of what they are being paid to do and achieve,
and that will only leave them with one hour a day." (Managing
Director 2 , p.6, no.29).
Q: "Is there a formal M.I.S.?"
A: "AA hoc, random, as-and-when, but it seems to work."
	 (Sales
Director 2 , p.4/5, no.22).
The cultural preference for ad hoc information exchange during lunch
and coffee breaks and via unscheduled meetings and telephone calls
translated into a considerable organisational reliance on non-
systematic communication. The cultural justifications for this
approach were the supposed speed and efficiency with which information
transfer could be accomplished. In an environment where individuals
felt under pressure there was little enthusiasm for taking more time
f oa l in regular meetings or codifying information in written reports.
In addition, levels of professionalism among middle and junior ranking
managers were insufficiently high to make formalised meetings a viable
option; they simply lacked the communication skills, interpretive
abilities and procedural experience to make them operable.
	 The
organisational preference for the non-systematisation of information
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exchange mechanisms was underpinned by the relatively high levels of
trust and confidence senior managers had in each other and the
closeness and familiarity which bound them together in tightly-knit
friendship groups. Everyone recognised the communication advantages
of these cultural traits:
"The one thing which puts us in a
different sphere from Company 1 is the
fact that everyone is so closely knit
here, that even if [formal]
communication is less than satisfactory,
people by one way or another get to know
of certain things. And so even if we've
not been told officially like about a
new pack or something, then they will
find out one way or another, and they
can work on it if they feel they
should."
(Buyer & packing Manager2 , p.3, no.6).
"I think the size of the company lends
itself to people telling other people
what's going on. You know, I get the
marketing manager, she'll often ring up
and say 'by the way this has happened,
just thought you ought to know'.... But
you tend to get that more often than
not, because of the size of the company.
We all know one another, we can all talk
to each other more easily than perhaps a
bigger company certainly would allow."
(Production Director 2 , p.5, no.17).
Nevertheless there was a growing concern that with the increasing size
and complexity of the company the cultural attitudes supportive of ad
im communications were causing problems and eventually come to be
dysfunctional:
a) As functions were not locked into a formally integrated set of
Information systems, and because many people were still learning
their roles there was a tendency for individuals to fail to
perceive the relevance of information they possessed for others:
"If we're building high stocks it's
because there's been a change in
forecasts, either the sales have dropped
so production are not producing or sales
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are high.... And that is just what's
happened. We're now taking labour on to
run an extra shift. So what I have done
with stock control, stock control have
said 'look, we're getting high stocks'.
I looked at the situation and said
'right, we'll look at putting contracts
back'. Before I have a chance to do
that I overhear a conversation which
says 'we are taking 16 women on in the
Mushroom Department'. So that gets me
thinking if we're taking women on then
that means we're going to boost
production, how does that affect these
figures. That information is not
forthcoming, so then I go over to the
production director and say 'well what's
this all about you taking women on?'
And he said 'yes, we're increasing
production'.... If you're not getting
the information then you are hunting it
all the time, and it's*not necessary."
(Buyer & Packaging Manager 2 , Ti. Si.
104-120).
Q: "him you ever been aware of people not distributing information
because they failed to perceive its relevance to others?"
A: A little bit, yes, that happens.
	 Again, going back to
communication where they don't perceive the relevance.... But
it's a learning process because people still aren't fully aware
of what marketing means. (Marketing Manager 2 , p.5, no.22).
1)) Senior managers were largely functionally insulated from the
junior managers and shopfloor operatives and there was,
consequently, little communication between the two as few formal
mechanisms existed to mediate information flow:
"The communication between the junior
management and the shopfloor, between
middle management and junior management
is not what it should be. And therefore
the age-old techniques of briefing
groups will be employed. It might take
us 2 to 3 years to start to communicate
properly, because we've got to
communicate better because in the end
the people who make our confectionery as
well or badly as they do do is people on
the shopfloor. They are the people who
physically make it, and they are the
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people with the good ideas, and they are
the people with the bad practices and
the good practices, and they are the
people who we all too often leave the
unions as being	 the	 acknowledged
communicators, and it's balls. The
responsibility for communication between
our employees is with the company, the
side	 responsibility
	 is	 with	 the
unions.... We must not renege on the
fact that we must communicate with our
employees and listen to them, and there
is no formalised structure to do that
apart from yes we do have union
councils, yes we do have works councils
which consist of union and non-union
people and the company
representatives.... But if you do want
to encourage a situation of passing a
message down the line and getting it
warped by God we're going about it in
the classic manner,- and therefore
briefing groups have got to come in, and
will come in, but it will take some
time."
(Managing Director2 , p.5/6, no.28).
Unsurprisingly, middle and junior ranking employees who did not enior
the information privileges which went with being a member of the elite
managerial group felt frustrated and marginalised:
"I think there could be an awful lot
more crossing of information from
different departments, and talking about
things in general - not because they
specifically need to know it in order to
do their job but because it's nice to
know. I personally feel it would make
me feel more part of the company to know
what problems [the production director]
had on the production line.... I don't
think he realises what sort of problems
I have at times. If we had a regular
session, even if it were once every
three months, all round a table and
discuss things in general I would
personally prefer it; it makes for a
much better working relationship."
(Credit Controller 2 , p.2/3, no.10).
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Within the production department at least this problem had been
recognised and steps taken to ameliorate it:
"I think that historically the
departmental managers for example, the
foremen and foreladies for example, have
been much less involved than they ought
to have been, whether it's consciously
or unconsciously I think that's the
case. It's something we are trying to
do something about. For example, my
production manager is having briefing
meetings with all the foremen and
foreladies once a month to let [them]
know what is happening. I'm trying to
have discussions myself on the shopfloor
with departmental managers, involving
them on discussions on labour variances.
Now when a hygiene visit takes place,
whereas before it was either me or [the
managing director] or one of the quality
control managers who would take them
round, they might get introduced as a
departmental manager if they were lucky,
that sort of thing; what I'm doing now
and have been for the last 6-9 months is
that the departmental manager is
responsible, O.K. with me in attendance,
but in fact they are taking the visitor
around. I'm deliberately trying to get
them involved, they have the discussions
with the visitor, they answer the
questions, they get the embarrassments
if they don't know, and equally they get
a pat on the back if the visitor thinks
that looks great. There is a conscious
effort to improve that involvement in
communication."
(Production Director2 , p.4, no.12).
c) The heavy reliance placed on individuals at all levels to make
their own decisions regarding what their superiors should see or
hear meant that senior managers could either receive a deluge of
unfiltered information or only a part of the total information
necessary for planning or decision making depending on the skills
and personal inclinations of their colleagues:
"I think there is always a tendency in a
new company when that company kicks off,
for management information, it's not
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really understood who wants it. I get
information on new market plans, new
brands that are coming out. Yes I
prefer to get them as individual pieces
of paper. I would prefer that as just a
summary, I can't be bothered to go
through each individual one and sit down
and work out how much the actual price
is." (Finance Director 2 , p.9/10, no.35).
"[There is] very little filtering from
subordinates, that's one of the problems
I have in my position. Because of,
again, going back to the history; when I
came here I had to know everything and
be involved in everything and understand
everything and start to build new
systems and introduce new systems. And
unfortunately I have not been able to
shed some of that workload and I get a
lot of pieces of paper which I should
never get; lot's of pieces of paper I
should never get which should be
actioned before they get to me."
(Sales Director 2 , p.4, no.17).
d) Informality meant that there was a vast scope for withholding and
modifying information:
"You know, if product has gone down the
drain, they're not going to tell me
unless I find out. It starts off with
the young man who does it; if he doesn't
tell his supervisor's foreman I aren't
going to get to know. I'm certain that
the information coming back from the
managers and the forepeople is as good
as it's likely to be.	 I don't think
they hide much at all. But I mean I
think they filter it; I think they might
tie a fancy ring round it before they
tell me."
(Production Manager 2 , p.7, no.40).
- 179-
6.3.4
	
Informal Communication
The extensive nature of ad hoc communications within the company meant
thatitwas often difficult to distinguish gossip and speculation from
management information. The informal communication network had in
effect been co-opted into the generally accepted system for
infoimmtion transmission.:
"Because the company has no formal
information structure it's very nebulous
as to what is gossip and what is
information, because you haven't got
that formalisation of communication."
(Marketing Manager 2 , p.6, no.29).
With regard to the workforce in general the senior managers took an
interested if not manipulative view of the grapevine:
"You can get the general mood of a [pay]
offer that's made, that's all. It's not
that good. We've got some moles.... To
me it's not that important; certainly in
personnel-relations they are important."
(Finance Director2 , p.40, no.97).
"The internal grapevine is one of the
most useful assets for being aware of
what's going on. But in general terms
it is localised knowledge, it's not
Group knowledge. [One might learn] who
is happy, who is dissatisfied, who is
likely to leave us, who is likely to do
that, where there's a problem.... If
you've got certain contacts in certain
areas then you get to know where
discontent is, and gives you a chance to
put it right. It's a useful tool to
have, it's handy to know. Let's say for
instance we had a ballot on wage
negotiations and I'd like to know how
they are going to vote, I can get a good
idea - that sort of thing."
(Production Manager2 , p.11, no.72/73).
6.3.5	 Information Consciousness
In the first two years of its existence information and communication
to the commercial task in hand.issues had taken second
Individuals were assigned
them through interaction
mechanisms
activities
place
responsibilities and
with others without
expected to achieve
recourse to formal
which cooperative
a form of 'organised
of information exchange through
could be coordinated. The result was
chaos' in which projects were accomplished more as a result of
enthusiasm and initiative rather than any formal machinery of
organisation. While on the one hand this placed inordinate demands
upon the time and energy resources of individuals, on the other it
also demonstrated a lack of information consciousness. There was
evidence that information was valued as a resource useful to the
company in the same way that land, labour and capital were prized, but
little realisation that information required management or that formal
systems of information could be efficlent and effective means of
facilitating organisational success.
The company's concentration on action rather than planning tb9
framework for acting more rationally was partly the result of the
demands made upon the organisation by the Holdings Board in the form
of profit targets. However, it also reflected the cultural bias to
action, a point recognised by the senior managerial team:
Q: "Would you say that the company as a whole was information
conscious?"
A: "No. I think there are some areas of the business that see the
conveying of information to other areas is less important than
what they are actually doing. That's my personal view, in some
respects I can appreciate that attitude in that you've got enough
work to do without having to write something to tell them what's
happening.... I do think there are times we get to a situation
where it's a pain in the backside to actually produce the
information, but it's critical that people have the information."
(Finance Director 2 , p.37, no.79).
@: "Would you say that Company 2 was information conscious?"
A:	
... The flip answer is 'yes', but I think it is a flip answer.
I don't think as a team we have mentally addressed ourselves to
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information except in certain areas. I think the philosophy of
the company is information conscious, I think the youth of the
company means that we are not harnessing information to its
best." (Managing Director 2 , p.6, no.30).
The pith of the company made a confident appraisal of the
organisation's 'information consciousness' difficult. The expressed
beliefs of the senior managers seem to suggest an awareness of the
value of information resources and effective information and
communication systems for organisational efficiency. While these
beliefs had yet to be manifested in the form of action and investment
this may well only be a matter of time. All that can really be said
is that while information was valued it did not have the same high
priority as investment in new production machinery, and although the
importance of effective communications was recognised no serious
examination of them had so far been conducted.
CHAPTER bEviai
SUBSIDIARY 3 
7.1 Introduction 
Company 3 was formed as a separate trading company in 1986 to handle
Gimp sales outside the two home markets of the U.K. and the
Netherlands.
	
It was derived from the international section at
Company 1, which was extricated from its original setting and
reconstituted three and a half miles away in offices adjacent to the
Holdings Board. The creation of the international division reflected
a growing awareness on the part of the Group that foreign markets
represented an enormous opportunity for organic growth, confidence
that store resources should be invested in international business, and
the perception that a new organisation Was required to maximise export
potential. As the Chairman stated at the time:
"We believe that this approach will
enable us to build on existing strengths
in our established overseas markets, to
expand into new markets, to expand into
new areas where opportunities for
profitable growth exists, and to exploit
group product resources and expertise in
a cost-effective way."
(Chairman's Statement, Report &
Accounts, 1986, p.4).
In first year of trading Company 3 achieved record sales (of £13.8
million) and trading profit (£785,000), and further expanded its sales
management team. However, in 1987/88 the company failed to match the
previous year's profits, which dropped to £534,000, mainly due to the
strength of sterling.
Company 3 was a 22 person operation consisting of two main
departments; sales and marketing, and finance/administration. The
sales and marketing department was headed by a marketing director to
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whom were answerable three area managers and their assistants and a
packaging manager and his assistant. The finance/administration
department was the responsibility of the finance director to whom
answered a commercial manager and an administration manager; under the
administration manager were three account controllers and five
employees looking after credit control and general accounting matters.
Two years after its inception as a separate trading entity Company 3
was still adjusting to its independent status. The beliefs, values
and attitudes which had developed among the employees during their
time at Company 1 were still very much in evidence, as were close
personal bonds with key staff at Company 1. Indeed, while a large
mime staff had an intimate knowledge of how Company 1 operated it
was comparatively ignorant concerning the other Group manufacturing
subsidiaries. Consequently, there was a tendency for Company 3 to
concentrate on selling the product range of Company 1, much to the
chagrin of the other manufacturing subsidiaries.
amparg 3 was a relatively young organisation, and while a uniquely
Identifiable culture was beginning to emerge, its close historical
association with Company 1 and current physical proximity to the
Holdings Board encouraged a high degree of cultural harmony with the
Group as a whole. This congruence with the dominant Group culture
translated into a belief on the part of many respondents that the
culture of their organisation was relatively weak:
(4: noes Company 3 have a recognisable corporate culture?"
A: "I think.., perhaps we do have one, but it's not sufficiently
evident really. It's not particularly strong." (Finance
Director3 , p.15, no.84).
Put of the cultural inheritance the company had imbibed at Company 1
were beliefs and values which supported a traditional and conservative
approach to business:
"...without knocking the organisation
too much it's quite a historical, out-
dated culture. A lot of decisions and
attitudes are based on the way things
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used to be done, and I think less so in
Company 3 than in the Group. I think
Company 3 are now going through the 21st
Century, or at least the 20th Century
stage: it's probably up to about the
1960's. Now Company 3 is a lot more
forward thinking than a lot of the other
organisations. It's definitely my
grandad did it this was, my dad did it
this way, I'm going to do it this way."
(Export Area Manager 3 , p.18, no.88)
In common with the other Group subsidiaries Company 3 felt
particularly vulnerable with respect to the changes and exigencies in
its external business environment:
"...we're exposed to so many external
factors which we cannot control.... in
terms of external environment you can
control the majority of marketing
functions. It is impossible to control
currencies.	 It's almost impossible to
take
	
out	 the	 uncertainties	 of
restitutions and M.C.A.'s (Monetary
Compensatory Allowance) which is the
balancing valve within the E.M.C. that
relates to currency strengths; they have
a fair old impact on the business and we
find those incredibly difficult to
control. We can take some of the
uncertainty out of it by fixing forward;
but I guess the furthest we can look at
is 12 months."
(Marketing Director3 , p.24, no.5/6).
Company 3 considered itself to be more sensitive to the overall needs
of the Group and to be more concerned with the health of the Group
(and not just its own well-being) than any of the other subsidiaries.
Indeed, the egocentricity of the manufacturing subsidiaries was a
constant source of frustration for the international division:
"...it is awkward because we feel that
we do have responsibility to the whole
Group, although our priority is to
Company 3. But the position we are in
we sometimes see more of the effect on
the Group than the manufacturing units
can because we're at the sharp end
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outside the U.K.."
(Export Area Manager3 , p.5, no.36).
7.2 Cultural 906\ C
7,2.1	 Personnel Orientation 
The personnel orientation was as well developed at Company 3 as it was
at Company 1, with employees rights and working conditions being
considered as important as their economic value to the organisation:
"It's	 [the	 company]	 definitely
personnel-based."
(Finance Director3 , p.16, no.86).
However, on account of the small size of the company (and possibly
Its proximity to the Chairman's office) there was no personnel
officer, and this fact was noted by the more junior members of staff
as being significant:
Q: "Does the company have a benevolent attitude towards its
employees?"
A: "I think its tries to make out that it does and I don't think for
one minute that it has anything untoward in that. I don't think
that the senior management are perhaps aware of some of the
feelings of the individuals, but that was possibly because we
haven't got a real personnel manager; our personnel manager is
also the F.D. and as such he's got to be the worst communicator
in Company 3." (Deputy Administration3 , p.17, no.97).
Thus while the company was recognised as providing secure employment
and being favourably disposed towards its employees, there was a
Ming that a safety valve for channelling small-scale discontent was
lacking. The chairman, although he took responsibility for
overseeing pay scales and car allocations, could not reasonably be
approached concerning minor problems and grievances. In addition, the
finance director within Company 3, who had SOMA personnel
responsibilities, was not a person who it was easy for junior staff to
approach,
	
This was an interesting case of where the cultural
Inclinations of a company were undoubtedly personnel-oriented, but the
- 186 -
mechanisms which would facilitate a smooth-running personnel function
had not been instituted.	 The result was that while the senior
managers could easily recognise Company 3 as possessing a highly
developed personnel orientation, less senior staff were more sceptical
of the organisation's benevolent intentions.
7,2.2
	 Loyalty
As Company 3 had only recently been formed out of Company 1 and the
staff who had been employed in the international section of Company 1
were now (with some additions) the staff of Company 3 it might be
expected that they would exhibit a residual loyalty to their original
company of employment. This was indeed the case. The staff of
Company 3 were not only intimately acquainted with the people, systems
and products of Company 1 but were arguably inclined to favour the
many above the other Group subsidiaries. 	 Thus when orders for
mthmts which could be manufactured at several Group companies were
gained, there was evidence to suggest that these tended to be
channelled through Company 1. However, there was also a considerable
and growing loyalty to Company 3 itself mhich seemed to haNe Increased
with the length of time the organisation had been independent of
Company 1:
"I would say that people at Company 3
are proud to work at Company 3, and
happy to work at Company 3. That goes
for the majority of people. I think
it's more prevalent since we've moved
away from the parent company. We are
much more aware that we are a separate
entity."
(Deputy Administration Manager3 , p.17,
no. 95)
7.2,3
	 Informality 
The company was characterised by its informality. Individuals tended
to see themselves as part of a team working towards common goals which
formalisation would impede. This was especially true of channels of
communication:
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"We're a sort of informal team here."
(Finance Director 3 , p.11, no.20).
"I think if you formalised channels of
communication you would lose a lot."
(Administration Manager 3 , p.11, no.82).
This cultural trait was manifested in a variety of other ways: access
to senior executives including the M.D. by junior staff was relatively
straight forward and did not usually require an appointment; access to
information resources was not rigidly controlled; individuals tended
to be on first name terms; and the general atmosphere of the company
was casual and relaxed.
7.201	 Autocracy and Democracy
The culture of Company 3 was extremely supportive of democratic,
consensual and participative action. This said, major strategic
decisions were, predictably, made by the three directors:
"I tend to think that at the end of the
day authority tends to rest with the 3
[directors] of us."
(Finance Director3 , p.17, no.9).
"...strategic decisions are basically
taken between [the marketing director,
the M.D. and the financial director]."
(Export Area Manager3 , p.17, no.65).
Butamultiplicity of day-to-day operational decisions and some higher
level decisions were devolved to the area managers and senior
administration manager:
"As far as is possible I try to
encourage the individuals to make their
own decisions. However, it tends to be
the more major decisions which I have an
impact upon. If we were going to alter
something fundamentally then I would
expect to have an input. Citing
examples, if for instance, we were going
to change our distributer in an overseas
territory, then I would expect to have a
fairly sizable input into that decision
- 188 -
making process. However, the actual
decision would be the area manager's,
because at the end of the day he has to
live with the territory and I don't."
(Managing Director3 , p.13, no.57).
”We really try and run the operation on
a very open basis.
	 It is very
democratic. In many respects it is
perhaps too democratic in that on
occasions where you do have to take
decisions without any input which are
not popular decisions you end up with
people questioning your decisions on...
'why are we doing it this way, I need an
explanation'. I guess that they are not
really entitled to ask for an
explanation, but that's probably one of
the biggest drawbacks in running a
democratic team."
(Marketing Director 3 , p.12, no.93).
NI free and easy working environment of Company 3 also meant that
there were a minimum of restrictions on information resources:
"...from my own personal point of
view... I've seen information that I
wouldn't have seen when we were down at
Company 1 for instance. I have seen a
lot of delicate information on financial
matters."
(Deputy Administration Manager 3 , p.18,
no .5)
"We don't operate just a 'need to know'
basis here, we do have a 'nice to know'
as well. I think some people view it as
a 'need to know', but I think there's
far more information that goes on in the
building than in a 'need to know'."
(Export Area manager3 , p.14, no.19).
The small size of Company 3 and the personal inclinations of the
managing director combined to make the international division the most
democratic and participative of all the Group subsidiaries. Not
unnaturally there was evidence of a reaction against this full-blooded
democratic work ethic by some senior managers, who showed signs of
interpreting the prevailing democratic norms as a threat to their
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authority. Given that the Company had only been in existence two
years more time was obviously required before a generally acceptable
level of questioning and participation in decision making by junior
managers; a state of dynamic equilibrium had yet to be achieved in
this facet of corporate life.
7.2,5	 Competition and Cooperation 
As the sole function of Company 3 was to market and sell Group
products in the international arena, it might have been expected that
this would have been the most internally competitive of all the
subsidiaries, with the competition faced externally being projected
inside the organisation. This was not the case, and though there was
some evidence of a competitive spirit between the area managers and
between junior employees within the administration section, in neither
case was this pronounced:
Q: "Is competition between individuals encouraged?"
A: "Possibly yes, in terms of admin., because they're all fairly
young, they all want to develop; there are four different tiers
within admin., of which everybody wants to get to the top. I
think in sales there is some competition but not really as
intense because we all have a different function. We have
different areas which are totally different ways of running
things....We're all pulling together; and I think there's more
encouragement than competition in that if anybody has a problem
we will group together and quite regularly, informally throughout
the day we will end up in one or each others' offices and just
generally discuss problems or opportunities." 	 (Export Area
Manager3 , p.12, no.3-5).
[Competition] is probably encouraged on an informal basis in that
they are aware of how their peers are performing. Therefore
there will be an implied competitiveness required from them, but
not to the extent where guys are grilled if they're not
performing or if they're bottom of the league table. It tends to
be an intrinsic thing." (Marketing Director3 , p.11, no.85).
The company culture stressed cooperation over competition:
"We work as a team; we're a small staff
of 22 people."
(Finance Director3 , p.9, no.89).
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Q: "Is the company internally competitive or collectivist?"
A: "It's not competitive at all." (Deputy Administration Manager3,
p.17, no.96).
This cooperative corporate ethos had almost certainly developed among
the employees of Company 3 during their time at Company 1, and had
since been perpetuated by the managing director, whose personal
philosophy greatly restricted the scope for competition between
individuals.
Q: H IS competition between individuals within the organisation
encouraged?"
A: "To a degree, yes. Given, if you like, that our fundamental role
in life is somewhere between professional selling and marketing
and commercial trading I think a little competition is healthy
for the organisation. (Managing Director 3 , p.15, no.84).
7.2,6	 Conflict and Confidence 
Levels of trust and confidence within Company 3 were sufficiently high
to facilitate work activities, and a high degree of oral communication
between individuals. Conversely, fear, hostility and distrust were
considered insignificant features of the culture:
"I think it [hostility] is a minor
thing.... I think Company 3 basically
exists on its interaction."
(Export Area Manager 3 , p.14, no.19).
"Distrust within the organisation I
don't believe is a factor, or it's not
evident as a factor to mT knowledge."
(Managing Director ) , p.17, no.94).
"I think it's high trust really; because
we have access to people's office, and
yuh, I think it's high trust."
(Deputy Administration Manager 3 , p.17,
no.99)
Nevertheless,
	 there were	 individuals
	 who	 were
untrustworthy and/or hostile by the respondents:
regarded as
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"I think the general attitude is high
trust, high confidence. There are
people within the organisation you
realise you can't trust....
	
But it's
more individuals than organisation."
(Export Area Manager ) , p.19, no.94).
"Again, it's personalities. We have
personalities within the office which
are resentful of superiors and it does
pose a problem. Someone will ask a
person to do something and the reaction
would be 'no it's not my job,."
(Deputy Administration Manager3 , p.9/10,
no.4/5).
This conflictual activity was primarily a function of personalities
and not really identified with the cultural fabric of the
organisation. More interesting was the conflict between the
finance/administration and marketing/sales sections of the business.
Junior employees in administration resented the fact that the sales
and marketing personnel were generally paid more and had more status
than themselves. The situation was inflamed by the fact that
administration personnel worked on the ground floor of the building,
while senior managers including all the marketing and sales employees
had offices on the first floor:
"I think that again senior management
ought to be made aware of the important
function that different departments
play. I get the opinion that the senior
management here are first and foremost
sales-oriented; you've got to be a
salesman, fair enough, but salesmen
can't function adequately without the
back-up service."
(Marketing Director 3 , p.23/24, no.98).
This tension had recently become more pronounced following the
discovery that senior managers within the company had the privilege of
a generous bonus scheme:
"We had a classic example that there was
a bonus scheme in operation which [was]
not generally meant to be known. It was
for senior management.
	 People found
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out, assume whatever, and it caused a
lot of conflict.	 That has not helped
the 'them-and-us'	 around here in
particular."
(Export Area Manager 3 , p.21, no.17).
There was also evidence of conflict between the finance and marketing
directors, based on their different perceptions of what activities it
was most important to perform at any given time:
"A financial guy is concerned about
tidying the books up by the period end.
If we're chasing the area managers and
with limited amount of time and
resources either to push through
paperwork for credit notes or to do
something a bit more creative in terms
of generating business, then I'm always
going to fall back on the creative
development side, whereas the financial
guy is really looking to tidy up the
books and balancing the columns."
(Marketing Director3 , p.24, no.3).
Company 3 possessed an essentially high trust, high confidence culture
in which team work and cooperation were valued as the 'appropriate'
mechanisms for the achievement of work objectives. The personal
tensions and inter-departmental conflicts that were evident were
mostly of minor significance, and few individuals thought they had any
substantive impact on the business. Thus in this respect, as in so
many others, the culture of Company 3 was in harmony with the dominant
Group culture.
7.2.7	 Pace of Activity 
The pace of activity at Company 3 was generally quite relaxed, though
it mild move with speed when required. This unwillingness
individuals felt to push themselves hard was notable at all levels in
the hierarchy, and seemed to be sanctioned by the managing director,
with whose open, informal and casual management style such attitudes
were congruent:
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"I think at times although it is
frenetic, a mixture of the traditional
and the benevolent can make it very
comfortable to stay here, but not to
strive too hard."
Q: "It's not very dynamic, fast moving, Mars-style?"
A: "No." (Export Area Manager 3 , p.19, no.98/99).
"I have to say on the whole... I see
the decision making process in Company 3
and on a corporate basis as being fairly
relaxed. There isn't the go go go and
'we are doing', that I've seen in other
companies."
(Finance Director 3 , p.16, no.97).
7,2.8	 Closeness and Familiarity
There was a closeness and familiarity about the culture of Company 3
which derived largely from its small size, both spatially and in terms
of number of people it employed. This was significant in terms of
the extent to which communication channels within the organisation
needed to be formalised; obviously, with so many people interacting
freely with individuals from other sections and with access to
Information not unnecessarily restricted, ad hoc communication could
usually be relied upon to service the internal communication
requirements of the company quite adequately.:
"Being a closely-knit sort of company
one does not always find something out
through the functional head
necessarily."
(Finance Director 3 , p.15, no.83).
7.3 Information/Communication Profile 
7.3.1	 The M.I.S.: evolution 
The formal M.I.S. in place at Company 3 had originally been developed
during its time as the export department of Company 1.
	 These
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information systems had subsequently been greatly modified to take
account of the company's independent status and new objectives: rather
than attempting to make a contribution to the overheads of Company 1
Company 3 was now a profit centre with a profit responsibility of its
mm. The information implications of this radical change in
objectives were profound:
(1: "Was your M.I.S. developed at some definite time or has it just
evolved out of existing working practices?"
A: "I think a bit of both; certainly within the old export
department of Company 1 we had an internal management information
system which really was developed out of trading at the margins;
like we were exporting the marginal bit of production. We were
trying to make a contribution to the company's overheads rather
than seeking a profit from our operations. When this particular
organisation was brought into existence, suddenly at one moment
In time, we had to refine our M.I.S. to such a degree that every
element of our own costs were suddenly brought into the picture,
which had possibly been forgotten under the old method of
operating, so I can answer your question with a sort of 'yes' on
both camps. (Managing Director 3 , p.20, no.17).
Since 1986 new information systems had been developed, but these were
still quite rudimentary. There was a belief that because the
organisation was so small there was not a great urgency to formalise
that communication which could be efficiently and effectively
accomplished on an ad hoc basis. The managing director was, however,
keen to institute more formalisation, and develop existing systems to
provide more information, especially in the area of marketing/sales:
"They [companies 2 and 4] are like
ourselves right in the middle of putting
together their information systems, and
we obviously focus very hard upon
accounting systems as a start. Now we
are able to do forecasts, historic
records, etc., but we are not where we
should be yet by a long wag."
(Managing Director ) p.4, no.18).
From an initial position in which Company 1 provided Company 3 with
much of its computer-derived information the organisation now had five
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micro computers which not only dealt with the sales order processing
and accounting functions, but were useful sources of a variety of
management information.
7,3.1.1	 Description 
The company's M.I.S. was largely founded on the record of daily
business compiled by the administration department. These daily
reports were collated into weekly reports which recorded actual
performance against budget by customer and territory. In turn, these
weekly reports formed the basis of the management accounts, which
provided the basic control information for Company 3 I s senior
management and the basis of the monthly managing director's report to
the Holdings Board. A weekly and monthly customs schedule (a legal
requirement for the benefit of Customs and Excise) was also produced.
On the marketing and sales side of the business monthly sales
forecasts (by line and pack) were produced by the three area managers
for their territories, largely for the benefit of the manufacturing
subsidiaries.
There were no regular and routine meetings held within the business
other than Board Meetings. Rather, a plethora of ad hoc meetings
tended to take place to resolve specific problems as and when they
occurred. The number of routine reports was also extremely limited,
though here again a considerable number of ad hoc reports and
forecasts (concerning new products, the state of various markets,
currencies receivable and so forth) were produced when required.
7.3.1.2 Problems with the M.I.S. 
The youth of the company M.I.S., a lack of resources, a lack of'
planning	 and	 careful	 consideration	 concerning
information/communication issues, 	 and the cultural bias for ad hoc
and informal communication engendered a number of problems.
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A:
Et) Mere was a tendency for information to be produced later than
was considered optimal:
"It [the M.I.S.] doesn't operate as
efficiently as it could, in that the
information could be generated, I
believe, more quickly than it is."
(Managing Director3 , p.21, no.22).
b) There was insufficient predictive information being generated by
the internal information systems concerning the markets the
company serviced:
"We generally get information when an
event has already happened. We don't
always get the pre-emptive information."
(Export Area Manager 3 , p.15, no.46).
0 The company produced a lot of general, background information,
rather than information with a specific decision-orientation:
"Generally speaking most of the internal
Information is fairly relevant, but it's
possibly not as specific as I would like
it to be. When that proves to be the
case, I can take immediate action to put
it right or we can talk around how in
the longer term to improve the quality
of the information we produce. Again,
the system where you have really an
embryonic company, there is still a lot
of work to be done."
(Managing Director3 , p.6, no.32).
C Some documents still had to be refined to capture the detail
required by some of their end-users:
Q: "Have you ever had insufficiently detailed information passed to
you?"
"Yes.... Well if I can give you an example. One thing which is
produced here is a periodic rolling forecast taking us further
through the financial year to see how we're going to do in volume
terns. That's produced partly as a marketing tool and partly as
a financial tool, and at present the format in which it reaches
me doesn't give me all the information that I need in order to do
certain of the forecasting that I have to do." (Finance
Director3 , p.3, no.29).
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e) Inaccurate information was not generally a problem except as
regards sales forecasting, an area which posed difficulties for
all the Group's subsidiaries, and doubtless the rest of British
industry as well:
"We've had certain cases this year where
the sales budget, which was put together
round about December 1986, has proved
fairly inaccurate in various markets,
the biggest of which being the market
which has affected us most severely, has
been the Middle East."
(Deputy Administration Manager 3 , p.1,
no.11)
f) Sales forecasts were also problematic in another respect; they
tended to be almost solely for the benefit of the manufacturing
units, and especially Company 1, rather than the marketing/sales
team at Company 3:
"The forecast system currently is linked
into basically what factory require as
opposed to what we as Company 3 require.
That will change, I hope in the next 2
or 3 months, in that we will develop our
own forecasting system which will run
totally independently of any of our
manufacturing units.... I'm not
satisfied with the format they're
currently in."
(Marketing Director3 , p.10, no.71/72).
There were a number of problems specifically relating to the computer
based information systems:
11) There was a fundamental dissatisfaction with the computer
software in use in the administration department:
"It's with software that we have
problems, because everybody speaks a
different language. The software people
know computers and the export people
know export. We are the customers and
we are trying to find out, to get the
technology to do something - reports,
schedules - various things to save on
labour.	 We have this on-going battle
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every time we try and get somebody to
write some software for us; they say one
thing and we say something and they
think it is totally different and then
when it turns out, they say 'I told you
that'. They don't seem to understand
the same language."
(Administration Manager3 , p.8, no.53).
1)) There was also a lack of confidence in the hardware itself, with
a lack of memory space and the inability to use all the
facilities simultaneously being cited as two major problems:
"We certainly have a lack of memory
space. We have one master and two
slaves downstairs, and you can't use all
three for a start. So if you're using
the master you can use one slave, if you
use the master and printer you can use
one slave. You can't use all three on
some functions - some functions you can,
you can't on others."
(Deputy Administration'Manager 3 , p.7,
no.66/9)
Company 3 possessed a sales-oriented culture that emphasised action
rather than reflective planning. The result was that information and
communication problems had not been given serious attention: the
formal systems for information dissemination were almost non-existent
mite computer facilities that had been purchased were considered
inadequate to meet the demands of the business. To some extent the
youth of the company, ambitious profit targets and a lack of resources
WET also contributory factors. But it was the cultural emphasis on
sales and marketing rather than the mechanisms for servicing the sales
function which largely dictated the distribution of scarce resources.
This cultural proclivity was itself reflective of the company's
fundamental mission, i.e. to profitably market and sell Group products
outside of the two domestic markets of the U.K. and the Netherlands.
7.3. 2 	 Information Culture Type 
Company 3 possessed a mixed 'oral/written' culture. Employees within
the finance/administration department expressed a strong preference
for receiving and transmitting information in written form, while the
sales and marketing personnel were oral communicators. This duality
reflected differences in the nature of the roles performed by
individuals in each department. Thus while the salesmen spent much of
their time selling, an activity demanding considerable (face-to-face
and telephone) inter-personal communication, the
finance/administration staff provided the support service, which
necessarily implied a need (often a legal need) for written
communication.
The personnel of finance/administration cited three principal reasons
why written communication was preferred:
a) It was easier to exercise the control function:
"Things in writing, once it's there on
paper, you've got a means of control."
(Finance Director 3 , p.3, no.32).
There was less opportunity for misunderstanding:
"If it is something complicated like an
address or a recipe or anything else, I
prefer to write it and invariably send a
telex or fax with it even if it is only
going to Company 1, because you try and
dictate it....the following address over
the telephone, it is difficult; also it
tends to get misconstrued if it is
verbal. If it is something very
important you have got to get it right,
and then I prefer to have it written."
(Administration Manager3 , p.7, no.43).
0 If there were problems with a communication then they personally
were covered:
"A word of mouth [communication] can
always be denied at some time later; a
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written communication is always filed
away and it's there in black and white."
(Deputy Administration Manager 3 , p.4,
no.40/41).
In contrast respondents in sales and marketing cited the great
advantage of oral communication as speed and some individuals, and one
individual expressed a general dislike of paperwork:
"I think in terms of cutting down paper
and saving time, certainly to be told
initially by word of mouth."
(Export Area Manager3 , p.7, no.69).
"I prefer word of mouth to make sure I
get the information early enough,
confirmed by the written information....
I guess the important thing in decision
making is that you have as much
information as possible as quickly as
possible. Obviously oral information is
a lot quicker to transmit than in
written form. That's not to say that we
don't appreciate the need for
confirmation in written information; but
I think it has to be a confirmation
rather than the prime content, if you
like,	 for	 a	 specific	 piece	 of
information.... I would find it
Impossible I think to work in an
organisation which relied heavily on
written communication."
(Marketing Director 3 , no.34/35).
It should be noted that these are broad cultural generalisations and
devise much important detail. For instance, administrators resorted
to oral communication where time was pressing or simple instructions
wuetobe issued to juniors:
"I obviously prefer to receive written
[information] because you can verify it
In its relevant slot, and that reminds
you that you have got to do something
about it; but if it means because it is
written it is delayed, then I would
prefer word of mouth."
(Administration Manager3 , p.6, no.38).
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Conversely, salesmen liked to receive written confirmation of much
information they sent/received, and made generous use of the telex and
fax facilities - for example, to confirm orders with foreign clients:
"I prefer to transmit information
externally	 by	 telex,	 internally
initially by word of mouth.... Telex
because it gives me a reminder of what
I've said and can also be legally
binding; orally in-house because it's
the quickest, most efficient method of
passing information."
(Export Area Manager3 , p.8, no62/63).
This apparent cultural dichotomy between the finance/administration
and sales/marketing departments is of the first importance. It
suggests that the broad characterisation of companies 1 and 2 as 'oral
information cultures' disguises as much as it discloses.	 The
possibility must be considered that information culture types
should be distinguished at the departmental rather than the company
level, While the probability that this can be done seems intuitively
to be extremely high, the focus of this thesis is on corporate or
organisational culture rather than group or departmental culture, and
these leads will not be followed up here, though some further points
are made in Chapter 13.
7.3.3	 Ad Hoc Communications 
The culture of Company 3 favoured informal, ad hoc and face-to-face
communication:
"If the question is: how much of your
internal information goes through a
formal M.I.S. and how much goes through
an informal one, then I think that's
really the crux. I would say that the
vast majority goes through an informal
[system].... What is really happening
on a day-to-day basis is a very informal
communication system.	 Therefore, if
someone wants to pass on some
information, they don't have to go
through 3 people to see you. I mean
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they basically come in and start giving
you the information. You know, working
with sort of 22 people in total and
being so close to each other, it's so
easy, and it's encouraged. I don't
think we suffer from a lack of
Information between departments within
Company 3."
(Marketing Director 3 , p.14/15,no.12/18).
"Because we have got a relatively small
operation here - we've got 22 people -
communications are not that difficult
and information tends to pass quite
quickly. If it's wrong somebody knows
quite quickly."
(Managing Director3 , p.6, no.33).
The problems associated with this communication were many and various:
E0 much ad hoc communication tended to be late:
"Certain things always Seem to arrive
late.
	
I always seem to be chasing
certain bits of information. My
favourite one, which, because a large
part of our expenditure tends to relate
to individuals travel expenses,
particularly overseas, where bills are
very slow coming through the system,
through charge cards, whathaveyou, an
Important part of controlling
expenditure on a cost basis for us is
getting individuals expense returns
returned promptly after each accounting
period.
	
And that for me is a major
problem because we have several
individuals on the sales side who are
really the world's worst at putting
these things in on time."
(Finance Director3 , p.2, no.20).
W due to the lack of systematisation and formalisation of
information systems individuals were often uncertain who needed
to know what, and consequently managers were prone to complain of
Others failure to appreciate their information needs:
MI general do the people who feed you with information
understand what you need to know?"
- 203 -
A: "No they don't. We rely on marketing a lot because they sell the
products and get the orders for it then, if it is a new product,
packaging has got to decide and go into our case studies. There
is a lot of time lost between anything being finalised and the
administration department starting to do the work."
(Administration Manager3 , p.9, no.56/57).
"My perception of that would be that communication could be
improved, that it's perhaps satisfactory but no better than that.
As I see it, certain individuals anyway are inclined not to
communicate well with their superiors, and that can lead to loss
of information, to wrong decisions being made, various
problems.... I think that a failure to see what's relevant is
certainly the problem on the administration side." (Finance
Director', p.7/8, no.79/82).
"I don't think the salesmen really understand what we need to
know."
Q: "Is that a major problem?"
A: "Yes, I think so."	 (Deputy Administration Manager3 , p.8,
no.83/84).
d One particular problem faced by the administration department was
the receipt of insufficiently detailed information from the
salesmen:
"When normally we set up a customer onto
our records, I have to get all the
information I can possibly get; who his
bankers are. And that's a good instance
where we have a form where the salesmen
just fill the form in. They see the
customer, they get the detail from the
customer, and invariably there's no
banking details. So I go back to the
area manager who'll go back to the
customer and eventually it will come
through. But if it was there on the
form for a start...."
(Deputy Administration Manager 3 , p.3,
no.27)
It is worthy of note that almost all the perceived communications
problems were considered to be between rather than within departments,
and reflected patterns of tension and conflict within the
organisation:
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"I feel that the finance/administration
communication to the marketing
department is good, excellent even, in
that I feel that we give them all the
information they need. If there was
information which they currently don't
receive which they do need then I feel
that they should be saying so and it
could be supplied. Whereas looking at
it the other way around, as I think I
have perhaps intimated, that I don't
necessarily get all the information from
the marketing area that I could. They
are basically loathe to give me or my
area much in the way of information
without us first asking for it, and even
then we virtually have to drag it out of
them at times."
(Finance Director3 , p.8, no.85).
"Is administration not always facilitating the flow of
Information, but actually impeding it?"
A: "Yes, it has been a bad problem in 's_ couple of instances. There
was a situation where we were supplying Aruba. We needed some
product on a certain day, I asked one of the controllers to check
the product would be available, they came back and said 'no, it
wouldn't be available' - it would be available the Monday after.
I then checked with Company 4 myself, and said 'why can't it be
available on Thursday?' They said 'it can, but it was asked for
on the Monday'.... As it turned out because I intervened they
were able to give me the product slightly quicker." (Export Area
Manager3 , p.1, no.8).
As with the other Group subsidiaries the cultural mores of Company 3
conditioned a working environment that relied heavily on informal
patterns of communication. Predictably this meant that while
communication could be extremely quick and easy to achieve there was
often considerable doubt as to its quality. Yet so strong was the
ultral basis for a non-systematised and informal communication
mtemidthin the organisation that despite recognising these problems
there was little enthusiasm for increased formalisation. Rather, the
cultural consensus was that attempts should be made by individuals to
work the existing system more competently.
The existence of only a minimal formal M.I.S. was undoubtedly one of
the factors that made a well-developed informal communication system
necessary, and this might tempt some to suggest that structural
factors are at least as important as cultural variables in explaining
the nature of Company 3 , s information/communication dimension. Such
an explanation would, however, be naive. While organisational
structure obviously played a significant role, it was within the
context of the beliefs, values and attitudes of the management team.
This does not mean that culture was the dominant and determining
variable shaping organisational structure, communication systems and
so forth. Indeed, it is a contention of this thesis that culture and
other aspects of organisations are inter-causally related and develop
conjointly through a continuous process of dialectical interaction.
All that is argued for here is that by concentrating on the cultural
fabric of organisations the relationships between information and
communication phenomena and other facets of organisational life can be
Interestingly and rewardingly examined.
7.3.4	 Informal Communication 
There was a grapevine in operation at Company 3 that pervaded the
whole organisation, though much of the gossip and speculation that
arose within the administration and sales/marketing departments tended
to be confined to these areas. Interestingly, a large number of
managers regarded it as a useful source of information:
"I find out things	 through the
grapevine."
(Administration Manager 3 , p.10, no.67).
However, only the marketing manager admitted to looking on it as a
management tool that could be manipulated for personal/departmental
advantage:
Q: "Have you ever made use of the grapevine?"
A: "It's another source of information."
Q: "You take
	 a	 manipulative	 attitude
	 towards
	 grapevine
communication?"
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A: "That's right, yes . " (Marketing Director 3 , p.19, no .62 ) .
There was evidence that as with Company 2 there was no clear
distinction between day-to-day management information and individuals
interpretive and speculative information. The relaxed and casual
atmosphere, the informal style of operation and the democratic and
participative ethos made this almost inevitable. To some extent the
problems associated with communication within the organisation,
especially the misunderstandings, uncertainties and lack of detail
were a consequence of these cultural traits.
7.3.5	 Information Consciousness 
Although the company was essentially sales/marketing-led, with the
three area managers securing orders for goods which the
finance/administration department then serviced, the organisation was
not appreciably more 'information •conscious' than any other
subsidiary. A great deal of information was collected concerning the
external environment, some of which had to be paid for, and some
problems were specifically recognised to have a large information
component. Nevertheless, the cultural sympathies of the company
centred on the concept and actuality of marketing/selling, rather than
information and communication as facilitators of this ultimate
objective. As the finance director asserted:
Q: "Would you say that Company 3 as a whole was 'information
conscious I ?"
A:	 "No."
@: "In what way does this lack of 'information consciousness'
manifest itself?"
A: "Perhaps it's just my perception. My perception of the situation
Is that a lot of the financial information that is generated here
is perhaps not necessarily reviewed in the sort of detail it
might be, because the lack of questions that come back often
suggests that the people receiving it perhaps haven' t studied it
as carefully as they might .... My impression from the lack of
questions or sometimes from the nature of questions asked
suggests that amongst the marketing-related fraternity they' re
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not that conscious of the role that information is playing or
needs to play." (Finance Director 3 , p.14, no.68-70).
7.3.6	 Dependency on Group Information 
Company 3 was unique within the Group in terms of its dependency on
information supplied by the manufacturing subsidiaries. The
marketing/sales department required a considerable amount of
information from the subsidiaries concerning new products and product
coatings. The administration section was mostly concerned with
production dates and the transportation of goods, and were in frequent
communication with the production and warehouse/despatch departments
in the subsidiaries. The company's relationship with each of the
manufacturing subsidiaries was highly variable; the highest quality
communication was with Company 1, and the worst was with Company 5.
However, while Company 3 had the closest communication relationship
with Company 1 there were still problems.. For example, of the three
manufacturing units in Company 1 only one of these was considered
particularly reliable:
"I am inclined to trust things coming
from the L.A.N%... team, rather than
the other teams [at Company 1] because
experience has taught us that what they
say they will do."
(Administration Manager 3 , p.2, no.13).
Similarly, while the administration department of Company 3 had a
major input into the finished goods system of Company 1, there were
still frequent information problems:
"We've got a big input into the finished
goods systems at Company 1. We book
containers and trailers to go out on the
strength of the information supplied by
that system which is obviously only as
good as the information put in. It's
updated on an on-going basis, but we
still try to move things which aren't
there.., somebody in the factory keyed
an extra nought in or got the wrong line
number or something, so we've got to
\--10-„L.¢ RnO\ 1„.• )NO
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verify that by physically going and
having a look at it."
(Administration Manager 3 , p.2, no.16).
The marketing and sales department faced a rather different set of
information problems :
a) Communication with the subsidiaries, especially regarding complex
issues such as the development of a new product, was excessively
slow and time-consuming:
"I think one of the biggest problems we
face is we have a system of P.I.F.'s
(Product Information Forms). When we
are looking at a new product, or a
product for a new market, we put out at
a form which gives the basic
specifications of the product, i.e. we
want a 3 kilo box of [product] with
natural colours and flavours for Greece.
That then goes to our own packaging
department who cost out the packaging
element (which is here at Company 3),
because we're responsible for all our
own packaging. It then goes to the
factory, Company 1, for a product
costing, which is a recipe cost. That
will take into effect the influence of
natural colours and flavours as opposed
to standard; also the production cost
and the packaging labour cost. That
will then come back to us for agreement.
If we agree we will then go to our
costing department, who raise a line and
pack, which is a unique product number,
and then when that product number is
ordered will automatically give the
specification. And from then, any
additional packaging, once we've agreed
that we have an order in, and packaging
will be ordered. If we know it's [a]
firm order in advance then we can
preempt that order and order the
packaging before hand. Obviously the
biggest problem is the length of time it
takes to do this. If it goes to [name]
and he's busy and it sits on his desk
for a week or two, then it goes to the
factory and gets lost, or somebody sits
on it again, then we can have a lead
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time for ordering the packaging. It can
be anything up to 6 months [between]
concept and getting an order out.... I
think the major factor again is with the
factory. there is not the same element
of urgency with the factory, especially
when it's something non-standard."
(Export Area Manager 3 , p.4, no.21/22).
I)) The subsidiaries were considered reluctant to reveal detailed
information concerning the costs of producing a product, making
optimal product specification by Company 3 very difficult:
"Again, if we go back to the question of
costing most of it now is insufficiently
detailed because certainly in terms of
Company 2, Company 4, we will simply get
a cost per tonne, they won't break that
down. Now it would be quite useful.
Sometimes we have an idea of what
product we want and in what packaging
specification we want it. It would be
very useful at tites if the
manufacturing units came back and said
'well hang on a minute, if you do it
this way you could probably save
yourself £50-£100 a tonne'. Whereas
you're not always aware what is the
easiest way for the factory."
(Export Area Manager 3 , p.6, no.43).
Poor estimates of costs from the subsidiaries were also a
problem:
HA lot of the information we work on is
based on input from manufacturing
plants, specifically costs. If we've
been given a true reflection by the
manufacturing unit then our cost guides
know where they stand; they feel they
can work out fairly accurately what our
own incurred costs are, we really know
where we stand. What happens if we get
a poor costing from outside, this can
obviously be magnified ri:ght through."
(Export Area Manager', p.2, no.11).
Many of these problems were caused as a result of Company 3 1 s lack of
knowledge or expertise in the field of production, and was thus a
local cultural difficulty. But poor relations with some subsidiaries,
and undeveloped and unreliable information systems linking company 3
to the rest of the Group were also significant factors. Moreover,
because Company 3 relied heavily on the other subsidiaries for its
information whatever problems they faced in devising product costings,
producing and transporting the goods, etc. were in turn problems
experienced by Company 3. Thus the export division more than any
other Group company was a victim of the Group culture and its
associated information and communication dimension.
CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUBSIDIARY 4 
8.1 Introduction 
The Company was an old, family business claiming a history dating back
to 1817, that had been built up by its three owner directors until
they sold out to the Group. On 28th November, 1984 the Group
completed the acquisition of the whole of the issued share capital of
Company 4. The company employed approximately 150 people, and had
three principal activities: 1) it manufactured its own range of gums,
pastilles and lozenges which it sold primarily to the chemist trade;
2) it manufactured for third parties under pharmaceutical licence some
well known medicated and semi-medicated products; and 3) it used its
sales force to distribute the products of third parties to the chemist
trade. While the Group was seeking to divest itself of companies in
Sweden and France the extent of perceived synergy between the Group
and Company 4 made it an attractive commercial proposition.
Specifically, Company 4 brought to the Group special skills in the
manufacture of medicated and semi-medicated products, it distributed
to chemists and specialist health shops, and it possessed the special
skills and techniques required for the manufacture and distribution
of products on behalf of third parties.
It should be noted that in some respects Company 4 differed
substantially from the other manufacturing subsidiaries in the Group's
portfolio. The essential distinguishing feature of the company was
that it manufactured medicated confectionery products which were
classed as medicines and therefore needed to be licensed by the
ULM.. In order to obtain the licenses to make these products the
company had to fulfil certain legal requirements: it had to possess
the necessary facilities and it had to employ qualified personnel in
the key technical positions. The need to obtain product licenses for
many products was significant as the manufacturer's license for these
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products specified what the product was in terms of its active
ingredients, manufacturing process and shelf-life, and this in turn
implied a huge overhead information cost to the company which it was
only just beginning to tackle.
Until recently the company had suffered from massive under-investment
in all areas of the business ranging from its stock of manufacturing
and packing equipment to information systems, its marketing strategy
and sales and distribution network. This state of affairs had arisen
because the previous owners of the company had had little interest in
investing heavily, with their own money,	 in a concern which was
already providing an 1 adequate I return. The Group, however, had
purchased Company 4 realising that if it was to play a major role in
its long term strategy then considerable investment had to be
undertaken. Within the first three years investment was made in new
packing equipment, product development and product assurance, and a
new finished goods and raw materials ' warehouse was completed. In
addition, by early 1988 the old senior management team had been
completely replaced, and while data collection was conducted a new
Management Information System was being installed.
The company was headed by just three directors: a managing director, a
works/production director and a technical director. While the works
director had his counterparts in companies 1 and 2 the technical
director, who had responsibility for the laboratory, quality control,
product development and licenses, was unique within the Group. The
sales function was headed by a national sales and distribution manager
and the finance function by a commercial manager. These five
Individuals constituted the senior management team of the company.
The culture of Company 4 had largely been formed under the old
management troika who in the 1950's had taken over from the
descendants of the family who had initiated the business. This
management team had been more interested in securing a good living
from the company than planning and investing for the long term future
of the company itself. These attitudes had a profound influence on
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the culture and general development of the organisation which became
extremely conservative, narrowly focused and unprofessional in terms
of its beliefs and outlook. The Group's new senior management team
described the old company culture as being 'dowdy', 'unimaginative',
'gone-to-sleep',	 which was 'very staid in its ways' and possessed
'almost an antiquated approach to life generally, and very old
fashioned'. The new managing director summed up these points:
"Company 4 has been in existence for 171
years, and it has been in Crediton all
that time. It started as a family
business, and it was run by the family
for many years, certainly well into the
1950's, and it has always had a very
localised sort of image of itself as
well. The family didn't ever want it to
do more than pay a reasonably good
living for the family. The result
really was that it became very parochial
in its whole view; what it was about,
what the options were, what the
opportunities were, and when the Group
bought it four years ago the directors
here then were all long established
people in the business all due to retire
in the not too distant future, and they
were making, one has to say, quite a
good profit from the business relative
to what they were doing. They could
have made more money, but they were
actually making sufficient in their view
if you like....	 The trouble was that
the business was largely starved of
reinvestment.... I think one of the
important factors was that they knew
they didn't have very long to go, and I
think they were more or less saying to
themselves, 'well, there's not much
point in spending on the business, we're
not going to be here, somebody else will
buy the business in due course and they
will do all the investment etc.' So
what we took over, really, was an
incredibly old-fashioned business."
(Managing Director 4 , T1.S1. 6-36).
Given that the Group had only purchased the company in 1984 and that
the current managing director had only assumed responsibility for the
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company sixteen months previously, the culture which had evolved over
so many decades was still very much in evidence, and played a crucial
role in the functioning of the organisation. This said, the company
was undergoing a rapid metamorphosis, as a more competent and
professional managerial team sought, with financial resources from the
Group, to remould the corporate structure and ethos. In short, during
the time this study was conducted Company 4, perhaps more than any
other subsidiary, was a company in transition:
"It's changing so rapidly from one type
of organisation to another. 	 It's
completely changing.... It's trying
very hard - or the new management team
are trying very hard."
(Production Manager4 , p.3, no.12).
The difficulties of engineering the cultural transformation facing the
senior management team cannot be easily over-stated. The historical
development of a low expectation, low esteem, unprofessional culture
over a period of decades had left its mark:
"...it [the company] has a unique image
within the community which is not
good.... This place seemed to attract
people that were out and out drop-outs,
ex-cons, ex-alcoholics, some of them not
ex, suffering from the 'falling down'
syndrome. And everybody treated it with
contempt.... It was treated in the main
as the last post; if you couldn't do
anything anywhere else go to Company 4.
And if you worked at Company 4 people
then viewed you with suspicion."
(Chief Engineer4 , p.4, no.17).
Combined with the internal problem of evolving a more satisfactory
corporate ethos was the company's perceived vulnerability to changes
in Its external environment. The lack of influence enjoyed by the
organisation over demand for its products, its suppliers and customers
OtTLCAAV did nothing to increase company confidence levels in the
short term:
(1: "To what extent do you think the external environment in which
the company exists is a predictable one?"
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A: "It is a rocky sea, and we're not a ship we're a rowing boat,
we're a rowing boat with one oar. We won't continue to be that
way but that's how we are at the moment, and it's bloody choppy
out there. When we regain our second oar that's going to give us
abit more stability, and I think once we get a little out-board
motor we'll be away, and I think all these things are beginning
to happen. But at this stage we're still getting the processes
right. We're still trying to get the stroke right, and when the
stroke is there, then we'll move on. But it's still getting the
basics right." (Account Manager4 , p.4, no.18).
Given these difficulties the managing director was making a conscious
effort to mobilise the company by running a 'hearts and minds,
campaign. This involved providing the workforce with more information
concerning the direction of the company, and giving middle and junior
managers a greater opportunity to make their ideas known to seniors.
This attempt to instil in employees a better developed sense of
responsibility for their work and a less introspective and more
confident outlook concerning the business was especially difficult in
Company 4 as a result of the management style of the previous owners
who had been keen to maintain a certain distance between themselves
and their employees. Levels of commitment to the organisation among
more junior managers and shopfloor operatives were not, therefore, as
high as in other Group subsidiaries:
"We recently did a presentation to the
whole of the workforce; just 3 weeks ago
we closed down the place for half a day,
took everybody into Exeter to a proper
presentation forum and sat the whole lot
down, 150 people, and did a two hour
presentation to them on exactly what
we're doing with the business and what
we see the future of the business as
being, and how they themselves hopefully
will have a greater interest in the
business as a result. I have to say it
was incredibly successful, the response
we've had	 since	 then	 has	 been
remarkable. I mean we've had people
who've been here 40 years saying 'well
it's the first time I ever knew this',
and that's all been another indication
of the way it was operated previously,
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which was very much management being us
and workforce being them."
(Managing Director4 , T1.S1. 168-183).
There was also evidence of the same strategy being used by the
waging director in an effort to exert more control over the
company's environment:
"...very recently we got all our
suppliers together and we did a
presentation to our suppliers and we
said this is what we're doing at Company
4, this is what our objectives are, this
is where we are at, this is where we've
got to go, these are the relationships
we need to form with yourselves and
these are the reasons we need to form
them. And then we said 'we will be more
demanding in terms of price and service
and quality and had a general sort of
discussion with them. I think we're
putting more pressure on suppliers than
they've ever experienced before - not
destructive pressure 2"
(Managing Director 4 , T2. S2. 445-459).
Despite the problems facing the company there was considerable
optimism amongst members of the senior management team that the
culture of the organisation was altering rapidly to one more
supportive of the economic objectives. The managing director was, for
example, sufficiently self-assured to predict a doubling of turnover
and profitability within four years. This confidence was derived less
from the cultural fabric of Company 4 or the Group than from the past
experience of the senior managers, all of whom had worked in larger
and more complex organisations, and several of whom (including the
managing director) had previously worked together at Allied Lyons.
The financial backing of the Group and export support of Company 3
WET also extremely helpful in generating the enthusiasm and
confidence needed to transform the company, and which had until
recently been in short supply.
8.2 The Cultural Profile 
8.2.1	 Personnel Orientation 
At the time data collection was conducted Company 4 had been a member
of the Group for just four years, and had yet to adopt the
characteristically benevolent attitude towards its employees typically
associated with its subsidiaries. Given the history of the company it
was perhaps unsurprising to find that less senior managers tended to
mud their employers as less than caring:
Q: "Would you say there was a benevolent attitude to personnel
here?"
A: "No." (Production Foreman, p.3, no.12).
However, more senior managers were aware of a change in the company's
philosophy towards the employees:
Q: "Is there a benevolent attitude towards employees taken here?"
A: "An understanding I think is probably a better word; they
understand the problems that the staff have had of late, and they
an actively trying to do something about it. I think possibly
'understanding' is a better word than 'benevolent'." (Account
Manager4 , p.4, no.16).
In appointing the current managing director of Company 4 the Holdings
Board had chosen a man in sympathy with the Group personnel
orientation, and over time employees perception of this cultural trait
mnbeexpected to change:
...we have deliberately set out to be
benefactors if you like as much as we
can, and we are definitely making lot
of progress within the business which is
to the benefit of the employees."
(Managing Director4 , pT2.S2., 296-311).
8,2.2	 Loyalty
Mere were a number of long serving people employed within Company 4
both in production and sales, and this translated into both a spirit
of tradition and a certain amount of loyalty to the company:
"There is still that [spirit of
tradition]; because of that there is
loyalty to the company. We have some
long serving people and overall that's
good."	
(Works Director4 , p.11, no.77).
"I think there is a spirit of tradition
that needs to be fostered.... Certainly
there are a lot of traditional aspects
here but they haven't been encouraged."
(National Sales & Distribution Manager4,
p.3, no.14).
However, unlike in other companies within the Group what loyalty there
nstothe company was not manifested in the form of commitment to its
success or pride in its products. There was a noticeable tendency for
individuals below senior management grades not to feel involved with
the company, a feeling linked to many individuals lack of concern with
promotion or personal advancement:
"There's a tendency not to be involved,
really to come in, to do a day's work,
and then to go home again, as evidenced
by the lack of response to the
productivity bonus. I think that lack
of involvement is a characteristic of
the old [Company]. We're trying to
change. We will build up a much better
identity starting at the top, with the
products being re—launched, going out
into the community and then pulling the
rest of the workforce with us. A very
much more collaborative role culture."
(Works Director4 , p.11, no.77).
"I can't think of anyone in the factory
other than in my own department, but
outside of my own department with the
exception of probably one person that
would be interested in furthering his
career." (Chief Engineer 4 , p.4, no.21).
8,2.3
	
Lack of Professionalism 
The executive directors and small senior management team had
considerable experience of working in other companies and were
introducing to the company increasingly professional methods of
waging the business:
"We've got a lot of people from outside
the area now who are bringing expertise
from other companies... they're
bringing different approaches in, and
starting to change the attitudes of the
people."
(Commercial Manager4 , p.14, no.84).
But as traditionally the company had been operated by just three
individuals who took all the important decisions for themselves there
had been no perceived need to develop the professional skills and
values of the vast majority of the staff. Consequently, the
professional competence of many middle ranking and junior managers
within the factory was extremely questionable:
"The problem in a nutshell is that we
have no professional middle management
at all. What's happened in the past is
that the people that are in the middle
management have been brought on by the
old company's regime, and are just not
capable of modern day management. No
fault of their own, they are nice
people, but that's where it ends, and
they are not used to having to justify
their actions; they will tell you
anything to get you off their back. And
then when it's not alright you get a
shrug of the shoulders and..."
(Chief Engineer', p.2, no.8)
"What's your biggest frustration here?"
A: "—first, is the inability of the supervisors and shopfloor
workers to take on board the changes so that the rate of change
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is limited by the time available to actually push those changes
through. We can't just say 'let's do so and so', it won't happen
because they've no experience for it. To tell them what to do
you've actually got to go through the details." (Works
Director4 , p.8, no.51).
Similarly, until comparatively recently the sales function had been
operated with a marked lack of systematisation and professionalism;
and this ethos was still evident in the abilities and attitudes of the
salesforce:
"The situation which existed previously
was one where 16 representatives
reported in to the managing director; in
basic terms there was no selling
function, there was no national Accounts
activity, no National Accounts contacts;
it tended to be done by representatives
just paying them an occasional call to
some of these people."
(National Sales & Distribution Manager4,
p.1, no.1).
8.24
	
Democracy and Autocracy
Company 4 had, in past, been run along extremely autocrstic Itmes Apy
its owner directors:
"Historically very autocratic, very
patriarchal."
(Works Director4 , p.11, no.77).
"...'you do as I say and that's the end
of it, never mind about arguing about or
asking questions about why you're doing
some jobs'. There was a little of that
going back to the private company - 'I'm
the boss and you will do this'."
(Commercial Manager4 , p.14, no.84).
The present senior management team were attempting to encourage more
debate, questioning and participation by middle ranking and junior
mums:
"I think you'll find when you talk to
other people in the business, they've
all got more information and involvement
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than they've ever had previously and
that allows them to understand more
clearly what they are doing. I am a
great believer in getting people
together and talking to them about what
your plans are, what your objectives
are. We've taken the whole of the
middle management and senior management
off-site twice in the last 6 months for
a day in a room to air their views and
their opinions and their say... And we
also took all the junior supervisors
from the factory of-site for a day...."
(Managing Director 4 , Ti. S2. 179-189).
There were, however, definite limits to the policy of openness and
democratisation. In part these restrictions were the necessary result
of the which was sadly lacking in professionalism; thus many
individuals could not cope with excessive demands on their abilities
and initiative. But the perceived need by senior managers to keep a
firm grip on the reigns of power also .stemmed from a belief in the
company's need for strong leadership to see it successfully through
this period of transition:
"I think it will remain relatively
autocratic, that the whole show here
needs leadership, and I can't see even
in the medium term the building up of
the majority of the workforce into a
democratic situation. We're so far away
from it, it's a quality of the people
here compared with the North East, where
I last worked where I had an incredible
workforce, very much more competent, it
was very much the other extreme, where
we had democracy... [people here don't
have] the skills and attitudes."
(Works Director4 , p.11, no.77).
But elm at the most senior level the situation was far from being
entirely democratic, and the authority of the managing director was
never In question:
"...at the senior management level it
[decision making] is a mixture of the
two	 [democracy	 and	 autocracy]
deliberately.
	 I'd be wrong to say...
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whereas I am encouraging democratic
approaches to decision taking, policy,
etc. I am also deliberately lacing it
with autocratic decisions to make sure
that the democratic aspect doesn't get
too democratic. Because one of the
problems we have to bring in all these
various changes in a definite period of
time	 and	 I	 can't	 afford	 total
democracy."
(Managing Director4, T2.S2. 323-341).
Those employees who had been members of the company for more than four
years had been socialised into a strong autocratic culture. The
present senior executive team was faced with a dilemma: whilst they
recognised that by making the company more democratic, consensual and
participative the workforce were likely to make better use of
Information resources and become more committed to the company's
Alain success, there were perceived costs to be taken into account.
In particular, greater discussion was thought to require time and
effort on the part of already hard-pressed managers who had ambitious
profit and turnover targets to achieve. Hence a full-blooded
democratic ethos was, in the short term at least, regarded as a luxury
that could be postponed.
8,2,5	 Competition and Cooperation 
The culture of Company 4 was extremely uncompetitive internally. On
amonehand the management team considered that they should work for
each otter as members of one team:
"We work for each other, well, with each
other."
(Production Control, Assistant Buyer4,
p.1, no.5).
"We work very much as a team."
(Personal Assistant to M.D. 4 , p.1,
no.5)
And on the other, junior managers and shopfloor operatives were too
relaxed and casual in their approach to work tasks to enter into
competition with each other. This was amply demonstrated by the
failure of all attempts to introduce competition into the production
department:
Q: ',Is competition between departments encouraged here?"
A: "We have tried it in the past, it's never been terribly
successful.... It's never really caught on."
Q: "How about competition between individuals?"
A: "Not that 1 m aware of. We have certainly areas where it could
apply."
Q: "Competition is not a major feature of the working environment
here?"
A: "No." (Production  Manager 4 , p.3, no. 9).
Interestingly, the works director did have plans to make competition a
more salient feature of the production environment by making the size
of pay increases merit-dependent, though the effects of this policy
were yet to be felt. The one area where there was some trace of
competitive spirit was the sales department, where salesmen were
increasingly being encouraged to out-perform their peers:
"...what we're trying to do is stimulate
competition by way of	 recording
information, publishing that
information, drawing more attention to
it and if you like putting a little
arrow in there with a barb saying 'come
on Fred you're not going to let Bill
beat you at this' - or whatever."
(National Sales & Distribution Manager4,
p.3, no.12).
The uncompetitive nature of the company had obviously been a cultural
trait for many years, while the current stress on inter-departmental
cooperation and middle management involvement was quite a recent
innovation. Given the managing director's appraisal of the dangers of
Internal competition it seemed likely that it would not feature
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particularly strongly in the foreseeable future, and that an
essentially cooperative culture would develop:
"I don't encourage actual competition.
I think that can be very negative. What
we try to encourage is involvement in
the whole, and the competition if you
like is Company 4 versus the rest of the
trade, the outside environment. 	 But
inter-department 	 rivalry	 is	 very
little."
(Managing Director 4 , T2.S2. 487-535).
8.2.6	 Conflict and Confidence 
Trust and confidence levels were generally high among senior managers,
and deteriorated further down the hierarchy of management:
"I suppose we've got some fairly honest
people here, you know."
(Commercial Manager4 , p.7, no.4).
"I think between directors and senior
managers there is great trust and
confidence in what we're doing with the
business."
(Works Director4 , p.11, no.77).
"It's [trust and confidence] higher at
the top and sort of filters down to a
medium level."
(Managing Director 4 , T2.S2. 315-317).
Consequently, while there was some political and conflictual activity
cultural mores meant that it was generally limited in scope:
"We're a very friendly company
basically, there's not a lot of in-
fighting going on."
(Personal Assistant to M.D. 4 , p.1,
no.6).
"I don't think it's sophisticated enough
to be political to be quite truthful. I
have been in business where it was
purely the politics of it; you know, you
had to be seen to be doing the right
thing even though in truth it was the
wrong thing to do."
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(National Sales & Distribution Manager4,
p.3, no.13).
The major conflict area was between production and quality control.
Both the production and the technical directors recognised that the
quality of the company's products had to be improved, but disagreed on
how rigorously quality standards should be applied, at least in the
short term:
"The technical department, which
includes quality control.... There the
problems are I think...[derived from]...
the cooperation between the two
departments [which] is in need of some
improvement. There is some divergence
over attitude.	 It's all part of the
upgrade in standards. Certainly the
approach to quality standards needed to
be improved, but the danger is we apply
too rigid a standard to our products
when our processes are not necessarily
able to meet those standards. The
difference in attitude, a point of
negotiation, is in finding the right
level of approach to standards; and we
have a technical director who comes from
an ethical pharmaceutical background
where	 the	 highest	 pharmaceutical
standards will apply; and we're
essentially dealing with medicated
confectionery made by a process which is
inherently imperfect; you can't make
l00% perfect pastilles, from the
appearance point of view at least there
are going to be some defectives. There
has tended to be some conflict over what
Is acceptable.... I think what we have
to bear in mind here is that there is a
cost penalty in improving standards too
far too quickly."
(Works Director4 , p.6, no.37).
There were also signs of tension between production and sales:
"...this is a personal view, sales go
out and sell products which are very
difficult to go and manufacture.
Normally they sell them to large
customers. It causes a lot of hassle.
I'm thinking of one particular product
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where our sales people went out and came
back having secured a contract for
supplying Superdrug with [-] which is a
product which we're having great
difficulty manufacturing.
	 There are
process problems with it. To sell a
product really before you know how to
manufacture it properly is really not on
in my book...."
(Production Manager4 , p.2/3, no.8).
The greatest problems of trust and confidence were evident in the
relationship between the senior managers and the shopfloor operatives
and their union representatives. This manifested itself in the form
of an 'us-and-them' confrontational spirit that had its origins in the
distant history of the company but was still very much alive. There
was also a perception on the part of some senior managers that the
three directors formed a closed group which was largely impervious to
their, criticism:
"I think there is a great deal of 'us-
and-them'. I think them being the
directors, the top three, and everyone
else are *******."
(Chief Engineer4 , p.4, no.19).
"[Amongst the workforce] certainly there
is a suspicion about any changes we
introduce. I think historically within
Company 4 it's been a typical 'us-and-
them' situation, management and
workforce, and it's proving a fairly
slow process to try and change that.
But once changes are properly explained,
people are trained in the new systems,
new documents, they are accepting them
reasonably well."
(Works Director4 , p.1, no.6).
8,2.7
	 Narrowness and Introspection 
The =pony had been extremely narrow and introspective both in its
approach to the outside world through marketing and sales and
internally, with separate departments being encouraged to operate
independently rather than cooperatively.
	 More than in any other
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respect the company had been narrowly focused in terms of its plans
for future growth and expansion, which were little short of alien
concepts in the management culture of the past:
"Company 4 has been a company with,
perhaps to use the expression 'limited
horizons' is not the right expression,
but perhaps 1 a limited outlook' in the
expansion projection for the company.
Of course all this has changed just
recently."
(Account Manager4 , p.1, no.2).
By the time data collection for this study was conducted the
narrowness and introspection of the past was evident only below the
level of senior management. It was, though, problematic in that it
was yet another cultural trait that was slowing the pace with which
economic objectives could be achieved.
8,2.8	 Marketing-led and Production COnstrained 
In the sixteen months since the current managing director had assumed
US NaB Company 4 had become increasingly marketing-ortex\ted ., tint,
mrloting agency it employed had been instructed to develop a more
mdernmarketing strategy for the company and many of its products had
been repackaged. As the managing director asserted:
"[The company is] certainly marketing-
led at this moment and since I've been
here. It's had to be because that's
really the criteria in the business was
to put it into a much more meaningful
marketing role. We will continue that
role, that philosophy, and the
investment that is being put into
production will have to be versatile and
flexible to a degree to meet the
marketing requirements of the business."
(Managing Director4 , p.T2.S2. 680-694).
while the constraints placed upon the extent to which th e
 M.D.'s
marketing philosophy should not be under-estimated - much of the
equipment at Company 4 was old and
	 lacked versatility,
	 many
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individuals other than the senior managers were averse to change, and
the company lacked any trained marketing personnel - this comment is
culturally significant. It indicated that, as with other Group
manufacturing subsidiaries, Company 4 was likely to pursue a
marketing-led path towards organisational growth and maturation.
8.2.9	 Pace of Activity 
The culture of Company 4 supported a slow and conservative pace of
wok activity that several respondents linked to the prevailing
regional culture:
"I suppose there is
approach generally,
area, certainly the
back.	 So there is
a certain laid-back
I suppose it's the
area is very laid-
a certain attitude
that filters through from Devon people
that might be said to be .found here."
(Commercial Manager4 , p.14, n0.84).
"On the most basic level of allowing
problems to create delays; at another
level they only have to produce, because
of a machine breakdown or a delay,
availability of material, they happen to
produce 3 batches in a day instead of 5
batches. This is an example of what can
happen. They'd rather have an easier
day than contribute far more money to
the total Group."
(Works Director4 , p.7, no.43).
Interestingly, it was thought that the pace of work activity had
increased over the past few years, especially since 	 the Group's
takeover of the company and the influx of new senior personnel
"I think it's gaining momentum in terms
of being more conscious of an urgency to
get things done."
(National Sales & Distribution Manager4,
p.3, no.16).
"...people are keen to see the company
go forward, we just need to move into
another gear."
(Account Manager4 , p.4, no.14).
"[Things] were more relaxed, they are
not as relaxed now."
(Production Manager4 , p.3, no.13).
But the fact remained that it was only really personnel in the most
senior positions who were keen to work hard, to work long hours and
to force through change within the company.
8.3 Information/Communication Profile 
8.3.1	 The M.I.S.: evolution and description 
The M.I.S. in place at Company 4 had evolved over a lengthy period of
time, with a major re-structuring having occurred four years ago when
the Company was taken over by the Group. Since that time and
especially during the sixteen months before this study was conducted
the formal information systems had been constantly revised, and were
in fact still in a state of flux. Major alterations and additions to
the M.I.S. were predicted once the proposed new computer facilities
were fully installed and operational. However, at the time data
collection took place (Summer, 1988) the company's formal M.I.S. was
still rather underdeveloped. One major problem was the lack of formal
meetings held between senior managers:
"...at the moment we're not having the
number of regular meetings that we need
to have, and that's because of all the
demands of all the various things -
putting new equipment in... changes in
marketing and distribution and such.
We've had to make ourselves get around
the table and talk abgut general items."
(Managing Director*, T2.S2. 682-720).
The company held Board Meetings every two months attended by all three
of the executive directors and a Holdings Board team. In addition to
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these the managing director held review meetings twice a year with his
senior management team. There was also a new product development
meeting held monthly, for which a report was produced by the technical
director, and at which most of the senior management attended. Aside
front these scheduled meetings there were a far greater number of ad
hoc meetings of sections of the senior management team as required.
The technical director, production director, national sales and
distribution manager and commercial manager all produced period end
reports on a monthly basis which were circulated among the senior
management team, and fuelled the formal meetings.
Within the technical director's department the only formal scheduled
meetings were fortnightly training meetings; no formal scheduled
documents were produced solely for internal consumption on a regular
basis, though a large number were produced ad hoc. Within the
production department weekly and monthly meetings were held between
the works director and his senior production team. In addition, a
daily labour efficiency report was compiled, and these were collated
into weekly and monthly summary reports. The sales department held
nom meetings a year for the senior managers, including territory
managers. These were supported by a weekly newsletter. All other
reports were produced ad hoc rather than to an agreed schedule. A
very basic sales/production forecast document was also produced in
conjunction with the production department. Within the finance
department the commercial manager produced period accounts and
summaries for internal consumption and for the Holdings Board. Other
documents, such as forecasts of financial requirements, were produced
as required.
8,3,1.1 Problems with the Formal M. I . S . 
The formal information and communication systems in place at Company 4
represented a piecemeal rather than an integrated M.I.S., a fact
recognised by senior managers:
an incomplete system at the
moment. Reports from each department to
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the M.D. and accounts coming down and
then bits and pieces within each
department, but [not] a complete set of
information systems by any means. It's
partly the historical set-up, it's also
the first stage implementation of a new
information system on an ad hoc basis;
'we must have such and such', and if
It's of sufficient priority we'll get on
and do it. Eventually it will dovetail
into an overall system."
(Production Manager4 , p.8, no.52).
To some large extent this was a result of past poor planning,
something which seemed to be changing as new computer systems were
being introduced:
"As you well know we are going through
the throes of the introduction of a new
computer system. Now at this point in
time the computer system is being geared
up to produce the information that I
shall require; immediately at this
moment the answer is 'no, I am not yet
getting the information that I will
require', but I am given to understand
that it will only be a short number of
weeks now before sufficient input-data
is available that I can draw on which is
vital to manage accounts.... There are
a number of safeguards if you like, in
that we have manual systems which I can
draw information from together with and
In parallel with the files that we've
got. So I can if you like pull
information manually which obviously
takes a greater degree of time than it
will in the future with the computer."
(Account Manager4 , p.1, no.1)
Nevertheless, a number of problems with the formal information systems
remained:
a) information tended not to be well distributed throughout the
company; if it was produced in one department it often remained
unavailable to other sections:
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"I don't think we yet do enough within
Company 4 to circulate information that
would help colleagues in other
departments with their decision making."
(Works Director4 , p.4, no.28).
W the little information that was transmitted from one department
to another was thought to travel very slowly:
"Timing can be a problem. Here we've
obviously got to provide information
both to our own directors and to the
Group, deadlines to meet.... I would
have to say that sometimes our own
information is a bit slow, generated
from within our own departments.	 We
don't need to get any information from
sales, so that's not a problem.
Occasionally we might be looking for
some information from production, and
that has been known to be a little bit
behind schedule, for instance, payment
of bonuses, we might have to chase for
that information. If you're talking
about wages of course then you've got to
have the information on Tuesday or else
it's too late, so there have been times
when we've had to push for that type of
information.
	
(Commercial Manager4,
p.1/2, no.4).
"It [information] usually has to be
coaxed, especially with this new
computer; we have got two or three
periods behind, so I have had the
contract customers asking me where their
figures are."
(Personal Assistant/Secretary to M.D.4,
p.1, no.1).
as the formal information systems were so underdeveloped and much
of what historical information there was was considered
unreliable, so there was a lack of information in every sphere:
"We could benefit from more information,
better quality information to help with
decision making. I think that is a
weakness within [the company] at the
moment."
(Works Director4 , p.12, no.79).
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"I think the problem when I came in was
that there was no basic information; in
actual fact I have to go to October this
year before there is any year over year
comparisons I can make, because there
were no records kept on a weekly
turnover basis."
(National Sales & Distribution Manager4,
p.1, no.2).
"[I produce financial forecasts]....
Again, because of the lack of data, not
as accurate as I would like because we
haven't got the historical data to say
last year it was X, we know why it was X
and this year we know from that that
it's going to be Y. We have to say it
was X last year, we're not quite sure,
so we'll put 5% on and make that....
Some of the work that we're doing now,
for instance we've got temporary people
there who are actually keying in all
last year's invoices again to provide us
with a little bit of background to work
with our new systems. (Commercial
Manager4 , p.5, no.26).
d) There was a learning curve that was still to be mastered by
sone respondents before the computer systems could be used
efficiently and effectively:
"Well I'm still learning how to use the
computer programs that we've got; we
don't know what is in that magic box
until we actually start playing with it,
and we're beginning now to play with it
to get the right sort of reports out
that we want, and so on."
(Account Manager4 , p.1, no.4).
0 Not only were there occasional problems in locating historical
information, but once it had been discovered there were often
doubts concerning its accuracy:
(I: "Have you ever experienced a situation where you have failed to
locate information required?"
- 234 -
A: "That would probably apply to technical information; background to
vat sizes and formulae, yields at various stages, which I suspect
have been calculated in the past but because the information's not
readily identifiable. It's probably around somewhere in the files
M... it's either searching for it and when we get it then being
somewhat suspicious of it anyway, saying 'well we really ought to
check this'. And so I think it's better to establish from basics
information like that, technical information which can be checked."
(Works Director4 , p.2, no.10).
These problems were intimately linked to the history and culture of
Company 4 which still suffered from a lack of professionalism in most
functional areas. This meant that the information resources which
were available to the organisation were not used as efficiently or as
effectively as they might be. While levels of professionalism were
rising among the ranks of the senior management through the
importation of skilled and experienced staff more junior employees
were far less sophisticated, making the satisfactory operation of the
formal information systems difficult to achieve. There seemed to be
particular problems in sales, though similar difficulties were also
mentioned by the senior production team:
"I think the business, in terms of
sophistication, is in it's infancy. You
have to go back to what it was: flown by
the seat of the pants, no
professionalism in terms of its major
accounts."
(National Sales & Distribution Manager4,
p.2, no.9).
"The salesforce direction in the past
has been very limited, very limited
insofar as the managing director
controlled the salesforce in addition to
every other function of the company.
Now when you are directing a salesforce
you need to have a specific line
management system in order to get that
salesforce to function efficiently and
productively; that hasn't been the case
in the past.... So the salesforce are
not yet communicating sufficiently
either in detail, time scale or any
other way sufficient to the requirements
of the on-going business."
(Account Manager4 , p.1, no.3).
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It should also be recalled that Company 4 was a culture in transition,
and that a variety of complications and confusions were being
continuously created and diffused as changes in individuals
responsibilities were instituted:
"There's been a lot of changes in roles
and responsibilities, there are times
when people think that they should be
doing something and aren't supposed to
be, perhaps it hasn't been explained to
them properly. A lot of changes have
taken place for instance with the
managing director's secretary, and there
are still things which she feels that
she should be doing because she's always
done it in the past, and there's no real
necessity for it because we've now set
up a different sales operation. So
we've got to get it together a bit more
before we can say 'yes, we've got an
effective system'."
(Commercial Manager4 , p.9, no.54).
In addition, while the culture of Company 4 was essentially
cooperative, conflict between some of the departments and especially
between the senior and middle/junior management teams further
Interfered with the smooth-running of the formal M.I.S.. Moreover,
MIAMI]. mores did not dictate rigid adherence to the formal timetable
of meetings (other than full board meetings) which were postponed and
re-scheduled at the whim of the senior executives. The skeletal and
piece-meal M.I.S. in place in Company 4 thus reflected the historical
and cultural milieu exemplified by the organisation.
8,3,2	 Information Culture Type 
The communication culture of Company 4 was neither oral nor written,
rather it illustrated a mixture of both characteristics. This was
indicative of the company's poor formal information systems, lack of
professional values and casualness on the one hand and the demands
made upon it by virtue of its role as a manufacturer of medicines on
the other. The former tended to promote oral communication, while the
latter provided a motivation to transmit information in written form.
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Many individuals associated oral communication with misunderstanding
mda dangerous lack of documentary evidence that could reflect badly
oritlum, and it was fear of reprisal in many instances which seemed to
have tnmsmuted employees oral inclinations into into an insistence on
written communication.
Respondents working in the sales and production departments were
noticeably happier to receive and transmit information in oral form:
Q: How do you prefer to transmit information, by word of mouth, in
written form, or do you have no preference between the two?"
A: Nell I suppose I spend a lot of time on the telephone
Internally, that tends to be a lot quicker; if I send a memo then
it will be waiting 4 or 5 days time." (Production Contro14 , p.1,
rm.2).
How do you prefer to transmit information, by word of mouth, in
written form, or do you have no preference between the two?"
M "I prefer transmitting by word
relation to the supervisors;
absolutely understand what you
several times with them, if they
Marmger4 , p.1, no.3).
of mouth.... I find this in
you can make sure that they
mean, you can go through it
don't understand." (Production
(I: "Do you have a preference for information to be passed to you in
written form, by word of mouth, or do you have no preference
between the two?"
M "I think if you want a spontaneous response to a situation then
It's got to be by word of mouth, and ideally recorded in writing
afterwards." (National Sales & Distribution Manager 4 , p.1,
no.4).
Conversely, those individuals employed in the technical, finance and
administration departments expressed strong preferences for receiving
and transmitting written information:
Q: "Do you have a preference for information to be passed to you by
word of mouth, in written form, or do you have no preference
between the two?"
"I prefer it to be written. 	 I have so many diverse
responsibilities. Somebody ringing up and saying 'can you
remember to do a credit note for X company' is not good enough
for me. I need to have specific authorisation for that type of
thing. A lot of it relates to what the auditors might ask for
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A:
instance, verification of them. 	 So I prefer things in writing."
(Commercial Manager4 , p.2, no.9).
Q: "Do you prefer information to be passed to you by word of mouth,
in written form, or do you have no preference between the two?"
"It must be in writing.... Because there is a set of guidelines
which are published by the W.H.O. and of course is adopted by the
U.K. and U.S. and everyone else in making medicines, and that
says that technical information must be documented in writing."
(Technical Director4 , p.2, no.9).
"Do you have a preference for information to be passed to you by
word of mouth, in written form, or do you have no preference
between the two?"
A: "Written form... then you've always got something to back you up.
Verbally [orally] it can be open to misunderstanding." (Personal
Assistant/Secretary to M.D. 4 , p.1, no.2).
Even within those departments highly reliant on oral information there
was apmeived need to have important information in written form as
aback-up to memory or in case something went wrong or was not done:
"Well I prefer it [information received]
in writing, because then you have a
record of that you've been told."
(Production Control, Assistant Buyer4,
p.1, no.1).
"I like it written...because you can
refer back to it, you can't refer back
to a conversation."
(Production Foreman4 , p.1, no.1).
"Well if you've written it down and
taken a copy of it at least you can
prove that it's been done."
(Chief Engineer4 , p.2, no.5).
In short, no clear pattern emerged. The fact that distinct oral and
written communication cultures could be discerned at the departmental
level suggests that further studies in this field should focus more
specifically on departments as well as whole companies. It also
raises serious questions concerning the extent to which one can
legitimately talk about 'corporate culture' as a meaningful concept
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for the analysis of information and communication phenomena in
organisations which are further discussed in Chapter 10.
Ad Hoc Communications 
As the formal M.I.S. was so underdeveloped much information was
communicated within the business on an ad hoc basis. As with the
other Group subsidiaries this was much the preferred route for
communication. There were a number of problems associated with this
communication:
(a)Fear, hostility and distrust tended to inhibit information within
production between union representatives, junior managers and
shopfloor workers and their seniors, and between the junior salesmen
and their managers:
Q: "Are you aware of any instance where fear, hostility or distrust
have inhibited the flow of information within the company?"
"Mn only time that that happens is when they have a union
disagreement [between the union and management]. That's when
fear and distrust start, and that's when information is withheld.
At any other time we're not a militant factory in any way
whatsoever, and we normally get all the information we want; but
in the odd case the shop stewards decide that they are not going
to comply with whatever." (Production Foreman4 , p.2, no.8).
"Possibly production people probably fear some reprisal,
disciplinary action, would not tell us about problems." (Works
Director4 , P•7, no.43).
Q: "Are you aware of any instance where fear, hostility or distrust
inhibited the flow of information?"
"The only answer I can give to that is probably with the
salesforce, a little bit wary of the changes that are taking
place—. Distrust is too strong a word, a little bit of 'hang-
of a minute, what are these people doing to the company, is our
job going to change in the future, are they looking at me from on
high, are they weighing me up', which is not true anyway."
(Account Manager4 , p.3, no.10).
b) Many individuals were not used to dealing with the volume of
information they were now being called upon to process and
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communicate; consequently, many senior executives had to pursue
information they desired themselves:
fl [I] often have to chase information
that I require. I think this is because
the people providing it are not used to
handling the volume of information and
data, and themselves are having to do a
fair amount of work to actually produce
the data rather than it being in a
readily available format."
(Works Director4 , p.1, no.8).
0 Much of the information that is passed upwards from junior and
middle management to the senior team was lacking in detail.
Men individuals were omitting important items of information in
order not to compromise themselves:
Q: "Do you have insufficiently detailed information passed to you?"
A: "Yes, from the supervision side when you're getting feedback you
don't always get the full information given to 7ou.... They
leave certain figures out occasionally when they haven't been
able to achieve or haven't had the time to achieve a particular
production target; when it reflects on them they don't give you
all the information.... We have a programme where we expect them
to produce 5 batches of pastilles a day. In one particular area
of the factory occasionally this will drop to 4 batches for some
reason or another. When you ask the reason for the reduction you
don't always get the answer unless you go and investigate
yourself, which has to be done in some instances." (Production
Mumger4 , p.1, no.1).
"Quite often I will get a request to look at a particular machine
or a particular process because such and such a thing is not
happening. So I will then go over and say to the supervisor
'what happened in this particular situation?' And he would give
me a reason for this particular situation arising. Now I would
say on average that 8 times out of 10 the real specific reason
does not come out on the first questioning, so it then has to be
analysed to find out really what is happening and in analysing it
I have to in the main either involve the production director and
myself or one of my staff and myself to stay there and analyse
the situation. That happens quite regularly. (Chief Engineer4,
no.2).
0 there was a problem with information being withheld as those who
possessed it were unaware that others needed to be informed:
- 240 -
"Possible examples on the basic sort of
level about information that's received
and you think well, you don't actually
appreciate yes it will be of benefit for
so and so to know about that. It
happens because of a slight lack of
definition	 of	 roles	 and
responsibilities. There are a few
peculiar, historical boundaries.., and
those are sort of adjusted. You can get
flow of information which crosses those
boundaries and another person needs to
know, and it just doesn't occur. I mean
the information's received, and 'yes
that's logical, and that's my
information, I'm the one who needs to
know about that',.. you don't think
another person needs to know because of
the way it operated historically you've
got to spread that information a bit
wider than would be strictly necessary.
(Works Director 4 , p.7, no.47).
"In general I would think that they
[other managers] don't understand what I
personally need to know. One tries to
put this right as one goes along and
explain the reasons for it, and to try
and explain why."
(Commercial Manager4 , p.5, no.21).
"Do the people who feed you with information understand what you
need to know?"
"No, I suppose there's a certain lack of prior communication.
People tend to go along their own little road, and it's not until
you shout and say 'hey, I want this', that they suddenly sort of
think.
"Are people here narrowly focused?"
"Yes, I think that is historical. Far more people are sort of
overlapping jobs now under [the current M.D.] than they were
under the previous management; there was very little
communication between the different departments, everyone had
their own little job to do and that was it, there wasn't a great
deal of contact at all."	 (Personal Assistant/Secretary to
M•D. 4 , p•1 no•4)•
Q:
A:
The reasons behind many of the problems with ad hoc communication
within Company 4 were firmly embedded in the history and culture of
the organisation:
"Would you describe communications within departments here as
generally excellent, satisfactory, less than satisfactory or
poor?"
Nell it must be unsatisfactory.... But again I have to say that
that is justified to some degree by the lack of detailed
information in the business. The other element is that they
weren't encouraged to communicate with each other very well. The
business was split very much sales and the commercial side was
this house, the production side was the factory, and the two
should never talk. That was basically the unwritten law of the
business - 'don't you interfere in that area, it's nothing to do
with us'.... So the communication side is not as good as it
ought to be within each department, but it is improving all the
time and people are communicating more meaningfully with other
puts of the business.... [The reasons are] historical and also
to some extent one or two departments are still learning on what
they should communicate; 'we've never told them before, and I
didn't think we needed to this time', is very often the failing.
So we've tried to clarify what they should communicate and how
often they should, and to get involved. I think everybody talks
much more readily and constructively now than they did even 6
months ago, but we still have to work at it."	 (Managing
Director4 , T2.S1. 445-486).
Communication between senior managers tended to suffer due to the
amount of work they had to deal with. Many managers were still
learning their jobs, had little support from their ill-trained and
unmotivated subordinates, and felt under considerable pressure to
perform well to meet the expectations of the managing director and the
kv4) }bud:
"Communication in the finance department
at the moment where we've got all these
things going on is probably just about
satisfactory, it certainly isn't
excellent.... From my own point of view
I suppose it probably tends to be
because you're fire-fighting a lot of
the time and you've got too many people
wanting to communicate and therefore you
can't get all the information you want."
(Commercial manager 4 , p.6, no.28).
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The lack of professionalism among junior staff within the production
department was a particular problem for the works director:
"Within production they [communications]
are satisfactory, but only just.... We
need to get the activity, the sort of
mental activity level at which people
are working rather than retreating to
their own tasks and plod away. To
actually be a lot more alert and pushing
out information and requests for action
in all sorts of directions to get
support and improvements; that's tended
not to happen, - to sit back on their
haunches and plod on."
(Works Director4 , p.5, no.33).
Despite these communication difficulties there was a great deal of
confidence among senior managers that individuals awareness of the
importance of accurate, timely and meaningful communication was
developing rapidly:
Q: In general do you feel that the people who feed you with
information understand what you need to know?"
A: "If we're talking internally, yes, without a shadow of a doubt.
I think in the first stages they weren't aware, but the [managing
director's] been cultivating them for more information, so
they've become attuned to that." (National Sales & Distribution
Manager4 , p.2, no.10).
Q: To the people who feed you information understand what you need
to know?"
A: H I think there is perhaps a learning curve that perhaps we're
still on; but I think generally, yes they do understand more the
sort of information I need. I mean I don't now get information
which is incomplete - very rarely. Whatever they give me has
been thoroughly put together.	 And that's been a process of
discussion and understanding of what the need is." 	 (Managing
Director4 , T2 . S1. 400-412) .
These comments are symptomatic of the new mood of confidence that was
beginning to develop within Company 4, and were associated with a
cultural recognition of the organisation's increasing professionalism,
emphasis on conflict reduction and introduction of basic democratic
values and working practices.
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8.3.4
	
Informal Communication
The senior management team tended to view the company grapevine
networks as a utilitarian means of distributing certain types of
sensitive information or pinpointing those individuals from whom
further confidential information should be withheld:
Nell we actually do on occasions make
the deliberate point of saying 'make
sure that that information gets through
the system, and you can do it via B-,
via A-, or via so-and-so."
(Managing Director4 , T2.S2. 241-248).
Q: "Are you aware of a company grapevine here?"
M "Yes."
Q: "Do you view it as a management tool?"
M
Q: "Can you give an example of when you used the grapevine in this
way?"
M "...If I wanted to find out if there was a leak, a mole leak, I
would feed absolutely confidential information and wait for the
mat person to come and tell it absolutely confidentially to me.
That type of thing." (Chief Engineer4 , p.3/4, no.16).
However, among senior production personnel there was a perception that
the grapevine was not well developed, and that consequently its impact
and utility were extremely limited:
"I don't think it [the grapevine] is
that important in this factory, it
doesn't work, it doesn't have the impact
it has in other places. So the
information you need to feed into it is
minimal and the information which comes
from it is minimal."
(Production Foreman 4 , p.2, no.10).
Q: "Are you aware of a company grapevine?"
M "I think the answer is 'no' in a normal sense. It tends not to
operate here because of the way the company's been
compartmentalised historically.
	 There's [been] very little
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communication between one area and another in the past. (Works
Director 4 , p.10, no.72).
The absence of a well-developed grapevine system contrasted greatly
with the situation in Company's 2 and 3 and especially Company 1. To
some large extent it can be explained in terms of the unwillingness of
the junior employees to be involved with the organisation; even
gossip, speculation and hearsay concerning the company were, it
seemed, casualties of the prevailing ethic of disinterest and
miscontent.
8.3.5
	
Information Consciousness 
Until recently the culture of Company 4 had placed little value on
information and had suffered from an extreme lack of investment in new
technology and information systems generally. The minimal information
awareness of the past culture was associated with the 'limited
horizons' mentality and short-term profit motivation of the three
owner directors:
"I class Company 4 as a nursery business
in	 the	 context
	 of	 business
administration and in information
technology. It's not the fault of the
current management it's the fault of the
company of old being short-sighted in
developing systems within the company
for the future, lack of investment."
(Account Manager 4 , p.3, no.11).
Within the past 16 months a new management style had been instituted
as part of a more general attempt to initiate cultural change which
had profound implications for the way in which information resources
and communication performance were regarded:
@: "How does the new management style contrast with the old?"
A: "It's totally different. The new management have a much more
modern approach to communication, more emphasis on communication.
Whereas the old management style was 'only tell people anything
they felt they ought to know',... now all the information, there
is nothing kept under the command desk, all information is passed
on.... In the past you never knew how well you'd done in a
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financial year. They would say 'well we've made a profit', and
that was all you would get." (Production Manager4 , p.2, no.7).
There was evidence, in the form of the planned new computer systems,
the building-up of databases and the expressed opinions and beliefs of
the respondents that information issues were a priority for the
company:
nI don't believe you are going to run
any company well without having a lot of
information to make decisions on; it's
like trying to fly a plane without any
dials to look at. And I think one of my
prime requirements, which perhaps I took
for granted in my previous background is
information. I didn't realise until I
came here how important information had
been to me."
(Managing Director4 , T2.S2. 498-509).
However, there was a general recognition that the company was still
far from possessing efficient and effective information systems. Many
employees lacked the information awareness or information skills
required of a modern company, and. it was clear that it would take some
considerable time to overcome these difficulties:
Q: "Is Company 4 'information conscious'?"
A: "No, it's too early in our programme of change." (Works
Director4, p.10, no.67).
"I mad say that probably information has not been that highly
valued, perhaps people don't think of it as being a resource
really. As far as lower down the scale, they haven't usually had
that much information before." (Commercial Manager4 , p.14,
no.r).
CHAPTER NIUE 
GROUP CULTURE 
9.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter represents an attempt to synthesise the core categories
that have been used to explicate the cultural and
information/communication dimensions of four of the Group's principal
subsidiaries. The objective is to present a unified and holistic
account of the global organisational culture and an overview of the
Group's information and communication phenomena. The illustrative
comments which supplement and enrich this case are largely drawn from
interviews with members of the Holdings Board, who were almost
certainly in the best position comment on the nature of the Group as a
whole entity.
Naturally, this macro perspective on the Group tends to concentrate on
the similarities between the subsidiaries at the expense of the very
real points of contrast and disjuncture. In short, this chapter is
open to the charge that it disguises as much interesting and useful
material as it discloses. While there is some truth in this claim it
should be noted that the real focus of this thesis is on
organisational culture, not subcultures, and it is therefore more
relevant for the chapter to concentrate on the common and generally
shared characteristics. Nevertheless, where a subsidiary differs
considerably from the Group norm this dissonance of cultural or
communication trait is commented upon for the benefit of the reader.
9,2 Group Cultural Profile 
9.2,1	 Personnel Orientation 
The personnel orientation was one of the dominant features of the
Group mature. This phrase has been used to refer to a variety of
relateoinotions concerning the Group's attitude towards its employees:
Et) aimlief that one of the roles of the company was to provide jobs
with good wages and working conditions and not just to make a
profit for the shareholders.
"It's been promulgated on more than one
occasion by the chairman that sure we
have	 responsibilities	 to	 the
shareholders, but we also have
responsibilities to our people, and we
should not consciously try to do things
with the minimum of people. One of our
roles, particularly in the Sheffield of
the late Twentieth Century, is to
provide jobs."
(Non Executive Director2 , p.17, no.65).
"We tend to think that the wages and
conditions are pretty reasonable."
(Non Executive Director% p.14, no.97).
b) an apparent tolerance of employees who were recognised to be
under-performing.
"Having a caring culture is a mixed
blessing... there are occasions when
that can slow things down.... When
someone is patently incompetent we all
carry them for far longer than a lot of
companies."
(Non Executive Director% p.16,
no.15/16).
ahigh regard for the rights of individual employees.
"It's a very strongly people-oriented
company; we've got a high regard for
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personnel policies, and the rights of
our people."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.15,
no.76).
ci) a generalised feeling of benevolence on the part of the senior
management of the company toward its workforce, allied with other
cultural norms stressing consensual, democratic and participative
decision making which at times bordered on the paternalistic.
"[The Group] is a very people-oriented
business, and it attempts to steer a
path between being an effective,
profitable organisation and being a
caring employer; also taking an active
role and interested part in the
environment in which it works. I have
no doubt at all that it could be more
profitable; I've also no doubt at all
that it could be better on its personnel
front. But I very much doubt whether it
could be better as a .combination of
those two."
(Development Director, p.22/23, no.58).
This personnel orientation, which was the cornerstone of the Group
ethos, had in recent years been moulded and reinforced by the
chairman and chief executive who had a background in personnel.
"I regard myself as the personnel
director. So all the things you would
normally have expected a personnel
director of a Group this size to be
doing, like salary structures,
remuneration, I do, because I think it's
important.... I'm involved in
everything which I associate with
people: pensions, motor cars, all the
emotive things."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.16,
no.79).
But as many long-serving employees observed the chairman was merely
=aiming traditions that had been a significant feature of the
cultural landscape of the Group for an extremely long time; and
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according to Johnson (1968) date back to the intentions of the founder
of the company himself.
9,2,2	 Loyalty
The best evidence for this corporate trait was the Group's excellent
strike record. The Group had suffered only one major strike in its
history; in the Autumn of 1986 there was a six week stoppage at
Company 1 which cost the business around V million. Despite its
generally benevolent attitude towards personnel at all levels, with
the end of the strike the Group took the opportunity to shed those
mimes who it considered undesirable members of the organisation.
The long-term impact of the strike on worker loyalty to the Group was,
though, perceived to be marginal by members of the Holdings Board; a
perception that was supported by informal conversation with members of
the workforce themselves.
"It's an old fashioned word, but people
are very loyal to the company."
(Development Director, p.23, no.59).
"Tremendous loyalty to the organisation.
It's a quality which is easy to dismiss,
but I think it's very valuable."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.7, no.70).
9,2,3	 Informality 
The cultural norms within the Group encouraged a degree of informality
sympathetic with its personnel orientation and compatible with its
lackofenThasis on professional austerity:
"I think there is a tendency for us to
be more informal than if it was a
harder, more professionally run
organisation."
(Non Executive Director 1 , p.15, no.5).
Indeed, to contravene the norms of informality could create problems,
mmftrthe most senior executives:
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"I still have some doubts in my own mind
sometimes, when I write internal memos,
as to how I should sign them. If I do
have a number to sign on any one
occasion, let's say they're in the file
for signing at the end of the day, and
combined with the external letters I'm
signing for and on behalf of the
company, and have on occasions gone
through to an internal memo and signed
it H.B. Stokes where normally I put Bev
Stokes or just Bev. If I make that
mistake, of putting H.B. Stokes on, and
I send it to the wrong person, I can
create a wall; what's the matter with
him today, why have we suddenly gone all
formal?	 - because it's an informal
organisation."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.6,
no.26).
This informality was evident throughout the organisation in terms of
the extent to which individuals of different rank were on first name
term with each other. Specifically within the Holdings Board, the
comparative lack of formal committees, the loose organisation of those
few committees (such as the Remunerations and Pensions Committees)
which did exist, the deliberate under-playing of authority by the
chairman and chief executive, and the somewhat ad hoc division of some
duties (such as in the rotation of Holdings Board directors to
subsidiary board meetings) were further indicators of this Group
proclivity for informal operation.
9,24	 Lack of Professionalism 
While the Group culture was not characterised by uniformly high levels
of professionalism there was a deep-rooted feeling among many
respondents that the company as a whole was becoming increasingly
professional.
"I think by-and-large we're improving
rapidly."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.3,
no.98)
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"A few years ago, budget, really nobody
cared about whether you hit budget or
not.... Now it's changing and we are.
For the last couple of years we have had
a review process where a member of the
Group Board with the F.D. have gone and
spent at least a day with each of the
subsidiaries going through their budgets
before they actually get presented to
the Group Board."
(Non Executive Director2 , p.5, no.53).
Nevertheless, lack of professionalism was still problematic in a
number of respects, with terms such as 'comfy and 'slovenly'
frequently being used to describe the Group work environment:
"Here we are much more cosy than that
[Mars]. Cosy is a bad thing to be, but
it's - we do take people's needs and
aspirations into account and we
recognise that they are doing more than
just working for us, trying to live an
enjoyable and fulfilling life as well."
(Development Director, p.23, no.58).
"I think possibly you could submit one
word, which is Icomfy."
(Group Financial Director, p.20, no.24).
This casualness was evident in several guises, notably as an
unwillingness to take up the challenges of the commercial world and an
unwillingness to take responsibility for decisions.
"An area where we may have a
problem...[is]... that I think there is
an unwillingness for people to say, you
know, 'that's my ball and I'm going to
run with that one'; or 'I'm going to
take that one on'. So that facts can be
presented and there might be an
uncertainty as to who really does what
at the end of the day."
(Company Secretary, p .9, no.54).
"I think there's this general referring
back all the time which the lack of
clear authority and threat, and this
McGregor Theory X type figure sort of
thumping the table and shouting and
screaming - the lack of that figure
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causes people I think to send decisions
up and down the chain all the time, and
nobody is really very keen on making a
final decision. I don't think that goes
for the PLC, don't get me wrong; but
that's the feeling that comes through
from the subsidiaries. An awful lot of
people, and you wonder what their real
responsibilities are, and you wonder
whether people are doing a job just
because they just succeeded someone else
who was doing it, and nobody's really
reappraised that they need to be doing
it or not."
(Company Secretary, p.20, no.24).
The casualness and general unwillingness to take responsibility for
decisions were symptomatic of poorly defined job responsibilities, the
lack of formal control mechanisms for ensuring that decision-
postponement by junior and middle management was immediately
detectable, and a general diffuseness •of authority. In short, there
were many facets to the Group's lack of professionalism, and these are
dealt with in more detail below. Two principal causes of this cluster
of characteristics were minimal investment in staff training and a
tendency to make internal promotions rather than bring talented people
in from outside. On a Group-wide basis, like so many other elements
of the organisation's culture, these cultural traits could be traced
back to the company's insistence on maintaining what in this thesis
has been referred to as its 'personnel orientation',	 which had
clearly created conditions which de-emphasised professionalism.
9.2.5	 Democracy and Autocracy
The ethos of the Group was almost unequivocally democratic, and the
style of democracy in evidence was both participative and consensual.
"I think it [the Group] has a very
recognisable corporate culture which is
one of a very democratic type of
management style."
(Company Solicitor, p.23, no.38).
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"We tend to manage by consensus, not
autocracy."
(Non Executive Director 1 , p.14, no.97).
"What tends to happen here is that
decisions tend to be made more by
groups."
(Non Executive Director ' , p.17, no.32).
At the most senior level this proclivity for democracy was manifested
In two significant ways. First, the functioning of the Holdings Board
itself, which relied largely on collective decision making, strived
for consensus on major issues, eschewed strict job demarcations or
other trappings of formality, and laid great emphasis on the
uninhibited free flow of information. This mode of operation was
facilitated by the small number of individuals involved (a maximum of
six), the day-to-day spatial proximity of at least the four executive
directors, and a more general 'team spirit' reflected in the joint
social activities engaged in by the Holdings Board members.
"There is a fair amount of wanting to
encourage collective decision making on
these things."
(Development Director, p.20, no.35).
"...we don't tend to have strict
demarcations on the job that we do or
don't do."
(Development Director, p.14, no.96).
"I think the Group Board works quite
effectively as a collective decision
making organisation. We're a fairly
close-knit group and people do listen to
what other people are saying and
generally we come up with a pretty good
consensus."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.19, no.75).
Second, the Holdings Board had devolved considerable power and
authority to its principal subsidiaries which were permitted to
operate semi-autonomously vis-a-vis the Main Board, though within
limits declared in their annual budgets. This ethic of
decentralisation had far reaching implications for the organisation's
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cultural life, not least of which was a certain amount of confusion
concerning the boundaries of the subsidiaries and the Holdings Board's
responsibilities. Essentially the Holdings Board had the role of a
fixer, mediator and expediter which co-ordinated the objectives of the
Group and formulated and implemented major strategic decisions such as
acquisitions and mergers. It also had special responsibility for
pensions, some insurance matters, the legal requirements of being a
public limited company, interfacing with The City, some personnel
Issues, and Group public relations.
There were, however, a number of 'grey' areas, notably some legal and
personnel matters, for which responsibility appeared to be uncertain.
To some extent this situation is typical of all Groups, but in this
Instance it seemed also to be a consequence of the Holdings Board's
unwillingness to adopt firm rules to regulate its relationship with
the subsidiaries except in a few specific areas, notably capital
expenditures in excess of £50,000. The fact that the Holdings Board
chose not to specify the fine details of its desired relationship with
the subsidiaries was symptomatic of the chairman's preference for
matters generally to be discussed and agreed on an ad hoc basis with
all the freedom and flexibility that implied. It also reflected the
relatively recent origins of the Group structure wherein the Main
Board was still attempting to define and refine the framework for its
limning of the subsidiary companies. Both of these factors though,
played their respective roles within the broader context of the
consensual/democratic ambiance which pervaded the life of the
organisation.
"...our goal, our objective, is to co-
ordinate."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.2,no.9).
"Because the managing directors of the
Group subsidiaries are encouraged to
develop their own companies to a very
large extent there is a very free
management style in the Group as you
will begin to discover. I have to say
that the influence of the superiors in
the Holding Board is probably not as
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great as it would be in many other
organisations."
(Managing Director3 , p.22, no.30).
"We are essentially concerned with
'what' and they [the subsidiaries] are
concerned with 'how'.... Basically what
I am trying to say is that we try and
set a policy framework in which they can
operate, and if they step outside that
framework then they have to come to us
because they are exceeding their remit.
But within the limit of their framework,
of what has been agreed, in the form of
the budget or strategic plan, I think
it's up to us to let them go ahead and
operate."
(Non Executive Director2 , p.4, no.41/42)
9,2,6	 Competition and Co-operation
The Group culture placed far greater emphasis on co-operative effort
mdteukhuilding than internal competition, though the restructuring
of the organisation had introduced a greater spirit of rivalry than
had ever existed before. There was, in fact, evidence of a
disjuncture between the prevailing co-operative ethos and the new
Group structure which made co-operation between subsidiaries more
difficult to achieve. Thus while many individuals welcomed the
opportunities unlocked by the new structure, almost everyone in the
subsidiaries thought that much had been lost with the development of
the competitive edge. The Group's equivocal attitude towards internal
competition was exemplified by the Holdings Board, which having
created the conditions for competition to thrive, subsequently failed
to encourage its development to the full:
Q: "Is competition between the subsidiaries encouraged and
fos tered?"
A: Mot in terms of the fact that we changed the organisation, in
the sense that we have gone to a sort of profit-centred type of
structure in the U.K.. That act inevitably tends to increase
competition. If you then accept that you've got that structure,
we don't tend to encourage competition any further than that. In
fact, if anything it would err the other way. We would prefer to
see companies [move] towards deliberately carving out niches for
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their own products which limits comp9tition with other subsidiary
companies." (Non Executive Director', P.7/8, no.94/95).
Q: "Is competition encouraged between the subsidiaries?"
A: We're a bit ambivalent about it....	 Sometimes we do and
sometimes we don't." (Non Executive Director 2 , p.12, no.12).
In fact, the Holdings Board had deliberately set up a system of formal
rules to regulate internal competition, in an attempt to prevent it
from making the negative impact they thought it might have on the
business:
"Nobody's saying at any time that people
should openly under-cut people. And
there certainly is a dictate that they
shouldn't compete with others for
specific product areas. For example
Company 2 would not be allowed to sell
Alpha in competition with Company 1
because it has the reputation for Alpha.
So there are a few little rules like
that."
(Company Secretary, p.15, no.73).
The extent to which internal competition was ever likely to develop
always seemed likely to be limited by the knowledge that all the
subsidiaries were part of one Group, that they had a common Holdings
Board and the fact that many individuals had worked in more than one
of the subsidiaries and knew people working in other sectors of the
business. There was also the point that in the U.K. only Company 1
and Company 2 were in direct competition, and even then Company 2 was
heavily reliant on Company 1 which was its largest 'customer'. It
should also be remembered that while Companies 1 and 2 were in some
respects business competitors, there was still a reasonable amount of
informal information exchange between the two concerning, inter alia,
the purchase of raw materials and production issues generally:
"Only last week I had the production
planner and his assistant [from Company
1] round the factory. I had a similar
invitation	 from	 [the	 production
director] at Company 1.... Certainly
the production people in particular very
much encourage that.... In the factory
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there is an exchange of ideas, I have
had people [from Company 1] ring up and
say 'by the way we're looking at this...
I heard you were dealing with that
particular item, I thought it might be
worth letting you know what we've
done'.... I can't think of an instance
where I've been refused a chance to look
at something or indeed I've refused the
chance for somebody to come and have a
look.... Certainly on the production
side there is relatively free exchange
of information if one wants it.... On
the marketing and sales side there
probably is some inhibition there
because we are competitors in some
respects."
(Production Director2 , p.3, no.9).
The Group's lack of emphasis on internal competition also stretched to
the activities of individual employees, who were encouraged to favour
a co-operative attitude to their work and their fellow employees (as
has been amply demonstrated in the Chapters on the individual
subsidiaries above):
"Competition between the individuals is
not a good thing."
(Development Director, p.10, no.75).
9.2,7
	 Conflict and Confidence 
Individuals within the Group tended to have fairly high levels of
trust and confidence in their fellow employees. This situation
contrasted starkly with that reported to have existed some years ago:
"I can go back over many years where of
course the Parent Board has had
different people involved, and one has
been extremely wary about what
communication was given because you had
a feeling, and sometimes certain
knowledge in distant years, that the
information was used politically as
opposed to commercially. And quite
often if it was used politically you
ended up having to play politics
yourself and try and work out who was
the man to communicate with, because if
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you went to the wrong damned horse you
went down as well. That environment and
atmosphere has truly gone"
(Managing Director, p.5, no.26).
Four trust/confidence scenarios may be envisaged: within the Holdings
Board, between the Holdings Board and the subsidiaries, between the
subsidiaries, and within each of the subsidiary companies. Members of
the Holdings Board were particularly confident of the abilities and
trustworthiness of their peers. In contrast, the relationships
between the Holdings Board and its subsidiaries and between the
subsidiaries themselves were somewhat more conflict-ridden and it is
these which will be dealt with in detail here. The levels of conflict
within the subsidiaries was more variable and has been considered on
an individual subsidiary basis above .
Efflethe relationship between the Holdings Board and its subsidiaries
was generally good there was conflictdal activity between the Main
Board and Company 1 which had lost influence and resources following
the recent restructuring of the Group; not only does the managing
director of the subsidiary no longer retain a place on the Holdings
Board, but two 'new' companies were extracted from it. Unsurprisingly
the Holdings Board is widely regarded by senior executives at Company
1as having imposed a less favourable structure on the Group than was
In place before 1986:
"So you go back 20 years and all there
was was Company 1 in Sheffield, and
there's some people still there. And
they've seen grow out of Company 1,
because it wasn't explained to them
correctly at the time, a Parent Company
which initially was seen as parasitic.
They said, 'all of a sudden we've got
another layer on top of us, and what are
they doing?'.... And indeed some people
at Company 1 still believe that the
correct organisational structure is that
you have just Company 1 and Company 1
have the other subsidiaries."
@: "Did this initially inhibit the flow of information?"
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A: "I think it still does to a certain extent." (Chairman & Chief
Executive, p.17, no.86/87).
Personalities and personal histories were also playing a part in
denuding trust and confidence levels between the Holdings Board and
Subsidiary 1:
"Within Company 1 I was first production
director then managing director, and
oddly enough with both those jobs
currently, there is a certain difficulty
with our communication. I think it is
a natural course of events and something
that only time will put right. But if
you can imagine, it is very hard for the
bloke that stepped into that job; and if
you take what we do tomorrow, I'm going
to see the managing director of Company
1 - and that's a job I used to do - to
go through his budget, and that's not an
easy thing for him, because in a way he
knows that I understand some of the
problems of running that business. He
can sit there and say 'well you never
got this right what are you criticising
me for?'."
(Development Director, p./3/1¢, no.933.
Inthecase of Company 3 tension between it and the Holdings Board was
largely due to the Board's expectation of rapid growth in the newer
export markets, which the personnel of Company 3 interpreted as a lack
of understanding of the problems involved in operating an export
division:
"...we have a problem in understanding
by the Parent Board here who continue to
set us targets irrespective of what's
happening in the environment. They tend
to have the philosophy that we can go on
year after year producing results X%
higher than the previous year regardless
of all the other factors that are going
on in the world. They just won't come
to terms with some of the operational
difficulties that we are under."
(Finance Director 3 , p.18, no.19/20).
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Thus while there were inevitably some tensions and points of conflict
between the Holdings Board and the subsidiaries these were, with the
possible exception of Company 1, minor problems with little impact on
the now of information. The relationship between some of the
subsidiaries was more conflict-ridden. The restructuring of the Group
NO placed Company 1 in competition with Company 2, and given the
managing directors of the subsidiary companies more scope for pursuing
their own objectives. Companies 1 and 2 would not, therefore,
exchange information on new product development and regarded each
other with some suspicion. Company 1 complained that Company 2 was
under-cutting their prices for similar goods in the marketplace while
Company 2 insisted on the need for all important communications
between the two subsidiaries to be in writing following several
'misunderstandings'.
"If you split a business that's been in
existence more than 100 years in three,
you create a certain amount of
antagonism.... That doesn't help inter-
company communication."
(Development Director, p.10, no.70/71).
"[Communication) is probably worst... at
least in certain peculiar ways between
Company 1 and Company 2 because Company
1 regards Company 2 as a bunch of
jumped-up upstarts who are trying to
steal their place in the sun."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.11, no.6).
hooter main crisis of confidence in the Group centred on Company 3.
Of all the manufacturing subsidiaries only Company 1 was satisfied
with its relationship with Company 3, reflecting their close
historical connections, continuing spatial proximity (just three
miles), the familiarity of its staff with the products of Company 1
mdthepeople they needed to deal with. While the conflict was acute
between Company 3 and Company 5, companies 2 and 4 also expressed
reservations concerning their relationship with Company 3. Company 2
chetA.y regarded Company 3 as the export arm of Company 1, citing as
evidence not only the 'poor' record of achievement of Company 3 with
their products but Company 3's appointment of an extremely junior
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member of staff to look after their interests. Company 4 had the
particular problem that it produced medicated confectionery, which
were products with which the staff of Company 3 were unfamiliar:
"I think for Company 4 and Company 3 the
situation is difficult for them. First
of all they don't know anything (or very
little)	 about	 the	 medicated
confectionery market; so obviously
they're not talking about sweets,
they're talking about a more specialised
product, and their managers dealing on
our behalf are limited at the moment as
to what they can say about us. We have
at some stage to try and educate them on
the advantages disadvantages,
restrictions - limitations in our
business."
(Managing Director4 , Ti. Si. 341-356).
The reasons for the conflict between Company 3 and Company 5 were
diverse and complex, with different respondents implicating a host of
factors ranging from language and national culture, to variables such
as mistrust, politics and competition. The essence of the problem was
that Company 5 relied very heavily on exports to maintain its
profitability, had built-up good relations with a number of customers
on the continent, and considered its export performance superior to
the service offered by Company 3. The managing director of Company 5
was, therefore, unwilling to relinquish control of his company's
destiny to the Group's export division, and it was this economic
reality which underpinned the cultural and personal antagonisms
between the two companies:
"There's no manager; Company 3 is an
agglomeration of area managers and other
people who are not managed. There is no
discipline, there are no orders and they
don't work. For the amount of people,
22, they don't have current ability.
When an export manager is spending less
than 20% of his time in the field it's
not a lot."
(Managing Director5 , p.10, no.88).
"I wouldn't suggest that I fully
understand the machinations of the
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history, but there are valid reasons why
the communications problems between
Company 5 and Company 3 are at the
bottom of the pile.... It really is
rooted in history and a lot of politics,
I guess."
(Marketing Director3 , p.8, no.53).
H I think it's sometimes a
personality, language,
competition, mistrust...."
(Non Executive Director%
question of
culture,
p.7, no.91).
Mu while the culture was supportive of high trust/high confidence
relationships other factors were in play which distorted the general
picture: the most significant of these were economic competition (for
internal resources and customers) and economic dependency (associated
withtheGroup's internal market for products) as well as personal and
'political' variables.
9.2.8	 Narrowness and Introspection 
Until recently the Group had been a highly introspective concern with
little interest in the external environment beyond maintaining its
market share. While this cultural trait was giving way to more open,
receptive and interactive attitudes towards the total business context
amm than residual narrowness in the scope of the Group's vision on
the world was still detectable:
"I think as a company we tend to be too
blinkered."
(Non Executive Director% p.6, no.81).
In part this can be accounted for in terms of the company's history as
an old family-run business which lacked the professional managerial
skills and imagination required to look beyond its immediate habitat.
A the time this research was conducted, however, it was more a
NmAim of individuals limited experience than Group history that was
responsible for the continuing salience of this cultural feature:
"People like working here and don't move
very quickly. So it means that you've
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got a lot of people with a lot of
experience. Now experience is good from
one point of view, but it can also be
the same experience repeated twenty
times.... That's why I say I think that
we tend to have a lot of long service
people thinking that that's the best
that can be done in that area of
responsibility; and it isn't, because
they haven't had experience of other
situations."
(Non Executive Director, p.17, no.23/24)
This narrowness and introspection manifested itself in several ways.
It partly accounted for the extent to which the Group was still
production-led despite the realisation by the Holdings Board directors
of the need to develop a marketing-led strategy to cope with an
increasingly complex and changeable market. It also provided at least
a partial explanation of the Group's changing attitudes towards
exporting its products:
"...In the setting up of the
International Division we have I think
achieved a fairly dramatic turn-around
In the way the company looks at
information there. Because it was
previously what I believe, rightly or
wrongly, to be the traditional British
attitude for exports; you know, which at
Its crudest is we will make enough for
the home market and if anything's left
over it will do for the foreigner. We,
I think, are now beginning to think in
terms of	 individual	 markets,	 in
geographical terms."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.5/6, no.54).
Informationally the introspective nature of the Group obviously had
tremendous implications for the boundary spanning function of the
Grog (which has severely under-developed), while commercially there
as the possibility that profitable opportunities were being left
unexploited.
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9,2.9	 Marketing-Led and Production-Constrained 
Traditionally the Group had been a production-led organisation which
placed higher priority on maintaining consistently high levels of
output, rather than tailoring production runs to meet the demands of
the market , This knee-jerk tendency to produce those products which
could be made relatively efficiently and easily with little regard for
patterns of consumer demand had been attenuated in recent years.
However, the expressed objective of the Holdings Board to metamorphose
the Group into a marketing-led concern is still far from complete.
Wit/An each of the manufacturing subsidiaries the production
department was an extremely influential player in determining what
products should be produced at what time, suggesting that obviating
the historical dominance of production was going to be an extremely
long and difficult process:
"There is a tendency to pull it towards
the marketing orientation which I
believe is the only feasible one in this
day and age. You know you don't sell
what you make, you make what you can
sell. We're moving in the right
direction, but it is still traditionally
very much a 'let's keep the plant
occupied - if in doubt keep the wheels
churning and we'll find a way of selling
it'."
(Non-Executive Director 2 , p.12, no.78).
For the Group to become more market oriented was essentially a
cultural shift that was not easily made, because it meant that the
abandonment of what had been a core assumption, namely that production
held the key to the Group's success; the recognition that this element
of the organisation was no longer the most relevant for the ultimate
survival and success of the Group had, therefore, to remain a long
term goal.
9.2.10	 Pace of Activity 
The pace of work activity within the Group, with the possible
exception of Company 2, was both relaxed and casual:
"there is a sort of laid-backness that
is perceived by people as being
slovenliness, which is probably the way
I perceive it."
(Company Secretary, p.23, no.19).
The lack of urgency with which individuals conducted their duties was
closely associated with the democratic and participative style of
management. The democratic ethos encouraged employees to indulge in
considerable internal reflection and debate, which often seemed to
preclude quick decision making. The slow pace of work activity was
also a consequence of the Group's personnel orientation, which meant
that wider-performing employees were not replaced:
"Having a caring culture is a mixed
blessing: the vast majority of the
people in the vast majority of time
would say that is the thing to do.
There are occasions when that can slow
things down.... When someone is
patently incompetent we all carry them
for far longer than a lot of companies."
(Non Executive Director', p.16,
no.15/16).
Non-cultural variables were also undoubtedly important here. 	 For
Instance, one further factor which tended to impede the time
efficiency with which tasks were accomplished was the under-developed
nature of the computer systems in the subsidiaries, which could often
make the search for, collation and analysis of information an
extremely time-consuming activity. There was confidence that with
increasing investment in new technology this cause of the slow rate of
work activity within the Group would be obviated. More interestingly
from the point of view of this cultural analysis was the Holdings
Board's perception that this cultural trait would be short-lived only.
The lack of professional values and positive attitude towards hard
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work and commercial success which many respondents claimed underlay
the Group's slowness were thought to be concentrated in the older
management cadres soon destined for retirement:
"I'll define the group of individuals.
It's those groups of older management
who have been around for a number of
years within the organisation, who have
not yet been replaced by the younger
school."
(Group Finance Director, p.21, no.30).
The Holdings Board were thus able to rationalise the Group's inability
to move quickly to solve problems and seize opportunities by blaming
both the technological equipment and an older generation of managers
which lacked the skills required by a modern business. Holdings Board
members showed only a marginal awareness that this was essentially a
cultural trait that had its basis in the values, beliefs and attitudes
of the vast majority of Group employees, and was thus consequently
likely to be a characteristic of the company for many years to come.
9.3 Information/Communication Profile 
9.3.1	 The Group M.I.S: evolution 
It is important to realise that the M.I.S. had been in its present
form only since the organisation's most recent restructuring two years
previously. The Group's M.I.S. had evolved under the guidance of the
incumbent Group finance director and his immediate predecessor.
However, it would be a mistake to consider the development of the
as being wholly pre-planned; while the extent to which the
company had exercised conscious, planned control over the development
of its M.I.S. and the degree to which it had been built-up ad hoc was
unclear, there was certainly an element of both:
"I think it's [the M.I.S.] grown like
topsy and been modified with the
emergence of the subsidiaries and the
setting up of things like the M.D.'s
Meeting."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.15,
no.33/34).
9,3.1.1	 Description 
The formally defined information channels and specific pre-arranged
communications related almost solely to financial and strategic
matters. The formally defined information channels were constituted
by the Holdings Board board meetings held monthly, and the subsidiary
board meetings and managing directors' meetings which both had a
periodicity of two months. The subsidiary board meetings always
involved the chairman and chief executive (who chaired all the
meetings except those for Company 3), the Group finance director, and
the full complement of a subsidiary's executive directors. The
company secretary took the minutes for the meetings at Companies 1,2,
and 3; the other members of the Holdings' Board attended the subsidiary
board meetings in rotation. The meetings themselves were a forum for
debate concerning the subsidiaries performances over the past eight
weeks and their plans for the immediate future.
The managing directors' meetings were attended by the members of the
Holdings Board and the managing directors of the subsidiaries. They
were an opportunity for the managing directors to present their long
term strategies for their individual companies to the senior
executives of the Group. In addition to their communication function
the managing directors also seemed to have ritualistic and general
social value.
There were three major items of information passed by the subsidiaries
to the Holdings Board during the course of a financial year: a) an
annually agreed budget, b) a four weekly management account and c) a
four weekly managing director's report which provided a more detailed
breakdown of a company's operation. If a subsidiary was found to be
below its agreed budget for more than one month then a control
mechanism was operationalised in which it had to present a written
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report demonstrating to the Holdings Board how it intended to rectify
its position. Ad hoc reports concerning strategic decisions
(especially capital appropriations requests) were also produced by the
Holdings Board and the subsidiaries throughout the year, and while
their content and timing was less fixed the channels through which
they were processed (mostly board meetings) were formalised.
Interestingly, no formal systems had been set up to transfer general
Group information from the Holdings Board to the subsidiaries.
In reviewing the Group's M.I.S. it should not be forgotten that its
primary purpose was to facilitate the accomplishment of the Group's
business objectives, i.e. to show the shareholders a healthy return on
their investment:
"Our basic objective is really a
financial one and our fundamental
objective is based on earnings per share
growth. Because of that the rest of the
matrix of budgets, strategic plans
leading to budgets and the planning
format and also the period accounts in
the control area - all are geared
towards making certain that we are
achieving our fundamental objective."
(Development Director, p.25, no.72).
9.3.1.2 Problems with the M.I.S. 
The Holdings Board was generally agreed that its formal information
systems operated satisfactorily:
Q: "In your opinion does the M.I.S. operate efficiently and
effectively?"
"It does, yes; if it didn't I would change it."	 (Financial
Director, p.13, no.50).
There were, though, a number of problems and difficulties associated
with these systems. Perhaps the most fascinating of these was that in
the short term at least subsidiaries could maintain a degree of
secrecy from the Holdings Board by deliberately omitting necessary but
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non-specified information from, for example, their managing director's
report:
"There are some sources of information
that are worthy of more trust, not
because the information you receive is
any more accurate, but because of the
nature of the information given. It's a
little bit like people being sparing
with the truth.... You will find that
some sections of any business, and this
one is no different, will produce
information that is factually correct
but does not necessarily give the true
picture of the business.... The
information we require from each of the
subsidiaries is standard, it's on a
standard format. For example, we have a
thing called a managing director's
report and each of the companies is
required to fill one in on a monthly
basis. If one looks at those one would
find that some of those are easy to
understand and some of them give you a
real feel of how that business is
conducting itself. Others give you the
information that you've actually asked
for but the whole thing doesn't add up;
a little bit like pieces of a jigsaw are
all there and maybe you can fix it
together, but there is no picture on
it."
(Development Director, p.1/2, no.14-19).
The deliberate construction of M.D.'s reports so as to fail to reveal
aclear picture of subsidiaries' activities had a palpable cultural
basis. Such actions reflected a lack of confidence on the part of the
subsidiaries [especially Company 1] in the Holdings Board's intention
to act in their best interests. This low level of confidence had its
origins in the restructuring of the Group which had effectively
disempowered Company 1. It was also symptomatic of Company l's
frustration, in that while it had day-to-day control of its operation
it m, nevertheless, dependent on the Holdings Board's approval for
the expenditure of sums in excess of £50,000 and ultimately
accountable to the Main Board for its commercial performance.
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Undoubtedly 'personal' and ! political' animosities also had a role to
play hem, providing a further motivation for withholding information.
A second problem involved the untimeliness of information from the
subsidiaries, which reflected their often primitive internal
information systems:
"I think we're a bit tardy in terms of
the time it takes to get out Group
accounts. They tell me that's both a
function of the system that we have and
the fact that this is a very complicated
industry. So I accept the first, I
think we have probably got a rather
cumbersome system; I don't accept that
we're complicated.., that's a load of
rubbish."
(Non Executive Director2 , p.15, no.38).
"...the M.D.'s report from each
subsidiary has to be on my desk,
according to my instructions, 15 days
after the end of an accounting period.
Now there are occasions when that is
tight; they may even be delivered by
hand on the fifteenth day."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.3, no.11)
The untimeliness of some items of information from some of the
subsidiaries could, to some extent, be accounted for by reference to
the relatively unsophisticated information systems possessed by
Company 2 and Company 4. In contrast, in Company 1 it was not that
the information systems were lacking in sophistication but the size of
the operation that was in part responsible for the untimeliness of its
information. But these problems - of being under-resourced and large-
scale - do not yield an adequate explanation of the subsidiaries'
inability to be timely in their communications with the Holdings
Board. The generally low levels of professionalism within the
subsidiaries, often associated with a lack of staff training, and a
certain casualness in their approach to commercial life, were also
factors supportive of untimely communications. Fundamentally, some
subsidiaries were just not fired with the overriding need to respond
to the Holdings Board on a timely basis.
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Thirdly, the actual written communications from the subsidiaries often
lacked standardisation:
"I spent my working career with American
multi-nationals and got used to, I
suppose, the American way of presenting
data; and I think particularly the
second of two companies I worked for
were really quite good at it, had a
standardised format of accounts and you
always new exactly where everything was.
Things tend to be a bit scrappier in
this organisation. People present
things in their own way. It's beginning
to be standardised, but you have to look
more, and some of the systems themselves
are, I think, less informative....
Standardisation of accounting forms
would, I think, be useful. Yes, I'm all
for a bit of formality. If you know
what the rules are you know what you're
breaking, that's often one of the
functions of the rules."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.4,
no.45/p15, no.35).
Rile some attempts had been made to standardise the major items of
communication between the subsidiaries and the Holdings Board -
certain information had to be included in the various accounts and
reports - the detailed fashion in which this was presented
varied front subsidiary to subsidiary. This state of affairs reflected
aGroup emphasis on subsidiary autonomy and an understanding that each
subsidiary was seeking to devise those information systems best suited
toitastyle of business:
"Every company has a differing
information system which by its nature
requires it to be presented in different
formats. I believe that the format
which allows that individual to run his
business efficiently is the best format
and therefore I am quite willing, at
times,
	
to	 struggle	 with
	 the
information."
(Group Finance Director, p.3, no.47).
There therefore seemed  to be an acceptance among the executive
directors that subsidiary communication would never be completely
standardised, and this had become incorporated into a facet of the
Group philosophy.
9,3,1 .3 Technology
The Group's attitude toward the new information technology was
favourable; there was a recognition of its value and, indeed, the
necessity of the organisation to utilise computer-based information
retrieval systems, word processors, and telefax facilities:
"I mean in terms of such things like
word processing and micros and mini
computers, I mean they are used widely
throughout the business. 	 There's been
no reluctance to introduce new
technology other than really just on a
cost basis; and if that has been
feasible	 cost-wise	 • it's	 been
Introduced."
(Company Secretary, p.21, no.15)
Avarietq of organisational information activities at Holdings Board
level involved the use of computer technology:
"The consolidation of all the Group's
subsidiaries is now computerised. We
have all the foreign currency and
foreign currency management which is now
computerised. All Head Office accounts
which were previously hand written are
now computerised and we have, within
subsidiaries, two new computer systems
going in within the next six months."
(Group Finance Director, p.13, no.31).
And time was considerable confidence that the
technology was used
sophisticated hardware
Holdings Board and the
conduct the business:
would increase and,
and software packages
subsidiaries with better
extent to which new
that increasingly
would provide the
tools with which to
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"Well I suppose if you say what is the
ultimate, each of us will be able to sit
down and in effect interrogate the
computer, saying what is the state of
the market at the moment. Now we're not
at that stage - or key graphs about
movements in the business, that sort of
thing. No, we're not able to do that -
but there's no doubt about it, we're
going to have it."
(Non Executive Director l , p.9, no.27).
"I can perceive that in the not too
distant future that all the computers
within the subsidiaries are linked so
that I can instantly get access to more
detailed information. For example,
we've just taken the step of linking the
micros of the individuals who I require
information of within this organisation
- and that is something that will expand
with time."
(Group Finance Director, p.14, no.60).
From the Holdings Board point of view three information/communication
advantages were associated with the new technology. First, it had led
tothenwe time efficient production of information:
".. .	 there's	 a	 rapidity	 of	 the
production of information because of the
new technology. So yes, it plays a
large part from that point of view. We
do produce the accounts and it's all
enabled to happen quickly because of
technology."
(Company Secretary, p.20, no.14).
Second, spreadsheets	 made the analysis of complex data sets much
easier to accomplish:
"I mean, to give you an example, if we
were looking at an acquisition the
'what-if' programs we can feed into a
micro (a series of 'what-ifs' - if we
acquire Cadbury's or Rowntrees or Mars).
You know, we can feed a lot of
information into equipment and say what
it will look like if we make that
decision.
	 Now you go back two or three
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years and that would have been a
horrible, hard, manual slog."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.11,
no.51)
Mini, computer technology allowed information to be formatted in
accordance with the needs of managers for specific tasks, to make
comparisons, show trends etc.:
"...it enables us to analyse
information input from, say, another
company that we may be looking at and
interpret and produce that information
in our own format.... It enables us to
extract those figures and put it through
the system and produce figures in a
format that the rest of the directors
are used to seeing because they see it
in the same format as the rest of the
business."
(Development Director, p.20, no.36)
These three features of the new technology were considered important
for the overall management of the organisation, which it was felt
could be accomplished more efficiently and effectively given these
technical advances. Two of the most important advantages it conferred
on the company were the facility for better risk management and an
improved reaction time to changes in the external environment, though
this still required improvement:
"First of all it is important in the
sense that it gives you up-to-date
Information on the progress of the
current businesses which are very
important in establishing what degree of
risk you can take in the future;
obviously you can take more risk if the
current businesses are doing very well."
(Development Director, p.20, no.36).
"I think we're fairly responsive to
changes in the external environment....
I think one of the reasons why we could
do a lot better is that we've not got a
good computer system."
(Non Executive Director, p.18, no.38/43)
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The Group's enthusiastic embrace of Information Technology was
Indicative of a culture which was not generally 'iuddite' in its
attitude towards new ideas and new inventions. The fact that the
organisation had only recently invested heavily in the new technology
was as 	 to do with the financial problems of the late 1970's and
early 1 980 ' s as it was with a lack of appreciation of the advantages
computers could confer on the business. The relative youth of the
Holdings Board and especially the Group finance director who was
particularly 'computer literate' meant that in terms of the Group's
approach to Information Technology the organisation was less narrow
and traditional than might have been expected. There were, however,
still residual worries concerning the justification for investment in
equipment that did not make something tangible:
"And in terms of justifying the purchase
of a new machine, I mean a production
machine, you can say it will go X
faster, produce so many more sweets, and
use less people, give a'greater yield.
In terms of information systems you're
looking at justification in terms of
negatives: what happens if I don't get
that information? How good are the
decisions going to be? There are very
few positives."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.9, no.39)
This is precisely the sort of comment that could have been predicted
on a far more widespread basis in a production culture oriented
towards the manufacture of a specific set of products. That such
fears were expressed relatively infrequently was emblematic of the new
spirit of professionalism which the rejuvenation of the Group was
beginning to engender.
The introduction of new technology into the organisation might have
been expected to have cultural implications in terms of its impact on
status and power and therefore on levels of conflict and,
concomitantly, patterns of communication. There was, however, little
evidence in support of this hypothesis from the Group macrostructural
perspective; though if the Holdings Board is ultimately connected to
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its subsidiaries by a computer-link which allows the Board direct
access to large amounts of data concerning their current performance,
this may further strengthen the position of the Main Board (and
especially the Group Finance Director).
9.3. 2	 Information-Culture Type 
The Group possessed an oral information culture:
"My word is my bond....
	 There's no
doubt about it... I'll give you an
instance. I'm Chairman of a private
hospital but actually it's a British
company but staffed solely by people
who've worked for American companies,
and they just carry on the habits
they've learnt at A.M.I. or H.C.I.. And
everything, the key things, to a fault
is in writing. Everything is
documented. The minutes are prepared in
a particular way... - .we have a non
executive secretary who is a solicitor;
they go through his minutes word by
word.... And we don't have that
problem.... There's no doubt about it,
the way we operate here which is oral,
suits us more. And it would be a
culture shock for people to work in this
other type of environment."
(Non Executive Director, p.15, no.8-
10).
Despite the Group culture's affinity with oral information
transmission there were individuals who had not become fully
socialised into this mode of working. Interestingly, these
exceptional individuals tended either to have recently joined the
Group or to have a specialised function requiring that they received
and sent mostly written information (such as the Group secretary who
1483 responsible for legal affairs). In addition, it should be noted
that finance departments were also generally far less reliant on oral
communication than marketing, sales and production departments, as has
been demonstrated in the previous four chapters.
	 Moreover,
individuals themselves are complex phenomena, and even the most keen
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081 communicators had particular preferences concerning the form in
which they preferred to transmit and receive information depending on
variables such as the subject matter of the communication, its length
and how much time they personally had available. Such distortions of
the general thesis that the Group possessed an oral information
mature do not render it invalid or inconsequential; there was
considerable reliance on oral communication, and this had a major
influence on many facets of Group life. What these counter-trends do
Illustrate is that the written-oral duality captures only one salient
feature of a complex and variegated perceived social reality.
The advantages of heavy reliance on oral communication in terms of the
speed and ease with which it could be accomplished were matched by
problems of distortion and misunderstanding. There were three basic
ways in which 'noise' was being introduced into oral communications:
deliberate and non-deliberate distortion by the sender and
misunderstanding on the part of the receiver:
"It's the classic syndrome that
Information is never passed accurately
between parties verbally [orally]; and
people will always put	 a different
perspective on it."
(Group Finance Director, p.10, no.24).
The Group's oral information culture was closely linked with its
culture generally. Most importantly, the values which supported the
personnel orientation were highly conducive to oral communication,
rat is a more intimate way of conveying information and a
facilitator of interpersonal relations:
"By and large I think the 'Peter would
you do this' or 'Frank would you do
that' or 'could you give me this
information' generally works better."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.6, no.26)
The organisation's reliance on oral communication also reflected its
democratic and participative values; if a large number of individuals
uetobecoopted into the planning and decision making processes then
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this is far more quickly and easily achieved if people are permitted
to make an oral rather than a written contribution. That so much
information was communicated orally was indicative of the high levels
of trust and confidence individuals had in their compeers that
information received was reliable, information sent would not be
distorted, and that the appropriate actions demanded would be carried
out, However, it was also symptomatic of the informality, casualness
and lack of professionalism which characterised the Group. But more
than anything else the oral information culture was the result of the
fact that the organisation was essentially a manufacturer of goods and
most of the employees were involved in the production units where of
necessity information exchange tended to be oral. The nature of the
business, i.e. being a manufacturing company, thus set the tone for
communications throughout the Group.
9.3.3	 Ad Hoc Communications 
The vast majority of the Group-level internal communication activity
(between the Holdings Board and the subsidiaries and between the
subsidiaries themselves) was ad hoc. This information tended to
concern specific problems and opportunities, projects and internal
agreements. The extent to which the Group engaged in ad hoc
communication was a reflection of its cultural distaste for
formalised, systematic methods of operation.
The quality of the ad hoc communication between the subsidiaries and
the Holdings Board was generally considered to be at least
satisfactory:
"...if you say between subsidiaries and
Group Head Office here I would say
communications are probably reasonable."
(Non Executive Director', p.7,no.87).
Part of the reason for this was that with the restructuring of' the
Group the Holdings Board had moved away.
 from Company 1 where it had
traditionally been based, and the extra distance (three miles) between
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thernhad gone some way to reduce the personal and political frictions
that had formally been inhibiting communication:
"Certainly the move of Group
Headquarters away from Company 1 - when
I was first involved it was at Company 1
you know. That was a disaster and the
move first of all down to the middle of
Sheffield was good and then the move
over here was better. I mean I
sometimes think it would be a good idea
to move the Group Headquarters away from
Sheffield - but they won't do that."
Q: "So communication actually improved with distance?"
A: "I think so, yes, because it made them realise that they were a
separate entity and therefore had to communicate. It was very
easy just to slip into somebody else's office and chat, thinking
you're communicating with them." (Non Executive Director2 , p.9,
no.88/89).
A second factor facilitating communication between the subsidiaries
and the Holdings Board was investment in fax machines which minimised
the problems of operating at distance:
"Has the geographical distribution of the company ever caused
disruption to the freeflow of information as far as you are
aware?"
A: "No, not any longer. The final part of the jigsaw which
prevented the freeflow of information has now been eradicated and
we now have a fax machine in our company in Crediton; therefore
we now have instantaneous document transfers."	 (Group Finance
Director, p.6, no.82/83).
However, while ad hoc communications were in general terms
unproblematic, the subsidiaries did vary widely in their ability and
inclination to provide members of the Holdings Board with timely and
good quality information; Company 4 suffered from the primitive nature
of its information systems and Company 1 was again prone to
attitudinal problems stemming from its historical development:
"There is probably a slight attitudinal
problem as well in that Company 1 has
been in existence since 1842; it's a
great big company. It' the biggest
private employer in Sheffield etc. It's
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linked to history, tradition.... A lot
of it is to do with, - we have got a
board there and an age structure of
management which is at the top end.
Company 1 is the biggest, also the most
political, so I would, while not
questioning the accuracy of any
information they provide I would look
for the slant; what are they trying to
prove? At the other end of the scale
there is Company 4.... 	 It's a very
small organisation, they've just got a
new management... and they are
desperately trying to yank it into the
Twentieth Century, and they're trying
very hard. I would question there not
any political slant, though undoubtedly
there is some there, but just their
actual lack of resources in terms of
gathering information; and they have
until just about now a very primitive
accounting system. I mean the only way
they could do a product cost was to take
a physical inventory of taking away what
was left from the sales.... That kind
of thing."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.2, no.26).
The Holdings Board recognised a number of areas of weakness in their
ad hoc communications with the subsidiaries, ranging from their
timeliness, format and accuracy, to political bias and a general
tendency not to provide as much information as they could when
requested. To some large degree the Holdings Board took the onus of
responsibility for these failings on itself:
"I do find that in terms of trying to
solicit certain information responses,
there are sometimes time delays, but I
don't think that is due to the
inadequacy of the people providing
information to meet deadlines. It's
more possibly the information is quite
hard to come about and that's why they
perhaps aren't able to produce it."
(Company Secretary, p.4, no.25).
"A lot of the work I do is investigating
new areas of opportunity.... My problem
is that I tend to be picking out
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particular aspects of the business and
honing in on a particular aspect I want
to analyse to death. We haven't
necessarily got all that information
that is within the Group centralised so
that you could have a V.D.U. on your
desk and just press a button and out
comes the information.... Basically
what I do is to phone the subsidiary and
ask them for the information I want and
they groan and say 'oh my God, I don't
think we can get that out, we will have
to work on it, it will take two or three
days', - that is a typical response."
(Development Director, p.3/4, no.30-33).
Such comments reveal the undemanding nature of the Group ethos, and go
someway towards explaining those problems which were firmly rooted in
the subsidiaries. The Company secretary, for instance, who relied
wholly on ad hoc communication with the subsidiaries and had
instituted no formal structures at all for dealing with legal and
insurance matters paid a particularly heavy price:
"I may have asked for something that is
fairly critical to me and important for
me to take a decision on in order to
work with and I may get a two line,
three line memo from an assistant to an
assistant to an assistant; or somebody
may get on the phone to me that is right
down the hierarchy and they expect to
chat with me for half an hour on a minor
sort of problem. It's not what I'm here
to do!"
(Company Secretary, p.4, no.27).
The Group's reliance on ad hoc communication was based on cultural
norms and mores which valued flexibility, informality and inter-
personal contact; while there was some appreciation of the merits of
formalised and systematised communication this was very much a
secondary consideration for the organisation. The Group's cultural
antipathy for the systematisation of communication channels was
closely interwoven with its belief in the advantages to be gained from
a decentralised mode of operation. Moreover, when making requests for
information members of the Holdings Board tended to see themselves as
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interfering in the lives of the subsidiaries which was justified only
insofar as it was for the benefit of the Group as a whole. This is
not to imply that the Holdings Board had problems vindicating its
existence, (though some members of the organisation thought along
these lines), merely that its 'hands-off' managerial philosophy did
not permit it to institute any further degree of 'restrictive,
formalisation on the subsidiaries than was absolutely necessary.
The quality of the communication relationships engaged in by the
Holdings Board and the subsidiaries and between the subsidiaries
themselves reflected the historical and cultural proclivities and
disjunctures detailed above. However, variables other than purely
cultural factors, such as spatial location and technology had also to
be taken into account in the assessment of Group-level communications;
though it should be observed that distance seemed to be having an
impact through the changes in attitudes which it engendered.
9.3.4	 Communications between the Subsidiaries 
There was surprisingly little communication between the manufacturing
subsidiaries, which remained largely isolated from each other except
insofar as they purchased and sold products between them; all the
manufacturing subsidiaries sold product to Company 3 (for export)
which was thus the subsidiary most heavily involved in inter-Group
communication. The communication relationships between the
subsidiaries varied tremendously in terms of their quality. Wine
subsidiary communications with the Holdings Board were basically sound
despite problems of detail and efficiency the same cannot be said of
the communication relationships between several of the subsidiaries,
where a competitive ethos inhibited information flow. This was most
evident in communications between Company 1 and Company 2:
"Unfortunately communications between
sister companies, there is a need that I
find very sad there is a need to
communicate in writing, to have
something on record. That need has been
manifested by the fact that there have
been many occasions, even in the last
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two years, when I have said 'we agreed
that' - 'no we didn't'.... Now that is
sad. Now the follow-up to that is that
you've got to communicate in written
form."
(Managing Director2 , p.3, no.14).
n I think communications between the
subsidiaries are... not good, not
altogether good because they do see
themselves, and it's been encouraged by
the company that they see themselves in
this way, but they see themselves as
competitors in the market. And
therefore there are certain areas which
they frankly say they don't want to
discuss with each other."
(Company Secretary, p.14, no.74).
"Between subsidiaries, then, I would say
that the communication is poor really,
particularly between the Dutch factory
and the U.K. companies, although it is
fairly	 bad	 between	 several
	
U.K.
companies. When I say 'bad' in the
sense that there is now a more
competitive position between certain of
the subsidiaries. So therefore, then,
people don't necessarily agree that one
of their roles is to communicate better
with their fellow subsidiaries."
(Non Executive Director 1 , p.7, no.87/92)
Communications were probably least satisfactory between Company 3 and
Company 5 for reasons of politics, personal antagonism, economics,
Group policies on company remuneration and national culture.:
n I think they [Company 3] think that
their [communication] relationship with
Holland [Company 5] is a bit dodgy at
times."
(Company Secretary p.14/51, no.72).
The most effective communication relationship was that between
Company 3 and Company 1 from which it had recently been derived; the
staff of Company 3 were not only familiar with the products and people
ofCompanylbut also exhibited some residual loyalty to it. Even so,
the relationship had become less intimate since the restructuring, and
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with changing personalities and a growing sense of their own unique
identity the privileged treatment Company 1 received could not be
expected to continue indefinitely:
"If the question was, in terms of where
you were last year, and where you are at
this time, have your communications
deteriorated or the amount of contacts
reduced between Company 1 and
yourselves, then the answer has to be
'yes'. In terms of the way you asked
the question, then the answer is that we
still have better communications with
Company 1 than with the rest of the
companies currently.... I think the
better communications are born of the
inter-character relationship and the
history and the roots of people both at
Company 1 and at Company 3.... I'm sure
that over time Company 1 will become, in
terms of communications, very similar to
the rest of the manufacturing units."
(Marketing Manager3 , p.7, no.48/49).
9.3.5	 Informal Communication 
The cultural norms of the Group supported an informal information
network that linked the subsidiaries together and to the Holdings
Board. The cultural consensus was that while information gained via
the grapevine was often of dubious quality and reliability it should
not be ignored and could be potentially useful:
"If I wanted to find out what Company 1
felt about a particular opportunity that
we may have in terms of acquisition that
would impinge on them before I had
sufficient information available to
positively check it out with them, in
other words before I had something to
say, I would still on occasion want to
know what they felt. And I would find a
way of feeding into the system a debate
about this particular company we were
looking at.... I think that in any
organisation one of the things that the
chief executive.., ought to do is to
recognise the	 informal	 lines	 of
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communication and get himself plugged
into them."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.17/18,
no.90/94).
"I think everybody is part of some
grapevine system, and you manage it and
use it."
(Development Director, p.21, no.49).
Q: "For what purposes do you use the grapevine?"
A: "To find out the perceptions of the company; how various groups
are reacting to decisions; whether or not that information can be
used to aid the implementation of some aspects. (Group Finance
Director, p.18, no.6/7).
The amount of information transmitted on an inter-personal word-of-
mmtlabasis was a reflection of the Group's strong cultural preference
for face-to-face contact and most particularly oral communication.
The luxurious growth of the grapevine was also linked to the informal
character of the business which created opportunities for casual
social communication. In fact, so prevalent was gossip, speculation,
hearsay and rumour, that many individuals had difficulty
distinguishing between ad hoc formal operational communication and the
grapevine of which they were frequently integral parts. Interestingly
the confectionery industry itself had also developed a highly
intricate informal communications network;
"Within the whole of the industry there
is a phenomenal grapevine; you have to
be very careful indeed what you say to
anybody."
(Development Director, p.22, no.55).
9.3.6
	 Information Consciousness 
The Group manifestly lacked sophistication regarding the concepts of
'information as a resource' and 'information management'. The
organisation employed no qualified information professionals and had
no library facilities other than what individuals chose to keep on
their shelves and in their files.
	 Indeed, no individuals were
employed solely for their information handling competence or
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specifically to seek out and/or analyse information; these functions
were instead 6onducted by almost all managers on all grades. The
circulation of documents such as newspapers, journals, trade and
promotional literature was extremely poor, with little evidence of any
formal systematisation either within the Holdings Board or the
subsidiaries; whether an individual saw an article relevant to his
interests which was not printed in a document he specifically
requested was largely a matter of luck. This lack of information
consciousness was recognised to some limited extent, especially as it
impinged on individuals‘ decision making capabilities:
Q: "Do you think that most managers within the Group understand what
information they need for decision making?"
A: "...I would think around half do.... I think within the
organisation there has been a change from the older school of
managers to more younger, professional managers within key
positions within the organisation. There are still within the
organisation a number of people who are of the older school
rather than the new school and I believe it is those individuals
who do not fully recognise the requirements of information to aid
their decisions...
	
I believe that by the late 1990's the
problems will be neutralised. 	 (Group Finance Director, p.17/18,
no.99/1/2).
Lack of information competence was associated with older and less
professional managers rather than as a Group failing; the idea that
the organisation as a whole faced an endemic lack of information
skills or that a lot more remained to be done in the information field
was alien to the respondents.
Given the culture of the Group these findings are, perhaps,
unsurprising. Fundamentally the organisation had been production-led
and had required little external information or expertise in seeking
it out, while much internally generated information had been, (and to
a certain extent still was) stored in the minds and memories of key
employees, and very basic information systems. In short, the Group
was not 'information-intensive , , and it could afford to allow its
narrow and introspective attitudes and unprofessionalism to permeate
the information dimension of organisational life as it had every
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otter. This Group emphasis on production had had a lasting impact on
the types of information both most easily available, and most elusive:
"I would like to see much more up-to-
date information about what is happening
in the marketplace for the industry in
general and our products in particular -
that's both by product and customer and
outlet type.... Certainly there's no
doubt I would like to see much more
external information: what's happening
outside. We're very good on what's
happening inside, what we want to know
is far more information about how we
compare with our competitors and how are
our products doing in the marketplace."
(Non Executive Director 1 , p.2, no.26/28)
This said there was evidence - investment in new technology, the
computer-storage of essential information such as recipes and a
feeling in some senior circles that the business should be more
marketing-led and so more information-aware - that the Group's
information consciousness was rising as its culture evolved; but
radical changes in attitude and approach to information issues was
extremely unlikely in the immediate future. Evidence for the 'new'
thinking was provided by, inter alia, the development director:
Q: "Have any attempts been made to cost/benefit analyse the value of
information for decision making?"
A: "Certainly within our subsidiaries that's been done, particularly
when new computer systems were being thought of for thos
subsidiaries. It is, in fact, being done at this very minute in
Company 4 today. Basically before any company has gone ahead to
modernise the computerisation of their systems, or put in their
information systems, they have attempted to first of all identify
that information really was required within the business, and
then attempted to evaluate how cost effective providing that
information would be. It tends to happen in specific areas where
you can identify that a certain amount of information.... Within
any business there is a core of information that you need however
much it's going to cost. There are pockets of information
sometimes you can identify that it is not cost-effective to have,
but it's not a science, it's more an art. (Development Director,
p.7, no.52).
CHAPTER TEN 
GROUP CULTURE: AN OVERVIEW 
This overview of the Group's culture begins with a consideration of
how the major features of the cultural landscape inter-link, underpin
and reinforce each other. A detailed conceptualisation section then
provides a synthesis of the main themes contained in the preceding
case study chapters. This is followed by sections providing an
assessment of the relative strength/weakness of the culture, the
extent to which the Group culture was controlled from the centre and
the forces for stability and change which seemed set to govern the
cultural development of the organisation.
10.1 Summary
The individual cultural traits identified and examined in previous
sections of this chapter are in reality involved in a complex series
of inter-causal and mutually dependent relationships, and it is the
totality of these characteristics and the ways in which they relate to
each other which conjointly compose the Group's unique corporate
culture. The starting point for understanding the culture of the
organisation is its long historical development as a family firm; the
spirit of tradition which developed over the years had found lasting
expression in the form of the Group's lack of professionalism Lnd
personnel orientation. This relative de-emphasising of professional
values was itself associated with a conservative approach to business
matters generally and a certain narrowness of vision and
introspectiveness.
The personnel orientation had, with the end of the family era s become
tied in with democratic and consensual norms which laid great stress
on participation by managers at all levels. These democratic values
were further supported by the development of increasing leveld'ktrust
and confidence and the strengthening emphasis on internal cooperation
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(rather than competition) which accompanied the end of the political
and status-seeking period from the early 1980 s onward. These same
democratic values and personnel orientation also contrived to make the
Group the relaxed, casual, informal and slow-moving organisation it
was.
This characterisation of the Group culture, while valid and veridical
fails to capture the spirit of freshness and vitality which it had
apparently only recently acquired, partly due to the restructuring.
This feature is perhaps the hardest of all to give represent
accurately, though a comparatively new member of the Group probably
made the most vivid attempt:
"Allied [Allied Lyons] is a vastly more
professional set-up, but vastly more
demanding, and less individual than [the
Group]. The main benefit of [the Group]
is its individual approaches; it's
personal, it's got a personality that
you are able to feel part of or close
to. Whereas at Allied it was inclined
to be a very large conglomerate which in
many ways you couldn't influence, - you
know, you were part of the system and
the system trundled on and you trundled
on with it. [The Group] is refreshing
insofar as it's almost, despite the fact
that it's been in existence a long time,
it's almost in an embryo form really.
And because of that you're involved in
almost a newness, a sort of freshness of
opportunity in a way, and the
involvement is more interesting in a
way."
(Managing Director4 , T.2.S2. 527-583).
10.2  Conceptualisation of the Cases 
The empirical model implicit in chapters 4-8 may be formally described
as follows (see fig.2).
This empirical model can be expanded and made somewhat more
theoretical in order to provide a more generally useful analytical
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tool. In specific terms the cultural profile can be replaced by the
core elements of an organisational culture as revealed by the
literature review, and the information/communication profile enlarged
to accommodate some of the concepts that were subsumed under the five
categories for the purposes of analysis. The resulting theoretical
model can be drawn as illustrated in fig.3.
Both the empirical and theoretical models are open to the criticism
that while they list the major cultural and information variables they
do nothing to explicate the relationships between them. This
criticism is obviously valid and extremely difficult to address in
terms of making refinements to the models given the complex inter-
causal nature of the relationships between culture and
information/communication phenomena. In short, because of the almost
infinitely variable nature of organisations any more precise model is
liable to the charge of being too simplistic to cope with any observed
organisational reality.	 A second criticism likely to be levelled
against the models is that they are incomplete. This criticism is
also valid, with culture being only one among many factors which
influence the nature of information and communication structures and
processes in organisations. What is required is a more complete
account of the relationships between cultural and information
variables and a broader appreciation of the multiplicity of other
factors which help to shape the information/communication environment.
An attempt to fulfil this requirement is given below:
*Management Information System.
The M.I.S.'s in operation in the subsidiary companies were symptomatic
of the prevailing cultural beliefs, values and attitudes dominant in
these organisations. In all of them there was a strong predilection
both for informality and the non-systematisation of communications
channels combined with a lack of professionalism which naturally found
expression in the form of an information adhocracy. This tradition
had developed over a long period of time, and was deeply embedded in
the psyche of the organisation. Added to this there was a widely
- 291 -
04
A
0
1-4
o
z
ft
Z
0
<4
0
44Z
6.4
cli
u
Z
0
C/3
1-1 4.1
C/3
ci) C/3	 Z	 I=1
4.1 Fi	 Z
cza
n-4	 C/3— C-D
Cz3
c=7
cal u
0
r4
held conviction that individuals could broadly be trusted neither to
deliberately distort information nor to consciously act contrary to
the best interests of the company. Moreover, as a manufacturing
company there was a tendency for information systems to be under-
valued relative to production equipment, the financial utility of
which was relatively easy to assess. Furthermore, the organisation as
a whole had until recently lacked the knowledge base necessary to
appreciate the potential of formal information systems and achieve a
successful implementation of them: to some extent this was still true,
though great progress had been made during the late 1980 1 s. In sum,
for a variety of reasons there was no culturally perceived need for a
fast, efficient and effective formal management information systems,
and unsurprisingly they had not therefore been developed.
Valid and interesting though this explanation it is still incomplete.
One major reason why the M.I.S. might have been underdeveloped even if
the culture had been more supportive than it was has its roots ' the
financial performance of the organisation. Profits for the company
had always been small, and despite an up-turn in its profitability
since the mid 1980's what available cash there had been (arguably)
needed to be invested in new capital plant and equipment. 	 While
financial constraints cannot be ignored, neither can the business
context within which the organisation subsisted.
	
The sugar
confectionery industry had for many years been slow-reacting and
unadventurous in its products, marketing and customer-liaison. The
business environment had thus reinforced the organisation's own self-
perceptions of the limited value of complex and expensive information
resources and systems.
Thus a knowledge of culture has to be informed by an appreciation of
both the financial constraints and situational context which impinge
on an organisation's information strategy. The picture is obviously
complicated by the fact that the financial, material and technological
resources available to	 an organisation,
	 and	 especially	 an
organisation's	 environment,	 can	 have	 significant	 cultural
Implications.
	 It is also arguable that material resources and
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business context may ultimately have their impact (at least in part)
through more subtle cultural channels than strict structural-
functional accounts of organisational behaviour admit. Facts, figures
and business environments do not determine action, they set the
conditions for it, and as such are subject to intense critical
evaluation through the perception filter of culture. The resulting
beliefs, values, attitudes, expectations and knowledge then inform the
decision-making and social situational arenas within which
organisational structures and processes like the M.I.S. are culturally
constructed.
* Ad hoc communications.
The ad hoc nature of much of the communication activity within the
group reflected its cultural antipathy to the systematisation and
fonuaisation of communication channels. The extensive reliance on ad
hoc communication was obviously largelY a consequence of the poorly
developed M.I.S.'s in place in the subsidiaries, the cultural roots of
which have already been explicated above. Nevertheless, the specific
web of beliefs and values which underpinned ad hoc communications
within the group requires further elucidation. Thus the Group's
'personnel orientation' included a belief in the ability and integrity
of employees, to whom judgements as to when, how often, what, how and
who to communicate were readily devolved down the hierarchy,
effectively obviating the need for rules or formal mechanisms.
Perceived high levels of trust between employees and a belief in he
need for a cooperative working environment further supported ad hoc
communication.
Again, the narrow cultural interpretation needs to be supplemented by a
consideration of a number of other active factors in order for a
sufficiently rich explanation of the prevalence of ad hoc
communication within the group to emerge. Foremost among these
factors are certain aspects of the group organisational context and
the nature of the work being carried out. 	 Four of the principal
subsidiaries researched were manufacturing units within which
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individuals were largely spatially located in close proximity to each
other, especially on production lines. This physical proximity of
individuals made ad hoc communication far more efficient than reliance
on a formal information support system. The frequent necessity for
immediate or almost immediate communication and the large number of
small items of information that needed to be exchanged reinforced
individuals' desires to transmit information as and when they saw fit.
Finally, the technological and material resources available to
individuals in order to facilitate communication were little better
than vestigial, which only underlined still further employees' positive
attitudes towards ad hoc communication.
*The Information Culture Type.
The information culture type of the case study organisation was found
to be oral as opposed to written, with the vast majority of
organisational information communicated by word of mouth. Of the
other information characteristics this trait was most closely related
to the organisation's proclivity for ad hoc communication. Looked at
from the vantage point of the thesis's empirical analysis of the
organisation's culture the relative informality of a telephone call or
casual face-to- face meeting where information exchange is inevitably
predominantly oral has an obvious cultural correlate. Underscoring
the organisation's tendency to transmit information internally by word
of mouth were its democratic and participative beliefs. That is, a
participative democracy is much easier to run when individuals' ideas
and opinions can be exchanged orally than when they have to be written
down. Lastly, that so many individuals were prepared to communicate
orally, rather than insist that everything that required action should
be written so that there existed a permanent record, could only have
occurred in a culture where employees had considerable trust and
confidence in each others abilities and motives.
Reference to three major variables other than culture is required here
to supplement this interpretation. Possibly the most important of
these was the nature of the work activity being conducted within the
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organisation. The company was fundamentally a manufacturing entity
and most people were employed on the production floors of the
principal subsidiaries. In order to facilitate a smooth, efficient
manufacturing process many small items of information had to be
transmitted up and down the management hierarchy very quickly. There
was thus little opportunity for information to be written down, and
Weed to have done so would almost certainly have been dysfunctional
in the vast majority of cases due to the time and opportunity costs
that would have had to have been incurred. The second major activity
of the company was selling, and this again is a function that relies
heavily on a minimal amount of written information relative to that
communicated by word of mouth. While the finance function did require
far more information to be communicated in written form very few
people were employed group-wide in finance departments. The other
Important factors here were the poor formal systems for information
exchange which often meant that oral communication was not only the
quickest and easiest means of information transmission, but the most
certain. And, as has been mentioned above, this fact was not only a
manifestation of cultural prejudice, but a reflection of the paucity
of financial and material resources available to the organisation.
* Informal communications.
The generally informal nature of Group life had been translated into
attitudes to communication which positively encouraged a luxurious
informal communications network. While the nature of the study
precludes a reliable estimate of the amount of the total
organisational information communicated by means of the grapevine, it
was apparent that it was not inconsiderable. Moreover, while the
quality and reliability of information communicated informally was
deemed to be highly questionable by respondents it was nevertheless
true that many senior managers (up to and including the chairman)
valued it. The utility of informal communications was at least two-
fold: first, it was a channel from which useful information concerning
potential 'people problems' could be derived; and second, the
judicious disclosure of information into the network could transform
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it into a management tool for the manipulation and control of others.
In fact, so pervasive and extensive was the Group (and various
subsidiary) grapevine(s) and so prevalent the information adhocracy
that in some subsidiaries (and especially subsidiary 2) it was
difficult to distinguish between bona fide management information on
the one hand, and rumour, speculation and hearsay on the other.
The prominence of informal communication within the organisation is to
some extent explicable in terms of the other information variables
discussed in this section. Thus, the lack of a well developed M.I.S.,
the preference for oral information exchange, and the expressed
desirability for face-to-face meetings all seem to have had an
influence here. In addition, the extensive nature of informal
communication was almost certainly symptomatic (and arguably a direct
response) to the poor downward vertical communications evident within
the Group. The Holdings Board communicated little information to its
subsidiaries which in turn tended to disclose little information down
the management hierarchy, while communication between management and
the labour force was practically non-existent. Under conditions such
as these where the majority of individuals were kept in relative
ignorance, it is hardly surprising that informal networks and internal
gatekeepers should develop. In sum, the informal communication
network should be seen as an extension of the information adhocracy
which characterised information exchange within the Group.
*Information consciousness.
While the extent to which an organisation is considered to be
'information conscious' will always require a judgement on the part
of the researcher, it is a contention of this thesis that that
judgement should be informed by a knowledge and understanding of an
organisation's culture. The level of information consciousness within
the Group was not high. The lack of value attributed to information
was evident in terms of the absence of any central library facilities,
the fact that no information professionals were employed, the limited
resources devoted to collecting external information and the paucity
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of the formal information systems. But most of all the low levels of
information consciousness discovered within the Group were manifested
in the beliefs, values and attitudes of the management team.
Historically, the Group had been a production-led organisation which
required little external information, and its transformation into a
marketing-led concern envisaged by some executives had yet to be
realised. The devaluation of externally derived information was,
therefore, less than surprising. A lack of professionalism resulting
from a dearth of trained managers, a high degree of introspection and
ageneral casualness of approach had also played their part in shaping
and conditioning attitudes to information issues. Moreover, a rigid
hierarchy had created an information-rich managerial elite which
communicated downwards only the most essential operational information
necessary for employees to perform their duties. The result was that
the vast majority of shopfloor operatives were not only information-
poor, but placed little value on information and had not been
encouraged to become pro-active information-seekers. A noticeable
lack of staff development and training programmes reinforced these
problems, as many low ranking employees did not possess the
information skills required to write intelligible memos or conduct
worthwhile formal meetings. Superimposed on the management hierarchy
was a framework of personal and political antagonisms which provided
great scope for the deliberate withholding and distorting of
information for individual and sectional advantage. In effect this
represented a further devaluation of information as a utilisable
resource within the Group.
The cultural change the Group was experiencing was reflected in
changing beliefs and attitudes towards information and communication.
There were plans to develop new and upgrade existing information
systems, especially those which were or needed to be computer-basi.
At Company 1 more junior members of staff were being sent on training
programes, and at Companies 2 and 4 the problems of lack of training
had at least been diagnosed. But old habits and values die hard, and
in an internal environment in which 'fire—fighting ,
 was still a major
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feature of the working day of many managers information management was
not generally seen as a priority.
10.3 The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Corporate Culture 
The Group's culture had both strong and weak facets. Indicators of
comparative weakness included the absence of specific slogans, the
lack of definite company heroes, little obvious unique symbolic
activity, rites or rituals and the fact that it did not possess many
company-specific linguistic expressions. The absence of a clearly
defined locus of corporate identification, buttressed by the Holdings
Board's belief in the merits of highly autonomous subsidiary activity
and the geographical dispersion of the company was a powerful catalyst
of cultural disjuncture, accounting for the local variations in
culture found in the subsidiaries. In addition, while there did exist
one dominating story within the company it did not appear to play an
integrative role; though it did serve to reinforce the conservative
values shared by many individuals. The Group thus lacked many of the
attributes generally associated with a strong and vibrant cultural
life. The weakness of the Group culture was most graphically
illustrated by Holdings Board uncertainty concerning the essence of
the company image they wished to project and 'mission' they sought to
pursue:
"When it actually comes to the sharp end
of the business I think we're still
actually scratching around for what we
are best at. I think we now recognise
that first and foremost we're a 'Alpha'
company - that [the Group] means 'Alpha'
and 'Alpha' means [the Group]. But in
terms of making that more generally
applicable, you know, what does that
mean?.... We kind of make noises about
quality as a way of really identifying
it as a banner for the company...."
(Non Executive Director 2 , p.18, no.66).
However, the Group did possess a recognisable corporate culture
-replete with common beliefs and values (clustered around its
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'personnel orientation') and symbols of identification of loyalty (in
the form of company products and logos). The company was considered
to have a long and distinguished history and employed many long-
serving individuals who held the Group in high esteem and were
extremely loyal to it. Moreover, the Holdings Board directors were
familiar with the basic notions of corporate culture and sympathetic
towards its encouragement and development. Hence while the culture
was not in the same mould as that at I.B.M. (Deal & Kennedy, 1982) it
was a significant organisational characteristic and exercised
considerable influence over its strategic decisions:
"We have come across a company that
basically we would like to have
acquired. The financial figures were
fine. The area of the business it was
in was O.K. and yet basically it had a
culture that was totally different from
ours and thus we felt that it wouldn't
'fit' into the business; so the
information coming from. from it would
have produced a 'yes, go ahead , result,
the culture from our business produced a
'no, don't go ahead'."
(Development Director, p.23, no.62).
"Having manufacturing companies in such
distant realms [Australia] is difficult;
you can't put the right sort of time in.
The other thing that's important in
terms of our Group philosophy too is
that you can't make them feel part of
your team."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.9,
no.37).
10.4 The Holdings Board's Attempts to Control Culture 
The authority and resources available to the Holdings Board placed it
in an ideal position to manage and shape the Group's culture. While
its unselfconscious impact on the cultural life of the organisation is
not in doubt, (the restructuring, the acquisitions policy, its methods
of handling the subsidiaries etc. are testament to this), the extent
to which the Holdings Board consciously manipulated culture for its
(mends was less than clear. On the one hand the Chairman asserted:
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"There are very few things which are
centralised - emotive things, and style
and culture is also attempted to be
established from the centre."
(Chairman & Chief Executive, p.19,
no.47).
And on the other, the Group Finance Director maintained a contrary
position:
Q: "Is there any informal consciousness which the Group possesses as
a whole?"
A: "Not that is clearly identified as a strategy that we wish to put
forward." (Group Finance Director, p.19, no.17).
The Holdings Board did not have a particularly sophisticated
appreciation of the concept of 'culture' and possessed no coherent set
of cultural objectives or plan for achieving them. It did have
specific ambitions to engender change in the organisation, both in
terms of its internal structure and the values, perceptions and
loyalties of individuals, but these were not interpreted in a cultural
light. For instance, it was recognised that Company 1 and Company 3
identified with each other to the extent that the best interests of
the Group were, arguably, not being served:
"Company 1 still regards Company 3 as
its export arm, which to some extent it
is - it's a thing we're trying to
break."
(Non Executive Director2 , p.11, no.5).
But the problem itself was not considered to be one in which culture
played a role and the changes in beliefs and attitudes that the
Holdings Board wished to initiate were not seen to represent a
modification in that area of Group culture.
10.5 Forces for Cultural Stability and Change 
In one sense the culture of the Group was perceived to be relatively
stable and unlikely to undergo any dramatic changes in the foreseeable
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future. The personnel orientation, democratic norms and traditionalist
ethos were so much part of the psyche of the organisation that it was
difficult to imagine their disappearance - in the short-term at
least. Other features of the culture, such as its casualness and lack
of professionalism were more prone to change in response to
restructuring, the threat of takeover and an increased tendency to
bring in experienced individuals from outside the company. There
were, though, two principal potential catalysts of change acting on
the Group's culture: generational change and a rapidly altering
business context.
Generational change was, within the next ten years, set to have a
major impact on Company 1 and to a lesser extent on Company 2, where
large coteries of middle and senior managers in their mid fifties were
due to reach retirement age:
"I would say it's an older organisation.
It's now becoming more yduthful in a lot
of key areas, there's been a whole spate
of retirements. Take the company you
were just interviewing [Company 1],
that' probably the oldest in the sense
that you've got a bunch of people there
in their middle fifties that are all
going to retire in the next 2,3,4,5
years. That will have a dramatic change
on Company 1.... - that changes the
character of the company."
(Non Executive Director 1 , p.14, no.99).
Whether generational succession will in fact lead to the domination of
substantially different beliefs and attitudes is unpredictable, and
largely depends on the Holdings Board's policy towards finding their
replacements. However, given that the Holdings Board is itself
committed to the central tenets of the organisational culture, it is
unlikely that managers with ideas and ideals incompatible with their
mm will be appointed. The only alterations that might be induced by
succession are those which one would associate with the experienced
and educated people the Board may be expected to bring in.
Professional values may well be strengthened, the degree of
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informality permitted may become less, and the introspective nature of
the Group should be transformed into a keener awareness of the
external world as an increasingly marketing-led approach to business
is taken.
The influence of the environment on the culture of the Group was
equally uncertain. An increasingly complex and demanding world would
seem to demand a less personnel oriented culture in which loyalty is a
less valued characteristic than professional competence and a relaxed
workplace gives way to an increasingly frenetic pace of activity. In
addition, increased competition may be expected to facilitate the
Group's conversion to a more marketing-led strategy. These are,
however, only speculative points; the history of British industry is
littered with examples of businesses which either refused or were
tumble to modify in order to meet the challenges of changing
circumstances. The essential point here is that the culture of an
organisation is shaped by its environment, and as the sugar
confectionery industry modernises so it can be expected demand changes
from the Group under study if it is to survive and prosper.
Information, Communication, Decision Making and Culture 
"The differing cultures of the
organisations interpret or structure the
problems in different ways; they weigh
the solution criteria differently and
thus almost guarantee the development of
different solutions."
(Allen, 1977, p.138).
11.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the utility of the concept
of 'culture' for understanding organisational behaviour with
particular reference to the information and communication dimension of
commercial decision making processes. Similar studies purporting to
demonstrate the value of culture to the understanding of
organisational competitiveness (Whipp, Rosenfeld & Pettigrew, 1989),
Innovation (Feldman, 1985) and strategic fit (Scholz, 1987) among
others, have already been conducted. The chapter provides an
account of a project conducted by the Group through one of its
principal subsidiaries, Company 2. Two aspects of the project are
explored in detail: first, the major decisions taken, and second, the
Information/communication activities which supported the decision
making processes and facilitated the project's successful evolution.
Time are themselves subjected to analysis within the framework of
the cultural perspective outlined in Chapter 3. The chapter is
divided into two sections, the first provides a serial history of the
project, while the second highlights the information, communication
and cultural dimension of the project. For the purposes of analysis
each section is sub-divided into eight semi-discrete phases.
Fundamentally, it is hoped to demonstrate the value of a cultural
interpretation of organisational behaviour in general and decisional
mdinformation/communication activities and processes in particular.
11.2 Anatomy of the Project 
11.3 Phase 1
In November 1985 the Group acquired the goodwill, stocks and shares
of Subsidiary 2 from Company R. This mutually beneficial transaction
inspired the idea of regular six- monthly meetings between senior
Company R. and Group personnel. Furthermore, the Group made it clear
to Company R. that they would be interested in any future commercial
opportunities that Company R. did not feel able to take advantage of
itself. In September 1986 Company R. acquired a major U.S. sugar
confectionery and snacks food company based in St. Louis, Missouri,
called S.Inc. Seven months later on 29.4.87, at one of the six
monthly meetings, it invited the Group to put forward a proposal to
manufacture, market and sell their S.Inc sugar confectionery range in
the U.K.. This was the date of conception for what in this thesis
will be referred to as Project W.
Overall responsibility for the project on behalf of the Group was
delegated to the development director.	 Recognising that he suffered
from a dearth of information he obtained a price list from S.Inc.
and samples of its product range together with more general
information concerning the U.S. confectionery market from Company 6, a
minor U.S.-based subsidiary of the Group. Further information was
gleaned by the development director from a number of American
confectionery journals. This information raised a plethora of issues
and observations for the Group which informed these early
discussions. One important feature of the S.Inc range that will be
discussed later was the unusual, off-beat nature of the products,
their packaging and their names.
There were three live options for handling the project within the
group. First, Company 2 could be permitted to manufacture and sell
the S.Inc range; second, Company 1 could be permitted to manufacture
and sell the confectionery range; and third, either Company 1 or
Company 2 could manufacture the products which would then be sold by a
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new salesforce under the name 'Group Food Brokers Ltd'. The route
through which the Holdings Board channelled the S.Inc opportunity was
obviously going to have a major impact on the structure and future
development of the project, and was likely to have a significant
impact on the chosen subsidiary and even the nature of the Group
itself.
Options 2 and 3 were very quickly discarded, and the project was run
through Company 2. According to the development director:
"...from the 13th of May onwards I had
really fitted that bit of the jigsaw
together and said that that the sales
and distribution will be through
[Company 2]"
This information was quite deliberately not imparted to Company 2, at
which an elite trio had begun work on the project in an almost
'conspiratorial' style. UnsurprisinglYr there were some unfortunate
consequences of this obsession with secrecy: some senior and middle
managers felt marginalised within the organisation and some of the
initial estimates for costs were considerably off target. Moreover,
when information was given out it was done so piecemeal (and often
late) which added to the sense of semi-controlled impulsion and
sometimes even confusion over what was happening, which betroubled the
project.
11.4 Phase 2 
Two weeks into the project the principal actors both at the Holdings
Board and at Company 2 envisaged building up a family of products
carefully selected from the S.Inc. range with price points at 5p, 10p
15p and 20p. The only real alternative to this strategy was to
promote a single product. There were three major reasons why the
former strategy was favoured: first, launching a single new brand into
the U.K. confectionery market was known to be difficult and expensive;
second, launching a family of products diminished the risk factor
involved quite considerably; after all, the one product chosen might
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flop, but of half a dozen products chosen some might reasonably be
expected to succeed. And third, umbrella advertising of the range,
most probably under the trade name ('W.W.') the Group thought it was
purchasing with the products, was recognised as a cheap but effective
means of marketing the products.
Company 2 commissioned an advertising agency which was requested to
devise a strategy for investigating the potential of the S.Inc. range.
At about this time the full commercial/strategic impact the project
could have for the company was becoming apparent to Subsidiary 2.
According to a discussion paper written by the company's marketing
manager while the S.Inc. range had to be fully researched its
potential was enormous and correctly managed 'could revolutionise
Company 2 into a major confectionery force'.
It was suggested that within a 2/3 month time scale the market size
should be evaluated, its prospects over the next 3,5 and 10 years
gauged, the possible 'life cycle' of the product should be considered
(is it going to be a fad or long lasting product), work should be done
to determine the age profile for the product range, taste
acceptability, competitor activity, child awareness of W.W., the
appeal of the pack design, the optimum price of the products and how
the products should be distributed throughout the trade (would the
products be sold through wholesalers, supermarkets, C.T.N. 1 s, etc.).
On the basis of answers to these questions a second stage of research
would be conducted over 4-6 weeks to determine how best to market the
products. Even at this early stage the possibility of using T.V.
advertising to support the range was also under consideration. This
was an important document as it set the agenda for the market research
activity that was conducted over the succeeding months.
At the same time as this project was being conducted Company 2 was
considering making a considerable investment in new computer
technology. The perceived advantages of the planned new computer
system were that it would be able to handle more customer invoices,
would be superior in terms of its sales ledger capacity, and would
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provide a more efficient stock control system. Investment in new
technology at Company 2 was symptomatic of the Holdings Board's
Intention to enhance the status of the subsidiary within the Group and
a sine qua non for the further expansion of the Company 2 operation
within the sugar confectionery market.
On 11.6.87 the same senior personnel from the Group and Company R. met
to discuss S.Inc. for a second time. Company R. were sufficiently
impressed with the outline Group proposal to agree that they should
proceed with their plans to commission market research. It was also
decided at this meeting that from now on the Group should negotiate
direct with the President of S.Inc, to which on Monday the 6th July
the development director departed for St. Louis in the U.S.. where
preliminary negotiations with S.Inc. concerning the possibility of a
licensing agreement were conducted. He also seized the opportunity to
collect more marketing and technical information from S.Inc..
11.5 Phase 3
On his return from the U.S. the development director began sorting out
the large quantity of information he had gained from S.Inc.. The most
plausible option for the Group still appeared to be to develop a range
of products at 10p, 15p, 20p and 25p. Working on the assumption that
the Group would sell $12 million worth of goods the development
director calculated, on the basis of information he had gleaned from
his U.S. visit and his own knowledge of the U.K. market, that the
venture would be commercially viable for the Group only if it was
manufacturing the products itself.
The essential problem was that factoring the products in from the U.S.
was so expensive that the Group's margin of profit on the goods they
sold in the U.K. would be too small to justify full marketing support.
The development director therefore developed a two-stage strategy
whereby the products were bought-in from the U.S. in the first year of
operation and provided with test marketing support at a small loss to
the Group. Assuming this phase of the project was a success capital
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expenditure would be	 authorised incrementally in order of
profitability by product and by actual expansion of sales volume
(rather than estimates). This plan had a number of perceived
advantages: it minimised the capital expenditure risks by buying
rather than making the products initially, it allowed for an expensive
marketing/advertising campaign, and it gave the Group an opportunity
to gauge the probable value of the range to them before any additional
costs were incurred.
On the afternoon of 28th July the managing director, sales director,
marketing manager and development director attended an agency debrief
meeting at which the results of the first phase of the research that
Company 2 had commissioned from the Childrens ' Research Unit (C.R.U.)
through their advertising agency were presented to them. The report
suggested that 'there was certainly considerable interest in the new
products', but added the rider that 'it is difficult to accurately
assess reactions to many of the parameters owing to the number of
products and the inconsistencies between packs'. In general terms
the research provided a vast amount of information concerning the
acceptability of prices, flavours, product descriptions and the
packaging etc..
A number of interesting points can be derived from the document. The
original assumption that the S.Inc. products had appeal as a range
rather than individually had been undermined by the C.W.A. research
which found that Beta was the only U.S.P. (Unique Selling Point) of
the range. Similarly, the initial assumption that the packs possessed
a number of positive U.S.P.'s was difficult to sustain in the light of
the C.W.A. conclusion that the packs researched rather poorly.
Further, the requirement that the products had a teenage market with
an additional element of adult purchase for children was now found to
be highly dubious given the C.W.A.'s finding that the products were
solely of the child self-purchase type and that the range was not
sufficiently strong to compete with chocolate countlines in the early
teens market.	 This meant that the assumption that the greatest
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percentage of sales would be through grocery outlets with C.T.N.'s and
wholesale outlets being of secondary importance was now questionable.
Mu nearly three months after Company 2 had become acquainted with
the project the C.W.A. research had cast doubts on the validity of
almost all of Company 2's most significant assumptions. The
development director later noted that:
"If the product range had been less
exciting but still desirable, this
particular piece of research might have
killed it, because we might have been
less confident about going again with
another £5,000 worth (of research)."
On the following two days, 29/30.7.87, the marketing manager and the
Company 2 buyer and packing specialist met with a trading standards
officer, to discuss the legality of the packs of a dozen S.Inc.
products. The function of a trading standards officer is to offer
advice concerning (and enforce) the Food Labelling and Descriptions
Regulations of 1984. These meetings provided a great deal of valuable
information which was later used in developing the pack-graphics for
Beta. It was discovered, for example, that the American product did
not need to have a 'best before' date stamped on it if it had a shelf
Min excess of 12 months or contained a 'significant' amount of
sugar (both of which applied to Beta).
11,6 Phase 4
Despite the down-beat conclusions of the C.R.U. it was decided to go
ahead with the second phase of the market research, which was
commissioned from Cox Williams Associates Ltd (C.W.A.). The results
of the C.W.A. research (which were far more positive than the first
report) were presented to the managing director, marketing manager,
sales director and development director on 18.9.87. According to the
marketing manager this was the 'most important piece of research'. It
nsonthe basis of this research:
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"...that the decision to go ahead was
made, and on that that it was 'Beta'
only, and on that that we fought for a
20p price point'."
The results were not universally welcomed by Company 2. While the
fact that Beta (and another product called 'Zeta') had researched well
was pleasing, less well received was the news that the products were
of the child self-purchase type. It should be borne in mind that the
Company 2 salesforce was not C.T.N. oriented and that consequently if
the products were thought to require a C.T.N. route then Company 2
mad lose the opportunity to sell them via its own salesforce. This
was a possibility that Company 2, who were keen to maximise the
potential gain to themselves, obviously wished to avoid. So
disappointing was this information that Company 2 solaced their
chagrin by seeking further and contrary evidence to support their hope
that there would be an element of adult purchase for children. That
me of the other findings of the C.W.A. research were subjected to
such a vigorous campaign of repudiation may well be symptomatic of
Company 2's perception that a sales route through Group Food Broker's
or Company 1 was a live possibility.
The C.W.A. research was the final catalysing agent which caused the
idea of launching a family of related products marketed under an
umbrella name to be discarded in favour of concentrating on a single
product, Beta. Hence, by 21.9.87 marketing manager could write in a
memo to the managing director that:
"Project W has now evolved from the
original concept of some 5 major and 10
minor products selling 60% of their
volume through supermarket outlets, to
one initial product, Beta, with flavour
variants, distributed primarily to
C.T.N. outlets'.
11.7 Phase 5
With the product and the subsidiary through which it was to be
channelled decided upon the Holdings Board were keen that Beta should
be test marketed in two regions, one with and the other without T.V.
moot. A great deal of work was done by the agency collecting
information concerning the population and distribution profile of the
LT.V. region and generating a potential sales matrix that evaluated
various hypothetical market penetrations and two levels of repeat
purchase. The agency also presented outline marketing costs for the
proposed T.V.-led test market programme which was to commence in April
1988 within the Y.T.V. region and be rolled out to Tyne Tees, Granada,
Central Scotland and Central T.V. regions if successful. A number of
other issues were discussed at this and successive Company 2-agency
ngings, such as the establishment of brand positioning and
personality, umbrella branding and the possibility of marketing the
product as possessing no artificial coloUrings and additives.
The inajcm issues as they were then perceived by the senior management
ofCompany 2 concerned:
* the product - ingredients, keeping conditions, the possibility of
using natural colours and flavours, and the best before date.
the carton - the bar code, ingredients declaration, its legality,
the graphics, among others.
the display outer - its configuration, the graphics for it etc.
the point of sale (P.O.S.) material.
the promotional activities scheduled to accompany the launch
how should Beta be launched so as to avoid it being a 'fad'.
the product's image - especially brand positioning.
the price point - still to be officially finalised.
the advertising - a host of questions concerning the T.V.
strategy to be pursued.
the launch - there were still many details to be finalised
relating to the amount of product required and how key buyers
should be handled.
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the shipping of Beta from the U.S. - shipping/customs clearance,
weight and dimensions of freight, classification and schedule.
This gives us as information scientists a feel for the scale of
the information-collation processes that were going on.
The agency was requested to reconsider how the product was to be
branded.	 It was at this meeting that	 a difference of opinion
between Company 2 and the agency emerged. The marketing manager
expressed concern that the T.V.C. concept that had been presented
could limit the appeal of the product to an inordinately young age
group and requested the agency to produce a Beta character that would
appeal to a 7-15 year age span. This was, in the words of the agency,
'a significant departure from the original age-range of 6-12 year
olds'. That the agency was unaware of 	 Company 2's interest in
courting a significantly older age group,	 indicates an information
gap that should perhaps have been closed at an earlier date.
The difficulties involved in deciding which flavours of Beta should be
launched proved insoluble without the benefit of further research
(known as the 'Hall Tests' ) which were conducted on the weekend of
17/18.10.87. At the following meeting the advertising agency
presented four alternative T.V.C. concepts and scripts based on the
positioning statement of 'Too much flavour for just one sweet' of
which two were selected for research purposes.
11,8 Phase 6
The C.W.A. research had suggested that one reason why Beta was not
well thought of by parents was that it was perceived to be an
unhealthy food. The use of natural colours and flavours, it was
thought, might increase the likelihood of parents purchasing the
product for their children. S.Inc were thus asked to provide costings
for Beta using natural colours and flavours. However, the information
received back from the States indicated this to be cost prohibitive,
and these tentative plans were dropped.
	 At this time further
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information was sought by Company 2 concerning the services that were
required to support a major sugar confectionery brand. It was thought
that Beta could be as big a brand as Company 1 's Epsilon, and the
development director gained information from Company 1 for sales of
Epsilon and the cost of trade support activities.
Meanwhile the development director and managing director of Company 2
had flown out to the U.S.A. on 2.11.87. The prime object of the visit
from the managing director's point of view was to look more closely
at the technical details of producing Beta. He had in fact been given
a list of engineering and production related questions compiled by his
production director, chief engineer and project engineer to which
Company 2 required answers before the costings could be prepared for
the 'Beta Proposal' document which was to be presented to the Holdings
Board later that month. Much of this information was phoned back by
the M.D. during his visit, and the chief chemist, production director
and project engineer used this infoimation to begin their work
immediately. Importantly, no technical problems were discovered
during this trip, which helped generate a great deal of enthusiasm for
the project. Towards the end of November more exact information
concerning capital costs were sent from the U.S., through less than
perfect lines of communication.
On 16.11.87 the M.D. and marketing manager attended a further meeting
at the advertising agency. At this meeting the results from the group
discussions covering the Beta T.V.C. animatics and pack designs which
had been conducted by the Hallam Associates Development Research and
Consultancy agency were discussed. The results strongly suggested
that one of the animatics and one pack design should be used in
preference to the others.
At a special joint Holdings Board/Company 2 Board Meeting held at
Group House on 19 . 1 1 . 87 the subsidiary team presented a 'Beta
Proposal' document to the Group directors. This was all extremely
important meeting at which approval for the subsidiary to undertake
the first stage of the project was granted.
	 The proposal document
- 313 -
itself consisted of a detailed overview of the strategic importance of
the project and how Company 2 intended to handle it, and merits our
further attention. While Company 2 had identified Beta as its
potential flagship brand it recognised that the support framework of
the company was not adequate to fully exploit the profit opportunity
presented by the project. The subsidiary team perceived three
capital projects to be necessary before the 'Beta Project' could be
handled satisfactorily, namely, the installation of a new computer
system (£110,000), the construction of a new administration block
(£335,000) and the building of a new warehouse (L675,000). The
capital investment required for the 'Beta Project' itself was
additionally estimated at £750,000. Despite the uncertainties and the
'guesstimate' nature of many of the forecasts the project was
considered sufficiently promising for the Holdings Board to sanction
expenditure on the first stage of the launch. No firm decisions were
taken regarding the capital expenditure.
The difficulties involved in collating and determining all the
information necessary to facilitate the production of the Beta carton
in the U.S.A. were considerable. As late as 9.12.87 Company 2 faxed a
query to S.Inc. concerning the red colouring, and it was not until
15.12.87 that Company 2 were certain they had a correct list of all
the colours to be used, i.e. the same day the artwork was despatched
to the U. S. .
From late November onwards a great deal of time and energy was devoted
by the company secretary to finalising the form the licensing
agreement between Company R. and the Group was to take, and legal
issues concerning the Beta carton. An equally important
consideration at this stage was the question of trade mark protection
to protect the uniqueness of the Beta carton. The carton design had
not been patented in the U.K. and the company solicitor was involved
in considerable work on this issue before it was resolved
satisfactorily.
11.9 Phase 7
On the last day of 1987 Company 2 received an invoice from the
advertising agency for £18,164 in respect of the six T.V.C. concepts
they had developed. This caused shock waves to reverberate through
Company 2 who had budgeted for an expenditure of circa £4,000. This
problem had yet to be obviated when the period of data collection came
to an end. However, the incident does illustrate just how loose the
procedures governing the authorisation of expenditure of the agency
had been and highlighted the obvious need for the system of costs
approval to be tightened up.
Against the backdrop of this dispute normal Company 2 - advertising
agency liaison work had to be conducted if the launch was to go ahead
on time. In several meetings with agency personnel in late January
the marketing manager and sales director discussed a variety of issues
key to the success of the project such as trade press advertisements,
the 'sales presenter , for use by salesmen, direct mail and the role of
promotional and point of sales items, all of which were being
developed in conjunction with the agency. Each of these on-going
activities required decisions on the amount of money to be spent and
the appropriateness of various alternatives.
Meanwhile a change in philosophy at Company 2 had begun to translate
Itself into resistance to the idea of building a warehouse. The M.D.
of Company 2 was particularly keen to increase the productive capacity
of the plant, and sensed that Project W presented the appropriate
opportunity to approach the Holdings Board on this matter. On
20,1.88 his instincts were proved correct, and at a Company 2 Board
Meeting capital expenditure proposals for both the computer system
and a manufacturing unit were approved.
By the date of the next Holdings Board meeting on 8.3.88 the
royalty/licensing agreement had been fully executed. However, not all
the difficulties associated with it had been resolved. Thus, while
preparations for the launch were continuing a problem arose concerning
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the trade name 'Beta'. The development director. had discovered that
the world-wide rights to the name Beta had been assigned by S.Inc. to
a company called A.M.I.., of New York, who in turn had granted a
licence to D.PL of Nutley, East Sussex in respect of the U.K..
Fortunately, after several meetings with D.PL the Group satisfied
themselves that this need give them no cause to worry. What the
incident illustrates is that even after eleven months of careful
planning and negotiation new salient items of information were still
being uncovered.
The next potential difficulty to be resolved was that of Company H.
Quite early on Company H. had been discovered to be selling Beta in
the U.K. by the staff at Company 2 who recognised the name on a
product listing of sugar confectionery available in Britain, This
revelation caused alarm bells to sound within the Group who had
believed that S.Inc. products were not being sold in the U.K.. A
number of meetings with Company .H were 'required before Company 2 felt
confident that its operation posed neither a threat nor an opportunity
to the project. S.Inc. were requested to cease supplying Company H
with Beta, and no further action was deemed necessary.
11.10	 Phase 8
If Beta were to be manufactured in the U.K. at Company 2 then a vast
amount of technical knowledge had to be ascertained from S.Inc., and
orders for some of the equipment placed well in advance of the desired
domestic production start-up date. It was, therefore, decided to send
the project engineer and chief chemist to S.Inc in the U.S.. It
should be noted that as U.K. production was supposed to commence in
February 1989 to ensure that sales targets were met this 	 meant
placing orders for equipment by the end of 1988, 	 i.e. making
a hefty capital investment before the true level of sales	 were
known.
During their visit it was decided that Company 2 would approach the
appropriate suppliers of equipment directly (rather than rely on
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S.Inc.) The project engineer gained valuable information concerning
the services (air, steam and electricity), maintenance, manpower and
so forth, that were necessary to manufacture Beta. The quality of the
information the project engineer managed to obtain is testament to
S.Inc.'s preparation in response to the questions that had been faxed
to them in advance of their visit, and general cooperative stance.
The chief chemist observed four production cycles noting problems with
quality control, re-work and wastage. He discovered that the
success of the Beta manufacturing process was dependent on the
judgement of the shopfloor operatives who had to take a number of
important decisions concerning when raw materials were added together.
Between them the project engineer and chief chemist gathered a vast
amount of information crucial to the success of the 'Beta Project!.
Both men commented on the exceptional candour of the S.Inc. team in
explaining the techniques and problems associated with the production
of Beta, and this openness on the part of S.Inc. seems to have played
a major role in facilitating the smooth-running of the project. For
example, when a shaft fractured during a nightshift the project
engineer and chief cheraist were called in to see it and discuss its
potential safety implications rather than kept in ignorance of the
occurrence. The main conclusion of their final report was that:
"Although the techniques involved in
dextrose panning differ from
conventional sucrose panning in a number
of areas, with a system of good process
controls and an effective
operator/maintenance training plan, no
difficulties should be encountered.
Back in England the chief chemist now used the comprehensive product
specifications he had obtained from S.Inc. to find matching colours
and flavours offered by companies this side of the Atlantic.
Fortunately all the colours used in the manufacture of Beta were made
by U.S. companies represented in the U.K.. The flavours were slightly
more problematic and had to be shipped to S.Inc. for testing.
Similarly the project engineer was now able to finalise contracts for
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the requisite capital equipment. Attempting to ensure that Company 2
attained the best financial and equipment deal possible, and that the
items reached Company 2 at the appropriate time was the concern of the
project engineer.	 This involved the project engineer in a
considerable information gathering, processing and evaluation
exercise, with each company's offer being subject to comparison with
the others and the original specification. The project engineer was
required to be highly interactive with the external business
environment, seeking discounts, resolving ambiguities in the suppliers
communications of what they could offer (especially where a company
had its own standards of manufacture) and later, physically checking
on the progress of the items ordered.
By late May the pre-sell campaign had been found to have been a
tremendous success. The product was out of stock almost everywhere,
and it was obvious that sales forecasts had been wildly inaccurate.
Sales, expressed as N.S.V., for the period 1988/9 were now forecast to
be 280% of' the original plan and 155% of the original 1989/90
projection.
While the initial launch of Beta had been a tremendous success the
product had of course been shipped in from the U.S.. Company 2 had
now to complete the factory, install the equipment and organise
suppliers for the ingredients and packing in readiness to begin
production of Beta in February of 1989. During mid-July the buyer
began contacting suppliers of packaging materials, and soon
established two acceptable supply routes.
	
The most essential
Ingredient of all, the sugar proved more problematic. In November
1987 the development director and managing director of Company 2 had
taken over a small amount of Belgian No.2 sugar (to S.Inc.) which was
confinned as being acceptable by the laboratory technicians subject to
a production test for which a much larger quantity was required. Due
to an oversight this sugar had never been sent by Company 2. Having
discovered this on 3.8.88 the finance director was understandably keen
to have the requisite amount of the sugar shipped out as soon as was
practical so that a batch of Beta could be manufactured.
	
The
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development director suggested that this failure to send the sugar to
the U.S. was the result of a failure in communications at Company 2.
In short, he felt that there had been a handover problem that was yet
to be fully resolved.
At this stage a regional T.V. test advertising campaign in order to
gauge the incremental effect of the advert was still favoured. Later,
the planned national T.V. launch was refined into a T.V.—A.M.
campaign at a cost of £850,000., and the T.V. test campaign was never
conducted as confidence in the product soared. But, at this
admittedly early stage, not all the company's initial hopes had been
fulfilled. Most notably the hoped for increase in other Company 2
business consequent of Beta had not yet materialised. It was thought
that this may be attributable to the fact that the product had been
off sale due to shortage of supply. In addition, in 1989/90 Company
2 had calculated that the strength of the brand and the planned T.V.
campaign would allow them to hold the trade margin to 2896. However,
discussions with the company's ctkaor customers revealed that this was
totally unachievable and consequently, the margin had to be increased
to 30.5%.
Moreover, although sales of Beta had surpassed all forecasts the
costing of the project had proven unduly optimistic. Thus the
financing costs increased for 1989/90 from £65,000 to £200,000.
This was because the financing costs associated with the new factory
building had not originally been included, and nor had allowance been
made for the financing costs of bought—in product from S.Inc..
Furthermore, the forecast for capital investment costs had risen by
circa £270,000. Since the original plans had been approved
alterations had had to have been made to the building as a result of
further technical information available from S.Inc.. In addition, the
original cost of equipment had been under—estimated by £110,000 and as
the projected volumes were now 59% higher than in the original plan
extra panning equipment at a cost of £200,000 had to be budgeted for.
Nevertheless, as the period of data collection came to an end
confidence in and enthusiasm for Beta had reached Olympian heights.
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
AMORAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR: ANALYSIS
12.1 Introduction 
The preceding account of Project W deliberately focused on the major
decisions and information/communication support activities which
underpinned them. The following analysis seeks to provide an
Interpretation of this piece of organisational behaviour from a
cultural perspective. Fundamentally it is hoped to demonstrate the
value of a cultural interpretation of organisational behaviour in
general and decisional and information/communication activities and
processes in particular. For the purposes of exposition the events
are considered in the same arbitrary time phases as the above
description.
A simple model of the inter—relationships between culture,
information/communication and decision making which are here under
scrutiny is given in figure 4. This process model illustrates the
basic point that these elements of organisational life are mutually
inter-causal. There are obviously many other aspects of
organisational life that need to be taken into account when explaining
organisational behaviour, but these are tangential to the concerns of
this chapter. These factors are, nevertheless significant, and an
expanded version of this model which takes into account the lessons of
Project W is provided in Chapter 13.
12,2 Phase 1
Phase 1 involved the Group in two extremely important decisions:
first, whether to discard or take seriously the S.Inc opportunity, and
second, through which subsidiary the project should be channelled.
Both decisions are susceptible to a cultural interpretation:
— 320 —
1a;
;-•
+.)
*the cultural attraction of the S.Inc. opportunity.
1 The Group was attracted by the high quality of the S.Inc.
product range. The Group saw its future as a specialist in high
quality branded products, and there was, therefore, cultural
empathy with the products themselves.
2 The Group wished to foster increasingly cordial relations with
Company R., and this motivation provided a strong incentive to
investigate the opportunity thorough2y, rather than discard It
out of hand as so many potential projects had been. This desire
for friendly and cooperative relations with Company R. stemmed in
part from a perception of the similarity in cultural values
shared by the two companies as well as the economic benefits it
might bring.
3 It was recognised that the Group did not have the resources (nor
possibly the expertise) to develop radically different products
with U.S.P.'s (Unique Selling Points) equivalent to the S.Inc.
range, and that if the Group as to expand its product portfolio
then novel ideas would have to be imported. This perception
reflected a cultural belief that the Group should aim for organic
growth in addition to growth through acquisition and instead of
more conservative policies of retrenchment or streamlining of the
business. It was also indicative of a realisation that while the
Group intended itself to be marketing-led its scope for manoeuvre
was very much constrained by the limitations imposed by its
production function.
4) The growth objective was linked with the new confidence the Group
had acquired since reviving the profitability of the organisation
following the diversification problems of the late 970's. This
belief in the Group's future and its continuing ability to manage
successfully was a significant cultural trait of the Holdings
Board team. Project W. seemed to offer an ideal opportunity only
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because the Group was sufficiently confident to accept the risk
involved.
the cultural influence on the decision to route the S.Inc.
project through Company 2.
This took the form of 'reasons' against the two alternative strategies
(involving Company 1 and G.F.B.) and in favour of Company 2:
1	 The G.F.B. option, which involved the expenditure of large
amounts of capital and was effectively the highest risk strategy,
was never seriously considered. At this early stage in the
project confidence levels had yet to build-up, and a corporate
history chequered with major disasters inevitably circumscribed.
the Holdings Board's commercial vision.
2 In addition, according to the Chairman the Group's philosophy
stated that the organisation's primary interest was in the
manufacture of confectionery rather than its distribution, as
indicated by the sale of its profitable distribution company in
1978. Comments such as these marked the furthest extent to which
the Group was ever likely to become marketing-led.
3 This should have favoured the choice of Company 1. However, the
recent history of tension and conflict between the Enldin%A anezed
and its largest subsidiary provided significant motivation for
avoiding this route. There was a feeling within the Holdings
Board that it would be a 'nice' thing if Company 2 could succeed
In a major project, possibly to demonstrate to Company 1 that it
was not the sole repository of commercial acumen within the
Group. as the development director stated:
"In a world without anything else
affecting you you would naturally go to
Company 1.... One aspect of it was that
we had taken a bit of flack from Company
1, having split Company 2 off in the
first place, which all the wise owls
down there thought was a totally wrong
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thing to do. We thought it would be
rather a nice thing if Company 2 could
succeed with this project, Company 1
having refused it. We're a bit evil
really.. .we play one off against the
other.
4 The Holdings Board considered Company 1 to be culturally
unreceptive to new ideas and unlikely to pursue the project with
the enthusiasm it required, a perception that seemed to be
justified by Company l's actual response to the S.Inc. range
when approached by the development director.
5 Company 1 was recognised to be highly bureaucratic and slow to
respond to stimuli, largely because of its size, but also because
of the cumbersome nature of its internal information and decision
making systems and entrenched conservative attitudes. The Main
Board wanted the project to succeed, and to do so quickly; there
was an acute awareness that such opportunities are easily killed
off, and to channel it through Company 1 seemed to be inviting
disaster.
6 The Group's philosophy of making total organisational
profitability less dependent on the performance of Company 1 (and
Company 2 less dependent on Company 1, its single largest
customer), by building-up and 'maturing' the other subsidiaries
made the choice of Company 2 especially acceptable.
7 There was synergy between the 'zany' culture of Company 2 and the
'personality' of the product range. To some extent it was
recognised that the persona of the range was malleable, but the
names of the products (which were unalterable parameters
according to the development director), restricted the room for
manoeuvre quite considerably. 	 This factor was not mentioned
explicitly by those involved in the decision making process, but
the possibility of its	 latent, contextual influence on the
actual choice of Company 2 cannot be ignored.
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8 Company 2 possessed a culture that prided itself on the speed
with which it could react, - its comparatively small size, the
pace of activity generally and the influence of an at times
autocratic managing director, ensured this. The S.Inc. project
was, therefore, thought more likely to succeed at Company 2 than
Company 1.
During phase 1 of the project there were four significant
communication acts and one major information gathering exercise.
*nmjor communication acts
1 On 29.4.87 Company R. first articulated the possibility of
selling the Group a licensing agreement for the S.Inc. range at
one of the regular six-monthly meetings the two companies held.
2 On 6.5.87 and 13.5.87 the development director met with senior
staff of Company 2 and discussed with them the potential of the
S.Inc opportunity. The enthusiasm and commitment communicated by
the staff of Company 2 was an influential factor in determining
the route through which the products were eventually channelled.
3 That lack of communication can be as interesting as actual
communication is demonstrated by the Holdings Board's deci ion
not to directly inform Company 2 that it would almost certainly
be allowed to exploit the S.Inc products. This fact is
culturally significant, providing us with a further insight into
the politics of the relationship between the Holdings Board and
its subsidiaries. It seems that on occasions the Holdings Board
deliberately withhold information concerning their intentions
from their subsidiaries in order to encourage sibling rivalry,
galvanise the subsidiaries into efficient and effective
operation, and motivate them to take an active interest in the
opportunities being offered to them. While it is unlikely that
such intentions are framed openly, they were certainly a feature
of the Group culture, and played a role in Project W insofar as
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withholding this information from Company 2 ensured that it moved
quickly to investigate the potential of the S.Inc. products.
*major information gathering events
1 Following the initial meeting between Company R. and the Group
the development director engaged in an information collation
exercise. His sources included S.Inc., a small Group-owned U.S.
subsidiary and trade journals, from which he gleaned sufficient
information to convince the Holdings Board that the project would
be a profitable venture.
12.3 Phase 2
In phase 2 three major decisions were made: first, that a family of
products should be launched; second, that the Holdings Board should,
temporarily at least, retain control of the project (a decision that
was made tacitly rather than formally); and third, that the Group
should negotiate direct with S.Inc..
the cultural influence on the decision to launch a family of
products.
1 Despite evidence from the U.S. that product Beta considerably
out-performed its peers there was little enthusiasm for launuhing
a single product. The Group's assessment of the risk factors
involved with launching a single new product meant, in effect,
that this option was still culturally unacceptable. Further
evidence of the likely performance of Beta was required before
the higher risk strategy could be adopted. This said, the Group
was ready to countenance a £2 million capital expenditure
programme in order to manufacture the range in the U.K. and £1
million on a national T.V. advertising campaign. This was
symptomatic of the Group's new found confidence in the future and
its determination to exploit those commercial opportunities which
seemed to it to be most attractive.
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the historical and cultural reasons for the Holdings Board's
determination to maintain its control over the project in these
initial stages.
1 At this early stage in the project the Holdings Board were firmly
in control of the proceedings; the fact that the development
director had entered into negotiations with Company R. and the
U.S. and had control of the purse strings for the funding of the
necessary market research, guaranteed this. Interestingly the
development director did not offer financial assistance until
'requested' by Company 2; the subsidiary's dependence on the
Holdings Board was thus further emphasised. Such 'games' may be
interpreted as moves in the Holdings Board's attempts to define
its relationship with its subsidiaries and reflected its
increasing assertiveness.
2 Moreover, while the Main Board had devolved much authority and
decision making capability to the subsidiaries it was sensitive
to the charge that it did not have a real role to perform. In a
very real sense Project W was an opportunity for the Holdings
Board to demonstrate its utility and commercial prowess to its
subsidiaries.
the information/communication impact of Company R.'s decision to
negotiate with the Group via S.Inc.
1 The importance of this decision for the success of the project
should not be under-estimated. It determined that the context
for inter-company communication and future decision making was to
be trans-Atlantic. The only real alternative to this was for
both the Group and S.Inc to channel information through Company
R.'s U.K. head office. This would have allowed senior personnel
at Company R. (U.K.) to maintain a tight hold on the project, but
may also have led to severe time delays in communication and
increased the opportunities for noise entering the communication
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channel.	 Unsurprisingly, therefore, both S.Inc and the Group
welcomed Company R.'s decentralised handling of the project.
There were three significant communication events in phase 2, and two
important information gathering exercises.
*major communication events
1 On 13.5.87 Company 2 contacted an advertising agency which
produced a report setting the agenda for all marketing related.
information seeking activity.
2	 On 11.6.87 senior personnel from the Group and Company R. met for
a second time. At this meeting the development director outlined
how the Group planned to proceed with the project, and Company R.
sanctioned the Group's plans to commission market research.
3 On 6.7.87 the development director visited S.Inc. and both
companies set out their expectations concerning the project. The
ground rules for the royalty agreement were also drawn up.
*major. information gathering activities
1 On 14.5.87 the company secretary commissioned a trademark search
on the W.W. name which the Group thought it was purchasing along
with the confectionery products.
2 While in the U.S. the development director collected a wealth of
information concerning prime costs (of raw materials, packaging
materials and labour), manufacturing methods, packing machines,
the importance of the W.W. trade name, the pattern of sales in
the U.S., S.Inc.'s promotional activities, and so forth.
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12.4 Phase 3 
In phase 3 there were three culturally noteworthy events, including
one major decision. First, the Holdings Board continued to apply
pressure on Company 2 to react speedily; second, the need for the
Group to grow without making expensive acquisitions was discussed;
and third, the decision to commission more expensive market research
was taken.
*Holdings Board pressure on Company 2
1 The development director continued to pressure Company 2 into
speedy action on a number of important issues with his proposed
timetable of activities. Whilst there was undoubtedly a
perceived need for speed the development director's actions also
served to reinforce the feeling that the Holdings Board was still
essentially in command. Additionally, there was throughout the
course of the project the feeling that the Holdings Board were
'testing' the metal of Company 2 and especially its senior staff.
This intention is itself indicative of an organisational culture
which was increasingly coming to value both individual managerial
competence and subsidiary professionalism.
*the cultural importance of organic growth
1 The need to make Company 2 less dependent on Company 1 was
specifically pointed out to the board of Company 2 by the
chairman of the Group at a Company 2 Board Meeting. The cultural
significance of this should not be overlooked: the staff of
Company 2 were being constantly reminded of the Holdings Board's
intentions to foster organic growth within the Group and were
encouraged to see Project W as part of a more general process of
organisational 'maturation'. This vision of an expanding Group
was reflective of burgeoning confidence levels, especially among
senior executives.
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the decision to commission more market research after the first
report proved disappointing
1 Three months into the project the first market research report
commissioned on the S.Inc. range had confounded many of the
Group's initial hypotheses, yet the decision to conduct further
research was never in doubt. Part of the reason for this was a
certain lack of confidence in the quality of the market research
itself. But it was the enthusiasm for the products (and
especially Beta) felt by almost everyone concerned with the
project that seems to have been the overriding factor
guaranteeing its continuance. The root cause of this essentially
emotional attachment to the project is difficult to locate with
precision: it was to do with the fact that sufficient time had
elapsed since the last major project had been tackled by the
Group, that funds were available to realise whatever potential
the products were eventually considered to possess, and that
Company 2 was in many ways a favoured 'daughter' of the Holdings
Board and needed a major product or product range to lessen its
dependency on Company 1. At bottom one cannot escape the
conviction that this was the right moment for an opportunity such
as Project W to have emerged, and the Group were in no
cultural/psychological state to kill it off on the basis of one
piece of research.
During phase 3 of the project there were four significant
communication events and one major information gathering exercise.
*major communication acts
1	 On 14.7.87 the development director reported on his visit to
S.Inc. and his current thinking concerning the project to a full
Holdings Board meeting. He informed the board that while a low
risk agreement could be entered into with Company R., specific
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market research was in his opinion required to test which
products would sell best in the U.K. and at what prices.
2 On 28.7.87 the results of the first phase of the market research
commissioned by Company 2 were presented to them at an agency
debrief meeting. Although the conclusions of the research were
highly ambiguous and cast doubts on many of Company 2 1 s initial
hypotheses concerning the product range the report nevertheless
generated a lot of enthusiasm.
3 On 30.7.87 the development director reported the disappointing
findings of the market research to a full meeting of the Holdings
Board. However, n9fone suggested that the project should be
terminated, thus providing evidence that information was viewed
and weighted selectively by the Group to support its own
preconceptions (see sections 12.10.1 and 12.10.2).
*major information gathering events
1 On 29/30.7.87 the marketing manager and buyer of Company 2 met
with a trading standards officer to discuss the legality of the
packing of a dozen S.Inc. products. The American packs were
found to require considerable modification to make them
acceptable in this country. The information collected in these
two days informed the process by which the English Beta pacc was
eventually devised.
12.5 Phase 4
In phase 4 the project became more obviously linked to other
processes of organisational maturation, responsibility for the project
1,1/33 increasingly devolved to Company 2, and the decisions both to
commission a further stage of market research and to launch just one
product were made.
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* cultural maturation and organic growth
1 Company 2 was a company in transition: a new building programme
and investment in new computer-based information systems were
creating (or about to create) a radically new working
environment. Project W represented a further facet of this
period of change which both reflected and enhanced the company's
aspirations to become a more significant force in the sugar
confectionery market. Coming to terms with the S.Inc.
opportunity, planning its research and exploiting its potential
composed stages in the broadening of the cultural horizons of the
company.
* the devolution of power to Company 2
2 The locus of activity was increasingly switching to Company 2 and
its senior management team, while the development director was
beginning to assume the role of a colleague and adviser rather
than 'project leader' - though his influence and through him the
influence of the whole of the Holdings Board, was still very
considerable.
* the decision to commission a second stage of market research
During phase 4 the decision to go ahead with a further stage of
market research was made. Given the less than positive findings of
the first market research report this decision reflected not only
enthusiasm for the product range but a growing sense of confidence on
the part of the Group.
* the decision to launch one product
3	 A complete metamorphosis in the Group thinking concerning Project
W had occurred by this stage. Whilst the launch of a range of
products had been recommended as being the least risk strategy a
single product launch was now favoured essentially on the grounds
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inaccurate sales picture for the U.K. had been extrapolated.
Although many features were held responsible the fact that East
Anglia was somewhat remote and that its geographical boundaries
were ill-defined were considered key. The decision to launch
Beta regionally in Y.T.V. which has a fairly finite and
identifiable audience and an area the company knew well, (i.e.
not taking the cheapest possible option) were significant
variables only in the light of the Omicron experience. The idea
of launching the product regionally in a second television area
(Granada) but without T.V. support, was supposed to allow ne
Group to evaluate the sales value of television: after all, if
T.V. coverage did not substantially increase sales the high costs
associated with its use would not be justified. Understandably
the high price of television advertising was a considerable
source of worry for the Group, which had invested heavily in the
marketing of Omicron.
lb A further aspect of the Omicron project which made the Holdings
Board uneasy was that the proposed May 1988 launch of Beta would
make use of product imported from the U.S.. Four years earlier
Omicron had been factored in from Finland at the beginning of a
'Beta-style' project which was terminated prematurely when, inter
alia, the exchange rate altered against them by 30% (for which
they were not covered).
In phase 5 there was one important 'set' of communication acts and a
series of vital information seeking activities.
*major communication acts
1 From late September onwards Company 2 was engaged in a continuous
dialogue with its advertising agency. A vast array of marketing,
sales and advertising questions remained unanswered, a series of
small-scale decisions had to be made and a large amount of
information collected. In order to accomplish this work a large
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number of meetings were conducted, telephone calls made and faxes
sent.
2 In mid-November problems in the quality of the communication
relationship between the advertising agency (based in Leeds) and
Company 2 (based in Pontefract) emerged. It became apparent that
the advertising agency had been developing a T.V. commercial that
would appeal to a substantially different age range than that
required by Company 2.
	 This was a foretaste of further
difficulties in the Company 2-agency relationship that were to
come.
*major information gathering events
1 Feeding into the agency-Company 2 dialogue was the result of a
continuous process of information gathering by both parties. The
agency concentrated on T.V.-related information (costs, markets,
strategies etc.) while Company 2 was in regular contact with
S.Inc. from which it required product and pack information.
2 On 17/18.10.87 a third piece of market research to determine what
flavours of Beta should be launched was conducted in Nottingham.
12.7 Phase 6
The events of phase 6 were intimately interwoven into the cultural
fabric of the Group: first, the project was being conducted at the
fastest possible pace, reflecting the Holdings Board's desire for a
speedy as well as successful outcome. Second, the Group had for some
pars been experiencing rising levels of confidence in its own
abilities, and the decision to forego regional T.V. testing was
testament to this. Third, the Holdings Board's involvement in the
project had by this time become more marginal, but there were strong
indications that it wished to exert a continuing influence on certain
(especially legal) activities. To some extent this was a response to
Subsidiary l's questioning of the need for this superordinate body,
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Le. the Holdings Board was determined to illustrate its worth in the
sharpest relief possible.
the Holdings Board had wished the project to be pursued quickly,
and it was
1
	
During this phase of the project the speed with which events were
progressing became increasingly palpable. While this was in
part a response to the Group's need for an immediate financial
return, it was also indicative of a general cultural awareness
that significant time delays could effectively kill the project.
The brevity of the meetings the Group representatives held at
S.Inc., the perceived necessity for the M.D. to phone back to
Company 2 so that immediate action could be taken to contact
suppliers, the imminence of the next Company 2 Board Meeting at
which it was hoped to present the Holdings Board members with an
outline document detailing how Project W was planned to progress,
the M.D.'s insistence on calling his senior managers into a
meeting on the Saturday following his return from the U.S.; all
these factors added to the sense of speed with which the project
was conducted.
* the rising confidence and organisational self-esteem within the
Group were playing a role in determining events
2 The decision to dispense with a regional T.V. launch reflected
the extreme confidence in and enthusiasm for Beta within the
senior management team of Company 2 and the Holdings Board. The
old cautious and conservative approach that had characterised the
Group culture from the early-mid 1980's following the fighting
off of a hostile takeover bid and the collapse of the Omicron
Project had been substantially modified.
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for political/cultural reasons the Holdings Board retained some
controls over the project
3 The fact that the legal dimension of the project was handled
through the Group company secretary at the Holdings Board was
significant. It guaranteed that the project would never be
wholly Company 2 1 s own, and that the Main Board would continue to
have a major role to play even as the development director was
beginning to further distance himself from the proceedings.
During phase 6 there were four major communication events and five
significant information gathering acts.
*major communication acts
1 On 4.11.87 the M.D. of Company 2 phoned senior managers in
Pontefract from the U.S., as pre-arranged, and relayed
information (relating to the recipe, manning levels on the
machines, machine speeds and so forth) which had a significant
bearing on costs.
2 The managing director returned from the U.S. on 6.11.87 and met
with his senior staff at Company 2 the next day. The function of
the meeting was largely informational, with the M.D. describing
the S.Inc. factory and Beta production processes to his
colleagues.
3 Considerable amounts of information were being sent from the U.S.
to the U.K. through very shaky lines of communication. Thus
while some of this new information was sent directly to Company 2
some also went to the development director at the Holdings Board.
In addition, some items were faxed and others were posted. This
weakness in the lines of communication between S.Inc. and Company
2 meant that there were unnecessarily long time delays between
the sending and receipt of information in some instances. A
further problem was that the S.Inc engineers were not themselves
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relaying information to the U.K. but passing it on to their
Holdings Board for vetting before it was transmitted across the
Atlantic. Interestingly, the project engineer cited the
impersonal nature of the inter-company communications as a factor
negatively influencing their regularity and quality - a factor
later obviated by the project engineer's and chief chemist's
visit to the U.S..
4 On 19.11.87 there was a special joint Holdings Board/Company 2
board meeting at which the subsidiary team presented their 'Beta
Proposal' document to the Group directors.
*major information gathering acts
I The idea of using natural colours and flavours in Beta gave rise
to an information seeking exercise by the development director,
who contacted the quality assurance manager of S.Inc..
2 On 22.10.87 the development director requested information from
Company 1 concerning its sales of a product called Epsilon and
the costs of associated trade support activities. This
information was used to gauge the trade support costs of Beta,
which it was thought would have a similar profile to Epsilon.
3 an 2.11.87 the development director and managing dire-tor of
Company 2 went on a fact-finding visit to S.Inc..
4 Throughout phase 6 information concerning the Beta pack was still
being collated from the U.S., the advertising agency, and packing
supply companies.
5 The company secretary was engaged in two information gathering
exercises, the first to satisfy himself that the draft licensing
agreement drawn-up by Company R. was satisfactory, and the second
in an attempt to ensure trademark protection for the Beta pack.
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12.8 Phase 7 
During phase 7 the growing culture of confidence evident within the
Group was underscored by two decisions, first the decision to make a
large capital investment in equipment before the actual level of sales
was blown; and second, the Holdings Board's sanctioning of Company 2's
plans to build a new factory complex.
*the decision to purchase capital equipment
1 As the Group expected to make little profit from Beta until it
was being manufactured in the U.K. there was considerable
economic pressure on the organisation to commence production at
Company 2 as soon as was practicable. It was therefore decided
to proceed with the purchase of the required production and
packaging equipment before the actual level of sales of Beta was
known. This was hardly a 'textbook' approach to strategic
planning, and further underlined the extent of the Group's
confidence in the project.
* the decision to sanction the building of a new manufacturing unit
1 The transformation of Company 2's capital request for the
purposes of building a warehouse into a capital request for a new
£1 million manufacturing unit marked another significant change
in the course of the project. There was no evidence that Company
2knowingly put forward their proposal document expressing a wish
to build a warehouse as a stepping stone to requesting extra
capital expenditure for a manufacturing unit, though this
'facilitator theory' cannot be ignored.	 These considerations
aside, the Holdings Board had every intention of developing
Company 2, had faith in its senior management team, and agreed
that the primary 'mission' of the organisation was to manufacture
and sell sugar confectionery, rather than to store it.
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During phase 7 of the project there were three significant
communication acts.
*major communication acts
1 It was essentially a problem of communication which led to the
disagreement between the advertising agency and Company 2
concerning monies owed, and this was itself indicative of 1) a
laxness in Company 2's control over the agency's activities and
2 A lack of experience in dealing with the agency where large sums
of money were involved. Fortunately for Company 2 and Project W
conflict between them and the agency did not appear to damage
Beta's chances of success.
3 The development director was in almost constant communication
with S.Inc's quality assurance manager concerning the price of
the Beta product that was to be shipped over from America, and
associated logistical and documentation questions.
4 The decision to build a manufacturing unit was supported by a
communication document drawn up by Company 2 and sent to the
Holdings Board on 22.1.88.
12,9 Phase 8
In phase 9 the most significant decision taken was to forego the
originally cautious plans for T.V. advertising.	 This phase	 was
largely an information gathering and communication phase in
preparation for the initial launch and later domestic manufacture. In
phase 8 there were two major series of communication acts and three
significant information gathering exercises.
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• the decision not to test the incremental impact of T.V.
advertising on sales of Beta
This decision, which was effectively a decision not to collect a
certain type of information, was yet a further indicator of confidence
in the product and in the Group's ability to exploit it.
Interestingly there was no evidence that enthusiasm for the venture
had been dampened even though there was no evidence of the hoped for
general increase in Company 2 1 s products, the diminished profit margin
that had been forced on Beta by their larger customers, and the
climatic increase in costs associated with the new factory and capital
equipment.
* major communication acts
1 The personal contacts the project engineer and chief chemist made
during their trip to the U.S. not only made the distance across
the Atlantic less psychologically significant (less of a barrier)
but opened up the channels of communication in a way which would
have been almost impossible without face-to-face contact. Having
met their S.Inc. counterparts asking further questions,
requesting information and resolving problems all became much
simpler.
2 A potentially highly damaging lapse in communication led to the
Belgian sugar not being sent to S.Inc. for testing.
* major information gathering exercises
1
	
	
The company secretary discovered that there was a potential
problem with the tradename 'Beta', for which U.K. rights had been
assigned by S.Inc. to a company called D.PL.
	 This led to
discussions between Company 2 and D.PL. in which it was agreed
that both parties could work together to explore the
	 Beta
character merchandising possibilities of a profile to be
developed by Company 2.
	 Further information collation or
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communication on this matter was no longer a priority after the
end of March, by which time the tradename 'Beta' had ceased to be
an issue.
2 The most important instance of information gathering was
performed by the project engineer and chief chemist during their
visit to the U.S..
3 The buyer was involved in an important information collating
exercise to determine two acceptable U.K. sources of Beta packing
materials.
12.10	 Conclusions 
WM Successes and Problems of the Analysis 
It Is apparent that the attempted cultural interpretation of Project W
has been only partially successful. Thus while some aspects of the
project proved susceptible to analysis in terms of the Group's and
Company 2's cultural traits identified in Chapters 5,8 and 9 the
analysis is not entirely unproblematic. There are two major
difficulties: first, some occurrences were plainly counter-cultural,
and second, there were many events on which culture could shed little
light. Exemplification of and explanations for these problems will
follow a consideration of the analyses more successful points.
The 'quasi-political' intrigues that characterised relations between
the Holdings Board and Company 2 fitted well with the empirical
investigation of culture offered in preceding chapters. The extent to
which such intrigues were an essential part not only of the style but
the whole process of the project's development was aptly demonstrated
by the development director's comment that:
"In the final analysis these are little
games that we play. Every now and again
I will say to [the M.D. of Company 2]
'Chris, are you really sure that you've
done everything you need to do to
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prepare yourself for the manufacturing
of Beta?'....And then he thinks 'Oh God,
I'll have to doublecheck everything'."
The speed with which Company 2 was able to react to the S.Inc.
opportunity was also explicable in cultural terms. Company 2 was a
low overhead, highly responsive organisation where the pace of work
activity was accepted as being faster than in other Group
subsidiaries. Similarly, cultural beliefs which lay behind Company
Ps position as 'favoured daughter' of the Holdings Board go some way
towards explaining why it (rather than the more obvious choice of
Company 1) was allowed to exploit the S.Inc. range in the first place.
The analysis also demonstrated (by means of the failed Epsilon
project) the potentially vital significance of a company's history in
influencing cultural beliefs and attitudes which in turn determine
what criteria are used to evaluate a project, a product, and various
aspects of organisational strategy.
Furthermore, as has been seen the project did not run continuously
smoothly, and many of the problems he.i their foundation In the
belies, values and knowledge base of the organisation. Company 2
was not only dependent on the Holdings Board for finance 'cut on an
outside agency for information, support and advice on the marketing of
the product range.	 This was indicative of the company's lack of
experience and expertise in the field - indeed, it only employed one
trained marketeer- while its strength lay in its
technical/manufacturing knowledge. Thus to engage in a large-scale
marketing-led project such as this was a cultural novelty for which
there were no precedents on which to draw. Although the key players
had had experience of other similar projects in other companies,
operating Within the context of Company 2 posed unique problems.
Company 2 was, nevertheless, extremely enthusiastic about the project,
reflecting its cultural determination to succeed; to make a name for
itself in the market place and to expand its turnover and
profitability. 	 The importance of this enthusiasm to the eventual
success of the project should not be under-estimated.
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If the value of the cultural perspective should not be under-stated
then equally its limitations should certainly not be overlooked.
From a Group-culture perspective one of the most striking facts to
emerge has been that despite possessing an espoused culture which
favours decentralisation and autonomy, the Holdings Board were
disinclined to allow Company 2 full control over the project.
Curiously this disjuncture between the culture as espoused by
respondents in the interview situation and the culture in practice as
evidenced in this project did not seem to be perceived by the Group
employees themselves. In addition, at subsidiary level there was an
unaccountable concern for secrecy. As has been seen throughout the
early stages of the project it had the air of a 'conspiracy' which
only an elite few were privileged to. Given that the respondents of
Company 2 adjudged their company's culture to be one of 'openness',
'honesty' and 'integrity' this obsession with secrecy within the
organisation is difficult to explain in terms of the cultural profile
drawn in Chapter 6.
While some features of the case contradict expectations raised by the
cultural profiles others require elucidation with reference to
variables other than culture. Many of the information-seeking and
communication events were inspired by economic rationality, and appear
axiomatic given our Western predilection with informed and
(apparently) logical decision making. To look for company-level
interpretations of the culture of Western Capitalism would therefore
seem to be a futile task. The possibility remains that analyses
emphasising the role of technology or limited resources would have
been more illuminating.
How can these weaknesses of the cultural analysis be explained? There
are three important points to note. First, the size and complexity of
Project W combined with the fact that only one researcher was engaged
in studying it meant that a mass of 'fine detail' was lost. The day-
to-day events which may have illustrated the reality of loyalty,
informality and cooperation at Company 2 were blurred into broad
themes and overall consequences. Any attempt to consider the project
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interns of the cultural profiles was thus always going to be at best
a partial success. Second, as was suggested in section 1.4 the
demands of the social, institutional and economic contexts in which
action takes place will exert an influence on that action which may
sometimes override the dictates of cultural conditioning. In the case
of Company 2, with its history of recent change and arguably
relatively weak culture the impact of perceived economic realities
might be expected to be great. Third, it has never been claimed that
culture alone could offer an all-embracing conceptual panacea for the
student of organisational behaviour, and its obvious deficiencies in
this chapter are testament to its restricted sphere of competence.
WM The Lessons Learnt From Project W
Project W revealed three key points worthy of further conceptual
exploration:
1 Investigations of organisational culture must recognise the
distinction between:
a mature as evidenced in the organisation's literature and as
espoused by senior executives, and
W mature as it is manifest in the organisation's observed
behaviour.
The examination of Project W revealed that the Holdings Board's stated
belief in the value of subsidiary autonomy was part of the
organisation's espoused culture. It was also a feature of some
aspects of the organisation's culture-in-practice; in many respects
the subsidiaries did enjoy considerable autonomy. However, the
evidence from Project W suggested that when the stakes were high, the
espoused culture lacked the strength to govern action. The culture-
in-practice thus differed radically from that to which all the
respondents had agreed.
— 344 —
This duality between the espoused culture and the culture-in-practice
was also evident within Company 2 where an espoused culture of
openness, honesty and integrity was obviously antagonistic with the
obsessive secrecy which characterised the first few phases of the
project. The extent of this dissonance or disjuncture between the
espoused culture and the culture-in-practice is extremely noteworthy.
It has important ramifications for organisations with strong and
11403 valued espoused cultures, such as Digital Equipment Company
(U.K.) which might wish to devise mechanisms for bringing their actual
nature into closer alignment with the culture they espouse.
Moreover, this distinction has important research implications. It
implies that students of organisational culture should collect data
relating to culture on these two very different planes. Indeed, if
this bifurcation of organisational culture is accepted as valid and
legitimate then this has major ramifications for previous empirical
studies, which have evidently conflated espoused and realised
cultures. This fact would then go some way towards explaining the
lack of homogeneity within organisational cultures discovered and
commented upon by some theorists (Payne & Pugh, 1976). While
distinguishing between the espoused or desired culture state of an
organisation and its culture as experienced by its employees would not
generally reduce organisational culture to a monolithic entity, it
would certainly reduce the confusion which permeates contemporary
UNAIrM of this phenomenon (see Pedersen & Sorensen, 1989).
2 Project W clearly demonstrated the importance of culture as a
perception filter through which information was interpreted,
valued and acted upon. Culturally the organisation was ready to
take up the challenge of a major new product launch, and despite
receiving convincing information that all the initial hypotheses
concerning the product range were false, and in spite of
constantly upwardly spiralling projections for costs, the project
never really seemed to be in danger. Given this finding the view
that management information has any absolute value for managers
irrespective of the cultural perception filter through which they
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view it, is highly questionable. It is a contention of this
thesis that organisational information (i.e. information used
within organisations) is best considered as a culturally
constructed product. According to this position any attempt to
understand how organisations use and misuse information without
framing the analysis within a context of cultural meanings is
likely to fail.
3 Project W illustrated the important role of information,
communication and cultural variables in any satisfactory account
of organisational behaviour of this kind. It was seen that a
marketing-led project is essentially an external-information-led
project, and that this is a very different type of project from
production-led projects which are fed largely on internally
generated information. It was also apparent that the progress of
the project was governed by the flow of information more than any
other resource, and that failures in communication were the major
source of difficulty for employees. 	 Traditional accounts of
organisational behaviour which concentrate on financial
variables, organisational structure and hierarchy, and more
abstract notions of leadership, control, planning and forecasting
and so forth in their attempt to explain events have thus been
demonstrated to be extremely limited in their analytical vision.
As has been demonstrated a marketing-led strategy is an
information-led strategy, and this marked a break with the past
for Company 2 which had until this time invested little time or
money in market research. The project may thus ultimately prove
to be a watershed in the company's cultural development: and
indeed, there was some evidence that individuals perceptions of
the value of marketing information were changing.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
”The literature in this field,
(organisational theory) as a whole, has
tended to move too far from the data and
findings. Or, put another way, there is
too much ideology and assertion and not
enough attention to the results (or lack
thereof) of the various empirical
investigations	 that	 have	 been
undertaken.”
(Pfeffer, 1982, p.259).
13.1 Overview of the Chapter 
The	 preceding	 chapters	 detailing	 the	 cultural	 and
information/communication profiles of the case study organisation and
Project W have quite deliberately been largely descriptive. The
analytical overlay evident in these chapters has served only to
illustrate the inter-relations between the cultural and information/
communication categories. Rather than engage in high-level
theoretical elaboration the cases have instead been used to present an
empirically validated argument to the effect that a cultural
perspective on organisational information/ communication issues is
both valid and useful - despite obvious limitations. In this final
chapter the emphasis will be primarily on conceptualisation and model
building.
Sections 13.2 and 13.3 describe two process models, the first of
organisations in general and the second of organisational culture in
particular. Some typologies of information/communication culture
types are drawn in an attempt to demonstrate the importance of the
information dimension of organisations to our understanding of
mature. In section 13.5 the use value of the concept and theory of
marasational culture is discussed. This is followed by an
exploration of the concept of a 'paradigm', which is a necessary
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precursor to extending the thesis's theoretical vision. Weak and
strong interpretations of the paradigm concept are developed and then
used to evaluate the concept and theory of culture with respect to
information and communication phenomena. 	 Finally, given the
limitations of this research and the nature of its findings, an
overview of the conclusions is provided and a 	 number of
recommendations for further projects in this field are made.
13.2 A Process Model of Organisations 
The conduct of this research project has led this thesis to a
particular view of organisational entities, a view which features
information, communication and especially cultural variables highly
prominently. This conceptual model of organisations is explicated
here as a 'process' (i.e. not static) model of the most significant
organisational variables. In this section the relationship between
organisational culture and informatidn/communication phenomena is
examined within the broader context of the total organisational
situation.	 The conceptualisation developed in this thesis is
summarised in diagrammatic form in fig.5 which is explained below.
First of all a brief outline of what is meant by each key phrase is
required.
* Human resources: refers to the stock of organisational employees,
including their knowledge, skills and abilities, individual
characteristics and idiosyncrasies, and personal biographies. The
distinction between 'human resources' and 'culture' is one of scale,
with the former referring explicitly to the level of the individual,
and the latter to the organisation as a collective entity.
* Material and financial resources, refers to the land, capital
(including both equipment and buildings), and financial assets
possessed by an organisation. It does not include those structures
and systems which are largely or wholly used for information,
communication or control purposes.
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;
• Information, communication and control, refers to the structures,
processes and systems which conjunctively constitute this facet of
organisational existence.
* Work activity, refers to the nature of the tasks conducted by
employees at all levels in the hierarchy of management and in all
functions within the organisation.
* Business context, refers to the external environment in which the
organisation subsists, including not only its customers, suppliers and
competitors, but the political, social, philosophical and global
economic contexts which form Twentieth Century human culture.
* Strategy, refers to the generally both long and short term
perspectives and associated plans the organisation has on and for its
own development. While strategy is usually formulated at senior
executive levels within an organisation it is not itself a meta-level
statement of goals, i.e. the / organisational mission statement', which
is here subsumed under the heading of 'culture'.
* Culture, unlike the terms so far defined eludes satisfactory,
concise definition, and the reader is referred back to Chapter 3.
* Effectiveness, is another term for which no particularly appealing
definition is available, and is here used to refer to the extent to
which an organisation accomplishes those objectives set out in its
long and short term strategies.
How should the model be read? While there are obviously many
potential starting points, all recognised as equally valid by the
researcher, this thesis will take 'human resources' as its guide into
the model. The idea is that individuals (human resources) come
together to organise themselves and to develop strategies for
exploiting the material and financial resources available to them.
Two major facets of organisational life are the structures, processes
and systems associated with information, communication and control
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activity on the one hand and the nature of the work activity on the
otter. The ability of the organisation to survive and thrive, its
formation of strategy, work activity and culture will all be
influenced and constrained by the business context in which it exists.
All of these factors shape and condition the organisation's culture,
which in turn has a major impact on all aspects of organisational
life. The final result of all this activity is a more or less
effective organisation. The effectiveness of an organisation will
depend on the quality of the 'fit' between the named organisational
variables and especially the relationship between the peripheral
factors and culture. It is important to note that this is a
contingency model of cultural fit which recognises culture as forming
at the confluence of a idde diversity of organisational and extra-
organisational factors. Significantly, causal force is also
attributed to culture, which thus enters into a dialectical
relationship with the other elements of organisationalexistence.
While it might be tempting to postulate a priori hypotheses concerning
the effectiveness of organisations the complexity of each unique
situation, the plethora of variables to be taken into account and the
often irrational and unpredictable nature of the relationship between
culture and other factors makes this an uncertain art. Actual
organisational effectiveness can reliably be gauged only by empirical
investigation. The model of organisational life presented here is
further complicated by the fact that each major variable shown may be
stable or in a constant state of flux. The extent of the 'fit'
between the components of the model can hence be extremely variable
over time even when applied to a single organisation, with the system
seeking but rarely (if ever) finding its ever changing equilibrium
position.
This process model of organisational existence has three important
lessons for the understanding of the relationship between culture and
Information/communication phenomena. First, it demonstrates the
necessity for grounding appreciation of these two organisational
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variables in the global context of organisational life. The business
context, individuals' stock of knowledge and personal idiosyncrasies,
the work activities they perform and strategies they devise in the
process of organising cannot be adequately incorporated into the
concept of 'culture' or safely ignored. Second, intrinsic to the
logic of the model is the notion of 'dynamic equilibrium' which
implies that over time the variables and consequently the
relationships between the variables will be subject to change as the
organisation develops. And third, the model illustrates the
dialectical nature of the relationships between many of the variables
which effectively preclude the generation of general laws (or even
rules) asserting causal relations which would be too simplistic to
cope with organisational reality.
13.3 A Process Model of Culture 
As Chapter 3 makes clear, when it comes to corporate and
organisational culture the academic literature offers the interested
reader an embarrassment of definitional riches. Moreover, there is
little sign of an emerging consensus on the core meaning of the term
'culture'. This said, in conducting this research project a complex
and dynamic model of culture has emerged, and is briefly adumbrated
here. The starting point for the model is Geertz's (1973) assertion
that '...man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself
has spun... culture (is) those webs, and the analysis of it (is)
therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an
interpretive one in search of meaning' (Geertz, 1973, p.5). To this
initial proposition have been added and distilled the ideas of
Eldridge and Combie (1974), Argyris and Schon (1978), Schein (1985),
Trice and Beyer (1984), Beyer and Trice (1988), Smircich (1983a,b)
among many others in order to arrive at figure 6.
In outline the model is designed to be read as follows: the business,
legal, political, social and philosophic context in which the
organisation subsists, the nature of the work activity it conducts and
the idiosyncrasies of its principal employees engender a set of basic
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assumptions. These basic assumptions represent the fundamental tenets
of an organisation' s cultural consciousness and take the form of
(largely unwritten) belief statements concerning human nature, work,
objectives to be pursued, organisational life, and so on. The basic
assumptions give rise to two forms of culture, the espoused and the
realised. The espoused culture consists of a series of normative
propositions contained in the formal literature of the organisation
and the statements of its senior executives; it structures, directs
and constrains the actual culture as it is realised in the thoughts
and actions of the organisation' s employees.
The culture-in-practice together with its espoused counterpart
conjunctively compose the empirically observable or at least research-
derivable culture. The cultural superstructure of an organisation can
be dissected into five major categories. Perhaps the most important
of these are the two sets 'leaders and heroes' and 'stories, myths and
legends', which are shown to feed back into an organisation' s basic
assumptions. The other three broad groups or cultural traits are the
cognitive (language, beliefs and values), behavioural (ceremonies,
rites, rituals and other symbolic activity) and the physical
attributes of an organisation (its artifacts, architecture and office
layout). While the influence of these cultural traits on other
elements of the model is not ruled out, the strength of their likely
impact is not considered to be as great as either the 'leaders and
heroes' or the 'stories, myths and legends ' .
134 Information, Communication and Typologies of Organisational 
Culture
The typologies of corporate and organisational culture that can be
found in the literature pay scant attention to information and
communication phenomena (see Section 3.15). However, as this thesis
has sought to demonstrate the information/ communication dimension is
an important and integral element of an organisation' s culture, and
its omission from such typologies is a failing that requires
rectification. Rather than modify existing typologies this section
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sketches some of the facets of information and communication
activities, processes and forms that seem likely to be culturally
variable. The following are really a list of spectra or dimensions
along which organisational cultures may be located for classificatory
purposes.
1 'Oral' cultures, which support a high degree of word-of-mouth
communication can be distinguished from 'written' cultures, which
tend to favour information exchange via the written word.
1 
Oral
	
Mixed	 Written
2 Information conscious' cultures, which demonstrate considerable
awareness of the value of information and sophistication in their
information behaviour and systems, can be separated from the
merely 'information competent' and, indeed, the 'information
retarded'. Perhaps two scales are required here to refer to an
organisation's information consciousness with respect to
internally and externally generated information.
Conscious	 Competent	 Retarded
3 'Formal information' cultures, which exhibit extensive
formalisation and systematisation of information channels (in the
ngm of regular meetings and reports etc.) may be distinguished
from 'informal information' cultures, which are more reliant on
ad hoc communication.
Formal
	
Mixed	 Informal
4 'Grapevine-rich' cultures, which possess a luxurious and active
network of individuals engaged in gossip, speculation and rumour-
mongering may be distinguished from those cultures in which
- 353 -
grapevine activity is vestigial. Other aspects of this facet of
culture can also be detected, for instance, the quality of the
information transmitted, and the extent to which managers take a
manipulative view of this material.
Grapevine rich	 Medium	 Grapevine Poor
While a multitude of other facets of the information/ communication
dimension of culture could be isolated these four provide a good
indication of the sort of typological possibilities that this approach
yields. Some of the many other possible candidates for typological
dimensions include cultural attitudes towards external information
sources, the detailed form of its internal communications (memos,
letters, meetings and so forth), and more subtle aspects of
communication culture such as accepted *dress styles and the layout of
offices and buildings. 	 No great claims are being made for these
Ideas, which are at most a 'first step' toward a comprehensive
framework for the analysis of organisational information and
communication phenomena from within the cultural perspective.
13.5 The Use Value of Culture for Information and Communication 
Studies
Traditional conceptualisations of the communication process typically
owe a considerable debt to Shannon (1948) and Shannon and Weaver
(1949). Shannon originally conceived his model (see fig.7) of the
communication system with five elements: an information source, a
transmitter, a channel, a receiver, and a destination. The modus
operandi of the model is simplicity itself: the information source
produces a message, the transmitter converts the message into a
signal, the channel carries the signal across space, the receiver
tuns the signal back into a message, and the destination takes the
message. The success of information transmission transmission is not
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guaranteed as noise (random interference in the channel) may distort
the message.
According to Weaver the problem of communication exists at three
levels. First, there are technical problems of the accuracy with
which the symbols of communication can be transmitted. Second, there
are semantic problems of the precision with which the transmitted
symbols convey their desired meaning. And, third, there are
effectiveness problems of the success with which the meaning of a
message leads to the conduct desired in the recipient. While Weaver
distinguishes three dimensions of communication he recognises that
they all ultimately relate to the one central problem of meaning.
This conventional approach provides a useful codification of the
basic mechanism of communication, but which is far too narrow and
restrictive to deal with the complexities of organisational life. As
this thesis has sought to demonstrate, 'communication needs to be seen
not just as a process occurring between a sender of messages and a
potential recipient, but in relation to the socio—cultural system in
which it occurs. Shannon and Weaver' s general principles of
communication, if transferred from a technical to a social—
psychological setting, are a valuable reference point, but they need
to be supplemented by and interpreted within the context of an
analysis of' the total social system (Katz & Kahn, 1966) .
In practice this means that organisational theorists must recognise
that information generated within organisations is a socially
constructed artefact which can reflect the values and beliefs of the
prevailing social system. Further, as with externally derived
information, it may be persistently subject to interpretation and
reinterpretation against these same cultural norms and expectations.
The fact is that while some forms of information may be deemed to
possess 'intrinsic' or 'objective' meaning (and this thesis has
considerable reservations that this is indeed the case) even these
Items will not be herrneneutically neutral. 	 If culture is all—
pervasive, then	 its 	 reach,
	 especially	 in	 the	 information
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/communication dimension of an organisation, will be inescapable by
all except the newest recruits.
Viewed from this organisational cultural perspective the Shannon-
weaver model acquires a whole new level of complexity. An information
source (or receiver) situated within the organisation must be
recognised as a cultural product whose information has been collated,
analysed and elucidated upon subject to a variety of culture-informed
pressures. Similarly, an externally situated information source will
be evaluated, as will the content of its information, against criteria
which have their origins in the history and culture of the recipient
organisation. Potentially this can be extremely significant. If an
organisation believes that information purchased from a commercial
information supplier is superior to that which can be obtained from
its local public library, then the former may be favoured at the
expense of the free service whatever the financial cost implications.
The communication channels through which messages are transmitted must
also be interpreted in their appropriate cultural context if they are
to be fully understood. In organisations these channels may take a
multitude of forms - memos, reports, telephone conversations,
meetings and so forth - and all these will be conducted/constructed in
accordance with the cultural prejudices of the organisation. Their
length, format, degree of formality/informality, frequency and other
channel variables will not always merely reflect the functional
demands made upon way in which the information is packaged for
consumption can be as important as the quality of the information
Itself.
The concept of 'noise' as originally understood by Shannon and Weaver
needs to be totally re-thought under the guidance of the concept and
theory of culture. It can no longer be assumed that only random
interference from outside the channel prevents a message from being
received with perfect clarity by its intended destination. The point
is that in the subjectivist-relativist world of the cultural
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organisation there is no such thing as 'objective' information to be
exchanged, only culturally mediated interpretations of items of
perceived informational value. A memo, a report or a telephone call
achieves the status of 'information' only by the act of changing the
image structure of a recipient (Boulding, 1956; Belkin, 1976), and the
precise way in which this occurs will, in part, be culture-dependent.
In the embrace of organisational life instances of random external
interference will be rare, though so-called 'distortions' and
'misperceptions' of information will be common. But these failures in
communication - i.e. attempts by the sender of information to alter
the image structure of a recipient in the desired way - are not and
should not be considered 'noise' in the traditional sense. Rather
they are indications of within-system disturbances and irregularities
which inevitably result from individual idiosyncrasies, human error,
intra-organisational multi-culturalism and imperfect or incomplete
enculturation processes to name but a few factors which may induce
failure in the communication process.
13.6 The Paradigm Concept 
In terms of its theoretical vision these conclusions place a heavy
burden on the concept of a paradigm as described by Kuhn (1962; 1970;
1972) and elucidated upon by his various commentators. Kuhn's (1962)
notion of a paradigm originally featured in his interpretation of the
historical development and structure of science where, unfortunately,
it finds no unambiguous definition. It is at different times
described as 'a strong network of commitments - conceptual,
theoretical, instrumental and methodological' (p.42), 'a set of
recurrent and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories'
(p.43), as patterns, vague theories, and ultimately something more
'global' (p.43). In fact in her attempt to unravel the polysemic
skein which is a Kuhnian paradigm Masterman (1970) refracted the
notion into twenty-one definitions. Such confusions have led Shapere
(1964) to comment that:
"The term paradigm thus covers a range
of factors in scientific development
including or somehow involving laws and
theories, models, standards, and methods
(both theoretical and instrumental),
vague intuitions, explicit or implicit
metaphysical beliefs (or prejudices).
In short anything that allows science to
accomplish anything can be a part of (or
somehow involved in) a paradigm."
(Shapere, 1964, p.385).
From the point of view of this thesis two meanings of the term
'paradigm' are recognised: first, it is understood in a restricted
sense to refer to a metaphor, and second, it is considered to be
something far broader, a general, meta-theoretical weltanschuung which
induces unity within a discipline. In which (if either) sense culture
should be classified as a paradigm is a central concern of this
research. The restricted conceptualisation of the paradigm concept as
a theoretical construct which can be used as an analogy or metaphor in
the description and explanation of social phenomena is the most useful
starting point. By reducing the meaning of the term paradigm to this
more manageable and plausible tenet, Kuhn's (1972, p.86) hypothesis
that 'there is nothing quite like it (a paradigm) in the arts, and the
parallels in the social sciences are at best partial' can be safely
rejected. For while there are certainly no universally accepted laws
Enshrined in standard textbooks which determine the development of the
social science disciplines, a plethora of analogies and metaphors are
employed by scholars of organisational theory and behaviour (see
section 3.8). The essential problem with the established metaphors,
and where they differ from the notion of culture, is that they do not
ergthasise information and communication issues.
This research has not embraced the cultural metaphor and rejects ,4these
other paradigms a priori, for it could be 'in conjunction with other
approaches' that 'culture may provide the critical tension that can
lead to new insight' (Jelinek, Smircich & Hirsch, 1983, p.531).
Nevertheless, the concept of culture does seem to be a particularly
promising paradigm that is far less restrictive than other approaches,
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and replete with as yet untapped interpretive possibilities.
Accordingly the idea that the notion of culture may yet be found to
offer an initial step towards a comprehensive and unified framework
(i.e. a paradigm in the broad sense) for information/communication
research is given careful consideration here.
13.7 Culture as Metaphor: its utility for the study of the 
information/ communication dimension of complex organisations. 
A metaphor is a way of seeing or thinking about an object as if it
were something else. In the case of this thesis the concept of 'an
organisation' has been elucidated as 'a culture'. The value of
metaphors is that they allow 'inferences to be made about one of the
things, usually that about which we know least, on the basis of what
we know about the other' (Harre, 1984, p.172). In the social
sciences, metaphors render social reality more palpable and
comprehensible than it would otherwise be (Gharajedaghi & Ackoff,
1984). Arguably, through metaphors one can say what cannot be said in
literal language, thus expressing an emotional reality lying beyond
conscious awareness (Srivastva & Barrett, 1988). In short, they are
tools for understanding, structuring and organising our experiences.
But the use of metaphors in organisational research is not as
uncomplicated and axiomatically utilitarian as these comments suggest.
Thus according to Tsoukas (1989), while metaphors are more capable
than literal speech of relaying information on the flow of experience
they lack the precision, accuracy, compatibility, analytical
penetration and testability of literal language. It is also important
to realise that metaphors do not simply penetrate into an external
reality, they prescribe how it ought to be viewed and evaluated
(Keeley, 1980; Harre, 1984). Moreover, they have to emphasise
certain features at the expense of others (Bunge, 1973; Morgan, 1980,
1986, 1988). There is also the very real danger that they can be
used to distort certain features and omit reference to others, with
the implication that metaphors should not be 'pushed' too far.
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Despite these reservations, the cultural metaphor employed in this
research was largely successful, in that it permitted concentration on
information and communication issues within the subject organisation.
This was because cultural forms and processes were found to be
intimately associated with (some would argue constituted by) the
nature and patterns of information and communication activity engaged
in by organisational members. In essence, cultural phenomena have been
understood subjectively as systems of shared beliefs and values about
the organisation, its objectives and its environment; and these
systems of shared values have been understood as being expressed in
the communicative acts of individuals.
Thought of as a paradigmatic metaphor the concept and theory of
culture proved to possess considerable operational utility. It
allowed a number of distinctive cultural traits to be isolated in the
case study organisation and provided a framework through which these
could be used to generate plausible hypotheses seeking to explain its
information/ communication dimension. This exercise demonstrated the
overriding necessity for information/communication processes, forms,
policies and events to be studied within the total global cultural
=text of organisations.
As with other qualitative research projects no attempts have been made
to establish laws (Achinstein, 1971), systems (Laszlo, Levine &
Mum, 1975; Moray, 1963) or rules (Cushman, 1977) concerning human
social (specifically information) activity. Indeed, the cultural
paradigm as described here eschews commitment to positivistic research
objectives. It has instead attempted to offer an explanation of how
individuals, groups and ultimately whole organisations come to exhibit
the information/ communication behaviour they do by reference to a
host of historical, social and psychological variables.
It is, therefore, a conclusion of this thesis that the cultural
metaphor is a valid and valuable paradigm (in this restricted sense)
for the study of the information/ communication dimension of complex
organisations. Compared with other available metaphors such as the
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'biological-organic' and 'mechanistic' metaphors it represents a
significant advance in two respects: 1) it concentrates attention on
the fact that what is under study are complex human activity systems
and 2) it quite naturally facilitates an analysis of aspects of these
cultural systems with respect to information and communication
activity.
13.8 Culture as an Integrative Paradigm
Rale it has been argued that culture can be used effectively as a
metaphor (a paradigm in the weak sense, as distinguished in Chapter
1), the question remains: can it be employed in a more significant
role, as an integrative paradigm within which all analytical
Information/communication studies could be conducted? In short, is it
likely to attain a similar status to paradigms detectable in the pure
sciences! In the view of this thesis the answer is almost certainly
that the theory of culture as outlined'in Chapter 2 can never really
hope to develop more than another 'perspective', ! approach' or
'metaphor' which must take its place among the many others that
already possess a long and distinguished biography.
In the immediate future the diverse and confused state of cultural
theory precludes its attainment of 'true' paradigmatic status, for in
Its current stage of evolution it is unlikely to attract the near
unanimous acceptance of scholars in the field. Yet even if consensus
on such major issues as a definition of 'culture' and the research
tools that should be employed in order to understand it was ever
reached, there would still remain good reasons why culture cannot take
onthemantle of a paradigm in the 'strong' sense:
1 There are organisations, especially those of very recent origin
which either possess no appreciable culture or instead have only
a very weak cultural superstructure. The application of a
cultural paradigm to these organisations is obviously not going
to be fruitful.
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2 There are a number of factors which evidently influence
information and communication processes and forms which are not
readily accounted for by the concept and theory of culture as
currently understood. For example, while new technology, spatial
location and the idiosyncrasies of employees may both impact upon
and (at least in the case of technology and personality
variables) be influenced by cultural forces, they cannot validly
be reduced to aspects or elements of culture without stretching
the notion of culture beyond reasonable limits. Individuals are
not merely cultural phenomena, they are highly variable and
unique personalities who interact not only as members of
culturally distinct organisational and sub-organisational units,
but as beings for and of themselves.
13.9 Summary of Conclusions 
The main research conclusions of this thesis are here summarised as a
series of brief statements in order to allow the reader to quickly
assimilate the major conclusions of the project:
1 a thorough and reliable understanding of an organisation's
information/communication processes and systems must be
predicated on an understanding of that organisation's cultural
fabric.
2 the employment of the cultural metaphor allowed this research to
concentrate on certain key aspects of organisations (such as
beliefs, values and organisational history). These elements of
organisational life could then be operationalised as variables
with explanatory force in this project's examination of
Information and communication phenomena.
3 grounded theory as interpreted in Chapter 1 is a utilitarian
methodological tool for investigating organisational cultures and
developing cultural profiles. It also facilitated research into
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information and communication phenomena and permitted the
generation of complementary profiles.
4 there is an important distinction to be made between an
organisation's 'espoused culture' and its 'culture-in-practice',
which has significant research implications.
5 useful though the concept and theory of organisational culture is
for the analysis of information and communication systems and
processes it cannot be adopted as an integrative paradigm for
information/communication studies.
6 any complete and satisfying research into organisational decision
making must make reference both to the role of information and
communication structures, processes and systems, and to
organisational culture.
7 general conceptualisations of organisations, and especially
organisational 'fit' models should include both information and
communication activity and culture.
8 typologies and classifications of organisational culture should
include an information/communication component. Complentarily,
researchers seeking to understand an organisation's culture might
do well to examine its information/communication dimension.
9 the relationship between culture and information/ communication
phenomena is complex, inter-causal and dialectical. It is,
therefore, futile to seek for simple causal laws which link these
facets of organisational life.
13.10	 Recommendations for Further Research 
Case study research of the type conducted in this project can be
thought-provoking and stimulating, but cannot be said to prove
anything. It is for this reason that the findings of this study have
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been presented above as a series of hypotheses, each of which requires
further empirical investigation and conceptual analysis. Comparable
research needs to be conducted in a variety of other organisations,
large and small, commercial and non-commercial in a diverse number of
=texts, fields and industries. In addition to this general
recommendation for further research in this field in order to
confirm/refute the findings of this thesis, there are two specific
areas which, while related to the research described here, have not
been addressed by it:
First, this project has quite deliberately focused on the macro-level
of organisational culture and organisational information/communication
phenomena. However, it is obvious that many organisations possess a
variety of identifiable sub-cultures, and that these and their
associated information/communication structures, processes and systems
should be subjected to investigation and analysis. This thesis found
that there were marked cultural and informational differences between
marketing, production and finance departments, and the fine detail of
these differences, the reasons for them and their economic and
behavioural implications require further research.
Second, the conceptual model of culture operationalised in this thesis
emphasised values, attitudes, beliefs and history above the many other
aspects and facets of organisational culture. Further studies of a
similar nature to this, but employing culture models which give more
scope to leaders and heroes, symbols and symbolic activity, language,
stories, myths and legends and so forth are needed. Only when
researchers have attempted to study information and communication
phenomena using the full scope of the cultural umbrella will the true
worth of the culture concept be really appreciable.
Furthermore, this research has itself generated process models of
organisations and culture, both of which require further empirical
validation. It is hoped that succeeding studies of organisational
culture might usefully employ the process models outlined in sections
13.2 and 13.3 as a guide both to data collection and conceptual
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analysis. The same is true of the typologies of information culture
types described in section 13.4. Such future research might also seek
to clarify the apparently complex relationship between an
organisation's espoused culture and its culture-in-practice. The
failure of many culture studies to appreciate this distinction has
undoubtedly been a source of intellectual weakness, which should in
future be avoided. It is also hoped that subsequent grounded theory
research will find the interpretation of Glaser and Strauss's 'style'
in the form of a methodology (as described in Chapter 1) a useful
guide. Finally, further research into organisational culture and
information/ communication phenomena in industrial organisations
should always consider the implications of their findings for culture
as a paradigm in this field.
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APPENDIX 1 
Personal Details of Respondents 
The Holdings Board 
1) The Chairman and Chief Executive had two quasi-distinct
functions. As Chairman his role was to take care of investor
relationships, and mainly involved interfacing with the City,
looking after the interests of the shareholders and the legal
requirements of being a public limited company. the respondents
Chief Executive role involved the coordinating of the activities
of the Holdings Board and its interlinking with the Managing
Directors of the Group subsidiaries. The respondent had joined
the organization in 1979 as Personnel Director, become Managing
Director of Company 1 in September 1980, Group Chief Executive in
1982 and Chairman in 1984.
2) The Development Director had responsibility for looking at
opportunities for the Group which would increase medium/long term
profitability and 'championing' the various projects. The
respondent had been a member of the organization for 5 years from
1969 until 1974 and for the last 9 years.
3) The Group Finance Director had responsibility for company liaison
with the City, the coordination of the Group financial strategy
and the Group strategic planning process. The respondent had
been a member of the organization for 41 years and had been in
his current position for 10 months.
4) The Group Secretary had responsibility for the secretarial side
of the business, especially with regard to the Stock Exchange,
insurance, pensions and in-house private medical schemes. The
respondent also had overall responsibility for legal matters and
was a legal adviser to the Group. The Group Secretary had been a
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member of the organization for one year and in his current
position for that time 9though as Company Secretary designate for
the first two months).
5) The Non Executive Director 1 had duties which involved the
discussion of issues with his fellow directors, was a member of
the Salary and Remunerations Committee and Chairman of the
Pension Committee. The respondent had been a member of the
organization for 17 years and had occupied his current position
for 5 years.
6) The Non Executive Director 2
 had the role of a sounding board for
new ideas and confidante of the Chairman and other Holdings Board
Directors. More specifically he was Chairman of the Salary and
Remunerations Committee. The respondent had been a member of the
organization for 6 years and had started in his current position.
Company 1 
1) The Managing Director had total responsibility for Company 1
within the parameters set out by the Holdings Board. The
respondent had been a member of the company for 33 years and in
his current position for 2 years.
2) The Finance Director had overall responsibility for financial
accounting, management accounting, credit control, office
services and information systems (the computer department) which
=minted to approximately 80 staff. The respondent had been a
member of the company for 4 years and in his current position for
2,1
 years.
3) The Marketing & Sales Director had overall responsibility for the
sales and marketing operations of the company. The respondent
had been a member of the company for fifteen and a half years and
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in his current position (including control of Marketing) for two
years.
4) The Production Director had responsibility for the total
production capacity of the company. The respondent had been a
member of the company for 4 years and in his current position for
that time.
5) The Unit Engineering Manager was responsible for the engineering
integrity of one of the three manufacturing units. The
respondent had been a member of the Group for 10 years, of which
3 were spent at Company 2, in his current position for 24- years.
6) The Production Planner was responsible for planning the
production programme for one of the manufacturing units. She had
been a member of the company for 25 years and in her current
position for 5 years.
7) The Operations Manager '  had responsibility for one of the
production units. The respondent had been a member of the
company for 10 years and in his current position for 3 'years.
8) The Operations Manager2 had responsibility for one of the
production units. The respondent had been a member Of the
company for 20 years and in his current position for 3+ years.
9) The Assistant Production Manager was responsible for the packing
of goods within one of the units, which employed approximately
half the people in the unit. The respondent had been a member of
the company for 19 months and in his current position for that
period.
10) The Machine Operator Instructor worked on an Ishido weighing
machine, along with a team of 10 other ladies, and was
responsible to a Forelady. She had been a member of the company
for 18 years and in her current position for 15 years.
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11) The Despatch Transport worked on the transport of goods within
the company. The respondent had been a member of the company for
10+ years and in her current position for 5 years.
12) The Management Accountant had responsibility for the Management
Accounts Department within Finance. The respondent had been a
member of the organization for 5 years and in his current
position for that period.) The Wages Manager had responsibility
for the Wages Department within Finance which dealt with the
payment of employees. The respondent had been a member of the
organization for 33 years and in his current position for 16
years.
13) The Secretary to the Finance Director had general secretarial
duties.
	 She had been a member of the company for 6+ years
(always within the Finance Department) and in her current
position for 2 years.
14) The Sales Ledger Manager worked under the Credit Controller with
5 juniors. The respondent had been a member of the company for
17 years and had been in her current position for 10 years.
15) The Departmental Sales Manager was responsible for the two
salesforces servicing the C.T.N. and independent grocery sectors
of the market. The respondent had been a member of the company
for nine years and in his present position for seven months.
16) The General Manager, National Accounts was responsible for a team
of national accounts managers who serviced the large multiple
retail outlets. The respondent had been a member of the company
for eleven years and in his current position for seven months.
17) The General Manager, & Sales & Marketing Co-ordinator performed a
mediating and fixing role, liaising between Marketing and Sales
personnel, cushioning the Director from the distractions of day-
to-day operational problems; he also held responsibility for the
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sale of private label products. The respondent had been a member
of the company for fifteen years and in his present position for
seven months.
18) The General Manager, Trade Development was the senior marketeer,
and was responsible for the marketing strategies implemented to
promote products under the two company brand names, both of which
were supported by teams of several marketeers. The respondent
had been a member of the company for ten years and in his current
position for seven months.
19) The Product Group Manager, Barrett Division was, together with
two other marketeers, responsible for the total marketing
activity associated with products sold under the Barrett name.
The respondent had been a member of the company for eight years
and in his current position for one month.
20) The Product Group Manager, Development was responsible for the
marketing of products under the Bassett brand name. The
respondent had been a member of the company for seventeen years
and in his current position for two years.
Company 2 
1 The Managing Director had general responsibility for all areas of
the company and the task function of achieving specified profit
objectives, people-objectives and the general maturation of the
company. The respondent had been a member of the Group for 28
years and had been in his current position since the inception of
the company 2 years ago.
2) The Sales Director had formal responsibility for the sales and
marketing activities of the company. The respondent had been a
member of the Group for 12 years, a member of Company 2 for 2
years and in his current position for 15 months. As a Director
— 
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of the company he was answerable directly only to the Managing
Director.
3) The Production Director had overall responsibility for the
factory in terms of production, maintenance, warehouse and
distribution. The respondent had been a member of the Group for
15.25 years, a member of the company for two years and in his
current position for just over a year.
4) The Finance Director had responsibility for looking after the
financial affairs of the company and its computer-based
information systems. The respondent had been a member of the
company for 2 years and in his current position for that time
(though as 'Director Designate' for the first year).
5) The Marketing Manager had effective responsibility for the total
marketing operation of the company, with involvement in a vast
diversity of activities from new product development to
advertising and promotions. She was answerable to the Sales and
Marketing Director and had one Marketing Assistant below her.
She had been a member of the company since its inception two
years previously and worked in her present capacity for that
time.
6) The Chief Chemist and Product Development Manager had
responsibility for organizing the workforce within the
laboratory, checking raw materials and some areas of new product
development. The respondent was responsible to the Production
Director and controlled one laboratory Supervisor and 2
Laboratory technicians. While the respondent had only been a
member of the company for 7 months this was for the second time
he had previously worked for the organization as a Departmental
Manager for 7 years before temporarily changing his employment.
7) The Production Manager had day-to-day responsibility for meeting
production deadlines in the factory. The respondent had been a
member of the company for 30 years and in his current position
for 7 years. He was responsible directly to the Production
Director and managed a staff of 550 employees.
8) The Buyer had responsibility for purchasing all packaging
materials and some ingredients (bulk raw materials such as sugar
were purchased under contract by Company 1), as well as acting as
a Packaging Manager. The respondent had been a member of the
company for 17 years and in his current position for two years.
He reported to the Managing Director and had one assistant.
9) The Stores & Warehouse Manager had responsibility for storing and
issuing raw materials and the storing and some of the
distribution of finished goods. The respondent had been a member
of the company for 18 years and in his current position for 1
year. He reported to the Production Director and had 11 staff to
organize.
10) The Credit Controller had responsibility for ensuring that
customers supplied could afford to pay for gods received, that
they did pay, that they paid on time and if they failed to pay to
take remedial action. The respondent had been a member of the
organization for 16 months and in her current position for that
time. She reported to the Finance Director.
11) The Works Study Manager had responsibility for the preparation of
labour standards, methods and 'works studies' on the shopfloor,
and costings for new lines. The respondent had been a member of
the organization for 11+ years and had been in his current
position for 9 years. He reported to the Production Director and
had a staff of 3, though two of these people were not fully under
his control.
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12) The Personnel Manager had responsibility for company personnel
matters including staff training, welfare and first aid. The
respondent had been a member of the company for 181 years and in
her current position for 3 years. She reported to the Managing
Director.
Company 3 
1) The Managing Director had responsibility for the activities of
Company 3 which involved the management of sales and marketing
activities for the Group outside of the domestic markets of the
U.K. and the Netherlands. The respondent had been a member of
the Group 19 years and had been in his current position for just
over two years.
2) The Marketing Director had responthibility for all the marketing
activities of the business in terms of strategic planning,
monitoring, budgeting, forecasting, coordinating, controlling
advertising and promotional expenditure, new product development
and so forth. the respondent had been a member of the Group for
9 years, with international business for 9 years and in his
current position for just over two years (though initially called
/Marketing Controller"). He reported to the Managing Director
and had responsible to him 3 Area Managers, a Packing Manager, 3
Group Product Assistant Area Managers and 1 Packing Assistant.
3) The Finance Director had responsibility for all financial aspects
of the business and information systems. The respondent had been
a member of the company for just over two years and started in
his current position.
4) The Export Area Manager was responsible for liaising with the
manufacturing subsidiaries, and overseeing the marketing and
distribution of products to be sold within his area (the Middle
East, the Far East, Africa, Australasia, South America, Canada,
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North America and Eastern Europe). The respondent had been a
member of the company since its inception and had begun in his
current position.
5) The Administration Manager ws responsible for the administration
Department which dealt with the physical movement of goods from
the time the company received an order for them until payment for
them had been received. The respondent had been a member of the
Group for 7 years and in her current position (as it exited in
Company 1) for approximately 4 years.
6) The Deputy Administration Manager was responsible for the
purchase ledger, credit control and export credit guarantee
business as well as serving as the deputy for the Administration
Manager. The respondent had been a member of the organization
for 14 years and had held his current position for 5 years (as it
existed in Company 1).
Company 4 
1) The Managing Director had the specific brief of bringing the
company up-to-date and realizing the potential of the business
recognized by the Holdings Board. The respondent had been at
Company 4 for 20 months, and had understudied the old Managing
Director for the first 8 months as Sales Director before assuming
his current position.
2) The Works Director was responsible for the planning,
manufacturing, packaging, goods handling and despatch operations.
The respondent had been with the company for 15 months, and
started in his current position.
3) The Technical Director had responsibility for quality control and
quality assurance, and the 'registration' of the legal/technical
aspects of the manufacture of medicines, plus a major input into
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product development. The respondent had been with the company
for two years and in his current position for that period. and
4) The National Sales & Distribution Manager was responsible for the
total sales operation for the company. The respondent had been
with the company for 9 months, and started in his current
position.
5) The Commercial Manager was responsible for the accountancy and
legal aspects of the business as well as being the company
secretary. The respondent had been a member of the company for 3
years and had started in his current position.
6) The Production Foreman was responsible for production and raw
materials handling below the Production Manager. The respondent
had been a member of the company for 7 years and in his current
position for that time.
7) The Chief Engineer had responsibility for all maintenance and
buildings, plus project and development engineering. 	 The
respondent had been a member of the company for 5 years and
started in his current position.
8) The Production Control, Assistant Buyer was responsible for the
purchasing of packing materials for the factory and calculating
factory efficiencies. The respondent had been a member of the
company for 11 months and in her current position for all that
time.
9) The Personal Assistant to the M.D. had responsibility for looking
after the M.D., some duties regarding the sales force and
consumer complaints and enquiries. The respondent had been a
member of the company for 6 years and was the longest serving
senior member of the company.
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10) The Production Manager had responsibility for the factory below
the Production Director. The respondent had been a member of the
company for 18 years and had occupied his present position for 15
years.
11) The Sales Office Manager had responsibility for the orders going
through the company to despatch and buying-in factored lines for
re-sale. The respondent had been a member of the company for 5
years and in her current position for 4 months.
12) The Account Manager had responsibility for all the national and
regional accounts and private label development within the
company where he answered to the National Sales and Distribution
Manager. The respondent had been a member of the company for 4
months and started in his current position.
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APPENDIX 2
INIEHV1EW SCHEDULE 
BACKGROUND
1) Confirm interviewee's name.
2) Confirm job title.
3) How long have you been a member of the organisation?
4) How long have you been in your current position?
5) Could you please give a brief description of what your job
entails?
6) Could you tell me how you fit into the management structure of
the company?
GENERAL INFORMATION 
1) Are you generally confident about the accuracy of the information
provided to you?
2)	 Are there some sources you trust more than others?
If yes, go to 2a. If no, go to 3
2a) What are these sources?
2h) Do you ever take steps to verify information passed to you?
3) Can you cite an instance where information passed to you proved
to be inaccurate?
If yes, go to 3a. If no, go to 4.
3a) How did you come to realize that it was inaccurate?
3h) What did you do?
3c) Were there any further implications of this episode?
4) Does the information you require to do your job efficiently and
effectively always reach you in time?
If yes, go to 5. If no, go to 4a.
4a) Is there any type of information that tends to arrive late?
4b) Is there any particular source which tends to pass information to
you later than you would like?
4c) Can you give an example of when information reached you at a
later than optimal time?
4d) Were there any further implications of this episode?
5) Is information always provided to you in the most easily
understood form?
If yes, go to 6. If no, go to 5a.
5a) How frequently does this occur?
5h) Does this not easily understood information usually originate
from particular sources? If so, what are these?
5c) Does it usually involve a particular sort of information?
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5d) Can you cite an instance where information has not been given to
you in the most comprehensible form?
5e) What did you do?
5f) Did any permanent changes in the way information is packaged
before being sent to you result from this (or any other)
incidents. .
6) Have you ever experienced a situation in which you have not been
able to locate the information you required?
If yes, go to 7a. If no, go to 8.
7a) Is this a general problem or an infrequent occurrence?
7b) Does it usually involve a particular type of information?
7c) Could you describe a specific situation where this has happened?
7d) What did you do?
7e) Were there any further implications of this incident?
8) Do you have irrelevant information passed to you?
If yes, go to 8a. If no, go to 9.
8a) Is this a general problem or an infrequent occurrence?
8b) Does this irrelevant information usually originate from a
particular source?
8c) Is this irrelevant information usually of a particular type?
8d) Have you taken any steps to reduce the amount of irrelevant
information you receive?
9) Have you ever had insufficiently detailed information passed to
you?
If yes, go to 9a. If no, go to 10.
9a) Is this a general or an infrequent problem?
9b) Does this insufficiently detailed information usually originate
from a particular source? If so, which source?
9c) Is a particular type of information usually involved?
9d) Could you cite a specific occasion on which this has occurred?
9e) What did you do?
9f) Were there any further implications of this occurrence?
10) Do you have a preference for information to be passed to you
a)	 orally (by word of mouth)(via pre-arranged meetings,
unplanned meetings or on the telephone) or
b) written (letters, reports, memoranda, newsletters etc.) or
c) no preference ?
If a preference is stated, go to 11a. If no preference is stated, go
to 11.
11) Could you explain your preference?
11a) Would you rank the modes of oral dissemination of information in
terms of their value to you for decision making purposes. (give
respondent a list of possible alternatives).
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11b) Would you rank the carriers of written information in terms of
their value to you for decision making purposes. (give respondent
a list of possible alternatives).
li e)
 
Do you prefer to transmit information orally or by means of
written communications?
11d) Could you explain your preference?
11e)Are there any sorts of information you would always/generally
communicate a)in writing, b) by word of mouth?
If yes, go to 11f. If no, go to 12.
11f) What are these sorts of information?
11g)Why do you think it necessary to communicate these sorts of
information in the ways you have specified?
11h)Are there persons or organisations with whom communication is
always or generally oral/written?
12) Are observational tours an important source of information?
If yes, go to 12a. If no, go to 13.
12a) Can you give an example of when an observational tour or an
inspection yielded useful information?
13) Do you have a spokesman role to other organisations/important
Individuals/the general public, etc?
14) Have you ever had to take quick decisions without recourse to any
other information than that which is in your own head?
If yes, go to 14a. If no, go to 15.
14a)Is this a frequent or a rare occurrence?
14b)Can you cite an example?
15) Has the geographical distribution of the company ever caused
disruption to the free flow of information?
15a) If yes, is this a general or an isolated problem?
16) Are you aware of occasions when expenditure on information did
not justify itself?
17) Are you aware of occasions when more information should have been
collected?
18) Have any attempts been made to cost/benefit analyse the value of
information for decision making?
19) Do you feel that you suffer from having too much information, too
little information, or that you receive about the right amount of
information?
20) In general, do you feel that the people who feed you with
information understand what you need to know?
21) Who best understands your information requirements: subordinates,
peers superiors or various other external bodies and
organisations?
22) Do you feel that you understand the information needs of the
people to whom you supply information?
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INTERNAL INFORMATION 
1) Does the company produce routine and regular internal reports?
If yes, go to la. If no, go to 2
la) Can you describe, in very general terms, their content and
function?
lb) Who has responsibility for producing them?
1c) Are you satisfied that they are in fact worthwhile?
2) Are ad hoc reports produced?
If yes, go to la. If no, go to 3.
3) Are forecasts produced?
If yes, go to la. If no, go to 3.5.
3.5) Are minutes of meetings circulated as a matter of course?
If yes, go to la. If no, go to 4.
4) Would you describe intra-departmental communications as generally
excellent, satisfactory, less than satisfactory or poor?
5) Would you describe inter-departmental communications as generally
excellent, satisfactory, less than satisfactory, or poor?
6) Is competition between departments encouraged?
6a) Is competition between individuals encouraged?
7) Are you aware of information being filtered by subordinates
before being passed up to you?
8) Do you consciously filter information before you pass it on to
others?
8a) Is this part of your job description or are you acting on your
own initiative?
8h) Where there is room to manoeuvre, do you ever present information
to superiors in a way which you think presents you in the best
light?
9) Are you aware of any instance where fear, hostility or distrust
inhibited the flow of information?
10) Have you ever discovered information to be distorted as it was a)
disseminated from you or b) to you via other individuals?
11) If yes, is this a general or an isolated problem?
12) Are you aware of any instances where individuals have
deliberately withheld important information?
13) If yes, is this a general or an isolated problem?
14) Are you aware of any instances where individuals have not
distributed information because they failed to perceive its
relevance to others?
15a) If yes, is this a general or an isolated problem?
15b) Is there a particular source responsible for this?
15c) Does it generally refer to any particular type of information?
16) Are you aware of your information (perhaps in the form of advice)
being rejected (or not used) for personal or what might loosely
be termed 'political' reasons?
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17) Are you consciously seeking promotion?
18) In general terms, would you say that you trust those who have
immediate authority over you?
If yes, go to 18a. If no, go to 19.
18a) Do you feel freer to communicate with those of your superiors you
trust?
18b) Can you cite a specific instance where your trust in a particular
superior influenced your communication with him/her?
19) Do some of your superiors have a greater influence over your
future promotion prospects than others?
If yes go to 19a. If no, go to 20.
19a) Do you feel freer to communicate with those of your
superiors who have least influence on your future promotion
prospects?
19b) Can you cite a specific instance where the influence of a
particular superior influenced your communication with him/her?
20) Does the company make use of special task forces or ad hoc
committees for the solution of specific problems?
If yes, go to 20a. If no, go to 21.
20a) How frequently are these convened?
20b) How is their composition determined?
20c) What sorts of problem do they deal with?
20d) Can you cite an example of a 'task force' being used?
21) Is there a formal MIS and/or DSS?
If yes, go to 21a. If no, go to 22.
21a) Was it specially developed at some definite time or did it just
evolve out of existing working practices?
If it was specially planned then go to 21b. If not, go to 21d.
21b) When was it installed?
21c) Who was responsible for installing it?
21d) Has anyone been primarily responsible for overseeing its
development?
21e) Is there anyone with overall responsibility for it?
21f) Do you understand how it works?
21g) In your opinion does it operate efficiently and effectively?
21h) Can you suggest any possible improvements that could be made to
it?
22) In approximate terms, how much information do you receive direct
from your internal computer system?
22a) Is this computer-derived information of importance for decision
making, either directly or indirectly?
If yes, go to 22b. If no, go to 23.
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22b) What sorts of decisions does it assist you with?
22c) Do you think the system could be improved? If so, how?
23) Approximately how much of the information you receive is provided
by a) your superiors, b) your subordinates and c) your peers?
24h) What sort of information is provided by your a)superordinates;
b)peers; and c)subordinates?
25) Approximately how much of your time is spent reading a)during
working hours, and b)at home?
26) What do you read?
EXTERNAL INFORMATION 
1) Do you ever have occasion to go outside the firm for information?
If yes, go to la. If no, go to next section.
la) Is there any particular sort of information you generally look to
external sources to supply? (provide respondent with list of
alternatives).
Are there any sorts of situations in which you look to external
sources for information? (provide respondent with list of
possible sources of information).
Is there any type of information that
you to obtain?
Which of the following are recei
respondent list from section d).
Does anyone have responsibility
documents?
If yes, go to if. If no, go to lh
if)
	
Who?
1g) How are these organised, circulated and stored?
1h) Do you have direct access to online databases?
DECISION MAKING 
1) Are there any decisions which you take without reference to your
colleagues?
If yes, go to la. If no, go to 2.
la) Could you describe these sorts of decisions?
2) Are there any sort of decisions which you help to formulate?
If yes, go to 2a. If no, go to next section.
2a) Could you describe these sorts of decisions?
2b) What is your specific role?
2c) Who else is involved?
3) Does new technology play a role in decision making in your
company in any way?
If yes, go to 3a. If no, go to next section.
is especially difficult for
ved here regularly ?hand
for looking after Vmse
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3a) Could you describe how new technology is used in decision making?
3h) Is its use restricted to particular sorts of decisions?
3c) Is its use restricted to a particular echelon (or echelons)
of your management structure?
INFORMATION AND DECISION MAKING
1) Would you say that you appreciate the role information plays in
your decision making?
2) Would you say that the company as a whole is 'information
conscious'?
3) Are you aware of the impact the quality of information available
to you affects the quality of the decisions you take?
If yes, go to 3a. If no, go to 4.
3a) Could you cite an example where the quality of information
available to you had a positive/adverse impact on your decision
making?
4) In your opinion, how important is easy access to internally
generated information for decision making?
5) In your opinion, how important is easy access to external sources
of information for decision making?
6) Do you think you understand precisely what information you need
for decision making?
7) Do you think that most other managers in the company understand
what information they need for decision making?
INFORMAL COMMUNICATION 
1) Are you aware of a company grapevine?
2) Have you ever been aware of any rumours circulating concerning
any aspect of the company?
3) Have you ever made use of the grapevine?
4) How important do you think gossip, speculation and hearsay are
within the organisation?
5) Does hearsay reach you from clients and/or suppliers?
6) Does hearsay reach you from The City/shareholders?
MISCELLANEOUS
1) Could you outline some of the various routes by which problems
germane to your responsibilities become known to you?
2) Does your company have a recognizable corporate culture (quote
definition)? [Scholtz,1987, 'The implicit, invisible, intrinsic
and informal consciousness of the organisation which guides the
behaviour of the individuals and which shapes itself out of their
behaviour,].
If yes, go to 2a. If no, go to 3.
2a) Could you describe it?
2h) How long has it been in existence?
2c) Do you think it is stable?
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2d) Do you think that is has any implications for the way in which
information is valued?
2d) Do you think it influences the way in which decisions are taken,
there orientation etc?
3) Are you afraid of disclosing a gap in your knowledge to some
people?
4) Do career patterns stress continuity of personnel in departments
and positions or do people often change departments when
promoted?
5) Is there any form of competition between the various sibling
companies in your company's portfolio?
6) In general terms, would you describe decision making as
centralised or decentralised or balanced?
7) In general terms, would you describe authority as centralised,
decentralised or balanced?
8) In general terms, would you describe information resources as
centralised, decentralised or balanced?
9) How rigid are your objectives and the plans you develop to fulfil
them?
10) Do you feel that you understand the problems of your
subordinates?
11) Do you feel that your superiors understand your problems?
12) Do you feel that you and your peers understand each others
problems?
13) Have you ever suspected that yot have been given information
designed to substantiate what it has already been decide to do?
14) Have you ever employed researchers/assistants to find information
for you?
ORAL MODES OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATION 
pre-arranged meetings.
unplanned meetings.
pre-arranged telephone conversations.
unplanned telephone conversations.
other (please specify).
WRITTEN MODES OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
letters.
reports.
memoranda.
newsletters (internally produced).
minutes
other (please specify).
PUBLISHED EximNALLY DERIVED INFORMATION
Yes
	 No	 D/K
journals
newsletters
newspapers
trade and promotional literature
directories
guides
official publications
patents
standards/specifications
abstracts/reviews/digests
books for work
any other types received
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TYPES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE EXTEMIALLY DERIVED
product information
production information
premises information
staffing or personnel information
health and safety information
financial information
market information
information on suppliers
information on competitors
export information
EEC information
patents
standards or specification
other information (please specify)
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APPENDIX 3 
DISCOVERING THE CORE CATEGORIES 
The first set of interviews were conducted with members of the
Holdings Board, and the process of analysis began as soon as
transcripts for the four Executive Directors had been generated.
Hundreds of codes, covering what seemed like the whole of
organisational life, soon emerged.	 These were then added to as
further transcripts were completed. Corresponding to each code a
theoretical memo was created which provided a description of it
together with some analytical and contextual material. Lists of the
codes and copies of the memos were kept in A4 files in alphabetical
order. These were subject to constant up-dating and amending.
The semi-structured interviews conducted with the respondents were
recorded on tape with the intention that they should be transcribed as
quickly as possible. This was deemed to be desirable so that findings
from the early interviews could be used to focus subsequent data
collection efforts on the more significant aspects of the phenomena
under study. However, given the vast amount of transcription to be
accomplished a backlog of tapes needing attention soon developed.
Nevertheless, rough written notes taken down during the interviews
meant that interesting leads were not overlooked, and could be fed
back to subsequent respondents for comment.
As more transcripts were generated it was possible to coalesce many of
the codes into more general themes, while others were recognised to
reflect the idiosyncrasies of particular individuals and were
discarded. Eventually the possibility of using the concept of culture
as an organising principle for the data emerged. Culture had
originally been identified as a potential approach to understanding
information and communication phenomena by the literature review
conducted at the very beginning of the project. But it was only now,
with many of the core categories defined, that the full value of the
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cultural approach became manifest.
	 The categories were then re-
examined	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 culture
	 metaphor,	 and
information/communication and cultural profiles developed. Case
analyses for four of the Groups principle subsidiaries and for the
Group as a whole were then generated.
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